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Abstract 
 
This thesis is designed to dissect the interpretations and implementation of 
‘command responsibility’ in international criminal law. It closely examines the 
development of command responsibility as a norm under international criminal 
law. It then scrutinises the consistency of interpreting and implementing this 
doctrine under the current jurisprudence and case-law of various international 
criminal courts and tribunals.    
Unlike other forms of criminal responsibility, command responsibility was 
developed through judges’ interpretations following the post-Second World War 
trials, which formed the customary nature of this doctrine. In these trials, judges 
established the unique nature and requirements of command responsibility and 
then it was successfully implemented as a sui generis form of liability. Recently, 
however, this doctrine was vaguely codified under various international statutes, 
without taking into account its unique creation and development. This resulted 
eventually in the current inconsistent application of command responsibility under 
international criminal law. This is primarily because of the recent deviation from 
its customary nature. Such inconsistency raises therefore two questions: (a) 
whether the current interpretation and implementation of command responsibility 
be accurate; and (b) whether this has had an impact on its effectiveness as a form 
of individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law. 
This thesis argues that the current interpretations and implementation of 
command responsibility are inconsistent with its purpose of creation in 
international criminal law. It therefore analyses the precise nature of command 
responsibility. It then scrutinises the reasons for, and the impact of, the current 
controversial and inconsistent implementation of command responsibility by 
various international criminal courts and tribunals. This thesis examines the 
extent of such inconsistency and its impact on this doctrine’s future in 
international criminal law and concludes with a new prospective direction.     
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 Introduction  
 
In international criminal law (ICL), an accused person might be found liable 
for international crimes in one of two forms: direct or indirect (responsibility).1 
The direct responsibility may stem from active conduct of the accused in relation 
to the crime committed; whereas the indirect liability results from passive conduct 
with regard to the underlying crime. Pursuant to the direct responsibility, 
“[a]person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in planning, preparation or execution of a crime … shall be individually 
responsible for the [international] crime”.2 Through indirect liability, individuals 
may also be held responsible for international crimes. This responsibility results, 
however, from their passive conduct; more precisely as a result of their failure to 
prevent the commission of crimes. Command responsibility (CR) is the only 
statutory form of indirect responsibility (by liability for omission) in ICL.3  
The nature and requirements of direct responsibility are consistently 
interpreted and implemented by international criminal courts and tribunals.4 This 
consistency is primarily attributable to the fact that, through direct responsibility, 
the accused is responsible for his active participation in the crime committed. This 
responsibility was consistently endorsed under various national criminal law 
systems prior to the incorporation into ICL.5 Judges at international criminal 
courts, therefore, confront no difficulties in interpreting the nature and 
requirements of the direct responsibility.6  
Unlike forms of direct liability, CR was not derived from national law 
systems. This is primarily because CR has been created under international law 
                                                          
1 Allison M Danner and Jenny S Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’ (2005) 93 Cal. L. 
Rev. 75, 120. 
2 ICTY, ICTR & SCSL Statutes, Arts. 7 (1), 6 (1) & 6 (1) respectively. These forms were also stated in 
Art. 25 of the ICC Statute. 
3 Elies van Sliedregt, Individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law (OUP 2012) 
54. 
4 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (CUP 2005) 311-312.   
5 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2 edn., 
CUP 2010) 361. 
6 There is debate about the standard of mens rea of some direct forms; nonetheless, its nature is 
clear and consistently implemented in ICL. Cf. Sabine Michalowski, ‘The Mens Rea Standard for 
Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability – Conclusions from International Criminal Law’ (2014) 18 
UCLA J. Int’l L. Foreign Aff. 237, 254-7. 
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and, as a result, has no equivalent in domestic law.7 This could be attributed to its 
complex nature.8 In fact, CR was created and developed by international case-law 
following the Second World War. Nonetheless, CR was not considered in a number 
of international conventions that were expected to codify this doctrine. In other 
words, its having no root in national criminal law traditions had an impact on 
drafters, which could account for the delayed codification.     
Under CR, superiors may be held responsible for crimes committed by their 
subordinates as a result of the superiors’ failure to act.9 Establishing a superior’s 
culpability pursuant to the doctrine of CR “depends on an affirmative duty on the 
part of the superior, whereby an omission may constitute the actus reus of the 
crime”.10 The accused commander becomes, therefore, liable pursuant to this 
doctrine for the result of his failure to act or to comply with international laws to 
prevent the illegal act or punish offenders 11 who committed the crime under his 
command.12 This is applicable only when the required mens rea was proved.  
CR is one of the most controversial principles in ICL because of its unique 
and complex nature.13 The controversy is primarily because of the nature of 
liability under CR, which renders commanders responsible for crimes committed 
by their subordinates. The commander is responsible for his subordinates’ crimes 
not because of his action of direct participation, rather as a result of his failure to 
act.14 The duty to act in international law obliged commanders – particularly those 
in superior positions - to take all reasonable measures to control and command 
their troops. Consequently, commanders are obliged to prevent their subordinates 
from committing crimes against international law.15  
                                                          
7 Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility in International Criminal Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 
2010) 247. 
8 Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility’ (1999) 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 573, 
574. 
9 Guénaël Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (OUP 2009) 270-1. 
10 Timothy Wu and Young-Sung Kang, 'Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates: The 
Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogue in United States Law' (1997) 38 Harv. Int’l. 
L. J. 272, 290. 
11 This failure to punish is problematic. Chapter 5 (n. 97) et seq. 
12 Kai Ambos, 'Superior responsibility' in Antonio Cassese and others (eds.), The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (OUP 2002) 806. 
13 N Karsten, ‘Distinguishing Military and Non-military Superiors: Reflections on the Bemba Case 
at the ICC’ (2009) 7 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 983. 
14 Judge Bakone Justice Moloto, ‘Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals’ 
(2009) Publicist 12, 12-3. 
15 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Related to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 [API hereafter], Art. 87. 
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Interestingly, the formulation of various provisions of CR seems to be 
vaguely drafted; thus, the nature of CR was not adequately declared. As a result, 
CR was poorly codified under various international statutes. The first codification 
of CR was under the Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Convention (API);16 
which was ambiguously formulated. For example, Art. 86 (2) of the API concerning 
CR stated that: “[t]he fact that [a crime]… was committed by a subordinate does 
not absolve his superiors from” responsibility. The question then arises whether 
the responsibility is for his omission (dereliction of duty) or for the crime resulting 
from his omission (the underlying crime).  
On the one hand, the ad hoc tribunals - ICTY, ICTR and SCSL - had, under 
their Statutes, identical provisions concerning CR, which were based on this 
already vague codification by the API. The ad hoc tribunals, in order to clarify the 
nature and requirements of CR, resorted therefore to the principle of 
interpretation. The process of interpretation, however, seems to have resulted 
eventually in more vagueness and greater inconsistency. On the other hand, the 
Rome Statute specified a more precise formulation of CR.17 Judges at the ad hoc 
tribunals frequently attempted to articulate the precise nature and requirements of 
this doctrine. The ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation of CR resulted, however, in its 
inconsistent implementation. 
The nature of CR was, accordingly, re-characterised and inconsistently 
implemented. The ICTY, for example, in some cases interpreted CR as a crime per 
se; whereas in other cases it was implemented as a separate form of liability. Other 
ad hoc tribunals, however, lacked the required clarity and certainty in their 
application of the nature of responsibility under this doctrine. Because of their 
failure to clarify this nature, the implementation of the requirements of CR was 
particularly inconsistent at these ad hoc tribunals.18  
                                                          
16 Matthew Lippman, 'The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility' (2000) 13 LJIL 139, 
158; see also API of 1977, Art. 86 (2). 
17 Although the nature of CR is precisely stated under Art. 28 of the ICC’s Statute, there is 
uncertainty in the literature as to its precise nature. See for example, William A Schabas, An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th. edn., CUP 2012) 233; also Cf. Alejandro Kiss, 
‘Command Responsibility under Article 28 of the Rome Statute’ in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law 
and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 609-610. 
18 For instance, the issue of “effective control” and constructive knowledge. V Hategekimana, 
Command Responsibility and the International Criminal Court (VDM, UK 2009) 14-22. 
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International criminal courts and tribunals were created to prosecute and 
punish individuals for crimes committed under international law.19 However, due 
to the inadequate interpretation of the nature of this doctrine of CR, some courts 
seem to have punished commanders for their dereliction of duty alone (CR as a 
crime per se). This means that the actual crime went unpunished, as CR replaced 
the underlying crime. Such practice is contrary to the true purpose of creating CR 
as a form of liability in ICL.20 Most importantly, implementing CR per se as a 
crime might be in violation of various statutes of these international tribunals and 
their applicable laws.21 
The inconsistent implementation of CR has attracted the attention of 
scholars, questioning the nature of this doctrine as a criminal theory.22 The 
controversy at the recent case-law as well as in the literature evolved mainly from 
misunderstanding of the precise nature of responsibility. The question is, 
therefore, for what should an accused commander be blamed and prosecuted: his 
omission or the result of his omission?23 Such controversy is argued in this thesis 
to have resulted from the failure to specify the components from which the precise 
nature of this doctrine could be formulated.  
These components – which can be deduced from the historical development 
of CR - are: (a) ‘military values’; (b) ‘customary rules’; and (c) ‘criminal 
responsibility’. These are regarded - in this thesis – as the distinctive components 
that, together, constitute the nature of CR.24 Recognising these components would 
                                                          
19 See preambles of international criminal courts’ and tribunals’ statutes, such as that of the ICC. 
See also, ICTY Art.1, ICTR Art. 1 and SCSL Art. 1. 
20 Chantal Meloni, ‘Command Responsibility, Joint Commission and ‘Control over the Crime’ 
Approach in the First ICC Jurisprudence’ in Triestino Mariniello (ed.), The International Criminal 
Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity (Routledge 2015) 43-44. 
21 The ad hoc tribunals have adopted a broad method of expanding the laws, whereas the ICC has 
implemented a more cautious approach. F O Raimondo, ‘General Principles of law, Judicial 
Creativity, and the Development of International Criminal Law’ in S. Darcy and J. Powderly (eds.), 
Judicial creativity at international criminal tribunals (OUP 2010) 54, 57 & 59. 
22 Cf. Elies van Sliedregt, ‘Command Responsibility at the ICTY – Three Generations of Case-law 
and still Ambiguity’ in Bert Swart et al., The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (OUP 2011) 388; also D Robinson, How Command Responsibility Got So 
Complicated: A Culpability Contradiction, Its Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution’ (2012) 13 Melb. 
J. Int’l L. 1; see also J. G. Stewart, The end of “modes of liability” for international crimes (2012) 25 
LJIL 165.  
23 See Volker Nerlich; Elies van Sliedregt; Scott James Meyer; and Christine Bishai. Chapter 3 (n 
98). 
24 Some scholars considered the nature of CR to be a mixture of ICL and IHL. They argued that CR 
became controversial because the IHL was not recognised as part of its nature in the case-law. 
Although this could be related to the current problem, this thesis goes beyond this aspect, to discuss 
the actual reason for the inconsistent interpretation and implementation.  Cf. Rogier Bartels, 
‘Discrepancies Between International Humanitarian Law on the Battlefield and in the Courtroom: 
The Challenges of Applying International Humanitarian Law During International Criminal Trials’ 
in Marielle Matthee and others (eds.), Armed Conflict and International Law: In Search of the 
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resolve the controversy surrounding the codification of the nature of responsibility 
under CR. Recognising the precise nature of CR can, subsequently, resolve the 
inconsistent interpretation25 and implementation of this doctrine. Consistency and 
compatibility in interpreting and implementing CR are significant for this 
doctrine’s future as an operative form of liability. Several writers have recently 
proposed expanding the scope and application of CR.26 However, this problem of 
inconsistency seems to have impacted on the effectiveness of the current 
implementation and would inevitably affect any potential expansion in the future, 
unless such inconsistency were resolved.  
 
1. The purpose:-  
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the precise nature of CR, and 
dissect the reasons for, and the impact of, the inconsistent interpretation and 
implementation of CR in ICL.  
In doing so, this thesis analyses the historical creation of this principle for 
articulating the precise nature of this doctrine. It then discusses the early 
implications of the nature of CR. It goes on to examine the accuracy of the 
interpretation process and to scrutinise the doctrine’s recently inconsistent 
implementation. These discussions are significant to illustrate the extent of the re-
characterising of CR.  
It analyses, thereafter, the inconsistency of the interpretation method 
employed by judges at the ad hoc tribunals. It then examines the impact of the 
inconsistent interpretation on the requirements of CR and the potential violation 
of an accused person’s rights. In conclusion, it highlights the reasons which have 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Human Face (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 339 et seq; ; see also Ilias Bantekas, ‘Reflections on Some 
Sources and Methods of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 6 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 
121, 131-133. 
25 Robert Cryer, ‘The Boundaries of Liability in International Criminal Law, or “Selectivity by 
Stealth’’' (2001) 6 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 3, 28-9.  
26 J Fussnecker, ‘The Effects of International Human Rights Law on the Legal Interoperability of 
Multinational Military Operations’ (2014) 2014 5 Army Law. 7, 7-20; see also Jody Prescott, ‘The 
Law of Armed Conflict and the Responsible Cyber Commander’ (2013-2014) 38 Vt. L. Rev. 103; see 
also Markus Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and 
Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems’ (2014) 47 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1371, 1407-
8; see also Jasna Hasanbasic, ‘Liability in Peacekeeping Missions: A Civil Cause of Action for the 
Mothers of Srebrenica Against The Dutch Government and The United Nations’ (2015) 29 Emory 
Int’l L. Rev. 415, 446-7. 
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exacerbated this problem of inconsistency, followed by a prospective view to 
resolve this issue.  
 
2. The Methodology:-  
 
For the purpose of this study, three types of methodology will be adopted to 
accomplish the objectives mentioned above. First, a doctrinal method is mainly 
followed, which aims to examine the legal theories and implications of CR as well 
as to analyse the case-law. This methodology is significant for considering varying 
international tribunals’ interpretations of CR; and then articulating the 
controversial issues accordingly.   
Secondly, a comparative method is adopted, where relevant, for comparing 
and contrasting the different approaches to interpreting and implementing CR. 
The importance of this method is fundamentally to scrutinise the legal 
implications and to examine the legitimacy and extent of the inconsistency. 
Overall, a theoretical method is followed, to shape the main arguments and 
articulate the proposed solutions.  
 
3. The structure:- 
 
This thesis is divided into three main parts. Part I analyses the evolution 
and development of the three elements of the precise nature of CR. This part 
consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 examines the origins of CR, to analyse the 
establishment of this doctrine and to determine its precise nature. Chapter 2 
discusses the implementation of CR as a mode of criminal responsibility. This 
Chapter evaluates also the impact of the components of the precise nature of CR 
during its early implementation. Chapter 3 examines the codifications of CR under 
various international statutes, and discusses the extent of the inconsistency in 
implementing CR. 
Part II examines the legitimacy/accuracy of the interpretation process of CR 
and the impact of its inconsistent implementation at the ad hoc tribunals. This 
part is divided into three chapters. Chapter 4 examines the process of interpreting 
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the nature of CR. Chapter 5 discusses the impact of this interpretation on the 
requirements of CR. Chapter 6 examines the consequent impact of such 
inconsistency on the rights of the accused.   
Part III discusses the future of CR as an operative form of criminal 
responsibility under ICL. Chapter 7 highlights, therefore, the key issues behind the 
inconsistency, in both the case-law and the literature. It then proposes a 
prospective view that may well resolve problems when interpreting CR. This is 
followed by the concluding remarks of this thesis.  
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Part I 
The Evolution of Command Responsibility 
 
It is argued, generally, that CR is an international law standard created by 
judges during the judgments after the Second World War. It is almost impossible, 
however, to understand where judges would find the nature of CR, if not found in 
national law systems. In fact, it is generally acknowledged however that CR evolved 
conceptually from the military context. 
Therefore, this part examines, first, the establishment of CR in military laws 
and codes before its incorporation into ICL. This part dissects the components of 
the nature of CR, through analysing the developments of these components 
historically. Accordingly, it examines (a) the ‘values’ component, that reflects the 
military values where this doctrine originated; (b) the ‘custom’ element, which 
declares the customary law in which the doctrine was recognised to be an 
international principle under IHL; and (c) the ‘criminal responsibility’ component, 
that expresses the criminal theory from which CR was crystallised as a mode of 
individual criminal responsibility in ICL. Military values examined in this study 
are only those of individuals in command position (commanders). 
This Part consists of three chapters. Chapter One examines the genesis of 
the unique nature of this doctrine. It analyses the precise nature of CR through 
examining its historical development. Chapter Two examines the successful 
implementation of CR during precedents set after WWII. Chapters One and Two, 
together, aim to verify and vindicate the precise nature of CR. Chapter Three 
illustrates various codifications of CR as a mode of individual criminal 
responsibility under ICL. It analyses the recent judicial implementations of the 
codified nature of CR, to examine whether various international criminal courts 
interpreted and implemented CR consistently with its precise nature.    
However, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine all policies that 
might be of some relevance to CR. Therefore, only the most relevant precedents 
and legislation are discussed. 
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I. Chapter One 
The genesis of command responsibility: the concept, nature and 
origins 
 
 
Command responsibility (CR) in international criminal law (ICL) is a mode 
of liability that was created to hold a commander responsible for the commission 
of crimes by his subordinates as a result of his failure to prevent them. 
Theoretically, CR is a liability for an omission (responsibility for the failure to 
discharge a duty) whereby individuals in superior positions might be liable for the 
result(s) of their failure. Nevertheless, confusion can (and did) occur between the 
role of a duty and criminal liability for omission regarding CR. It is significant to 
examine its historical applications and illustrate the components of the nature of 
liability under CR. 
Chapter One aims to reveal the “roots” of these components and to examine 
more precisely their developments and relevance to its contemporary nature and 
requirements. It argues that CR has a hybrid nature as a result of its unique 
establishment and development, rather than that of a creation in international law 
alone1. It therefore discusses that CR existed as a military concept – forming the 
‘military values’ element - before being recognised as a rule under the laws and 
customs of war – forming the ‘customary rule’ element. CR was, thereafter, 
developed to be a separate form of individual criminal responsibility – forming the 
‘criminal responsibility’ element – in ICL. 
This chapter is accordingly divided into four parts. First, it discusses the 
philosophical background to the first element from which the nature of CR 
derived. Secondly, it illustrates the evolution of the ‘values element’ in conjunction 
with the nature of CR through ancient military regulations. Thirdly, it examines 
the developments of this unique element to form the second component, the 
‘customary rule element’, and its relation to the first element. Finally, it analyses 
early attempts to constitute the third component, ‘the criminal responsibility’, for 
the purpose of implementing CR as a mode of criminal liability.  
                                                          
1 Cf. Guénaël Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (OUP 2009) 43. 
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1. The concept:  
A) An overview of the nature:-  
The doctrine is constructed from distinctive requirements regarding actus 
reus and mens rea elements;2 but these requirements may share similar 
characteristics with other types of individual criminal responsibility that could 
result in misunderstanding of the actual concept.3 Generally, under CR individuals 
in superior positions may be found responsible for crimes under international law 
committed by their subordinates as a result of the failure to control these 
subordinates if: the superior knew or should have known; and failed to prevent or 
repress the commission of such crimes.4  
CR is, therefore, a distinguished form that differs from other forms of 
liability, being the only form of indirect liability for omission (failure to act). 
Although recent judgments included the direct responsibility forms to be a 
potential basis of liability for omission under CR.5 This doctrine remains, however, 
the only pre-existent customary norm of the liability for omission under 
international law.6 Therefore, CR when referred historically to as a form of 
accomplice liability for failure to act, this was most probably as a result of the 
nature of military laws and values of commanders only, as examined below.  
The contemporary CR is regarded accordingly a distinctive mode of 
responsibility under ICL. It was argued however that CR is a form of strict liability, 
particularly its first implementation at the Yamashita Trial.7 However, a person “is 
guilty of a strict liability offence if by a voluntary act he or she causes the 
prohibited result or state of affairs. There is no need to prove that the defendant 
had a particular state of mind”.8 In other words, an accused person under strict 
                                                          
2 For the actus reus and mens rea requirements, see Chapter 5. 
3 Mettraux (n 1) 39. 
4 Rome Statute, Art. 28. 
5 This was through broadening the concept of ‘crimes’ commission’ by subordinates. Prosecutor v. 
Blagojević et al., TC, IT-02-60-T, 17 January 2005, para 788; also Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, TC 
Judgment, IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006, paras 299-300; see also for the criticism of this broad 
interpretation; see E Sliedregt, ‘The Curios Case of International Criminal Liability’ (2012) 10 J. 
Int’l Crim. Just. 1171, 1181-1182. 
6 Gideon Boas, ‘Omission Liability at the International Criminal Tribunals – A Case for Reform’ in 
Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal 
Tribunals (OUP 2010) 207. 
7  Cf. Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age (OUP 1998) 85; also Cf. Matthew Lippman, 
‘Humanitarian Law: the Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility’ (2001-2002) 9 Tulsa J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 1, 14. Cf. Chapter 2 (n 9). 
8 Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2014) 213. 
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liability is punished for harm resulting “without proof of intent, knowledge, 
recklessness, or negligence”.9  
Strict liability is, therefore, a problematic mode of criminal liability, as an 
accused may be held responsible merely because the harm occurred. Command 
responsibility generated controversial debates about its nature as it was confused 
with other modes of liability, although it is the only type of liability for omission 
which exists explicitly under ICL.10 In this, CR is similar to strict liability, as both 
punish for the resultant harm, but CR requires a degree of knowledge with regard to 
the resultant harm. Nevertheless, controversy also emerged between scholars in 
defining the distinctive root and nature of CR.11 Accordingly, it is important to 
distinguish the elements from which the nature of CR was – and should be always - 
regarded a distinctive mode of liability.  
 
B) The sui generis nature of CR:-   
The true sui generis nature of CR, as proposed in this thesis, consists of three 
legal components: values, customary and criminal elements. Only when these three 
elements existed simultaneously could CR be acknowledged then implemented. 
Initially, CR evolved only in a military context.12 Military society is recognised as 
distinctive, governed by the values of its unique ethics, training, discipline and 
laws.13 Military values examined in this study are concerned with those of 
individuals in command position (commanders).  
These military values –also known as military society’s: moral values, norms, 
principles, rules or laws, which are related directly to the military discipline - were 
the “gist” of applying CR at the Yamashita trial as well as the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
Tribunals. The re Yamashita case relied particularly on these values mainly duty, 
responsibility and leadership.14 The current practices of international criminal 
                                                          
9 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 160. 
10 E Sliedregt, Individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law (OUP 2012) 54. 
11 Damaška, infra n. 25. 
12 M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary 
Application (CUP 2011) 528; see aslo Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility in International 
Criminal Law (T.M.C Asser Press 2010) 1. 
13 Although military societies may vary in the method of applying the military principles, values and 
training, they share almost identically the basic values. Cf.  Jassica Wolfendale, ‘What is the Point 
of Teaching Ethics in the Military?’ in Paul Robinson and others (eds.), Ethics Education in the 
Military (Ashgate 2008) 161. 
14 This is discussed further below. Chapter 2 (n 72).  
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tribunals rarely discuss the impact of these values when interpreting CR, although 
domestic military laws and justice systems recognised these values as determinate 
factors currently for placing the criminal responsibility particularly for international 
crimes.15 
Under the customary element, CR is recognised as a rule of customary 
international humanitarian law (CIHL) that is traditionally known as the laws and 
customs of war. Through CIHL rules, commanders’ responsibility was considered in 
two separate rules: first, commanders’ liability for orders to commit war crimes16, 
addressed under international criminal law as responsibility for “orders”17; and, 
secondly, command responsibility for failure to act18.  
ICL developed as a multi-source legal system that encompasses procedures 
and principles deduced from different legal systems such as customary 
international law, international humanitarian law and international human 
rights,19 as well as national systems, primarily those with common law and civil 
law traditions.20 CR as a doctrine under ICL was developed, interpreted and 
implemented by judges as will be discussed in Chapter (2).21 However, under the 
rules of CIHL, there was no specification for the nature of criminal responsibility 
under this doctrine.22 This is because of the differences between ICL and IHL 
regarding their nature and purpose of creation.23  
 
Most importantly, most of the forms of individual criminal responsibility 
under ICL were deduced from the domestic law where the nature and 
requirements of these forms are well established. However, CR was – at least when 
                                                          
15 See Róisín Burke, Troop Discipline, the Rules of Law and Mission Operational Effectiveness in 
Conflict-Affected States’ in Morten Bergsmo and SONG Tianying (eds), Military Self-Interest in 
Accountability for Core International Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2015) 389. 
16 Jean-Marie Henchaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Volume I Rules (CUP 2009) Rule 152; see also Hiromi Sato, ‘International Criminal 
Responsibility Concerning ‘Control over and Organization’ and Command Responsibility Lato 
Sensu’ (2012) 12 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 293. 
17 Ordering a subordinate to commit a crime is a mode of individual criminal responsibility that is 
provided for under most of the international criminal Statutes, such as the ICTY Statute; Art. 7 (1) 
ICTR Statute Art. 6 (1); and the Rome Statute, Art. 25 3 (b). 
18 Henchaerts and Doswald-Beck, n. 16, Rule 153.   
19 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd 
edn., CUP 2010) 11-15. 
20 Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., TC Judgment, IT-96-21-T 16 November 1998, [Čelebići], para 159 
21 Note that its military nature was the dominated element, See infra (n 82); also chapter 2 (n 1). 
22 Nonetheless, under the IHL responsibility existed in the general sense; more importantly, the 
responsibility of individuals “who plan or decide upon an attack” (i.e. superiors) perceived to be 
greater than those who “carry them out”. A Rogers, Law on the battlefield (2nd edn., MUP 2004) 
111.  
23 W J Fenrick, ‘Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions before the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1995-1996) 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 103, 104. 
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it was created - the only mode of liability to be established as a norm of 
international law.24 Note that, originally under military values and thereafter 
CIHL, commanders obliged to command and control their subordinates’ conduct. 
Accordingly, under ICL, subordinates’ crimes would trigger the commander’s 
criminal responsibility if he failed to fulfil his duty to control. 
 
The questions, however, arise whether commanders’ duties and responsibility 
have any origins and, if so, to what extent their nature corresponded to the modern 
CR.25 In discussing – below - policies and origins of CR, these issues will be 
examined. But, before this, it is essential to shed light on some legal philosophies 
and their extent of development, as this carries some implications of CR’s historical 
development as well as its contemporary nature.   
 
C) Law and liability: philosophical reflections 
This is not an attempt to explore philosophies of law; rather it is to lighten   
the theoretical side of some potential problematic aspects of CR. In this morality for 
CR is twofold: (a) inner morality that is part of the criminal liability as an element or 
theory and (b) military values as another element of the nature of CR. These two 
concepts of morality are dissimilar in this study but both related to CR as discussed 
below. Generally, the essence of responsibility is a mixture of both moral values and 
the rule of law, a person being held responsible for violating the law by permitting 
immoral conduct.26 Therefore, it is generally accepted that both moral values and 
legal rules exist to channel individuals’ behaviour.27 Nevertheless, these concepts 
generated dispute among philosophers. Some rejected any connection, for example, 
with the extreme legal positivism claim that only imposed legal rules are relevant to 
                                                          
24 Category Three of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE 3) is controversially recognised as being 
created under international law. Allison M Danner and Jenny S Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law’ (2005) 93 Cal. L. Rev. 75, 111. 
25 For example, Damaška argued that the historical survey of command responsibility is irrelevant 
to the contemporary doctrine. M. Damaška, ‘The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility’ (2001) 
49 Am. J. Comp. L. 455, 485. Note that Green argued against this view. Infra (n 48). 
26 Responsibility in the sense of criminal responsibility is the essence of this thesis that should not 
be confused with any form of liability such as the moral responsibility. Cf. Peter Cane, 
Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart Publishing 2002) 12-5. 
27 Steven Shavell, ‘Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct’ (2002) 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 227. 
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applying law.28 Others support the ‘natural law’ theory that legal rules need to meet 
a moral standard to be regarded as the applicable law.29  
Although it appears that one theory is conflicts with the other, they may 
interact. It is argued, therefore, that some natural law principles gradually became 
the highest positive law in national law.30 This impacted, more precisely, on some 
rules of international law which concerned some principles of natural law. Although 
these international rules are ‘natural’ by establishment, they gradually came to 
constitute positive law governing all nations and known as ‘general principles of 
law’.31 
These theories were gradually developed, in general, as a result of societies’ 
development. In this, some developments (or philosophers) were in favour of: 
bridging the gap between these two main theories or establishing now theory, which 
may be more applicable to justify or interpret some problematic rules.32 In this 
regard, Cryer stated that with regard to interpreting CR, it is “[f]or good reasons, not 
all areas of law are necessarily subject to the same interpretative canons”.33 This can 
also be seen through – and particularly after - the notable debate between Lord 
Devlin and Professor Hart in the sixties.34  
The Devlin-Hart debate is relevant to CR because it was mainly about 
justifying a criminal liability in conjunction with social values.35 Devlin argued that 
values should be enforced as rules under criminal law, to protect the existence of 
society.36 In his view, society’s moral values are per se sufficient for criminalising 
conduct if such conduct is against the mainstream values of that society. Hart, 
however, argued that, although law is influenced and developed by morality,37 in 
criminal law wrong/harm is that for which a person is punished.38 In Hart’s view, 
even if conduct is considered to be against a society’s mainstream values, unless it 
                                                          
28 Alan D Cullison, ‘Morality and The Foundations of Legal Positivism’ (1985-1986) 20 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 61; see also Reginald Parker, ‘Legal Positivism’ (1956-1957) 32 Notre Dame Law. 31. 
29 Ibid.  
30 W Friedmann, Legal Theory (5th edn, Steven & Sons 1967) 95-7.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Perhaps Fuller’s concept of the “inner morality of the law” is an example of the tendency of 
bridging the gap. Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd edn, YUP 1969) 42.  
33 Robert Cryer, ‘The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Law of Command Responsibility: A Quiet 
Earthquake’, in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International 
Criminal Tribunals (OUP 2010) 182. 
34 In this Devlin was favouring natural law, while Hart was for positive law.   
35 Wolfenden Report, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, 1957. 
36 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (OUP 1965) 22-5. 
37 H L A Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (OUP 1963) 1.  
38 Ibid 21-4.  
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causes harm to (an) identified individual(s), the conduct is not criminalised39 . In 
sum, neither the mere imposition of rules nor the immorality of a conduct is alone 
sufficient for criminality; both are needed during the formation of an applicable rule 
under criminal law. 
 Sliedregt argued, however, that moral responsibility is an important factor in 
shaping ICL. Sliedregt suggested that “[t]o insure an effective and legitimate 
international criminal justice system, we should strive towards a rapprochements of 
moral and legal responsibility” because “judgments are made in a context of moral 
views that live in society”.40 Note that morality was considered – so far- as part of 
the criminal liability as a theory, which is one element of CR’s threefold nature (i.e. 
criminal responsibility, military values and customary rules). But CR was born 
conceptually in a military context, therefore the moral-legal responsibility of 
military society concerning CR is examined below.  
 
D) CR and the military concept:- 
The philosophical debate about these concepts is relevant to CR, particularly 
regarding its nature and development being an international law creation. Hart 
argued that international and national laws are “morally quite indifferent”.41 But 
this is inaccurate, as some of the general principles of international law are 
dependent on moral considerations. For instance, the principle of good faith in 
international law requires a higher degree of morality for legal implementation.42 
Isolating morality from responsibility or values from rules can, accordingly, result in 
a moral failure in applying rules of law.43  
                                                          
39 Hart’s view was in line with John Stuart Mill about the necessity of harm to others for 
criminality; Mill’s central argument was, however, about individuals’ liberty rather than criminal 
accountability. See Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, 
OUP 2013) 35-8.    
40 Elies Sliedregt, ‘Criminal Responsibility in International Law: Liability Shaped by Policy Goals 
and Moral Outrage’ (2006) 14 Eur. J. Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 81, 113. 
41 Hart argued that a rule is established because it is legally fixed and cannot exist because of “any 
moral importance (is) attached to the particular rule”. H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 1994) 228-9. Cf. Chapter 2 (n 119) et seq.  
42 Carl Wellman, The Moral Dimensions of Human Rights (OUP 2011) 99-100. 
43 Steven J Burton, ‘Law, Obligations, and Good Faith Claim of Justice’ (1985) 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1956, 
1982.  
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Bantekas, shed lights on the moral considerations pertaining CR; however, 
this was from the IHL perspective.44 Newton and Kuhlman, although touched upon 
moral compasses of commanders and the interaction between moral and legal 
responsibilities,45 this was not concerning the military values as an element of the 
nature of CR.46 Joshua Root, a military Lieutenant, discussed morality as part of the 
criminal theory of the liability for omission in general rather than the military values 
in relation to CR.47  
Green although did not consider the relevance of the military origin to the 
modern CR, he  criticised “the tendency in military and even academic circles to 
assume that the concepts of superior orders and command responsibility only 
became important, from the point of view of the law of armed conflict”.48 Therefore, 
the importance of military values to the doctrine of CR seems to have been 
undermined or confused with the inner morality of the criminal responsibility in the 
literature.49 
Values, as Pound suggested, must be balanced with or weighed against law, 
particularly while interpreting legal rules,50 which was missing in the interpretation 
process of CR under ICL.51 These values in civilian societies may be somewhat 
difficult to define. Nevertheless, values are important to justify “what would be a just 
rule or decision, even though not ‘objective’ in the sense of being based on absolute 
truth, may, nevertheless, be relatively true, in the sense of corresponding to the 
existing moral standard of the community”.52 Thus, relevant values cannot be 
disregarded in interpreting rules of law or in the judgment of a case; Freeman 
                                                          
44 Ilias Bantekas, Principles of direct and superior responsibility in International Humanitarian 
Law (MUP 2002) 70. 
45 Moral compasses were referred to by: R Puckett, words for Warriors: A Professional Soldier’s 
Notebook (Wheatmark Press 2007) 112.  
46 Nichael A. Newton and Casey Kuhlman, ‘Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the Critical 
Path: Reframing the Theory of ‘Effective Control’’ (2009) 40 Netherlands Year of International Law 
3, 9.  
47 Joshua L. Root, ‘Some Other Men’s Rea? The Nature of Command Responsibility in the Rome 
Statute’ (2014) 23 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 119, 151. 
48 Leslie C. Green, ‘Fifteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Superior Orders and 
Command Responsibility’ (2003) 175 Mil. L. Rev. 309, 310.  
49 Cf. Arthur O’Reilly, ‘Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles’ (2004-
2005) 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 71, 98-99. 
50 Roscoe Pound, cited in Michael Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn., Sweet 
& Maxwell 2014), para 8-101; also Cf. J W Harris, Legal Philosophies (2nd edn, Butterworths 1997) 
197-205. 
51 See the discussions in chapter 4.  
52 Freeman, n. 50, para 1-017. 
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therefore argues that “to analyse the meaning and use of legal rules … it will be 
found impossible to disregard the role of value judgements”.53 
Values are, generally, the factors that constitute what a person should do or 
ought to do in certain societies, informing “right” and “wrong” conduct.54 At their 
lowest level, these values would inform “duties of aspiration”.55 Those values or 
duties of aspiration vary in application between societies.56 In the military, however, 
values are much more important for constituting not only rules of legislation but, 
more precisely, the military character. These values “embody the principles, 
standard, and qualities considered essentially for successful Army leaders”.57 
Leadership or ‘officership’ is an essential value for commanders, alongside other 
values required for all military personnel particularly: “loyalty, duty, respect, selfless 
service, honor, integrity and personal courage”.58 These values play a significant role 
in forming rules of law. 
 These values are core reasons for justifying or interpreting criminal 
responsibilities in general, but more significantly in conjunction with superiors’ 
criminal liability. Military values for especially commanders are essentially: duty, 
responsibility and leadership.59 The commander is therefore expected to be 
responsible for the conduct and activates of his subordinates. Historically, as 
discussed below, as a result of this general responsibility (under the military values), 
commanders were held directly responsible for crimes committed by their 
subordinates. These values aggravate the commanders’ liability, therefore, the 
commander was held responsible based on the accomplice liability.    
 During the Diplomatic Conference, when the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to 
the Geneva Convention (API) was drafted,60 military values were determinant 
factors. For example, as a result of ‘loyalty’ being a military value, the proposed 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54 R A Duff, ‘Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings’ in S Shute and A P Simester (eds.), Criminal Law 
Theory (OUP 2002) 47. 
55 This is of analogy to Fuller’s theory, infra (n 92) et seq.  
56 For example, personal obligations for military personal, infra, n. 66; see also the status of the 
general duty to rescue as between Common and Civil Law traditions. See Chapter 7 (n 34).  
57 Diane H Mazur, ‘Military Values in Law’ (2007) 14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 977, 994. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ryan, for example, explained the importance of responsibility as a values and stated that 
“[r]esponsibility is the very DNA of Military” commanders. Allan Ryan, Yamashita’s Ghost: War 
Crimes, MacArthur’s Justice, and Command Accountability (UPK 2012) 62. Cf. Paul Robinson, 
‘Introduction: Ethics Education in the Military’ in Paul Robinson and others (eds.), Ethics 
Education in the Military (Ashgate 2008) 7. 
60 The ‘Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict’ operated between 1974 and 1997 by the ICRC.  
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standard of the liability for superior order was rejected.61 In this case, the proposed 
standard was contrary to ‘obedience’, which under military values62 compelled 
soldiers to obey orders.63 The proposed standard was not, accordingly, included 
under Protocol I. Thus certain values are significant to CR mainly duty and 
‘officership’.   
Generally some of these values are general by nature; however, for military 
commanders those values are significant morally and legally. For example, on the 
one hand, duty per se is a military value, that of a moral obligation to be fulfilled; 
on the other, a specific duty constitutes legal obligation. Thus, in military society, 
the failure of duty raises first moral culpability and then legal liability; and these 
two constitute the underlying responsibility. These values practically constitute 
moral obligations: failure to discharge those obligations raises moral responsibility 
that could be considered the essence of the notion of individual criminal 
responsibility in general.64 
In ICL, moral values may be considered as an integrated part of imposing 
legal liability. Alongside the IMTs’ judgments,65 the UN Commission of Experts, 
for instance, emphasised that in finding accountability for genocide the legal and 
moral responsibilities are equally important, and stated that “civilian and military 
personnel…must be treated equally…. As individuals, they are subject to 
prosecution like any other individual violator… The legal and moral 
responsibilities are the same” regardless of the accused’s position.66 This was also 
supported by the ad hoc tribunals: for example, the ICTR, whilst examining the 
application of CR, stated that “it is necessary to recall that criminal intent is the 
moral element required for any crime and that, where the objective is to ascertain 
the individual criminal responsibility of a person Accused of crimes” under ICL.67  
The UN Commission of Experts also emphasised that CR “is directed 
primarily at military commanders because such persons have a personal obligation 
                                                          
61 Charles Garraway, ‘Superior Order and the International Criminal Court: Justice Delivered or 
Justice Denied’ (1999) International Review of the Red Cross 836. 
62 Rogers considered obedience as a requirement under military discipline from which soldiers 
“have a duty to obey”. Cf.  Rogers (n 22) 208-9 and 211. 
63 See, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), Volume IX, 
CDDH/I/SR. 51, paras 20 et seq. 
64 R A Duff, ‘Who is Responsible, for what, to whom?’ (2004-2005) 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 441, p. 
443. 
65 Chapter 2 (n 119) et seq.  
66 The UN Commission of Experts, Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, Final 
Report, UN Doc. S/1994/674, para 100. 
67 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, TC Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para 489.  
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to ensure the maintenance of discipline among troops under their command”.68 
The UN Commission seems to have resorted to military values, as ‘personal 
obligation’ encompasses both moral and legal obligations. Thus violating these 
values evoke an inner responsibility part of the overall criminal liability under CR.  
Although the origins of CR have been repeatedly examined in the 
literature,69 the following discussions examine the development of these three 
components rather than merely listing examples of CR’s origins. The following 
dissects the chronological development of these elements (values, custom and 
‘criminal responsibility’).  
 
2. The ancient nature: military values 
 
As discussed above, the historical origins of CR are to be examined for 
scrutinising the threefold sui generis nature of this doctrine. Note that the 
responsibility of a commander (“responsible commander”) as a concept could be 
regarded as a deep-rooted concept from which CR was created.70 Although it might 
be argued that the ancient concept is distinct from the contemporary CR, some 
aspect of the earlier notion could be considered the other side of the later coin. 
Hence, it is essential to examine the origin of the military values to adequately 
identify the nature of CR. The following discusses the three essential values of 
commanders (duty, leadership and responsibility) and examines their impact on 
the nature of CR. 
A) Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”:-  
CR is essentially considered to be a military concept. Thus, the earliest 
reference to this concept was about 500 BC in Sun Tzu’s military manual, which is 
generally recognised as the “oldest” military treatise.71 With regard to the 
responsibility of a commander it stated that:- 
                                                          
68 The UN Commission of Experts, n. 66, para 57.  
69 See for instance, Lippman (n 7); see also Meloni (n 12) 33-74; also L C Green, ‘Command 
responsibility in International Humanitarian Law’ (1995) 5 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 319; 
see also E. van Sliedregt, The criminal responsibility of individuals for violations of international 
humanitarian law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2003) 119-136. 
70 Bantekas (n 44) 67-68. 
71 David C. Nelson, ‘On Military Strategy and Litigation’  (2006-2007) 31 Vt. L. Rev. 557, 560. 
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“[W]hen troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder or 
are routed, it is the fault of the general. None of these disasters can be 
attributed to natural causes.” 
Also:- 
“If the words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not 
thoroughly understood, the general is to blame.”72 
This ancient instrument is of significance for two essential factors. It stated, first, 
that troops (subordinates) are to be monitored by a commander. Accordingly, this 
commander is under a duty to command and control his troops.73 Secondly, if the 
commander were to fail in his duty to command he would be responsible for the 
resulting misconduct of his subordinates. 
These statements could be considered as the first to recognise the 
commander’s most affirmative obligation currently: the duty to control 
subordinates. Nevertheless, it is still inadequate to allow us to conclude that what 
was intended was holding commanders criminally responsible for crimes committed 
by troops under their command. However, the second extract added emphasis on 
both: first the subordination relationship and then the responsibility of 
commanders.  
Although it does not indicate criminal responsibility, it suggests that the 
commander is to be blamed as a result of the disorder of his subordinates. This is 
the key element of responsible commander under the laws of war and a core value 
for effective military leadership currently.74 In other words, Sun Tzu provided that: 
(a) whenever there are troops there must be a commander; and (b) this commander 
shall be responsible for the misconduct of his troops accordingly.75 Sun Tzu used 
accordingly the three values of a military commander to formulate the above 
mentioned treatise.  
                                                          
72 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Samuel B.  Griffith tr, OUP 1971) 125; see also W.H. Parks, Command 
Responsibility for War Crime’ (1973) 62 Mil. L. Rev.1, 4. It stated also that “[t]he consistent 
enforcement of commands promotes a complementary relationship between the commander and 
his men”. Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare (Roger T. Ames tr, Ballantine Books 1993), 144.  
73 This is tantamount to the “superior-subordinate relationship” and important element for 
‘responsible command’ at its first codification. Cf. Max Markham, ‘The Evolution of Command 
Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law’ (2011) Penn State Journal of International 
Affairs 50, 51.  
74 Major Michael L Smidt, ‘Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in 
Contemporary Military Operations’ (2000) 164 Mil. L. Rev. 155, 156-9. 
75 It is important to read these two ancient texts in their actual nature and context: (a) military 
nature; and (b) war context. Green (n 69) 371. 
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B) King Charles VII’s Ordinances for the Armies:- 
The negative aspect of the Sun Tzu can be attributed to not specifying the 
form under which commanders are held responsible. Therefore, the following 
instrument is considered an important historical point regarding commanders’ 
responsibility for the conduct of troops under their command. In 1439, King Charles 
VII of France issued Ordinances for the Armies, in which his military commanders 
were warned that they would be liable for any crimes against civilians committed by 
those under their commands,76 and which stated that:- 
“The king orders that each captain or lieutenant be held responsible for the 
abuses, ills and offences committed by members of his company, and that as 
soon as he receives any complaint concerning any such misdeed or abuse, he 
bring the offender to justice so that the said offender be punished in a manner 
commensurate with his offence, according to these Ordinances. If he fails to do 
so or covers up the misdeed or delays taking action, or if, because of his 
negligence or otherwise, the offender escapes and thus evades punishment, the 
captain shall be deemed responsible for the offence as if he had committed it 
himself and be punished in the same way as the offender would have been.”77 
This provision - from 1439 - is very much relevant to the contemporary doctrine of 
CR. This Ordinance is remarkable because it shares the characteristic of the current 
CR as a norm of customary law.  
 
i) Relevance to the modern CR:-  
The Ordinance stated that a commander should be responsible for crimes 
committed by his subordinates, if he knew (received any complaint) about the 
commission of those crimes,78 and failed to prevent their commission79 by the 
relevant subordinates as a result of his failure to act80. Note that this is not a form of 
                                                          
76 Stuart E. Hendin, ‘Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century-A 
Century of Evolution’ (2003) 10 MurUEJL 4, para 6. 
77 Leslie C. Green, ‘War crimes, crimes against humanity and command responsibility’, in Essays on 
the Modern Law of War (2nd edn., Transnational Publisher 1999) 283. 
78 This is the mens rea requirement for criminal responsibility.  
79 This is the first indication of the requirement of failure to prevent. See Chapter 5 (n. 82) et seq. 
80 Note that the responsibility was a criminal form of liability for omission.   
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strict liability, because it required the knowledge element.81 However, it provided 
that the commander should be punished similarly to the main offender, which might 
arguably constitute a form of accomplice liability.82 Conversely, this could be 
attributed to the age of this ancient instrument and the domination and rigidity of 
the military values of commanders.  
However, the Ordinance was drafted with significant accuracy, considering 
its mediaeval date. It stated that the commander shall “bring the offender to justice 
so that the said offender be punished”.83 Interestingly, CR– more recently - was 
formulated inaccurately, transferring judicial functions to be exercised by 
commanders.84 For instance, Articles 7 (3), 6 (3), 29 and 6 (3) of the ICTY, ICTR, 
ECCC and SCSL respectively, stated that the commander is to be held responsible if 
he fails “to prevent [subordinates from committing crimes] or punish the 
perpetrators”.85   
The Ordinance specified also the rank of commander to whom this provision 
issued. In this it stated that the “captain or lieutenant” was to be held responsible, 
corresponding explicitly to what is now known as “officership or leadership”.86 The 
“officership” as a group consists of officers whose ranks are sufficient to enable them 
to command troops. Therefore, the expectations, duties and responsibilities of this 
group are always higher than of individuals occupying other positions. This is 
primarily because certain values are required in military society to be fulfilled 
particularly by members of this elite group of ‘commanders’.87 
In this context, Sarkesian, for instance, regarded these values as the 
“absolute-relative values”.88 He stated that these values “are certain core principles 
of professionalism that are rarely questioned”.89 An officer, therefore, “perceived his 
relationship to [his military society] as directly linked to his personal values system 
and performance”.90 This is consistent with the UN Commission of Experts’ 
                                                          
81 Cf. supra (nn 7-11). 
82 Pursuant to accomplice liability, the accused is held responsible as a direct participator in 
committing the crime with the principal perpetrator(s). See Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, TC, IT-
95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001, para 373. 
83 The Ordinance, supra (n 77).  
84 Articles 7 (3), 6 (3), 29 and 6 (3) of the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC and SCSL respectively. 
85 Even though courts interpreted this ‘failure to punish’ as a failure to investigate, this did not 
resolve the problem; see Chapter 5 (nn 91) 102 and 238. 
86 Sam C Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: New Military Professionalism (Pergamon Press Inc. 
1981) 204. These ranks were most probably occupying positions of operational command. 
87 Supra (nn 59-68).  
88 Sarkesian (n 86) 11. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Sarkesian 10. 
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justification of holding military commanders primarily responsible pursuant to 
CR.91 Accordingly, holding the commander responsible for the crimes committed by 
his subordinates, coupled with violating these values, could partly justify the gravity 
of the commander’s punishment under this Ordinance.  
Fuller, for instance, attributed his theory of inner or internal morality to be 
part of the “basic morality of social life [and] duties”.92 In this, Fuller argued, 
morality is twofold and these are connected but distinctive: (a) morality of duty; and 
(b) morality of aspiration. The morality of aspiration is the central focus of natural 
law, where morality is in the top aspiration of human achievements.93 The morality 
of duty, however, is at the bottom forming the basic requirements of governing 
social living.94 Accordingly, violating those basic rules will generally cause harm to 
others, hence it is punishable.95 In a military setting, these two moralities are in 
higher demand than in civilian societies. Thus, the morality part of the concept of 
responsibility is more relevant to CR, not only as part of the criminal theory but, 
more precisely, as a separate part of the nature of CR as a principle.   
C) American Articles of War:- 
A third historical policy illustrates the impact of these values on increasing 
the responsibility in military society. The American Articles of War of 1775 stated 
that:-   
 “Every officer commanding in quarters, garrisons, or on a march, shall keep 
good order, and, to the utmost of his power, redress all such abuses or 
disorders which may be committed by any officer or soldier under his 
command; if, upon complaint made to him of officers or soldiers beating, or 
otherwise ill-treating, any person; of disturbing … markets, or of committing 
any kind of riots to the disquieting of the good people of the United States; 
he the said commander, who shall refuse or omit to see justice done on the 
offender or offenders, and reparation made to the party or parties injured, as 
far as part of the offenders’ pay shall enable him or them, shall, upon proof 
                                                          
91 Supra (n 59) et seq.  
92 Fuller (n 32) 42. 
93 Ibid 5. 
94 Ibid 6. 
95 Ibid 30-1. 
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thereof, be punished, by a general court-martial, as if he himself had 
committed the crimes or disorders complained of.” 96 
This Article particularly required the commander to exercise his duty to command 
and to exercise control over his subordinates. It explicitly stated that commanders 
would be criminally responsible for subordinates’ crimes, as a result of failure to 
exercise this duty. The provision not only shares some very important 
characteristics of the modern CR, but also it articulates the form of this 
responsibility as liability for omission.97  
In spite of this acknowledgment of the nature of liability as an omission, the 
provision considered the commander an accomplice – and then increased the 
punishment as if he himself had perpetrated the crime. If one reads this provision 
and associates it with the military values of commanders, the gravity of the 
punishment would be foreseen appropriately at that time.98 On a separate note, this 
provision obliged commanders to prevent their troops from committing crimes. But 
if crimes were committed, it was the commander’s duty to transfer the perpetrator 
to justice. In other words, this provision never required the commander to punish 
the perpetrator directly, as this is a function only of the judicial authority.99 
 
 
D) Lieber Code:- 
This military instrument was promulgated as “Instructions for the 
government of United States armies in the field”.100 The significance of this Order 
evolved from forming the basis of the criminal responsibility of commanders for 
crimes committed by their subordinates. Article 71 therefore stated that:-  
“Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already 
wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages 
soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs 
                                                          
96 Section (IX) Art. (1) available at Journals of the Continental Congress – Articles of War; 
September 20, 1776 <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/contcong_09-20-76.asp>  accessed 
(12 November 2012); also E Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2003) 210. 
97 Cf. supra (n 7) et seq. 
98 This is because the values element took priority over other elements at this time.  
99 Cf. Carol Fox, ‘Closing a Loophole in Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commander’ duty 
to Punish Known Past Offenses’ (2005) 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 443, 448.  
100 Also known as the Lieber Code, created by Dr. Francis Lieber in 1863.  
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to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after having 
committed his misdeed”.101  
This provision is not directly relevant to the nature of CR; rather it solidified the 
commander’s duty to exercise command in accordance with the military values. 
 
3. The evolvement of the customary element:- 
The ‘Lieber Code’ although a national instrument, it was not only recognised 
to be one of the regulations that were utilised in forming the Hague Conventions,102 
but function also as the basis for these Conventions’ establishment.103 This 
illustrates the importance of these values to these fundamental Conventions 
regarding CR. The Hague Conventions are regarded as the first international 
instruments that govern and codify successfully the laws and customs of war 
through utilising the Lieber Code.104 Although CR as a mode of liability was not 
codified by the Hague Conventions, the latter formed the basis for codifying and 
implementing CR judicially.105 Note that the Hague Conventions functioned as 
customary law for the post-WWII trials,106 thus, it is evident that military values 
were integral to the nature of CR as a norm of customary law.  
Accordingly, for the nature of CR, military values influenced the law and 
developed the concept of ‘responsible command’. The concept of ‘responsible 
command’ and generally rules of IHL “were designed to guide the actions of the 
military during an international armed conflict”.107 However, rules under IHL “are 
not only universal but often reminiscent of the values or ethics” of the military 
society.108 These values - mainly duty, responsibility and officership - are sources for 
                                                          
101 American General Order No. 100, ( Lieber Code), Article 71.  
102 The Grotius Society stated that the Second & Fourth Hague Conventions had been “modelled” on 
American General Order No. 100 “Lieber Code”. The Grotius Society, Problems of the War: Papers 
read before the society in the year 1916, Vol. II (London, Sweet and Maxwell Limited 1917) 39. 
103 E Wallach and I Marcus, ‘Command responsibility’, in C Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal 
Law (3rd edn., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 460. 
104 Gerd Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Law, Practice and Policy (CUP 2015) 28; 
also Howard Levie, ‘History of the Law of War on Land’ (2000) I.R.R.C. 838. 
105 Infra (n 114). 
106 Chapter 2 (nn 114-117).  
107 Richard Goldstone, ‘Ownership of International Humanitarian Law’ in Morten Bergsmo and 
SONG Tianying (eds), Military Self-Interest in Accountability for Core International Crimes 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2015) 37. 
108 SONG Tianying, ‘The International Humanitarian Law Implementation Paradigm and the Idea 
of Military Self-Interest in Accountability’ in Morten Bergsmo and SONG Tianying (eds), Military 
Self-Interest in Accountability for Core International Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 
2015) 52; see also chapter 7 (n 17). 
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deducing not only the commander’s duty but also part of forming his responsibility. 
Philosophically, Hart - although a positive law thinker - emphasised that: if the 
question is: “Has the development of the law been influenced by morals? The 
answer to this question plainly is “Yes””.109 With regard to military society, these 
values occupy a higher degree of fulfilment, therefore, playing a more important role 
in shaping the law than in civilian society.110    
 An associated issue is the current formulation of the nature of the liability for 
CR. Between the French and American formulations mentioned above there are 
similarities. Both oblige the commander to prevent the commission of crimes by his 
troops and to bring the perpetrator to justice. Interestingly, this agreement between 
the two was not successful when formulating the modern CR doctrine during the 
drafting of the API of 1977, as the American representatives argued for a duty to be 
imposed on the commander to punish the perpetrator. This was confronted by the 
French argument that punishing the perpetrator is a judicial power that cannot be 
transferred to the commander.111 
 
 
A) The early recognition under international instruments:-  
i) The Hague Conventions:-  
As observed above, the responsibility of commanders for the result(s) of their 
failure to act was established as a military concept before being imposed under the 
laws and customs of war. This concept - ‘responsible command’ - was developed 
primarily to oblige commanders to exercise command and control over troops, 
although few historical instruments provided for the criminal responsibility of a 
commander that is partly relevant to contemporary CR. Nevertheless, ‘responsible 
command’ was not codified as an international principle until 1899.  
Several attempts to codify the laws and customs of war - prior to 1899 - failed 
to constitute international agreements. For example, the Conference of Brussels was 
an early attempt to establish an international agreement for “the Laws and Customs 
                                                          
109 H L A Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (OUP 1963) 1. 
110 Cf. Sliedregt (n 40). 
111 Chapter (5) (n 99). 
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of War”.112 In this, the Brussels Declaration of 1874 - although it was not ratified - 
provided for the right and duty  of the commander in Article 9, which  was later 
adopted in Article 1 of the Hague Convention.113 The Hague Conventions were the 
first successful attempt to codify the duty and responsibility of a commander. The 
Hague Convention (II) of 1899 in its Annex, Article 1, stated that:- 
“The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to 
militia and volunteer crops fulfilling the following conditions:- 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form 
part of it, they are included under the denomination "army."”114 
 
This provision was also adopted in 1907 by the Hague Convention (IV), which 
emphasises its importance.115 The provision first lays down the commander’s duty to 
command; and, secondly, affirms the commander’s responsibility for subordinates’ 
conduct, although it did not specify the form of liability. Overlooking the form of 
liability indicates the influence of these military values. Moreover, Article 43 of the 
Hague Convention (IV) provided that:-  
“The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands 
of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to 
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.”116  
                                                          
112 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 
August 1874. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 hereafter.  
113 The Brussels Declaration of 1874, Article 9, provided that: “The laws, rights, and duties of war 
apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
1. that they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates”. Successfully, this 
provision has been identically adopted by The Hague Convention (IV) Annex of 1907; of which the 
Preamble stated that: “. . . have deemed it necessary to complete and explain in certain particulars 
the work of the First Peace Conference, which, following on the Brussels Conference of 1874, and 
inspired by the ideas dictated by a wise and generous forethought, adopted provisions intended to 
define and govern the usages of war on land”. 
114 The Hague Convention (II), 1899, Annex, Sec.1 Chap.1 Art.1.  
115 Convention (IV), 1907, Annex, Sec.1 Chap.1 Art.1. 
116 Convention (IV), Annex, Sec.3 Art.43. 
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This provision directly imposes duties to positively “take all the measures in his 
power” to prevent crimes and restore order,117 which should enable commanders to 
fulfil the essential duty of command and control.   
Note that the lack of explicit reference to the nature of the responsibility does 
not exclude criminal liability, and it is more precisely resulted for the general 
recognition of responsibility under the military context and society that attributed to 
the conduct of the subordinates. Most significantly, these Conventions, although 
treaties by nature, encompass pre-existing rules. Concurrently, the Hague 
Conventions have currently the character of customary international law, which is 
binding not only upon the treaty’s parties, but also upon non-signatory states.118 It 
should be in mind, therefore, that the military values, though not the only basis, are 
fundamentally part of developing the responsibility under CR as a norm of 
customary law.119 
After the adoption of the Hague Conventions, the first practical attempt to 
hold superiors responsible pursuant to CR was after World War I. The post-WWI 
period was a turning point, from creating the principle (under international 
humanitarian law) towards implementing it judicially (under international 
criminal law). However, a number of historical events of value to CR as a concept 
occurred before and around the First World War. The following section discusses 
those most relevant to this doctrine.  
 
4. Criminal responsibility: judicial origin and implementation:-   
The historical origins generally (a) emphasise the duty to exercise effective 
control over subordinates; and (b) create a subsequent responsibility for 
subordinates’ conduct. Nevertheless, placing such international responsibility on 
individuals has not been implemented judicially.120 This could be ascribed to the 
lack of the required mechanism that is needed to be widely recognised as an 
International Criminal Court. However, some historical precedent structured 
through international tribunals relevant to CR can be examined in what follows.  
                                                          
117 M. N. Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 1178.  
118 See Chapter 2 (nn 116-117).   
119 Supra (n 102) et seq. 
120 In other words, so far the commander’s responsibility is merely a general principle under the 
laws and customs of war. Cf. Rogers (n 22). Holding a commander to account for failure to comply 
with such a principle, however, has yet to be successfully attempted.         
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A) Peter von Hagenbach:- 
The early international precedent that recognised the concept of CR, for the 
failure to act, was at 1474 in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach.121 Initially, 
Hagenbach was appointed as a knight and Governor of Breisach by Charles, Duke of 
Burgundy. Hagenbach was charged with various brutal crimes committed by his 
subordinates that constituted international, or transnational, crimes.122  
This is because of the location of the city of Breisach on the border (it is now 
in modern Germany, but very close to the French border); and offences had been 
committed within neighbouring territories at that time. Therefore, these 
neighbouring cities and states established a coalition which resulted in Hagenbach’s 
defeat. These allies brought Peter von Hagenbach before an international 
tribunal,123 and he was convicted for failure to act and prevent crimes committed by 
his subordinates and sentenced to death.124 Although contemporary CR differs in its 
requirements, the Hagenbach trial is important for the unprecedented enforcement 
of the commander’s criminal responsibility for subordinates’ crimes by a court that 
could, in its structure, be considered an international tribunal.   
Peter von Hagenbach was executed as a result of being the executive 
commander – the Governor - who failed to fulfil his duty to control subordinates. 
The fact that he was brought before an international court is remarkable. In fact, the 
Hagenbach Trial was referred to – as a precedent - by the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremburg.125 The Hagenbach case (a) emphasised the commander’s 
duty to control subordinates; (b) laid down that failure to fulfil such a duty 
                                                          
121 Ivan Simonovic, ‘The role of the ICTY in the development of international criminal adjudication’ 
(2000) 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 440, 452. 
122 Green, n. 48, 311. 
123 For instance, Bassiouni suggested that this court is the first international tribunal which consists 
of more than twenty-five Judges from the “allies”. M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Repression of Breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions under the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 
12. 1949’ (1976-1977) 8 Rutgers-Cam L.J. 185, 189. 
124 E. Greppi, ‘The evolution of individual criminal responsibility under international law’ (1999) 
International Review of Red Cross 835. 
125 The High Command Case, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 
Vol. XI, 476. 
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constitutes criminal responsibility; and (c) makes clear that the crime with which he 
was charged was the equivalent of the crime against humanity currently.126 
More precisely, Hagenbach was charged with “crimes against the laws of 
nature and God”.127 This corresponded to the natural law philosophy, where both 
morality and legality constitute responsibility under the applicable law.128 In this 
case, crimes were committed by subordinates and the commander was held 
responsible as a result of his failure to act. The nature of these crimes – being 
international or transnational offences – resulted in and justified the creation of 
such unprecedented form of liability.  
The applicable law at this international tribunal was natural law;129 and so 
the responsibility-basis of those crimes is of violating that international society’s 
values at the time of commission.130 Thus, it could be argued that the responsibility 
of commanders for the conduct of their subordinates was developed under natural 
law. However, the military values may have been the reason for convicting 
Hagenbach as a principal perpetrator. Schwarzenberger suggested that the nature of 
the operation was military, therefore the military laws and values seems to be the 
reason.131  
Grotius in 1625 attempted also to regulate duties and rights during war 
time.132 He stated that the commander “may be held responsible who was able to 
prevent a crime but did not do so”; therefore, he “must not only have knowledge of 
it but also have the opportunity to prevent it”.133 This statement not only provided 
for criminal responsibility for a commander’s failure to act but also provided for 
the mens rea requirement.134 Note that, unlike the current formulation of the ad 
                                                          
126 George Schwarzenberger, Cited in Gregory S. Gordon, ‘The Trail of Peter von Hagenbach: 
Reconciling History, Historiography, and International Criminal Law’ in Kevin Heller and Gerry 
Simpson (eds.), The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (OUP 2013) 16-17. 
127 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Perennial Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and 
Realpolitik’ (2005-2006) 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 541, 551.  
128 Ibid 543-4.  
129 George Schwarzenberger (n 126) 4. 
130 Cf. chapter 2 (n 119) et seq. 
131 See I Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 384. Erik Andersen 
suggested that the sentence was more of “Christian values” and the applicable law was 
“supranational rather than international”. Erik Andersen, ‘The International Military Tribunals in 
Nuremburg and Tokyo’ in Cedric Ryngaert (ed.) The Effectiveness of International Criminal 
Justice (Intersentia Publishers 2009) 5. 
132  Bassiouni (n 123) 186-187. 
133 Stephen C Neff, Hugo Grotius on The Law of War and Peace (CUP 2012) 292-293. 
134 Cf. supra (n 8). 
31 
 
hoc tribunals, the commander was never required to punish the perpetrator 
throughout the history of CR.135  
 
The above discussions illustrate that the nature of the underlying crimes 
play a significant role in developing the associated liability. The society’s values 
accordingly function to not only shape and justify the applicable law, but more 
precisely, determine the relevant form of liability.136 Despite the importance of 
both the Hagenbach case and Grotius’ contribution, the contemporary CR 
explicitly became a mode of liability after the First World War.  
 
B) The Paris Conference137:-  
 The casualties of the First World War were unprecedented: the number of 
dead and wounded people was in millions.138 Thus, a suggestion was put forward 
for holding individuals responsible for these crimes committed during that War. 
This was initially through the British proposal to prosecute the German Kaiser 
before an Allied Court to hold him responsible for these crimes.139 This proposal 
was initiated after the event, when Germany bombed British ships in British 
territorial waters, which was considered a breach of international law. The United 
Kingdom therefore established a Commission of Inquiry, which concluded that not 
only the German military commanders should be convicted for crimes committed, 
but also political leaders should likewise be prosecuted. 140 
In spite of its significance in establishing the criminal liability of individuals 
- whether civilians or military personnel - for war crimes, the British Commission 
did not introduce the forms of responsibility that are required for such 
prosecution.141 If, for instance, the German Kaiser and other officials had been 
                                                          
135 Cf. supra (n 84). 
136 Cf. Chapter 2 (n 111) et seq. 
137 The Preliminary Peace Conference, known as the Paris Conference, commenced on January 18, 
1919. See Erik Goldstein, The First World War Peace Settlements, 1919 – 1925, (1st edn., Routledge 
2002) 9; see also The Preliminary Peace Conference: Minutes of The Plenary Sessions, Preliminary 
Peace Conference, Protocol No. 1, Session of January 18, 1919, 307088-43-vol. III-11, Paris Peace 
Conf. 180.0201/1. 
138 Francis A. March and Richard J. Beamish, History of The World War: An Authentic Narrative 
of the World’s Greatest War (The United Publishers of the United States and Canada 1919) 31-32. 
139 John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial (YUP 2001) 331; see 
also Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, ‘Supranational Criminal Tribunals for the Colonial Era: The 
Franco-Siamese Mixed Court’, in Kevin Jon Heller and Gerry Simpson (eds.), The Hidden Histories 
of War Crimes Trials (OUP 2013) 74. 
140 Meloni (n 12) 37-38; also see Horne and Kramer (n 139) 329. 
141 See Brockman-Hawe (n 139).   
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prosecuted for the crimes committed during the war, under what form of liability 
would they have been charged? This issue of identifying the mode of liability had 
not been discussed until the creation of the preliminary Peace Conference. 
The conference was therefore established in Paris142 for this purpose. 
Accordingly, the Paris Conference established a commission to investigate 
potential responsibilities, known as “The Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties, 1919” which is recognised as 
the “first international investigative commission”.143 
 
 
C) The 1919 Commission: ‘criminal responsibility’ element:- 
 
The Commission’s main function was to investigate and examine liability for 
First World War offences. It also tried to place the responsibility on individuals 
directly for the first time.144 Therefore, the Commission reported that:- 
“…the Commission desire to state expressly that in the hierarchy of 
persons in authority, there is no reason why rank, however exalted, should 
in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility when that 
responsibility has been established before a properly constituted tribunal. 
This extends even to the case of Heads of States”.145 
It is evidently clear from this statement that the Commission sought to abandon 
any form of immunity that could be claimed as a ground of excluding liability. 
Accordingly the Commission placed more emphasis on this issue, where it stated 
subsequently that:- 
“All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position 
may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of State, who 
                                                          
142 The conference first started in Paris and concluded in Versailles. As a result, the Treaty of 
Versailles was created in 1919. See (n 162). 
143 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court’ (1997) 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 11, 14. 
144 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal’ (1994-1995) 18 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1191, 
1194. 
145 The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 29 March 1919, (1920) 14 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 95, 116. 
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have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the 
laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution.”146 
This was a brave leap, to consider non-military personnel able to be convicted 
pursuant to an exclusively military doctrinal concept at that time. More 
importantly, the Commission relied on the Hague Conventions as the authority to 
hold individuals criminally responsible for crimes committed by troops.147 This 
could be regarded as the first reference to include not only civilian superiors, but 
also allowing a Head of State to be held responsible for crimes committed by 
subordinates.  
 
 
D) The Commission and the nature of CR:- 
The Conference consisted of a number of Allied members, of which the five 
Great Powers were the only members authorised to participate in every session, 
each Great Power having two representatives.148 The Commission concluded 
within sixty days, during which intensive meetings occurred to investigate criminal 
responsibilities.149 In spite of the significant conclusion that established individual 
criminal responsibility within an international framework with regard to the 
liability of the high-ranking individuals, two dissenting opinions were of 
considerable significance with regard to CR. These are discussed below.150  
 
The Commission was asked to investigate and assess the “degree of 
responsibility” of the alleged offenders. Their purpose was, inter alia, to 
investigate the responsibility of individuals for the crimes committed by others 
during the war. The Commission Report therefore established the criteria under 
which individuals can be held responsible, reporting that:- 
 
                                                          
146 Ibid 117. 
147 Bassiouni (n 144). 
148  The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. See Geo A. Finch, 
‘The Peace Conference of Paris 1919: Its Organization and Method of Work’ (Apr., 1919) 13 Am. J. 
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“All authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however 
high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including 
the Heads of States, who ordered, or, with knowledge thereof and with 
power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to 
prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs 
of war (it being understood that no such abstention should constitute a 
defence for the actual perpetrator)” should in principle be potentially 
liable for violations of the Laws and Customs of War.151 
 
 Accordingly, this Report established a form of liability that is unique in 
nature and in its requirements from other criminal modes of responsibility. This 
‘liability for abstention’ applied to military and non-military personnel alike. 
Under this form, criminal responsibility may arise for acts committed by others. 
Hence, such responsibility arises when the accused has or have (1) knowledge of 
the offences; (2) possessed the authority to prevent them; and (3) subsequently 
failed to repress such crimes. Finally, omission in fulfilling these norms shall be 
recognised as a liability for abstention (meaning command responsibility).152  
 
This concept of abstention (CR) was debatable, as the Japanese and the 
American representatives were against such a proposition. Overall, the Japanese 
supported the concept of holding high-ranking individuals criminally 
responsible.153 However, the Japanese were against the Doctrine of abstention as 
described above, and also against commanders being convicted "on the sole 
ground that they abstained from preventing, putting an end to, or repressing acts 
in violation of the laws and customs of war".154 Accordingly, they proposed 
modifying, or omitting, any inclusion of this form of liability.  
   
 The American representatives were also against the Doctrine of abstention. 
They questioned the nature of the proposed forms of liability, arguing that the 
Commission proposed two responsibilities, one of a legal nature and the other of a 
moral nature. Those offences with a legal nature are admissible and so may be 
                                                          
151 The Commission (n 145) 121. 
152 This term was used in the ICTR during judgments of its early cases. See AkayesuTC, para 479.  
153 Memorandum of reservation by the Japanese Delegation April 4, 1919, Annex III to Report of 
The 1919 Commission, (n 145) 151. 
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prosecuted through the prospective court. However, the moral or “indirect” 
responsibility is inadmissible, as it lacks legal consistency.155  
 
Therefore, the US representatives differentiated between two principles: (a) 
responsibility for ordering others to commit a crime, which was recognised as a 
principle under international law. The second is responsibility for omission, which 
was unrecognised by the law.156 However, this is inadequate, as the concept was 
recognised (but somewhat vague due the lack of clear precedents) and applied 
mainly to the military commanders under the Hague Conventions, as discussed 
above. The representatives, thus, stated that:- 
 
“Neither knowledge of commission nor ability to prevent is alone 
sufficient. The duty or obligation to act is essential. They must exist in 
conjunction, and a standard of liability which does not include them all is 
to be rejected.”157 
 
Accordingly, the representatives required: (1) knowledge of the crime; (2) ability to 
intervene; and (3) a pre-existing duty to do so. Thus, the United States’ 
representatives were against this form of liability, as it lacks legal recognition and 
contradicts the legality principles.158 They concluded that such a form of liability 
would lead to the exclusion of the principal perpetrator from punishment, as the 
indirect accused would illegitimately replace the perpetrator.159  
 
Note that the American and Japanese representatives seem to be against the 
association between morality and legality in developing responsibility under 
international law.160 It seems also that because this provision aimed for 
prosecution of non-military individuals, applying the military values were difficult. 
Conversely, other states (the majority) seemed to be in favour of developing rules of 
law through interpreting the forms of responsibility that were associated with such 
violation of the laws and customs of war, thus the military values of commanders 
were perceived applicable for any individual who was in a position of command.  
                                                          
155 Memorandum of The United States Delegation to the Report of the Commission on 
Responsibilities April 4, 1919, Annex II to the Report The 1919 Commission, (n 145) 128. 
156 Memorandum of the United States Delegation, 143. 
157 Ibid.   
158 In fact, The US Delegation argued that the Commission’s report constituted an “ex post facto” 
and should therefore be amended. See John P. Cerone, ‘Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US 
Attitudes toward International Criminal Court and Tribunals’ (2007) 18 EJIL 277, 281.  
159 Memorandum of The United States Delegation, 143.  
160 Cf. ( nn 40 and 109).  
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Nevertheless, until this point no duty to punish perpetrators was imposed on 
commanders.161 These dissenting opinions by the American and Japanese 
representatives were reported to the Commission. The Commission then submitted 
its Report to the Paris Conference (which was concluded at Versailles).  
 
E) The Treaty of Versailles:- 
The Paris Conference - or the Peace Conference - was concluded at 
Versailles in France by creating “the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and 
Associated Powers and Germany”.162 The Treaty of Versailles contained principles 
that had been suggested by the Commission’s Report and was signed on June 28, 
1919.163 The Treaty consisted of a large number of Articles (440 in total) and, 
under it, Germany was required to hand over the alleged criminal individuals.164  
Even though the Treaty excluded a number of suggestions made by the 
Commission's Report, it encompassed and emphasised the responsibility for the 
offences committed by German individuals.165 The Treaty paved the way for 
subsequently created Tribunals and Commissions internationally.166 For the 
purpose of CR, the Treaty is a milestone, as it encompasses a number of provisions 
relevant to this doctrine. 
First, Article 227 was considered one of the most important provisions in 
the Treaty, in that it named the German Kaiser, William II, as responsible for the 
crimes committed, and called for a special tribunal to be created for the purpose of 
putting him on trial.167 The relevant provision said that the Kaiser, as the Executive 
                                                          
161 Cf. (n 135). 
162 See (n 137). 
163 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise Volume I – Peace, by Ronald F. Roxburgh, 
(The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2006) 91. 
164 James W. Garner, ‘Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War’ (1920) 14 
Am. J. Int’l L. 70. 
165 See in this regard George W. Egerton, ‘Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American 
Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920’ 
(1978) 21 The Historical Journal, 885-911. 
166 Bassiouni (n 143) 13-14. 
167 The Treaty of Versailles, Art. 227, stated that: “The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign 
William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international 
morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, 
thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five 
judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great 
Britain, France, Italy and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of 
international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings 
and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers 
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Commander, should be held responsible for the crimes committed by his troops. 
This Article is considered to be one of the fundamental bases for the international 
criminal responsibility of individuals.168  
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 228, which 
provided for the Allies to have the right of prosecuting and punishing German 
individuals liable for “violation of the laws and customs of war”.169 This provision 
entitled the Allied Powers to prosecute individuals as international criminals for 
War Crimes.170 Additionally, Article 229 provided that the Allies should prosecute 
any responsible person before military tribunals.171 These provisions are significant 
as they recognised the principle of individual responsibility, which potentially 
encompasses CR. Although the Treaty was ratified, Article 227 was not enforced as 
the Kaiser was in The Netherlands, where he was considered to be a refugee.172 In 
fact, The Treaty of Versailles was not implemented as it was replaced by the 
infamous and unsuccessful trials under the Leipzig Proceedings.173 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
should be imposed. The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of 
the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.”.   
168 Richard L. Griffiths, ‘International Law, the Crime of Aggression and the Ius Ad Bellum’ (2002) 
2 Int'l Crim. L. Rev. 301, 304. 
169 Ibid. Art. 228, provided that: “The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and 
Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to 
punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or 
prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies. The German Government 
shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all 
persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are 
specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the German 
authorities.” 
170 Salim A. Nakhjavani, ‘International Crimes’ in Max du Plessis (ed.), African Guide to 
International Criminal Justice (Institute for Security Studies 2008) 73 & 93.  
171 The Treaty of Versailles, Art. 229. Additionally, Articles 230 & 231 obliged Germany to accept full 
responsibility for crimes committed during the war and to surrender all alleged criminals within its 
jurisdiction. 
172 Max du Plessis, ‘The African Guide to International Criminal Justice: purpose and overview’ in 
Max du Plessis (ed.), African Guide to International Criminal Justice (Institute for Security Studies 
2008) 14. 
173 Mohamed M. ElZeidy, ‘The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law’ 2002) 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 869, 872; also The United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, The History of the United Nations’ War Crimes Commission, (His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office 1948) 437; also M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘World War I: “The War to End All Wars” 
and the Birth of A Handicapped International Criminal Justice System’ (2002) 30 Denv. J. Int'l L. 
& Pol'y 244, 281; also M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The United Nations’ Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)’ (1994) 88 Am. J. Int’l L, 784-805 
& 786. 
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5. Conclusion:- 
This chapter has surveyed and discussed the genesis of the nature of CR. 
Although CR is generally considered a creation by judges under international law, 
states are the founders of international law. Particularly, the nature of 
contemporary CR - at least some of its elements - could be found in states’ national 
systems. The foregoing discussions illustrated that CR was created in a military 
context; therefore, only the most relevant military systems were examined in this 
study. The aim, of doing so was not merely to show examples of the existence of CR 
in national systems but, more precisely, to distinguish the elements from which 
this doctrine can be seen as a sui generis form of responsibility.  
Accordingly, the chapter argued that the sui generis nature of CR is 
threefold: the values of military society, the rules of customary law and 
responsibility pursuant to criminal law. These three elements should be considered 
simultaneously in holding commanders responsible for their subordinates’ crimes. 
The historical developments of these elements demonstrated that the “military 
values” element was fundamental and the first to be established under various 
historical military codes, which generally required the commander to be 
responsible for his troops’ conduct according to the essential values of 
commanders (duty, leadership and responsibility).  
This was the foundation of the “customary rule” element forming the 
concept of ‘responsible command’ under the Laws and Customs of War. However, 
the historical origins and policies of CR struggle to constitute “criminal 
responsibility” when examining the judicial implementation of CR internationally. 
This was manifest through the debates in the 1919 Commission about the nature of 
this form of liability and its requirements. As a result of such difficulty, the first 
judicial attempt to implement contemporary CR as a mode of criminal 
responsibility was unsuccessful.  
This chapter found that the history of CR was important regarding the 
constitution of the three elements of this doctrine’s nature. The violation of 
military values dominated the nature of liability under CR; however, the problem 
was, historically, that ‘criminal responsibility’ as an element was not successfully 
implemented as part of the nature of CR. Having examined the historical nature of 
CR, the following chapter analyses the evolution of the contemporary nature of CR 
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and the development of these three elements simultaneously by judges, which 
established CR as a distinct form of individual criminal responsibility under ICL. 
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II. Chapter Two 
Customary nature of the contemporary doctrine 
 
As illustrated above, CR is inherited – conceptually - from military 
regulations, where the “military values” predominated. Military laws and values 
dominated the nature of CR as a principle in various national law systems until  
WWII,1 although CR as a military concept was adopted as a rule under 
international agreements governing the Laws and Customs of War such as the 
Hague Conventions. These conventions, however, were mainly concerned with the 
commander’s duty to command rather than with criminal accountability for 
commanders’ violations of the law. 
   
The violation of this law was interpreted mainly as an infringement of 
military values and basic principle; this, therefore, was the determinate element 
for the commander’s liability for crimes committed by his subordinates. Thus, 
commanders were, historically, held responsible as principal offenders or as being 
directly complicit. Recognition of the commander’s potential form of criminal 
responsibility with regard to subordinates’ crimes was not internationally 
discussed until the Paris Conference.2 This occurred through “The 1919 
Commission”, where it was addressed as the responsibility for abstention. 
Nevertheless, reliance on military values alone for criminal accountability was 
controversial during this Commission, and CR was not successfully implemented.  
 
                                                          
1 For example, in order to demonstrate evidence of state practice regarding CR, the ICTY cited the 
“French Ordinance of 1944, Article 4” and the “Chinese Law of 1946, Article IX”. See Čelebići 
Judgment, para 336-7. Article 4 of the French Ordinance of 28 August 1944 stated that “Where a 
subordinate is prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of a war crime, and his superiors cannot be 
indicted as being equally responsible, they shall be considered as accomplices in so far as they have 
organised or tolerated the criminal acts of their subordinates”. Article IX of the Chinese Law of 24 
October 1946 Governing the Trial of War Criminals provided that: “Persons who occupy a 
supervisory or commanding position in relation to war criminals and in their capacity as such have 
not fulfilled their duty to prevent crimes from being committed by their subordinates shall be 
treated as the accomplices of such war criminals”. Noteworthy, due to the domination of the 
military laws and values CR was considered under these national regulations as a form of 
accomplice liability. Cf. Bantekas (chapter 1 n 44) 70 et seq.; also Cf. Gideon Boas et al., 
International criminal Law Practitioner Library: Volume I (CUP 2013) 149. Art. 28 of the ICC, 
was recently incorporated under national laws and some scholars advocated Yamashita therefore 
proposed that the commander is to be responsible under accomplice liability. But was Yamashita’s 
standard an accomplice liability?  Cf. Constantine Mortopoulos, ‘Kobayashi Maru: Arduous Effort 
and Scan Incorporation of the Yamashita Standard to the Hellenic Law’ (2011) 19 Eur. J. Crime 
Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 199, 234.    
2 This is with the exception of the Hagenbach case, Chapter 1 (n 121) et seq.  
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This chapter, therefore, aims to examine the early successful judicial 
implementation (precedents) of contemporary CR as a mode of criminal 
responsibility under ICL. It illustrates the true meaning of regarding CR as a sui 
generis form of responsibility. This sui generis attribution – as discussed thus far 
– is ascribed not solely to the doctrine’s creation by judges internationally but, 
more precisely, to the development and implementation of the three elements 
(military values, customary law and criminal responsibility) during the evolution 
of the contemporary CR doctrine. 
 
This chapter examines the impact of these three elements on the early 
judicial interpretation of the nature and requirements of CR. It focuses mainly on 
precedents following the Second World War (as customary precedents). It consists 
of two parts. First, it analyses the evolution of the nature and requirements of CR 
during the trial of the Japanese General Yamashita, where CR was born as a 
separate  mode of liability. It then examines, secondly, the crystallisation of the 
contemporary nature and requirements of CR by the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, concentrating on the interaction between the three elements and their 
impact on the development of the nature of CR.  
 
1. Command responsibility:  its contemporary nature:- 
During WWII, The Allied Powers held a meeting in London for constructing 
the legal mechanism (resulting in the London Agreement of August 1945,3 which 
formed the basis of the International Military Tribunals (IMT)) and drafting the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Nuremberg trials then the 
Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal subsequently.4 
 
The Allies then issued Control Council Law No. 10 to enforce the rules of the 
Agreement and the Charter in relation to Germany and subsequently Japan.5 Some 
cases were, however, conducted differently by Military Commissions just before 
                                                          
3 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, London Agreement of August 8th. 1945. 
4 The Agreement provided for the Nuremberg Charter. See Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals Of the European Axis, and Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal, London, 8 August 1945. The creation of the Tokyo Tribunal was, pursuant to an 
order by General MacArthur, based on the Nuremberg Charter. The Tokyo Charter, Article 3 (a).   
5 The Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity, Berlin, 20 December 1945. 
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establishing the already agreed International Military Tribunals.6 One of those 
cases was the core case for developing the contemporary doctrine of CR.  
    
During the War, the Japanese authorities were warned by the Allies that 
crimes committed against Americans and Filipinos would be punished, whoever 
might be responsible for these offences.7 Accordingly, General MacArthur's 
General Headquarters announced he would  hold them “immediately responsible 
for any failure to accord prisoners of war and civilian internees proper treatment” 
as well as other offences.8 The following section scrutinises one result of 
MacArthur’s immediate action - the case where the contemporary doctrine of CR 
emerged.  
 
A) General Tomoyuki Yamashita9:- 
The Yamashita trial is one of the most important and influential trials so far 
for the doctrine’s development. In this, contemporary CR was successfully 
implemented for the first time as a mode of individual criminal liability; thus 
Yamashita is recognised as an important precedent.10 Several issues surrounding 
this trial, mainly the procedure of conducting and establishing it, were 
controversial. Therefore, the problematic procedure and its legitimacy was 
confused with, and used to criticise, the nature of CR. As a result, confusion 
accrued between the nature of CR and the conduct of the Yamashita trial, as 
discussed below.  
General Yamashita became the commanding general of the 14th Army Group 
of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands on the 9th. October 1944. 
He was also regarded as the executive commander of the Islands until he 
surrendered on 3rd. September, 1945.11 
 
                                                          
6 See (nn 18, 68 and 225). 
7 R. John Pritchard, Donald Cameron Watt  and Sonia M. Zaide, The Tokyo war crimes trial : index 
and guide, v.2 (Garland 1981), (p. 49,749 at the official record). 
8 Ibid, 49, 750. 
9 See John C. Fredriksen, America’s Military Adversaries: From Colonial Times to the Present 
(ABC-CLIO 2001) 534-5.  
10 Infra, n. 107; see also Čelebići TC, para 338. 
11 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, Volume IV, London 1948 (hereafter Law Reports) 3.  
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The 14th Army Group came under his command about 10 days after the U.S. 
invasion of Leyte in the Philippines.12 U.S. advances forced him to move from 
Leyte to Luzon, where his Army was divided into several groups and widely 
dispersed.13 This also affected all means of communications between Yamashita 
and his troops. The offences in respect of which he was tried were committed after 
this division, including the killing of thousands of prisoners and civilians in 
Manila14 and of about 25,000 civilians in Batangas Province in the south15. Note 
that Yamashita headed north with his Division and appointed General Yokoyama16 
to be responsible for the southern area. In fact, the vast majority of the offences 
committed took place within the southern area, including Manila.17  
 
B) The Trial:-  
After Yamashita’s surrender on 3rd. September 1945, the US authority was 
determined to prosecute him before a military commission18, even though the 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE) 
would be decided upon in January 1946.19 (He would be executed on 24 February 
1946, after being found guilty by the U.S. Military Commission).20 The 
Commission was established in Manila in October 1945 by General MacArthur,21 
the Commander-in-Chief of the US Army in the Pacific, who appointed General 
Styer, the US West Pacific commander, to structure the Commission.22  
 
                                                          
12 Yamashita reached Leyte on the date of the US invasion of 20 October 1944. Nevertheless, he 
managed to restructure, plan and prepare his staff for its defence. See Bruce D. Landrum, ‘The 
Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now’ (1995) 149 Mil. L. Rev. 293. 
13 P. Piccigalo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951 
(University of Texas Press 1979) 49; Yamashita commanded the northern area, General Yokoyama 
was responsible for the southern area where the atrocities were committed and General Tsukada 
was responsible for the Bataan Peninsula.  
14 The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume 
IV, London (H.M. Stationery Office, 1948), [“Yamashita”] 5-6. 
15 Yamashita 5. 
16 General Yokoyama, although tried before a military tribunal and sentenced to death, served only 
five years’ imprisonment and was then pardoned by the Philippines’ President. Spencer Tucker, 
Who’s Who in Twentieth-Century Warfare (Routledge 2001) 366.  
17 See Landrum (n 12) 294.    
18 This Commission comprised five American Army officers; the trial started on 19th. October 1945 
[“The Commission” hereafter]. 
19 This led to criticism of this trial’s standard of fairness. See Meloni (2010) 43. 
20 Yamashita 2. 
21 Law Reports, Volume III, 105. 
22 General Styer assigned five military officers as judges and six officers as defence. Christopher 
Crowe, ‘Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: the Changes for Successful 
Prosecution’ (1994-1995) 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 191, 197. 
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i) The nature of CR:- 
Yamashita’s trial was before a U.S. Military Commission, where the 
procedure differed from that in normal criminal proceedings. However, the 
rudimentary nature of the charges (under CR) was the essence of the debate 
between the prosecution and the defence. Initially, Yamashita requested two of his 
subordinates to act as counsellors, which was successful and the Commission 
stated that:- 
 
“...since it was the desire of the Commission to conduct a fair trial, the 
request of the Defence would be granted.”23  
 
Apparently the Commission desired a fair procedure. After that, Yamashita was 
accused of being responsible for the crimes committed and he was convicted of 
having:-  
 
“…unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to 
control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to 
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes.”24 
 
This charge encapsulated the nature of CR, in that: commanders can be held 
responsible for crimes of their subordinates as a result of the commanders’ failure 
to discharge the duty to control their subordinates.25 The prosecutor submitted, 
therefore, the Bill of Particulars, which contained forty-six charges laid against the 
accused.26 Accordingly, Yamashita pleaded not guilty27 and the defence asked for a 
period of 3 weeks for preparation28.  
 
 On 29th. October 1945, the prosecutor submitted another Bill, with an 
additional 59 crimes.29 The defence argued that the Supplementary Bill lacked 
clarity, being too broad and too vague;30 however, this argument was dismissed.  
 
                                                          
23 Yamashita 3.  
24 Yamashita 3-4.  
25 Cf. the ICC Article 28. Chapter 3 (nn 78-82).  
26 Yamashita 4; see also Crowe (n 22) 197. 
27 The defence argued that Yamashita should not be held responsible because of his lack of 
knowledge. Yamashita 7; see also Landrum (n 14) 296.  
28 Yamashita 8. 
29 The offences increased to 123 crimes in total. Yamashita 4. 
30 Yamashita 9-10  
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ii) Actus reus:- 
The defence argued that the Supplementary Bill did not clearly provide 
information for the main charge, particularly about the phrase "permitting them to 
commit brutal atrocities"31. The prosecution claimed that, from the evidence, it was 
clear that Yamashita had allowed – as a result of his failure to act - the crimes to be 
committed, which was in accordance with the US Constitution and applicable law 
of evidence.32 The defence argued that, according to the source of law referred to by 
the prosecutor, rather more emphasis should have been put upon the right of the 
accused person, pursuant to the "constitutional rights" of an accused.33 The 
Commission rejected this argument on the basis that these rights cannot be applied 
to enemy offenders.34     
 
The defence then urged that the case be dismissed, primarily on two 
grounds: (a) that the Bill of Particulars failed to prove the accused’s breach of the 
Laws and Customs of War; and (b) that the Commission had no jurisdiction to try 
the accused.35 The defence first argued that the main allegation was that the 
accused’s failure to control had permitted crimes to be committed. However, the 
Bill did not provide any information about, for example, the accused’s 'neglect' or 
'omission' that had presumably resulted in permitting the crimes (as a causal 
link).36 The defence, accordingly, stated that:-  
 
“...the accused was not accused of having done something or having failed 
to do something, but solely of having been something, namely commander 
of the Japanese forces.”37   
 
The defence also argued that the accused had not ordered, the crimes being 
committed.38  
 
                                                          
31 Yamashita 12. 
32 The prosecutor argued that under the US Constitution and applicable laws there are no 
requirements upon prosecutors to “disclose their evidence”. Yamashita 10. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution provides fundamental rights for any accused 
person and accordingly it was claimed that Yamashita should be entitled to these rights.  
35 Yamashita 12.  
36 Yamashita 5. In this, sometimes, it was specified that “such omission caused” crimes.  
37 Yamashita 12; Cf. Meloni (2010) 44.   
38 The defence also stated that: “No one would even suggest that the Commanding General of an 
American occupation force became a criminal every time an American soldier violated the law”. 
Yamashita 12.   
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Interestingly, the prosecutor stated that this Commission was not a court; it 
rather functioned as an “executive tribunal”.39 Nevertheless, the prosecution 
brought 286 witnesses before the Commission, then considering 423 statements of 
evidence.40 The prosecutor’s aim was to establish “subordination”, a link between 
troops who had committed crimes and Yamashita. On the one hand, the defence 
did not argue against this contention and generally agreed that these crimes had 
been committed by troops under Yamashita’s authority, thus satisfying the 
subordination requirement.41 On the other, the defence denied the accused’s actual 
knowledge of those offences.42  
 
The defence argued that Yamashita himself was a subordinate but, in doing 
so, overlooked the fact that Yamashita had been appointed to the executive 
command in that territory.43 The defence argued that, as a result the American 
victory, death had spread between the soldiers and prisoners, which had 
contributed to the disorder among the Japanese forces, resulting in those crimes 
being committed.44  
 
The defence claimed that Yamashita had done his utmost to control the 
situation,45 arguing that a considerable number of these offences were committed 
by Philippine guerrillas. These guerrillas were then being fought by the Japanese 
forces and Yamashita had therefore acted in accordance with International Law.46 
However, these arguments were insufficient to show that Yamashita had taken 
measures to prevent the widespread occurrence of those crimes. Hence, besides 
the commission of crimes and subordination requirements, the defence arguments 
allowed the prosecutor to establish – although not explicitly – the other 
requirements of this liability: (a) that Yamashita had failed to act to prevent those 
crimes; and (b) that his failure to control his troops had permitted his subordinates 
                                                          
39 The prosecutor stated that “This Commission…is … set up … for the purpose of hearing the 
evidence on this charge, and of advising … as to the punishment…. It is an executive body, and not a 
judicial body”. Yamashita 17.  
40 Yamashita 18.  
41 Yamashita 18-20. 
42 Yamashita 21-23. 
43 Yamashita 23; see also Cf. Michael Kelly, ‘Grafting the Command Responsibility Doctrine onto 
Corporate Criminal Liability for Atrocities’ (2010) 24 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 671, 676. 
44 Yamashita 24. Cf. Judge Murphy’s opinion, (n 103).  
45 Yamashita 25.   
46 Yamashita 26. 
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to commit atrocities, which was sufficient to establish a causal link47 between his 
failure to act and those crimes. 
 
iii) Mens rea:-  
The defence argued that Yamashita did not know about those offences. In 
answer to this, the Commission stated that Yamashita “must have known about” 
the atrocities.48 The defence therefore contended that Yamashita had tried to 
gather as much information as he could,49  but that it had not been possible at that 
time because of the lack of equipment and resources.50 Under such circumstances, 
therefore, the assumption that Yamashita “must have known about” the atrocities 
could not be substantiated, because he had had no means of obtaining the 
knowledge on which such an assumption could be based.51 This is the core of 
criticising CR at the Yamashita trial and also in the literature.52 
 
 The prosecutor, accordingly, emphasised that a commander is obliged  
constructively to control his subordinates according to International Law,53 and 
that his failure to act is recognised as a breach of the Laws of War.54 The 
prosecutor quoted Yamashita saying that if he had had the knowledge he would 
have prevented the crimes, which meant that Yamashita had known about his duty 
to control and to acquire information accordingly.55 The prosecution, therefore, 
submitted that Yamashita’s failure to know about the widespread crimes should be 
considered as equating to permission to violate the law, resulting in the 
atrocities.56  
The prosecutor contended that Yamashita has been informed that a 
considerable number (thousands) of "children and women" had been killed.57 
                                                          
47 Causation seems to be tantamount to raising the risk of crimes. Curt Hessler, Note, ‘Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes’ (1972-1973) 82 Yale L. J. 1274, 1283. 
48 Yamashita 17, 26 & 27. Cf. The ‘should have known’ standard at the ICC. Cf. William Eckhardt, 
‘Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard’ (1982) 97 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 19. 
49 Yamashita 27.    
50 Yamashita 26-27. 
51  Yamashita 28.  
52 See (nn 92 and 94). 
53 The standard of constructive knowledge resulted from the nature of the crimes and then the 
responsibility in accordance with the military values. Cf. Joshua Joseph, ‘Rethinking Yamashita: 
Holding Military Leaders Accountable for Wartime Rape’ (2007) 28 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 107, 116-
7.  
54 Yamashita 29. 
55 Yamashita 29-30. 
56 Ibid 31; see also Akayesu, TC, para 489.  
57 Ibid. 
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Moreover, his decision to trace the guerrillas had resulted in the commission of 
more crimes, which had to be also recognised as equating to a permission to 
commit atrocities with his knowledge.58  
 The prosecutor therefore argued that Yamashita’s omission could not be 
used as an excuse, when it had been the reason for the crimes being committed.59 
The Prosecutor referred to Moore, which stated that, “[i]t is true that soldiers 
sometimes commit excesses which their officers cannot prevent; but in general, a 
commanding officer is responsible for the acts of those under his orders”.60  This 
finding, as well as the above-mentioned illustration, explains the extent of 
domination of the military values on CR.61 Above the customary law, the military 
values (duty, responsibility and leadership) were the determinate factors.62  
 
Accordingly, the prosecutor in conclusion asserted that Yamashita could 
have informed his highest commander of his situation, at least to “relieve him” 
from the duty.63 The Commission, accordingly, rejected the denial of knowledge, 
supporting the prosecutor’s arguments, inter alia the “widespread” crimes and 
general information about these crimes to satisfy the knowledge requirement.64 
Although Yamashita was widely criticised in the literature, few distinguished 
scholars supported the nature of liability under CR. Lauterpacht, for instance, 
supported the liability for failure to act under which Yamashita was found 
responsible.65 
 
 
                                                          
58 Ibid 32-35, also Geert-Jan Knoops, ‘The Transposition of Superior Responsibility onto Guerrilla 
Warfare under the Laws of the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2007) 7 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 505, 
512. 
59 Ibid. The Prosecutor cited Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Volume I, Section 88, that he: “...is not 
supposed to have known the facts of which it appears he was ignorant; but if his ignorance is 
negligent or culpable . . . then his ignorance is no defence”. 
60 Ibid, see also The Prosecutor cited Moore's International Law Digest, Volume VI, page 919. 
61 This domination of the values element is –in this thesis- the reason behind the loose application 
of Yamashita. Cf. Mortopoulos (n 1) 213. This domination was also the reason for Yamashita being 
described as absolute command responsibility. Cf. Franklin Hart, ‘Yamashita, Nuremberg and 
Vietnam: Command Responsibility Reappraised’ (1980) 62 Int’l L. Stud. Ser. US Naval War Col. 
397, 408.  
62 See Ryan (chapter 1 n 59) 62; also René Värk, ‘Superior Responsibility’ (2012) 15 C.E.E.O.L. 143, 
146. As a result of unrecognizing the values element, CR was seen as a strict liability. Cf. Avi Singh, 
‘Criminal Responsibility for Non-State Civilian Superior Lacking De jure Authority: a Comparative 
Review of the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility and Parallel Doctrines in National Criminal Laws’ 
(2005) 28 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 267, 271. 
63 Yamashita 33.  
64 Yamashita 35. Cf.  Wallach and Marcus (chapter 1 n 103) 464-5.  
65 L. Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise: Vol. II: Disputes, War and Neutrality (6th. 
revised edn. by H. Lauterpacht, Longman’s 1944) 454. 
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C) The U.S. Supreme Court: in re Yamashita:-  
On December 7, 1945, the Commission announced its verdict: General 
Yamashita was "… guilty as charged and sentenced … to death by hanging".66 The 
defence therefore submitted a petition, to the US Supreme Court, requesting “a 
petition for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition” on the grounds: (1) that the 
Commission did not have the authority to try Yamashita; (2) that the Commission 
had failed to prove breach of the Laws of War; and (3) that the Commission had no 
jurisdiction to convict Yamashita.67  
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that General Styer was entitled to create this 
Commission under the instructions of General MacArthur, who was directed by 
the U.S. Authority.68 The Court provided that International Law recognised such 
military tribunals to prosecute violations of the Laws of War. The Court referred to 
“The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War” and the Treaty 
of Versailles as precedents and authorities.69 It ruled therefore that the 
Commission had been legitimately established.70  
The Court, most importantly, asserted that the charges were in accordance 
with the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, the 1929 Geneva Red 
Cross Convention and the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. 71 The 
Court concurred with the Commission’s conclusion and stated that the defence:- 
 
“…overlooks the fact that the gist of the charge is an 
unlawful breach of duty by petitioner as an army 
commander to control the operations of the members of 
his command by ‘permitting them to commit’ the 
extensive and widespread atrocities specified”.72  
 
                                                          
66 Yamashita 35. 
67 Ibid.  
68 This was established by President Roosevelt’s Executive Order for creating a Military 
Commission to try those accused of being war criminals. See 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942), cited 
in Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference 
Sixty Years Makes (Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers No. 27, 2002) 4.  
69 Re Yamashita 11 (at footnote 1). 
70 Yamashita v. Styer, Case Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
[Hereafter Re Yamashita] 11-13.       
71 Re Yamashita 15-6. 
72 Ibid. 
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Note that the court relied on ‘customary rules’ and ‘military values’ as 
elements for interpreting and justifying the liability under CR.73 The Court 
emphasised that, according to the findings, the Commission was required to 
“establish guilt” pursuant to the evidence presented.74 Nevertheless, the ‘criminal 
responsibility’ element was not examined by the court, as it merely supported the 
Commission’s ruling. This is also ascribed to the domination of the values element 
on the nature of CR.   
 
i) Justice Murphy Dissent:- 
Judge Murphy criticised the Commission’s argument about the 5th. 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as this Constitution maintained the "rights of 
an accused person".75 He suggested that the Commission’s interpretation of this 
fundamental right was inappropriate, as these rights applied to any person, no 
matter what his nationality. Therefore, he argued that the Commission had failed 
to maintain the accused’s rights according to the Constitution.76  
Judge Murphy also argued that the Commission had failed to determine 
Yamashita’s knowledge, in respect of “ordering or permitting” subordinates to 
commit crimes.77 Moreover, under International Law there is no explicit liability of 
commanders for failure to control.78 Justice Murphy also criticised the 
Commission’s procedure, the unprecedented charge and the way in which the case 
had been conducted.79 With regard to the standard of liability, Justice Murphy’s 
main criticism was the lack of precedent.80  
 
                                                          
73 Cf. Ann Ching, ‘Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the Celebici 
Decision of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2000) 25 N.C.J. Int’l 
L. & Com. Reg. 167, 182.  
74 Re Yamashita 16. 
75 Yamashita 49.  
76 Yamashita 50; see also re Yamashita 27 and 40.  
77 He stated that Yamashita “was rushed to trial under an improper charge”. Re Yamashita 27.  
78 Yamashita 51.  
79 He stated that the case was contrary to the “common ideas of mankind”. Re Yamashita p. 28; 
also Yamashita 54.  
80 He argued that “The only conclusion I can draw is that the charge made against the petitioner is 
clearly without precedent in international law or in the annals of recorded military history.” Re 
Yamashita 40. 
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ii) Justice Rutledge Dissent:-  
Judge Rutledge's dissenting opinion was also significant regarding the 
nature of CR. He emphasised the legitimacy of the law’s being developed, but 
argued that the Court “to go forward with caution”.81 He questioned fairness of this 
trial, arguing that no one can be convicted for a crime committed without his 
knowledge that is afterwards defined and recognised (the legality principle).82 He 
argued that the rights of the defence to have sufficient time to prepare for the trial 
and the accused’s rights to examine witnesses were jeopardised.83 
Justice Rutledge criticised the establishment of Yamashita’s trial, in that an 
appointed authority should not conduct, investigate and prosecute such a trial.84 
This was against the Act of Congress and the Constitution; therefore, this 
Commission lacked “credibility and admissibility”, he claimed.85 Accordingly, he 
asserted that the conduct of this trial precluded the rights of the accused; 
therefore, this had not been a fair trial.86  
Justice Rutledge argued that the Commission had charged Yamashita with 
having "permitted"87 the offences, but that it had failed to prove his knowledge of 
these crimes.88 The Commission had therefore selected some evidence in order to 
justify its own theory, without adducing proper evidence about his knowledge.89 
This evidence was also a basis for the impression that indications had been 
everywhere around the accused and that he therefore should have known.90 This 
alone made the Commission’s allegation very vague, from creation to verdict, he 
ruled.91  
 
 
                                                          
81 Justice Rutledge first stated that “Precedent is not all-controlling in law. There must be room for 
growth…”. Re Yamashita 43. 
82 He stated that “It is not in our tradition for anyone to be charged with crime which is defined 
after his conduct, alleged to be criminal, has taken place; or in language not sufficient to inform 
him of the nature of the offense or to enable him to make defense”. Re Yamashita 43. 
83 Yamashita 55.    
84 Yamashita 56.    
85 Yamashita 55; see also Re Yamashita 45.  
86 He considered that the procedure departs “from constitutional norms inherent in the idea of a 
fair trial”. Re Yamashita 45.  
87 Yamashita 58. 
88 Yamashita 59. 
89 Ibid.   
90 The (should have known) is the standard of knowledge under the ICC; however, it differs, as 
satisfying this requirement in Yamashita’s case was questionable. Cf. Chapter 3 (nn 75 and 78). 
91 Re Yamashita 51; see also Yamashita 60-1. 
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D) The Yamashita case and fair trial:-  
The key criticism in Yamashita was about the standard of fair trial and the 
mens rea92 adopted by the Commission.93 These were the essence of the problem, 
as this impacted on scholars’ views of the procedure, the judgment and the 
applicable law. Eventually, such a problem resulted in questioning the nature of 
CR as an applicable mode of liability primarily because of three reasons.94     
i) The composition of the Commission:- 
As articulated by Justice Rutledge, judicial interpretation is a means for 
developing the law, but should be carried out by a judicial body and with caution.95 
Here, on the contrary, the Commission had stated that it had been created “for the 
purpose of hearing the evidence on this charge, and of advising …”: accordingly, “It 
is an executive body, and not a judicial body”.96 The Commission was neither a 
judicial body nor authorised to develop the law. More precisely, the Commission 
consisted of a number of respectable military personnel, of whom none, however, 
had been trained as (a) “lawyer(s)”.97 This cannot, of course, be said of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, even though it is not an international mechanism.      
ii) Interpretation:- 
The U.S. Supreme Court referred to the Treaty of Versailles as an 
authority.98 The court did not, however, consider the argument about the CR 
standard discussed as abstention by The Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War of 1919.99 The U.S stance at the 1919 Commission had been 
against adopting a standard of mens rea similar to that in Yamashita.100 In fact, in 
1919 the American representatives had argued against this “constructive 
                                                          
92 The means rea problem impacted on the development of CR, therefore, some scholes refer to this 
issue as “the ghost of Yamashita”. See Jenny Martinez, ‘Understanding Mens Rea in Command 
Responsibility: from Yamashita to Blaškić and Beyond’ (2007) 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 638, 641; Cf. 
David J Cohen, ‘The Singapore War Crimes Trials and their Relevance’ (2013) 31 Sing L Rev 3, 15 
(in footnote 18). 
93 Note “the desire of the Commission to conduct a fair trial”. See (n 23). 
94 See Chapter 5 (n 58). 
95 See (n 81).  
96 See (n 39). 
97 Harlington Wood, ‘Real Judges’ (2001-2003) 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 259, p.272. Wood 
criticised the Commission because the appointed judges were not “real” judges. Wood 274. 
98 The Supreme Court also referred to The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the 
War. See (n 69). 
99 See Chapter 1 (nn 155-159). 
100 The U.S. Delegation stated that this principle of “indirect responsibility” is inadmissible as it 
lacks legal consistency. See Chapter 1 (n 155). 
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knowledge”, which corresponded to the defence argument in the Yamashita 
case.101 
 Nevertheless, the Court relied mainly on The Hague Conventions and the 
commander’s duty and responsibility to control his subordinates, which implicitly 
required acquiring knowledge about troops’ activities. The constructive knowledge 
standard adopted in Yamashita shares some features of the ICC knowledge 
requirement;102 nevertheless, the ‘criminal responsibility’ element remained 
unclear. 
iii) Victors’ justice:-  
The composition of the Commission, taken together with the interpretation 
of CR, was characterised as victors’ justice. In this, Judge Murphy notably stated 
that:-  
“We, the victorious American forces, have done everything possible to 
destroy and disorganize your lines of communication, your effective control 
of your personnel, your ability to wage war. In those respects we have 
succeeded. We have defeated and crushed your forces. And now we charge 
and condemn you for having been inefficient in maintaining control of your 
troops during the period when we were so effectively besieging and 
eliminating your forces and blocking your ability to maintain effective 
control… In short, we charge you with the crime of inefficiency in 
controlling your troops. We will judge the discharge of your duties by the 
disorganization which we ourselves created in large part. Our standards of 
judgment are whatever we wish to make them.”103 
From another perspective, the Commission’s, and ultimately the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s, findings were described as “extremely racist”.104 The Yamashita 
trial was indeed controversial; however, CR was, more importantly, enforced 
through a legal framework. Although, the Commission in Yamashita lacked 
experienced lawyers, the defence team particularly functioned as lawyers seeming 
                                                          
101 See Chapter 1 (n 144). Note that, this U.S stance was inconsistent as in Medina only actual 
knowledge was required for CR. See Chapter 7 (nn 145-147). 
102 The Yamashita standard was “must have known” and the ICC standard is “should have known” 
both impose a duty to know and the failure to know is not an excuse. Cf. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Pre-
TC II, Amicus Curiae Observations on Superior Responsibility Submitted Pursuant to Rule 103 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-01/05-01/08, 20 April 2009, para 3. 
103 Re Yamashita 34-35. 
104 Ann Marie Prévost, ‘Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita’ (1992) 14 Hum. Rts. Q. 303, 323. 
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to perform as proper practitioners.105 The knowledge requirement was the 
highlight of the defence, which appears to be the most problematic element of the 
Yamashita case and CR as a form of liability under ICL currently.106    
Cassese, for example, attributed the importance of this Trial to the fact that 
it fleshed out the notion of the contemporary command responsibility.107 The 
foregoing discussion provides the reason for the importance of the Yamashita case, 
which is interpreting the customary rules in accordance with the military values. It 
also provides the reason why Yamashita does not reflect the current CR.108  
 
2. International Military Tribunals:- 
Neither the Nuremberg nor Tokyo Charters included a provision with 
respect to CR as a mode of liability. Therefore, it was essential, for articulating CR, 
to employ judicial interpretation for clarifying its nature and requirements. 
Nevertheless, interpretation should be limited, used for this purpose and not 
exceeded for creating new law. 
A) Means for legitimately developing the law:-  
The Nuremberg Tribunal, particularly, recognised interpreting law as an 
essential principle and asserted that:- 
“In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are 
doing that which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment 
than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague Convention. In 
interpreting the words of the Pact, it must be remembered that 
international law is not the product of an international legislature, 
and that such international agreements as the Pact of Paris have to 
deal with general principles of law, and not with administrative 
matters of procedure. The law of war is to be found not only in 
treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which gradually 
obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of 
                                                          
105 Crowe (n 22); also Edward H. Buehrig, ‘The Case of General Yamashita, by A. Frank Reel’ (1950) 
25 Indiana Law Journal 408. 
106 Chapter 5 (n 58). 
107 A Cassese et. al, International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary (OUP 2011) 422. 
108 Cf. Brian Parker, ‘Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Corporate Officers: a 
Theory of Individual Liability for International Human Right Violations’ (2012) 35 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 1, 9-10. 
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justice applied by jurists and practised by military courts. This law 
is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a 
changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than 
express and define for more accurate reference the principles of law 
already existing.” 109 
 
This illustrates the demand for such a principle.110 As a result, interpreting the law 
should be implemented beyond the written provisions, as the latter are normally 
created to provide the general framework only. 
The Tribunal, for the purpose of interpreting rules for modes of individual 
criminal responsibility, stated that:-  
“[t]he Pact…was a political agreement of undoubtedly very great moral 
importance, but just as certainly it had nothing to do with the establishing 
of a crime, from which a criminal responsibility could be derived”.111 
The Tribunal, to justify its demand for interpretation, stated that the Hague 
Conventions “neither expressedly stated that certain actions were crimes, nor 
created courts for their trial” or even for interpreting those rules.112  As a result of 
not recognising rules, inter alia CR, by the Tribunal’s Charter, it stated that the 
“law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing 
world”; therefore, “[t]he view which the Tribunal takes of the true interpretation of 
the Pact is supported by the international history which preceded it”.113  
The Hague and Geneva Conventions, accordingly, emphasised commanders’ 
position and duty, in that the commander is to ‘be responsible for his 
subordinates’ and has a number of more specific duties to command 114 under 
international law that eventually constituted customary law. This also implies the 
values element of commanders being: duty, responsibility and leadership.115 In 
this, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that “by 1939 these rules laid down in the 
                                                          
109 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
Volume I, 12 November 1945 – 1 October 1946,[Nuremberg] p. 221. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
influenced not only Tokyo tribunals but also developments of ICL and IHL. See David Scheffer, 
‘Nuremberg Trials’ (2008) 39 Stud. Transnat’l Legal Pol’y 155, 180-181. 
110 See Chapter 4 (n 8) et seq. 
111 Law Reports Vol. X, p. 365. 
112 Law Reports Vol. X, p. 366. 
113 Ibid.   
114 The commentary on the API stated that: “[T]he first duty of a military commander, whatever his 
rank, is to exercise command”. The API Commentary, para 3549. See also Articles 1 and 43 of the 
annex to the Hague Convention (IV), Article 5 of the Hague Convention (IX), Article 19 of the 
Hague Convention (X), Article 26 of the Geneva Convention of 1929. 
115 Chapter 1 (n 59).  
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Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being 
declaratory of the laws and customs of war”.116 The ICRC, thereafter, reinforced 
this interpretation, stating that The Hague and Geneva Conventions “are 
considered as embodying rules of customary international law. As such they are 
also binding on States which are not formally parties to them”.117  
Accordingly, the tribunal specified and justified the rationale for the use of 
judicial interpretation. The court would not, therefore, be limited in its judgment 
to the immediate Charter. The court would interpret the customary rules and 
previous practices, including military courts’ practices. This was to enable the law 
continuously to meet the needs of the times in accordance with the legality 
principle.118  
 
B) Developing the nature of command responsibility:-  
Generally, developments of the nature of CR should be read in conjunction 
with those of the requirements discussed hereafter. Prior to the first judgment 
related to CR - High Command - and as a reply to the defence’s objections to this 
standard of liability, the court explained the nature of the underlying crimes and 
the associated form of criminal liability. The Tribunal noted, first, that the nature 
of crimes was inherently punishable and that even the:-  
“official Nazi publication, on 28 May 1944, contained the following correct 
statement of the law:-  
‘It is not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a 
despicable crime is exempt from punishment because he passes the 
responsibility to his superior, especially if the orders of the latter are in 
evident contradiction to all human morality and every international usage of 
warfare.’”119 
The Tribunal accurately illustrated that such responsibility (particularly under 
military values and laws ) resulted from the commander’s conduct if that conduct 
should contradict all human morality and that even the Nazi regime recognised 
                                                          
116 Nuremberg, Volume XXII 497. 
117 See <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195>, accessed 14 August 2014.  
118 Arajärvi (Chapter 4 n 37). 
119 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Volume XI, Oct. 1946-Apr. 
1949. [High Command hereafter] 509. 
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the criminal responsibility that could result from violating a personal obligation 
and military values.120 Most importantly, it asserted that:-   
“For a defendant to be held criminally responsible, there must be a breach 
of some moral obligation fixed by international law, a personal act 
voluntarily done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under 
international law.”121 
 
The Tribunal further illustrated that an accused may be responsible under CR 
specifically, because the commander’s:- 
 
“[c]onnection may however be negative. Under basic principles of 
command authority and responsibility, an officer who merely stands by 
while his subordinates execute a criminal order of his superiors which he 
knows is criminal violates a moral obligation under international law. By 
doing nothing he cannot wash his hands of international responsibility.”122 
 
Accordingly, the nature of responsibility was interpreted in line with the nature of 
those crimes committed that were against all human morality (i.e. international 
crimes).123 It asserted, further, that breaching moral obligations may occur by 
negative conduct (omission or failure to act), raising CR. Thus, determining such 
responsibility is dependent on violating not only international norms, but more 
precisely basic principles of command authority and responsibility (i.e. military 
values).124 This interpretation method should not be misread so as to make CR per 
se a war crime.125 
 
The court, therefore, regarded Yamashita as a precedent though not 
binding, because the facts of Yamashita were not applicable to the instant case.126 
In this, besides the knowledge standard, subordination was an issue of criticism 
                                                          
120 Not that this does not suggest a moral responsibility as to replace the legal responsibility. Cf. 
Elies Sliedregt (Chapter 1 n 40) 103-4. 
121 High Command 510. 
122 High Command 512. 
123 Cf. Joakim Dungel and Shannon Ghadiri, ‘The Temporal Scope of Command Responsibility 
Revisited Why Commanders Have a Duty to Prevent Crimes Committed after the Cessation of 
Effective Control’ (2011) 17 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 1, 15-16. 
124 This constitutes the rationale of CR. Cf. Andrew Mitchell, ‘Failure to Halt, Prevent or Punish: 
The Doctrine of Command Responsibility for War Crimes’ (2000) 22 Sydney L. Rev. 381, 382. See 
also discussions in the previous Chapter. 
125 Cf. Mettraux (2009) 37-8. 
126 Law Reports Vol. XII, 76. See Edward O’Brien, ‘The Nuremberg Principles, Command 
Responsibility, and the Defense of Captain Rockwood’ (1995) 149 Mil. L. Rev. 275, 287. 
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that factually required an actual ability to control.127 Yamashita had in fact been 
unable to exercise control as a result of the US advance.128 Accordingly, the 
Tribunal stated that:- 
 
“The President of the United States is Commander-in-Chief of its 
military forces. Criminal acts committed by those forces cannot in 
themselves be charged to him on the theory of subordination. The 
same is true of other high commanders in the chain of command. 
Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of 
command from that fact alone. There must be a personal 
dereliction. That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to 
him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates 
constitutes criminal negligence on his part.”129  
 
Accordingly, the test of the actual ability (material ability) to control is 
important for establishing the subordination requirements.130 For example, 
assume that Yamashita had the actual knowledge about crimes; this would not 
change the facts, as he was in practice unable to control his troops, due to the US 
advance. The Tribunal emphasised that the commander’s subordination link and 
knowledge should be associated with an omission recognised as a failure to act: 
“There must be a personal dereliction”.131 The court, therefore, after articulating 
the ‘customary rules’ connection with the ‘military values and ‘criminal 
responsibility’ elements of CR; stated that:-   
“The authority, both administrative and military, of a commander 
and his criminal responsibility are related but by no means co-
extensive. Modern war such as the last war, entails a large measure 
of de-centralization. A high commander cannot keep completely 
informed of the details of military operations of subordinates and 
most assuredly not of every administrative measure. He has the 
right to assume that details entrusted to responsible subordinates 
will be legally executed.”132 
 
                                                          
127 As in Reel’s argument, for instance, that, according to the standard of responsibility adopted in 
Yamashita, every U.S. commander would be responsible for any crime committed by the troops. A. 
F. Reel, The Case of General Yamashita (University of Chicago Press 1949) 8. 
128 See (n 103).  
129 Law Reports Vol. XII, 76. 
130 Čelebići TC, para 351. 
131 Law Reports Vol. XII, 76. 
132 Ibid. 
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The court examined, therefore, situations in which an illegal order issued by 
a higher authority required the commander in question to pass it down to 
subordinates.133 The Tribunal, after acknowledging the military nature of the 
operations, articulated measures which a commander can take in accordance with 
military values and basic principles;134 nevertheless, the commander should bear 
responsibility in accordance with these values.135 This is consistent with the 
military values of the commander being: duty, responsibility and leadership. 
 
The military nature of those operations was essential in determining 
criminal responsibility; the court therefore stated that a chief of staff “has no 
command authority over subordinate units. All he can do in such cases is calling 
these matters to the attention of his commanding general.”136 The Tribunal, by 
recognising and differentiating between the commander’s position and his actual 
ability to control, did not ask commanders to do the impossible. Accordingly, the 
tribunal examined and interpreted the criminal responsibility - beyond the laws 
and customs of war - through resorting to the military society and its values. 
   
The Tribunal, thereafter, in the Hostage trial, discussed the responsibility of 
a commander for crimes committed by troops not under his direct command.137 
Hostage adopted the conclusion of the High Command trial that, on the one hand, 
a tactical commander is responsible only for his subordinate’s crimes.138 On the 
other hand, the occupational or executive commander will be responsible for the 
crimes committed within his occupational territory.139 
 
The IMTFE,140 under Counts 54 and 55, sought to impose individual 
liability, in the “ordering, authorizing or permitting atrocities” and the “disregard 
of duty to secure observance of preventing breach of laws of war”, respectively.141 
                                                          
133 Law Reports Vol. XII, 23, 29 & 30.    
134 Law Reports Vol. XII, 74. 
135 Ibid.   
136 Law Reports Vol. XII, 81.  
137 Hostage Case, 1260. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid.  
140 B.V.A. Röling and A. Cassese (eds.), The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger 
(Polity Press 1994) 3.  Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (OUP 2008) 63-69. 
141 It is worth mentioning that Sengheiser argued that the latter count seems to be a form of 
complicity rather than of command responsibility. Jason Sengheiser, ‘Command responsibility for 
Omissions and Detainee Abuse in the “War on Terror”’ (2007-2008) 30 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 706. 
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These counts were controversial, because CR was not a form of liability under the 
Tribunals’ Charters and the Tribunal hold the Japanese Government collectively 
responsible for the underlying crimes. The IMTFE in its interpretation, therefore, 
first emphasised the direct role of the governmental authority in protecting 
prisoners of war,142 and asserted that responsibility:- 
“…rests therefore with the Government having them in possession. This 
responsibility is not limited to the duty of mere maintenance but extends to 
the prevention of mistreatment. In particular, acts of inhumanity to 
prisoners which are forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as by 
Conventions are to be prevented by the Government having responsibility 
for the prisoners.”143 
 
The Tribunal interpreted this form of responsibility as encompassing a 
wider scope of culpability, including that of individuals whose function is 
governmental, whether military or civilian. Thus, it ruled that the Japanese 
authorities had been under an affirmative duty to ensure the safety of those 
prisoners, having the power of creating legislation for such a purpose.144  
 
C) Developing the requirements:-  
 
The requirements of CR as recognised and implemented generally by the 
IMT required: (a) the commission of crimes, (b) a subordination, (c) knowledge, 
(d) failure to act, and (e) causation. Note that those commanders were appointed 
de jure command; accordingly, the subordination requirement was directly 
identifiable in both IMTFE and IMT. More precisely, as a result of particularly the 
Nazi reporting system, the prosecutor’s task of proving these requirements was 
easy because the evidence put forward was unquestionable. The IMT stated, 
therefore, that the Nazi “documents consist mostly of orders, reports and war 
diaries which were captured by the Allied Armies at the time of the German 
collapse”.145  
 
                                                          
142 William H. Parks, ‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’ (1973) 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 65. 
143 Ibid.   
144 B.V.A Röling and C.F Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo judgment: the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 April 1946-12 November 1948 (University Press, Amsterdam 1977) 30. 
145 Hostage case, 1258. 
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The Law Report also stated that “In the Yamashita Trial few if any reports 
of atrocities committed were found to prove the knowledge of the accused”. 
However, in the Nuremberg proceedings the “task of the Prosecution … was made 
easier by the fact that reprisal actions were often reported by lesser officials to 
various of the accused, and many such reports were quoted in the Judgment”.146 
The Tribunal emphasised that these “reports offered consist generally of those 
made or received by the defendants and unit commanders in their chain of 
command”.147 Accordingly, these requirements were directly established. Thus the 
following discussions are limited to two requirements: the knowledge and 
causation; as they were more difficult to prove.  
 
i) Knowledge 
Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb was the highest-ranking commander 
among the defendants in the High Command Trial.148 Before addressing the 
offences against von Leeb, the Tribunal asserted that he “must be shown both to 
have had knowledge and to have been connected with such criminal acts, either by 
way of participation or criminal acquiescence”.149 Such a finding could be assumed 
to form a general condition of criminal liability that there should be actual 
knowledge alone for criminal responsibility. However, this finding particularly 
should not be confused with the CR’s knowledge standard. This was limited to the 
execution of unlawful orders as a form of transmission, in respect of which von 
Leeb was found responsible for those transmitted orders and not CR.150  
 
 More precisely, regarding the requirements of CR, the IMT, at the trial of 
Field Marshal Georg von Kuechler, distinguished this doctrine’s requirements 
from those of others. First, the Tribunal found from the evidence that he was 
responsible for the Commissar Order, which, contrary to international law, 
instructed German units invading the Soviet Union in June 1941 that all captured 
                                                          
146 Law Reports Vol. VIII, 89. It is, therefore, as a result of this system of reporting these five 
requirements were directly identifiable. The ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, which ask for three 
requirements instead, does not reflect the customary precedents i.e. post-WWII trials. Cf. M Cherif 
Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (CUP 
2011) 551.  
147 Law Reports Vol. VIII, 37. 
148 High Command, 553. 
149 High Command, 555. 
150 Law Repots, Vol. XII, 106. Cf. Michal Stryszak, ‘Command Responsibility: How Much Should a 
Commander be Expected to Know?’ (2002) 11 U.S. A.F. Acad. J. Legal Stud. 27, 46-7. 
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political commissars of the “Red” Army should be summarily executed.151 Initially, 
von Kuechler denied knowledge of this unlawful Order.152 The Tribunal, however, 
found a number of reports from his subordinates that confirmed the execution of 
the Order, of which the defendant denied any knowledge.153  
 
The Tribunal, significantly, concluded that von Kuechler was responsible, as 
he should have known about the reports at least, since these were available to 
him.154 The Tribunal resorted to military values and considered that, as a 
commander, he had had a duty to control, from which he should have known about 
his troops’ activities, stating that “[i]t was his business to know”.155 The Tribunal 
found, also, “numerous reports” available to the defendant about the commission 
of those crimes by his subordinates.156 It therefore concluded that von Kuechler 
“must, therefore, be held responsible for the acts committed by his 
subordinates”.157 
 
Lieutenant General Karl von Roques was held responsible for crimes 
committed when he was General of Rear Area of Army Group South and Group A 
as the commanding general (executive command) of the occupied territory.158 The 
defence argued that “[t]here is no obligation under International Law to assign this 
task”.159 The Tribunal emphasised that the defendant was the “commanding 
general of occupied territory”, thus “[t]he duty and responsibility for maintaining 
peace and order, and the prevention of crime, rest upon” him.160  
 
Accordingly, the Tribunal, referring to the judgments of re Yamashita,161 
concluded that:-  
  
                                                          
151 Law Repots, Vol. XII, 18 and 41. 
152 He argued that although he passed the order, he was unaware that the order was illegal. High 
Command 566. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid 566-7. Cf. Matthew Lippman, ‘War Crimes: American Prosecutions of Nazi Military Officers’ 
(1995) 6 Touro Int’l L. Rev. 261, 298-299. 
155 Ibid 567.  
156 Ibid 568.  
157 Law Reports, Vol. XII, 107. High Command 568. Likewise, the Tribunal charged General Kurt 
von Salmuth with crimes committed by his subordinates and ruled that he must have known about 
them. High Command 617. 
158 High Command 630-1. 
159 Law Reports, Vol. XII, 107.  
160 High Command 631-2. 
161 Therefore, he should have implemented the necessary measures ‘to protect prisoners of war and 
the civilian population’. High Command 632. 
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“…command authority and executive power obligate the one who wields 
them to exercise them for the protection of prisoners of war and the 
civilians in his area; and that orders issued which indicate a repudiation of 
such duty and inaction with knowledge that others within his area are 
violating this duty which he owes, constitute criminality”.162 
 
Therefore, the commander’s failure to fulfil such a duty was the reason behind 
these subordinates’ crimes (causally).163 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
failure to control or to prevent, taken together with the knowledge, subordination 
and the nature of the underlying crime, raised commanders’ liability for the crimes 
committed by subordinates.164 
 
The Hostage judgment supported the preceding judgment of the High 
Command trial. The Hostage judgment, therefore, emphasised, first, the military 
values element – since the ‘customary rules’ element was articulated already by the 
preceding judgment - and stated that: “We have been confronted repeatedly with 
contentions that reports and orders sent to the defendants did not come to their 
attention. Responsibility for ... [international] crimes have been denied because of 
absence from headquarters at the time of their commission”.165 The Tribunal 
therefore ruled that:- 
 
“An army commander will not ordinarily be permitted to deny knowledge 
of reports received at his headquarters, they being sent there for his special 
benefit. Neither will he ordinarily be permitted to deny knowledge of 
happenings within the area of his command while he is present therein”.166  
 
In this regard, the Tribunal asserted that “the German Wehrmacht was a well- 
equipped, well-trained, and well-disciplined army. Its efficiency was demonstrated 
on repeated occasions throughout the war”.167 
 
                                                          
162 Ibid.  
163 Ibid. The causal link was most probably weighed against the responsibility as a military value of 
commanders rather than a requirement of causation in criminal law. Cf. John Douglass, ‘High 
Command Case: A Study in Staff and Command Responsibility’ (1972) 6 Int’l L. 686, 699. 
164 Law Reports, Vol. XII, 110. 
165 Hostage 1259.  
166 Ibid 1260. 
167 Ibid 1259; Cf. Emily Langston, ‘The Superior Responsibility Doctrine in International Law’ 
(2004) 4 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 141, 152. 
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The Tribunal emphasised that commanders were therefore supposed to 
acquire information constructively about their troops; and that, as a consequence, 
commanders are assumed to have knowledge of subordinates’ activities. The 
Tribunal continued as follows:-   
“It would strain the credulity of the Tribunal to believe that a 
high-ranking military commander would permit himself to get out 
of touch with current happenings in the area of his command 
during wartime.”168 
 
The Tribunal, therefore, emphasised the requirement of knowledge to hold a 
commander responsible on the ground that he ‘should have known’ about the 
crimes based on the values element.169 In High Command, the knowledge 
requirement was believed to be favouring actual knowledge of the commander.170 
Hostage, however, explicitly adopted the ‘should have known’ test as well as the 
actual knowledge, more appropriate to this standard being derived from the 
obligation to know subsidiary to the duty to command, depending on cases’ 
circumstances.171    
 
In Hostage, Field Marshal Wilhelm List denied awareness of these reports 
as he had been absent at the time.172 The Tribunal emphasised that not only is a 
commander under an obligation to be reported to, but also his actual responsibility 
is to examine those reports and Orders.173 Accordingly, List had failed to fulfil his 
duty as a commander to command and control. The Tribunal therefore concluded 
that “[h]is failure to terminate these unlawful killings and to take adequate steps to 
prevent their recurrence constitutes a serious breach of duty and imposes criminal 
responsibility”.174  
 
                                                          
168 Ibid 1260.   
169 See the ICC Article 28 about “should have known”. Chapter 5 (nn 75-81). 
170 Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal 
Law (OUP 2012) 267-8.  
171 Hostage 1260.  
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1271. 
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The IMTFE judgments also laid down that commanders may be held 
responsible for the crimes of subordinates if: “(1) They had knowledge that such 
crimes were being committed… [or] (2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire 
such knowledge. If such a person had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, 
have had such knowledge he is not excused for inaction if his office required or 
permitted him to take any action to prevent such crimes.”175 In other words, based 
on the duty to command the commander may be presumed to have such 
knowledge if he has failed to fulfil his sub-duty to know by failing to acquire 
knowledge.176  
 
ii) Causation 
 
It is important to reiterate that the Nazi reporting system was the reason for 
the easy task of proving the CR requirements.177 High Command recognised the 
requirement of a causal link between the commander and the committed crimes. 
This issue was significant particularly for the responsibility of General Otto 
Woehler under CR when the defendant was serving as a staff officer.178 
 
The Tribunal addressed the charge of implementing the Commissar Order 
by subordinates, committed while the defendant was a staff officer who lacked the 
executive power, actual authority or ability to control.179 The Tribunal stated that 
the defendant “has no command authority over subordinate units nor is he a 
bearer of executive power. The chief of staff must be personally connected by 
evidence with such criminal offenses of his commander in chief before he can be 
held criminally responsible”.180 
 
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, with regard to this charge, the 
commander should be held responsible for those crimes, if the commander 
possessed the required authority to control181 for his omission to raise the risk 
(causally) of committing those crimes. It thus implicitly required a connection 
                                                          
175 Boister and Cryer (n 140) 83. This was supported by Čelebići, para 388.  
176 Cf. Joseph (n 53). 
177 See (nn 145-147). 
178 High Command 683-4. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Ibid 684. 
181 Ibid. 
66 
 
between the crime and the commander’s omission. Hostage specified, most 
importantly, that:-  
 
“In determining the guilt or innocence of these defendants, we shall require 
proof of a causative, overt act or omission from which a guilty intent can be 
inferred before a verdict of guilty will be pronounced.”182 
 
The Tribunal explicitly required causation as a condition to establish CR as a 
distinct form of criminal liability.  
As a result of being recognised as a separate form of liability, CR was 
applicable also to non-military commanders. The fact that military values are part 
of the nature of CR did not - and should not – preclude this form from 
implementation if individuals have, or had, assumed such positions of command. 
 
D) Non-Military Superiors:- 
The 1919 Commission is considered to be the first attempt to hold civilian 
superiors criminally responsible pursuant to CR.183 It reported that the 
responsibility should not be limited to military commanders, but should be 
extended to include civilian officials.184 In this regard, the IMTs dealt with the 
responsibilities of non-military superiors for paramilitary commanders and 
civilian superiors’ responsibility. The rationale for including civilian superiors 
under CR – in not only the 1919 Commission but also the Nuremberg and the 
Tokyo Tribunal – is argued here to have been the voluntary assumption of the 
position of command.185 This is consistent with, Article 1 Annex to the Hague 
Convention stated that: “The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to 
armies, but also to militia and voluntary” groups.186  
 
                                                          
182 Hostage 1261. 
183 See (nn 98-99); see also Chapter 1 (n 143).  
184 Ibid.  
185 See Mitchell (n 124). 
186 The Hague Convention (IV) 1907.  
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i) Paramilitary Commanders:- 
The voluntary assumption of the role of a military commander, whence the 
obligations are derived, means that the responsibility is derived accordingly. The 
Nuremberg Tribunal, regarding the paramilitary groups - because of this derivative 
nature - faced no difficulty in applying CR. In this, the Tribunal deduced 
individuals’ duties and responsibilities from the military system, as both 
frameworks were identical.187 Accordingly, the S.S. (a paramilitary organization 
under the Nazi regime) consisted of a number of departments, one of which was 
the ‘W.V.H.A.’.188 This department was led by Oswald Pohl and functioned as the 
“main office of the Inspector of Concentration Camps”.189  
Pohl was directly under the orders of Heinrich Himmler; therefore, he 
denied responsibility for the crimes committed by his subordinates, claiming that 
he lacked the actual power of command as the orders were issued by Himmler.190 
The Tribunal rejected his argument and stated that “[T]he fact remains…that Pohl 
as head of the WVHA was the superior…in a position to exercise and did exercise 
substantial supervision and control…”.191 The Tribunal derived the duty to control 
from the military system and concluded that it is applicable to the paramilitary 
structure. Hence, the Tribunal concluded that Pohl “had full disciplinary power 
over all guards who served in the concentration camps”.192  
Likewise, the Tribunal charged Karl Mummenthey under CR for his 
subordinates’ crimes as a result of his failure to exercise control. He presented 
himself as a “private business man” but the Tribunal found that he “was a definite, 
integral and important figure in the concentration camp… [and] wielded military 
power of command.”193 The Tribunal, although it recognised Mummenthey’s 
position as non-military, deduced his duties and responsibilities from the military 
system: accordingly his position was comparable. Therefore, it stated that “[i]f 
                                                          
187 Heller (n 170) 265-6.  
188 Law Reports, Vol. VIII, 57. (W.V.H.A. stands for “Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt” or “Main 
Economic and Administration Office” (of the S.S.)). 
189 Ibid. 
190 Heller (n 170) 265-6. 
191 Pohl case 981-2. 
192 Pohl case, 981-2. This, coupled with the operational manner of issuing orders and reporting 
issues to Himmler, rendered the case easy to proceed with at the Nuremberg Trials. 
193 Ibid 1052.  
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excesses occurred in the industries under his control he was in a position not only 
to know about them, but to do something.”194  
Accordingly, it could be argued that the Tribunal convicted Pohl and 
Mummenthey on the basis of CR, for international crimes committed by 
subordinates, as a result of their voluntary assumption of the position of 
operational military commanders. Since the assumption of such a position was 
voluntarily, the duty and responsibility attached to the position are binding and a 
failure to exercise command and control renders the accused responsible for 
subordinates’ crimes resulting from his omission. 
 
ii) Civilian superiors:- 
Although the test of voluntary assumption of military command is easier to 
establish in a paramilitary structure, in relation to a civilian superior the IMTs 
adopted a similar criterion. In this, the IMT asserted that “the mere fact of being a 
civilian affords no protection whatever to a charge based upon international 
criminal law”.195 Subsequently, the Tokyo Tribunal unprecedentedly charged the 
Japanese Government as “collectively” responsible for its failure to control 
subordinates.196 Most importantly, one of those members – Koki Hirota, whose 
case is discussed below - was prosecuted in accordance with CR.197 The Tokyo 
Tribunal was thus the first to recognise explicitly civilian officials’ liability under 
CR. 
The duty to exercise command and control that attaches to the relevant 
position is the core factor when a civilian is charged pursuant to the CR doctrine. 
The Trials at Nuremberg illustrated the importance of identifying such a duty 
through their judgments in several cases. In the Medical case198, Karl Brandt (a 
Professor Doctor199) was found responsible for the crimes - medical experiments - 
committed by his subordinates.200 The Tribunal asserted that, because of his 
                                                          
194 Ibid.   
195 Law reports, Vol. XV, 59. 
196 E. van Sliedregt, The criminal responsibility of individuals for violations of international 
humanitarian law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2003) 128.  
197 See (n 214).  
198 Medical was against twenty-three German “doctors and scientists”. Law Report, Vol. VIII, 55. 
199 The Medical case, Volume II, 190. 
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69 
 
position, he had had the duty to act and he was held responsible for his failure to 
fulfil that duty.201 
In the Justice case202, Joel – the Nazis’ General Public Prosecutor203- was 
held responsible pursuant to CR. The Tribunal stated that “[i]t was his task to 
supervise the work of all prosecutors assigned to his office”204. In other words, it 
was Joel’s duty to control his staff, which he failed to do: he was thus found 
responsible for the resultant crimes. The superior’s duty to act was weighed against 
his ability to act; and this was further illustrated through the Ministries case’s 
judgment. Gottlob Berger, as the Chief of the Main Office for State Security (SSHA 
– Staatssicherheitshauptamt)205 was charged with crimes committed by 
examiners (subordinates) in their “racial examinations”.206 Those examiners were 
assigned to carry out those examinations by RuSHA (SS Rasse- und 
Siedlungshauptamt/SS Race and Settlement Main Office.). Thus, they were under 
the control of the RuSHA and not the SSHA. Accordingly, the Tribunal acquitted 
Berger, as he lacked the material ability to control those subordinates.207  
Indeed, commanders’ positions are essential factors in determining their 
duties and responsibilities under CR. International law generally stated that the 
commander is obliged to command and to be responsible for his subordinates.208 
However, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, for the purpose of articulating CR, 
interpreted the extent of such duties and responsibilities by resorting to the 
military system and values. The tribunals accordingly derived and illustrated the 
sub-duties required for the commander to excise command.  
 
E) Boundaries of developing the nature of CR:- 
 
According to the interpretation of the IMTFE CR as a form of responsibility 
could occur as a result of a failure to create the required system (the failure to take 
                                                          
201 Ibid 193-4.  
202 The Justice Trial was against sixteen German “judges and prosecutors” for crimes committed 
through “legislative or judicial acts”. Law Report, Vol. VIII, 56. 
203 Justice case, Volume III, 1135. 
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measures to prevent crimes)209, or of a fault regarding the sufficiency of that 
system, that ultimately resulted from an omission of the duty to command. Thus, 
the Tribunal found General H. Kimura, Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Area 
Army, responsible in accordance with CR.210  
 
Even though he had issued and passed an order to his subordinates to 
maintain the care of prisoners, the Tribunal held him responsible (as a result of his 
failure to control) for the offences committed by his troops because of his failure to 
maintain an effective system.211 This interpretation of CR by the IMTFE expanded 
the application of this doctrine; however, this was controversial for the lack of an 
established test for examining the commander’s ability to control.212  
 
Interpretation was an essential tool for articulating the nature and 
requirements of CR. The three elements, (values, custom and criminal 
responsibility) of the nature of CR, just started to crystallise through these judicial 
developments. Nevertheless, the implementation of CR was more problematic for 
the Japanese superiors. Two trials against Japanese superiors were, however, 
important for both their interpretation and their implementation of CR.213 
 
i) Hirota:- 
Koki Hirota served as Japanese Foreign Minister between 1933 and 1936 
before he was appointed Prime Minister until 1937, when the Government 
collapsed. After that, the Konoye government took over and again Hirota was 
appointed Foreign Minister until May 1938. The Tribunal charged him under 
Count 55,214 in respect of the offences committed in Nanking, or Nanjing, between 
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December 1937 and February 1938 (also known as the Nanking, or Nanjing, 
Massacre).215 
Although Hirota admitted knowledge of those crimes, he argued that the 
Minister of War had been responsible for those issues and that he, Hirota, had 
acted effectively in requesting the Minister of War to prevent these atrocities.216 
The Tribunal concluded that he should have urged the Cabinet to prevent these 
offences and that; ultimately, he did not take the necessary measures to prevent 
them.217 Accordingly, the majority opinion of the Tribunal convicted Hirota and 
sentenced him to death by hanging for those crimes.218  
 
However, Judge Röling, in his dissenting opinion, argued that Hirota more 
precisely had fulfilled his duties properly and that the evidence showed that he had 
taken the necessary measures which were open to him to prevent the crimes.219 
Judge Röling also argued that the effect of the Tribunal’s majority ruling would be 
to hold a Foreign Minister responsible for crimes which had been out of his duty 
and ability to control.220 He argued that the defendant, based on his authority, had 
reacted immediately and urged the Minister of War to prevent atrocities and 
control the Japanese troops; therefore the Minister of War instead should be 
charged on those factual grounds.221 In other words, the material ability to control 
should have been the boundary (or the test) for the liability under CR. Therefore, 
Hirota’s liability under CR was problematic, particularly because he did act in 
accordance with his material ability.222 Thus, Judge Röling adequately argued that 
this charge “was too broad, and led to unjust convictions”.223 
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ii) The Trial of Toyoda:-224 
This case was against Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the Commander of the 
Japanese Combined Fleet in 1945. The defendant was tried before a Military 
Commission created under the authority of General MacArthur similar to that 
which had tried Yamashita, but Toyoda was acquitted.225 This Commission’s 
presiding judge was an Australian military officer and the Tribunal included a law 
practitioner. Toyoda was charged with “wilful and unlawful disregard and failure 
to discharge his duties by ordering and permitting the unlawful interment, 
mistreatment, abuse, starvation, torture and killing of prisoners of war”.226  
 
The Commission required that, in the event of large-scale atrocities during 
war time, such a commander must know, at least constructively, about his troops’ 
activities on the battlefield.227 The Commission concluded that:- 
 
“In the simplest language it may be said that this Tribunal believes the 
principle of command responsibility to be that, if this accused knew, or 
should by the exercise of ordinary diligence have learned, of the 
commission by his subordinates, immediate or otherwise, of the atrocities 
proved beyond a shadow of a doubt … and, by his failure to take any action 
to punish the perpetrators, permitted the atrocities to continue, he has 
failed in his performance of his duty as a commander and must be 
punished.”228 
      
It then suggested, however, CR to be comparable with a dereliction of duty and 
ruled that:-  
“In determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, charged with 
dereliction of his duty as a commander, consideration must be given to 
many factors. The theory is simple, its application is not”.229 
 
It seems, therefore, that the Tribunal in Toyoda applied this form of liability too 
narrow in comparison with Hirota too broad implementation. More precisely, 
                                                          
224 Cf. Čelebići TC, para 339.   
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Toyoda confused CR, being a form of liability for underlying crimes, with the mere 
dereliction of duty that is per se a requirement, among others, for CR.230 Thus 
these two cases may be used to generally define the boundaries of developing CR. 
In that sense, CR should not be interpreted too vague, too narrow or too broad. 
Note that this conclusion in Toyoda did not require the commander directly to 
punish a perpetrator of criminal acts; instead it obliged the commander to take 
action to ensure that the perpetrator should be punished.231   
 
3. Conclusion:- 
 
This chapter examined the creation of CR as an applicable form of 
international criminal liability. It illustrated the establishment of CR as a distinct 
form of responsibility, resulting from judges’ interpretations rather than from 
states’ codifications under ICL. CR was implemented in Yamashita, then 
developed by the IMTs’ judgments, which resulted in the gradual crystallisation of 
its customary nature and requirements. The requirements were perceived 
eventually, in terms of identity, to be integrated as follows: (1) the commission of 
crime(s), (2) subordination, (3) knowledge, (4) failure to act, and (5) causation.   
 
Yamashita was problematic because of the failure to clarify the nature of 
CR, as the judgment relied on the ‘military values’ and ‘customary rules’ elements 
to hold the accused responsible for subordinates’ crimes. Due to the domination of 
military values over CR, nationally and internationally at that time, it was 
perceived that, under CR, commanders should be held responsible, as accomplices, 
for crimes committed by subordinates. Clarifying the nature and requirements of 
CR at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals was, therefore, the main reason for the 
use of interpretation by judges. The three elements (military values, customary 
rules and criminal responsibility) of the nature of CR were accordingly interpreted, 
simultaneously, to articulate and implement this doctrine as a form of criminal 
liability.    
 
                                                          
230 This finding was the core argument for re-characterising CR. See Chapter 4 (n 143). Halilović 
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The judges found that, under international law and the rules of customary 
law, commanders were generally responsible for their subordinates. To interpret 
this general customary rule, however, they resorted to military laws and values – 
being the source of this customary rule - to specify the meaning of such a rule and 
the associated responsibility. This was mainly through the commander’s three 
values of duty, responsibility and leadership. The nature of the crimes committed 
(being contrary to international law) required a different method to interpret the 
associated forms of responsibility. Judges illustrated, therefore, that criminal 
liability, to be upheld internationally, required both moral and legal elements of 
violation, when structuring the applicable law. This was also the result of resorting 
to the common military laws and values.   
 
It was therefore concluded that a commander’s failure to control 
subordinates can establish the commander’s criminal responsibility for the crimes 
resulting from this failure to act. The tribunals then articulated the requirements 
of such a responsibility and derived them from those duties and sub-duties 
attached to the position of command. They resorted, therefore, to the military 
systems’ values to interpret the extent of implementing these duties. The sui 
generis nature of CR is thus attributed to the development of the three elements by 
judges, rather than solely to the establishment of CR under ICL. These three 
elements were interpreted and implemented as an integral part of the nature of 
CR; this doctrine was applied also to non-military superiors, but only to those who 
voluntarily assume command. 
 
The rudimentary nature of ICL, with its lack of clear precedents and 
codified principles, were, however, behind the indefinite boundaries of developing 
CR, which, consequently, were controversial. Nevertheless, the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals were generally consistent about the nature of the liability under 
CR. In the interpretation process, the three elements of the nature of CR were the 
reason for its successful application as a consistent and operative form of 
international criminal responsibility. The following chapter examines whether the 
recent codifications and implementation reflect the threefold nature of CR as 
developed by the post-WWII trials.   
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III. Chapter Three  
Codifying CR and its impact on the sui generis nature of the doctrine 
 
As illustrated above, the doctrine of CR was established and subsequently 
developed through case-law. Essentially, its threefold sui generis nature consists of 
values, custom and criminal elements.1 These three elements developed gradually 
through case-law after the Second World War, forming the nature and 
requirements of CR as a mode of liability. The commander’s duties during armed 
conflict – for the purpose of CR - were also developed through case-law, out of 
military values.2 In fact, precedents for CR – post-WWII - recognised the 
importance of these duties – as part of the sui generis nature of CR3 - from which 
the nature and requirements of CR were deduced. Even so, CR was not considered 
under any international treaty until the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1977 (API). 
This chapter aims to examine the extent of the codification and its impact 
on the threefold nature of CR. The first part of this chapter, therefore, examines 
the extent of the codifications of CR under international law and international 
tribunals’ statutes. It evaluates the consistency of codifying the nature and 
requirements of CR, with the three components of its nature. This is essential for 
the second part, which analyses the implementation of the nature of CR by various 
international criminal courts and tribunals. In doing this, the chapter scrutinises 
(a) the compatibility of these codifications with the threefold nature of 
responsibility under CR; and (b) the consistency of the nature of CR throughout 
the various recent implementations under ICL.  
 
 
                                                          
1 See Chapter 1 (n 12) et seq. See also the discussions in chapter 1. 
2 The Law Report stated that “… all persons are usually equally bound by the general provisions of 
the applicable criminal law. With the international criminal law as it has been developed in recent 
years the position is different. In many instances rules have developed in relation to particular 
categories such as commanding generals and staff officers”. The United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume XV, Digest of Laws and Cases, 1949, 
59. 
3 See Chapter 2 (nn 24, 72, 114 and 160 et seq). 
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1. Codifying the doctrine: Additional Protocol I of 1977:- 
The First and Second World Wars together were one of the most horrific 
events for centuries; nevertheless, the Second was positively a turning point for 
developing the concept of International Community. For instance, the United 
Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recognised the 
need to adopt some binding legislation.4  Several international instruments were 
therefore adopted to uphold (1) peace and security; (2) humanitarian standards; 
(3) international criminal law; and (4) human rights. Nevertheless, CR was not 
integrated as a mode of liability until 19775, when the doctrine was codified by 
Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Convention (API).6  
Generally, treaties are directed to states, to implement and ensure the 
compliance of individuals with their provisions.7 The significance of the API 
evolves from its being another cornerstone of CR since the WWII aftermath. In 
this, the API emphasised commanders’ obligations8 and responsibility for failure 
to exercise duties9, unprecedentedly articulating and regulating them under an 
international treaty.10 Article 86 (2) of the API states that:-  
“The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was 
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from 
penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they 
knew, or had information which should have enabled them to 
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing 
or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all 
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the 
breach.”11 
                                                          
4 Waldemar A. Solj and Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, (1977) 9 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 205, 218-9. 
5 Following WWII the UN adopted, for example, the Genocide Convention of 1948 as well as the 
Geneva Convention of 1949, but neither of them considered Command Responsibility as a 
punishable form of liability.  
6 The adoption of the Additional Protocols was a result of the ‘Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict’ 
operated between 1974 and 1977 by the ICRC. See Igor P. Blishchenko, Adoption of the 1977 
Additional Protocols, (1997) International Review of the Red Cross 320.  
7 The Geneva Convention of 1949, Art. 1, provides that ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’. Therefore, the 
obligation is upon the states’ parties and it was not directed to individuals, as international criminal 
law had not yet been crystallized. 
8 API, Art. 87, ‘Duty of commanders’.  
9 API, Art. 86,  ‘Failure to act’. 
10 Igor P. Blishchenko (n 6); see also Beatrice Onica Jarka, ‘30 Years from the Adoption of 
Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions’ (2008) 15 Lex ET Scientia Int'l J. 23, 23-4. 
11 ‘Failure to act’, Additional Protocol I, Art. 86. 
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This provision is considered a novel development particularly for International 
Humanitarian Law: for instance, the term ‘superior’ explicitly encompasses a 
wider scope of responsibility, including that of non-military commanders.12 
Nevertheless, the provision has been criticised for its lack of clarity in 
defining the nature of the liability.13 Bassiouni, for instance, argued for the 
inclusion of “from responsibility” instead “from penal or disciplinary 
responsibility” at the time of drafting the API.14 However, even with such 
amendment, the question will still be, for what will commanders actually be held 
responsible? In fact, this question of the nature of responsibility was the most 
problematic issue, (one that was eventually resolved only through resorting to the 
Yamashita Trial, IMTs’ trials and military codes and values during this drafting)15.  
The ICRC published a non-binding commentary document to clarify the 
meaning of the API provisions. First, it emphasised that Art. 86 should be 
considered as a whole, together with Art. 87 in the stage of implementation.16 
Therefore, Art. 86 (1) addressed the role of states in implementing the principle of 
failure to act,17 and Art. 86 (2) defined this principle. Accordingly, Art. 87 
explained commanders’ duties thus: (1) commanders are obliged to “prevent, 
suppress and report” any violations under existing legislation;18 (2) to ensure that 
troops are fully conscious of their obligations;19 (3) the commander should initiate 
                                                          
12 Timothy Wu and Young-Sung Kang, 'Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates: The 
Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogue in United States Law' (1997) 38 Harv. Int’l. 
L. J. 272, 291-2.    
13 The lack of clarifying the nature of CR impacted on states’, such as the Former Yugoslavia, 
incorporation of this article into their national law. Cf. Dragan Jovašević, ‘The Command 
Responsibility in Criminal Law – International Criminal Law and Criminal Law of Republic of 
Serbia’ (2010) 3 Int’l L. Y.B. 39, 42. The provision stated that that “does not absolve his superiors 
from penal or disciplinary responsibility”: this did not specify for what commanders will be held 
responsible. Is it for the crime committed or for his failure to prevent such a crime? However, at the 
time of the codification it seems that this issue was not considered a problem, perhaps because of 
the clear judicial practice and interpretation of the post-WWII trials, as has been observed. See 
Chapter 4 (nn 80 and 115 et seq).  
14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions under the Draft 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949’ (1976-1977) 8 Rutgers-Cam L.J. 
185, 203-4. 
15 See Chapter 4 (n 108 et seq). 
16 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, para 3541  
17 API, Art. 86 (1). provided that: ‘The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall 
repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.’. 
18 API, Art. 87 (1). reads as following: “The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict 
shall require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their 
command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and 
to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.” 
19 API, Art. 87 (2). provided that  “In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting 
Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of 
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any steps necessary to prevent offences from being committed by his 
subordinates20.  
Therefore, commanders are to be held responsible if they know that 
crimes have been committed or are about to be committed which constitute, or 
which may constitute, a violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol. 
Accordingly, that a crime has been committed is not a pre-requisite for CR; but the 
existence of a crime or the potential commission of a crime is essential for a 
jurisdictional assumption.21  
Most importantly, Art. 87 concerning the commander’s duties did not– 
explicitly – oblige commanders to acquire knowledge. Nevertheless, the ICRC 
Commentary provided that, for the commander to be held liable for offences 
committed or about to be committed by subordinates, three conditions have to be 
satisfied to raise the possibility of CR for ‘omission’:- 
“a) the superior concerned must be the superior of that         
      subordinate (“his superiors”); 
b) he knew, or had information which should have enabled 
him to conclude,  that a breach was being committed or 
was going to be committed;  
c) he did not take the measures within his power to prevent 
it.”22       
Thus, it could be argued that these three requirements are accordingly the 
foundation of the contemporary doctrine of CR, as seen later in the ad hoc 
tribunals.23 However, this is not the case with regard to the ICC,24 as it 
corresponded to the post-WWII25 trials in respect of the requirements of causation 
and the commission of a crime. It could be argued, however, that the causation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are 
aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol”. 
20 API, Art. 87 (3). stated that “The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require 
any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to 
commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as 
are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where 
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof”. 
21 The API commentary did not discuss this issue; nevertheless, this issue is potentially 
problematic. See Chapter 5 (nn 11 and 241-245). 
22 Commentary on API, para 3543. 
23 However, they are under ICL currently not limited to these requirements: Art. 28, the ICC.  
24 The ICC, being a treaty, is an evidence of the current status of customary law. See Chapter 4 (nn 
129-130). 
25 Chapter 2 (n 145).   
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the commission of a crime or crimes are requirements inherently deduced as 
general requirements of criminal liability.26  
These provisions successfully - although not fully - codified the 
requirements of CR, especially the problematic ‘mens rea’, the requirement of 
knowledge.27 A duty to acquire information could be regarded as a subsidiary 
obligation under the duty to initiate necessary steps to prevent offences, discussed 
later, below.28 Note that the commander is not obliged to punish perpetrators, but 
rather his duty is limited to “initiate disciplinary or penal actions”.29 Most 
importantly, the articles were vaguely formulated regarding both the nature and 
requirements of the liability, which impacted on the subsequent codifications 
discussed below.  
 
A) The codification in contemporary jurisprudence: Ad Hoc 
Tribunals:- 
The unprecedented event of codifying the modern CR by the API of 1977 
was a notable development of International Law, particularly its criminal and 
humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the codified principles were not tested until the 
creation of the ad hoc Tribunals for (the Former) Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR).  
The violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the 
former Yugoslavia caused the Security Council to establish a special Commission 
in order to investigate the crimes alleged to have been committed in there.30 The 
Security Council requested the Secretary General to establish a tribunal in 
accordance with the Commission’s Report.31 The United Nations Charter permits 
the Security Council to take necessary action to preserve peace; that can include 
establishing Tribunals pursuant to Chapter Seven.32  
                                                          
26 Čelebići para 346.  
27 Weston D. Burnett (Op. cit chapter 2 n 211) 147-8. 
28 Chapter 5 (n 52 et seq). 
29 Article 87 (3). The formulation is still vague as to whether these actions are a means of 
punishment or only of arresting and transferring to judicial jurisdiction. 
30 SC Resolution 780 (1992), under which M. Cherif Bassiouni was the Commission Chairman.  
31 The Security Council request was submitted to the Secretary General in Resolution 808 (1993).  
32 UN Chapter VII, Art. 39 provided that ‘The Security Council shall … decide what measures shall 
be taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security’. 
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The Secretary General, in his Report submitted to the Security Council, 
included a draft Statute.33 The Security Council then established the ICTY by 
Resolution 827 in 1993 for “the prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law”.34 It may be noted that the Security 
Council, in this Resolution, recognised the concept of Victims’ Rights, which was a 
notable development in the implementation of International Human Rights Law.35 
It did not, however, consider the rights of the defence,36 which could be ascribed to 
the predominant international tendency at that time to favour the enhancement of 
victims’ rights.  
The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) was also created, 
by a Resolution in 1994 almost identical to that which had led to the creation of the 
ICTY.37 The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes – including the SCSL – stated that these 
courts were created to prosecute and punish individuals for crimes committed 
under international law, and stated that the purpose of creating such tribunals is 
“to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in” these territories.38  
With regard to CR, both Tribunals’ Statutes identically formulated the 
standard of CR as a separate mode of individual responsibility that derived from 
the API of 1977. Accordingly, Article 7 (3) of the ICTY and 6 (3) of the ICTR 
(concerning the criminal responsibility of individuals) stated that:- 
“The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the 
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not 
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such 
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to 
punish the perpetrators thereof.”39 
                                                          
33 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S/25704. 
34 SC Resolution  827, 25 May 1993, 1. 
35 SC Resolution  827(1993), para 7; stated that ‘the work of the International Tribunal shall be 
carried out without prejudice to the right of victims to seek, through appropriate means, 
compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian law.’ 
36 See discussions in Chapter 6. 
37 SC Resolution 955, 8 November 1994.  
38 See ICTY Art.1, ICTR Art. 1 and SCSL Art. 1.   
39 Art. 7 (3) ICTY and Art. 6(3) ICTR Statutes.  
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It seemed, accordingly, that the API had not been fully adopted in drafting these 
Articles.40 These provisions not only differ in formulations but also lack the 
inclusion of the nature of the criminal responsibility of CR.41 However, the Report 
of the UN Secretary General emphasised that a superior “should also be held 
responsible for failure to prevent a crime or to deter the unlawful behaviour of his 
subordinates”.42  
Note that the purpose of creating the ad hoc tribunals - abovementioned - 
was to prosecute individual responsible for the serious violation (the underlying 
crimes); nonetheless, the report of the UN Secretary General suggested the 
prosecution for a dereliction of a duty to prevent, which is contrary to the 
customary nature of CR43 and to the purpose of creating the ad hoc tribunals. 
Nevertheless, the Report explicitly defined CR as liability for omission, 
stating that it is a “responsibility for failure to prevent”.44 Additionally, the UN 
Secretary General’s Report provided the conditions for this doctrine to be 
established. These requirements are in accordance with those specified in the 
API.45 The UN International Law Commission (ILC), in the Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1991, and then in 1996, regarding 
Responsibility of the superior, said that:-  
 
“The fact that a crime against the peace and security of 
mankind was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his 
superiors of criminal responsibility, if they knew or had reason 
to know, in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate 
was committing or was going to commit such a crime and if 
                                                          
40 The formulations were not identical, although in the API Article 86 (2) used the similar meaning 
that, if a violation is committed by a subordinate, this ‘does not absolve’ his superior; and the ad 
hoc tribunals’ provisions provided that a breach committed by a subordinate ‘does not relieve’ his 
superior.   
41 Cf. Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (CUP 2005) 319. 
42 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S/25704, para 56.  
43 Ibid para. 35. Note that this report required the tribunal to only apply rules of customary law. See 
Chapter 4 (n 96).  
44 Ibid.    
45 Ibid. Paragraph 56 provided that the responsibility standard is to be invoked ‘... if the person in 
superior authority knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit or had 
committed crimes and yet failed to take the necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or repress 
the commission of such crimes or to punish those who had committed them’. 
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they did not take all necessary measures within their power to 
prevent or repress the crime.”46 
The ILC – in its Commentary - after citing the Hague Conventions,  
referred to the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments to illustrate this form of liability 
and emphasised duties of significance to the nature and requirements of CR.47 For 
instance, this Commentary on the ILC referred, inter alia, to the Hostage Trial 
conclusion that “a corps commander must be held responsible for the acts of his 
subordinate commanders in carrying out his order and for acts which the corps 
commander knew or ought to have known about”.48 The ILC Commentary also 
stated that the commander “incurs criminal responsibility for the failure to act 
only when there is a legal obligation to act”.49  
On the one hand, this could be considered as a restriction of the liability 
solely to individuals who have official duties known as the de jure command rather 
than individuals who possess material ability to act.50 On the other, it could be 
argued that requiring legal obligation to act, does not exclude superiors who 
voluntarily assume the position of command from responsibility attached to such 
position.51 It rather asserts the importance of duties to the nature and 
requirements of CR and the relationship between the doctrine and the concept of 
responsible command.52 
This corresponded also to the Final Report of the ICTY Commission, that 
“the Commission is satisfied with the principles provided in Article 7, ICTY”.53 
However, the Experts’ Final Report suggested that CR is principally relevant to 
military commanders rather than to civilian superiors. Nevertheless, the Experts’ 
Report recommended that, if this standard of liability is to be applied against 
civilian superiors, some conditions should be considered differently.54 Therefore, it 
provided that CR “is directed primarily at military commanders because such 
                                                          
46 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, Article 6; see also Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1991, Article 12. 
47 Draft Code 1996, 25-6. 
48 Ibid 25.   
49 Ibid.   
50 Mettraux arguing that the ad hoc tribunals contradicted the ILC by establishing the de facto 
command standard. Mettraux (2009) 143.  
51 See Chapter 2 (nn 121 and 186 et seq). 
52 See (n 162).  
53 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780 (1992), UN Doc. S/1994/674, para 56. 
54 Ibid para 57. The Commission did not explicitly state the conditions to be applied, but it 
suggested that ‘certain circumstances’ might exist in which non-military superiors could be held 
liable pursuant to the Command Responsibility doctrine.  
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persons have a personal obligation to ensure the maintenance of discipline among 
troops”.55 Such personal obligation, attached primarily to military commanders, is 
to be deduced from military laws and values.  
The above-mentioned codifications were not able fully to acknowledge the 
multiple nature of CR.56 Thus, it appeared inconsistent regarding the nature of the 
doctrine; this could be ascribed to the missing balance between elements of this 
threefold nature: values, customs and criminality. These codifications focused to 
illustrate mainly the criminality element in conjunction with only the customary 
element through explaining the conditions or requirements of CR. As a result, its 
nature was missing, as they failed to specify whether commanders’ responsibility 
was for their own failure or for the crimes of subordinates. This had an impact on 
the implementation of CR, as will be illustrated below.57 Other international 
criminal tribunals’ provisions were affected accordingly.  
 
B) Other International Tribunals:-   
The ad hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda were adopted as the 
model in drafting other tribunals’ statutes.58 Accordingly, the majority of the 
subsequent tribunals followed the ICTY/ICTR codification of CR. The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) Statute,59 The Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)60 and The East Timor Special Panels included 
provisions concerning CR.61 These provisions are largely similar to the ad hoc 
                                                          
55 Ibid; see also Chapter 1 (nn 58-68).   
56 As mentioned above in the Additional Protocol discussion, these problems were mainly about the 
vagueness of the nature of culpability and the requirement of causation.  
57 See (n 159 et seq). 
58 This is with the exception of the STL (n 63). 
59 The SCSL Statute, Article 6 (3). “The fact that any of the acts referred to in  Articles 2 to 4 of the 
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal 
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit 
such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” 
60 ECCC, Article 29: “The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of 
this law were committed by a subordinate does not relieve the superior of personal criminal 
responsibility if the superior had effective command and control or authority and control over the 
subordinate, and the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators.” 
61 The ETSP, Section 16, UNTAET/REG/2000/15, 6 June 2000:  “… the fact that any of the acts 
referred to in the said Sections 4 to 7 was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior 
of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”  
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tribunals’ formulation, which corresponds to the international influence of the ad 
hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, especially that of the ICTY. However, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)62 has adopted different language in presenting the 
principle of CR that corresponded to the ICC formulation.63  
 
C) The International Criminal Court (ICC):- 
 
The ad hoc Tribunals indeed paved the way for the creation of other 
tribunals or special courts: that alone is commendable. Nevertheless, there was a 
great need to establish an international criminal court, with the scale of atrocities 
growing globally. The UN therefore established a Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, from 1996.64 The UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) created a Diplomatic Conference for the purpose of establishing 
an international criminal court.65 This Conference concluded in 1998 with the 
Final Report in favour of the establishment of the present ICC.66 Accordingly, the 
Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted as a Treaty and came into force on 1 July 
2002.67 
 
CR was initially proposed to be drafted under Article 25 (Article 28 
currently) of the Rome Statute as the “Responsibility of [commanders] [superiors] 
for acts of [forces under their command] [subordinates]”.68 The Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
noted that “[m]ost delegations were in favour of extending the principle of 
                                                          
62 The STL was established under Security Council Resolution 1664, 29 March 2006.  
63 The STL Statute, Article 3 (2). 
64 See <http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=prepcommittee> accessed 1 May 2013; see also the Report 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/50/22.   
65 The UNGA Resolution 51/207 of 17 December 1996. 
66 Final Act of The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, done at Rome on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/10. [Final Act of The Diplomatic Conference of the ICC] hereinafter. 
67 See <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx> accessed 1 May 
2013. 
68 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Reports and other documents, Volume III, A/CONF. 183/13 (Vol. 
III), 15 June - 17 July 1998, 32. [The UN Diplomatic Conference of the ICC, (Vol. III)] hereinafter. 
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command responsibility to any superior”.69 CR was drafted originally under Art. 25 
(Art. 28 now) as follows:- 
 
“[In addition to other forms of responsibility for crimes under this Statute, a 
[commander] [superior] is criminally responsible]. [A [commander] [superior] is not 
relieved of responsibility] for crimes under this Statute committed by [forces] 
[subordinates] under his or her command [or authority] and effective control as a result of 
the [commander’s] [superior’s] failure to exercise properly this control where:-  
(a) The [commander] [superior] either knew, or [owing to the widespread 
commission of the offences] [owing to the circumstances at the time] should 
have known, that the [forces] [subordinates] were committing or intended to 
commit such crimes; and 
(b)  The [commander] [superior] failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission [or 
punish the perpetrators thereof]”.70  
 
CR under this initial Article was drafted consistently with the customary 
nature of CR. This can be observed through its emphasis that: (a) CR is a form of 
responsibility; (b) this responsibility is criminal; (c) both military personnel and 
civilians alike can be held to account under this form of responsibility for their 
subordinates’ crimes; and (d) this responsibility is established as a result of failure 
to exercise duties attached to the position of command.71 The requirements of CR 
under this Article appear to be generally consistent with those under the 
customary form of CR. 
 
The requirements of CR were also drafted consistently for both military and 
civilians alike.72 This supports this thesis’ argument that the determinate factor is 
not whether the accused was military or civilian, rather it is whether an accused 
assumed voluntarily the position of command.73 The mens rea requirement 
                                                          
69 The UN Diplomatic Conference of the ICC, Vol. III (32 at footnote 78).  
70 The UN Diplomatic Conference of the ICC, (Vol. III), 32. 
71 This customary nature originated from the precedents following WWII. See the discussions in 
Chapter 2. For the nature of CR under the ICC, see Robert Cryer, ‘General Principles of Liability in 
International Criminal Law’, in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds.), The 
Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart Publishing 2004) 257-
261. 
72 The voluntary assumption of the position of command is the reason for holding a civilian 
superior criminally responsible similarly to a military commander, pursuant to CR doctrine. See 
Chapter 2 (nn 185-195).  
73 Ibid. It emphasises instead that the determinate factor is whether the alleged accused 
commander had voluntarily assumed the position of command. Cf. Yaël Ronen, ‘Superior 
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specified, for instance, that the accused superior may be responsible if, “owing to 
the widespread commission of the offences [or] owing to the circumstances at the 
time”, he/she knew or should have known about the crime(s) committed.74 The 
‘should have known’ standard and the widespread element of the subordinates’ 
crimes were recognised as essential features of the mens rea requirement under 
the customary nature of CR.75  
  
However, CR, as drafted initially under Article 25, was re-drafted later on, 
in accordance with an amendment proposed by the delegation of the United 
States.76 This suggested a separation between the responsibility of military 
commanders and that of civilian superiors under the principle of CR. The 
delegation’s reason for this separation was “because of the very different rules 
governing criminal punishment in civilian and military organization”.77 Note that 
the customary status of CR was not discussed during the process of codifying CR 
under the ICC. This lack of examination seems to be the reason that other 
delegations supported the US proposal. Therefore, the original formulation of CR 
under Art. 25, which was consistent with customary law, was replaced by the 
current formulation under Art. 28. 
 
Accordingly, the ‘responsibility of commanders and other superiors’ 
provided, under Art. 28 of the ICC Statute, that:- 
 
“In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:- 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Responsibility of Civilians for International Crimes Committed in Civilian Settings’ (2010) 43 Vand. 
J. Transnat’l L. 313, 347. 
74 See supra (n 70); see also Major James D. Levine II, ‘The Doctrine of Command Responsibility 
and its Application to Superior Civilian Leadership: Does the International Criminal Court Have 
the Correct Standard?’ (2007) 193 Mil. L. Rev. 52, 94-95. 
75 See Chapter 2 (nn 56, 64 and 72) regarding widespread commission and Chapter 2 (nn 151-176) 
regarding the ‘should have known’ standard. 
76 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Volume II, A/CONF. 183/13 (Vol. II), 15 June - 17 July 1998, 
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1, 136. 
77 Ibid. The US delegation added that the “main difference between civilian supervisors and military 
commanders lay in the nature and scope of their authority. The latter’s authority rested on the 
military discipline system, which had a penal dimension, whereas there was no comparable 
punishment system for civilians in most countries”. Note that this argument is partly incorrect, as a 
civilian superior would be held responsible under CR only if he or she was in a position of 
command and only when those under his/her command committed crimes against international 
law.  
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(a) A military commander, or person effectively acting as a military commander, 
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or 
effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure 
to exercise control properly over such forces, where:-   
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to 
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress 
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such subordinates, where:- 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded, 
information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing 
or about to commit such crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and  
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or 
to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.”78  
 
This is indeed the most comprehensive provision concerning CR as a ground on 
the basis of which to hold superiors criminally responsible for crimes committed 
by subordinates.79 Mettraux, for instance, argued that this is the only provision 
fully and explicitly to consider the requirements of CR one-by-one.80 Karsten, in 
                                                          
78 Rome Statute, Art. 28. 
79 See Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (3rd 
edn., CUP 2014) 395; see also William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court (4th. edn., CUP 2012) 233; Cf. Alejandro Kiss, ‘Command Responsibility under Article 28 of 
the Rome Statute’, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal 
Court (OUP 2015) 609-610; cf. also Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law (OUP 2016) 
332.  
80 Mettraux (2009) 24. This could be ascribed to the fact that the ICC is a treaty base and 
comprehensive provisions would encourage more states to ratify. 
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contrast, described Art. 28 as being “long and complicated”.81 The latter 
description is, however, inaccurate.  
 
In fact, Art. 28 recognised, first, the doctrine of CR as a separate form of 
liability for omission (failure to act). It then provided an extensive definition, most 
probably to maintain clarity and to avoid ambiguity, and to confirm the nature of 
the responsibility under the doctrine of CR. Accordingly, commanders are 
responsible for the crimes of subordinates only if they fail to control their troops. 
Art. 28 then specifies the conditions required for such liability.82 Interestingly, Art. 
28, when extending the liability to civilians, seems to have adopted the caution 
suggested by the Commission of Experts, although it is not binding on the ICC.83  
This Article was therefore divided into two parts: the first concerns military 
commanders and the second civilian superiors.  
 
On the one hand, this separation between military and civilian superiors 
under Art. 28 does not entirely reflect customary law,84 although Art. 28 (a) and 
Art. 28 (b) of the ICC specifically recognised the duty to exercise control as being 
the decisive element in CR of both military and civilian superiors.85 On the other, it 
could be argued that Art. 28 sought to develop the customary nature of CR; thus, a 
sub-provision for civilian superiors was desirable because of the differences 
between the military position and the nature of civilian authority.86 Nonetheless, 
                                                          
81 Cf. Nora Karsten, ‘Distinguishing Military and Non-military Superiors: Reflections on the Bemba 
Case at the ICC’ (2009) 7 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 983, 984. 
82 See Roberta Arnold and Otto Triffterer, ‘Article 28: Responsibility of Commanders and other 
Superiors’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (2nd. edn, C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 807-808. 
83 See (n 54); see also William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on 
the Rome Statute (OUP 2010) 460. 
84 See Roberta Arnold and Otto Triffterer, ‘Article 28: Responsibility of Commanders and other 
Superiors’ in Otto Triffterer and Kia Ambos (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary (3rd edn, C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2016) 1105-1106; see also Robert Cryer 
and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd. edn., CUP 2010) 
393-394; see also Mettraux (2009) 210; also Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (CUP 
2005), 325; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba, Pre-TC II, Amicus Curiae Observations on Superior 
Responsibility Submitted Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-01/05-
01/08, 20 April 2009, para 7. Note that the Amicus Curiae provided that the customary nature of 
CR is to be found in the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, which is contrary to this thesis’ argument.  
85 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-TC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-
01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, para 406. 
86 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Volume II, A/CONF. 183/13 (Vol. II), 15 June - 17 July 1998, 
Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1, 136. This 
is also in line with the personal obligation. See Chap. 1 (n 59). It can be argued that the separation 
was needed to avoid the problems of some precedents. Cf. Hirota (Chap. 2, n 214) et seq. 
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Art. 28 (a) and Art. 28 (b) were both consistent with the customary law of CR for 
charging the accused, being a superior, with crimes committed by subordinates. 
Thus, some aspects of Art. 28 were inconsistent with the customary nature 
of CR, such as the separation between the requirements of military and civilian 
responsibility, whereas other aspects were consistent with customary law.87 
Nevertheless, the ICC approach, of codifying customary rules, appears to be 
generally controversial. Therefore, it is unclear whether the ICC approach 
constitutes a departure from customary law or the developing of customary rules. 
In the case of CR, Art. 28 allows an accused, whether military or civilian, to be 
charged with a crime committed by a subordinate under his/her command, which 
is consistent with the customary law. The separation between military 
commanders’ and civilian superiors’ criteria of responsibility under CR does not, 
however, reflect customary law.  
 
This unclear approach of the ICC in codifying customary law continues to be 
controversial in other rules under the Rome Statute. This can be seen more 
precisely in the case of (Art. 33) the “superior orders” defence. Art. 33 states that:- 
 
“1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a 
person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, 
shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:- 
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the 
superior in question; 
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and 
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity 
are manifestly unlawful.”88 
  
The defence of superior orders under Art. 33 means that the principal perpetrator 
of war crimes can be excluded from criminal responsibility. Under customary law, 
however, the defence of superior order(s) is not permitted, although it can be 
invoked as a mitigating factor in relation to the punishment alone.   
 
                                                          
87 Vetter, for example, because of this partial consistency, argued that CR for military commanders 
under the ICC “is essentially the current customary international law standard”. Greg Vetter, 
‘Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Courts (ICC)’ 
(2000) 25 Yale J. Int’l L. 89, 95. 
88 Rome Statute, Art. 33. 
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The Nuremberg89 and Tokyo90 Tribunals’ Charters, as well as the API91, 
expressly rejected the ‘superior orders defence’. The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes of 
the ICTY92, ICTR93 and the SCSL94 also rejected it. Furthermore, some non-
governmental organisations, such as Amnesty International, have criticised Art. 
33, as being a departure from customary law.95 Nevertheless, these rejections were 
not absolute, as the “superior orders” defence can be invoked only as a ground for 
mitigating punishment. Thus, it can be argued that the ICC standard of the 
“superior orders” defence is partly consistent with the customary law;96 hence, Art. 
33 (2) rejected the defence in relation to genocide or to crimes against humanity. 
 
Accordingly, the ICC approach, of codifying customary rules, appears to be, 
in part, consistent with some aspects of the original customary norms, although 
this approach is controversial, as it does not precisely reflect or express customary 
law. It seems, therefore, that the rationale of the ICC approach is to develop the 
customary law rather than to deviate from, or merely express, the original 
customary rule. 
 
In short, the codification of CR was not consistent throughout its recent 
developments. The API was not consistent with the customary case-law.97 The ad 
hoc tribunals were inconsistent with the API regarding CR as well as the ICC. 
Accordingly, neither the ad hoc tribunals nor the ICC precisely reflected or 
expressed the customary nature of CR. This made it inevitable that the 
implementation of CR would be inconsistent and highly controversial - unless the 
nature of the doctrine were interpreted adequately.  
 
                                                          
89 The Nuremberg Charter, Art. 8 stated that “[t]he fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order 
of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”. 
90 The Tokyo Charter, Art. 6. 
91 See Chapter 1 (nn 60-63). 
92 ICTY Statute, Art. 7 (4) provided that “[t]he fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an 
order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires.”. 
93 ICTR Statute, Art. 6 (4). 
94 SCSL Statute, Art. 6 (4). 
95 Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: Making the right choices – Part V: 
recommendation to the Diplomatic Conference, IOR 40/010/1998, 47. 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/010/1998/en/> accessed on 19 September 2016. 
96 Paola Gaeta, ‘The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court 
versus Customary International Law’ (1999) 10 EJIL 172, 190; see also Lydia Ansermet, ‘Manifest 
Illegality and the ICC Superior Orders Defense: Schuldtheorie Mistake of Law Doctrine as an 
Article 33(1)(c) Panasea’ (2014) 47 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1425, 1452. 
97 Chapter 4 (n 108 et seq). 
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2. The impact of codifications on the nature of command 
responsibility:- 
 
Although codified internationally, CR became more problematic, as these 
codifications are inconsistent regarding the formulation of CR. It seemed 
inevitable, therefore, that the application of CR would be controversial. As a result, 
it became debatable whether a commander would be held responsible only for his 
failure to act (dereliction of duty); or for the crimes committed by his subordinates 
(a form of liability).98   
 
As argued here, however, the question should be whether various 
international criminal courts’ formulation, interpretation and implementation 
were accurate; whether the ICC’s and the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretations were 
consistent with the true sui generis nature of CR; and whether the practices of the 
ICC and of the ad hoc tribunals - regarding CR – were consistent and in 
accordance with the legality principle.99 
 
 
A) CR at the ICC: (the Bemba case):-  
 
The ICC is required to apply ‘in the first place’ the Rome Statute.100 As 
discussed above, Art. 28 of the ICC’s Statute is the most comprehensive provision 
of CR under International Law. Although the formulation of Art. 28 does not 
precisely reflect customary law, the ICC is bound to apply its Statute. Most 
importantly, as a result of the clear and comprehensive formulation of CR under 
                                                          
98 Volker Nerlich, ‘Superior Responsibility Under Article 28 ICC Statute: For What Exactly is the 
Superior Held Responsible?’ (2007) 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 665; Elies van Sliedregt, ‘Article 28 of the 
ICC Statute: Mode of Liability and /or Separate Offense’ (2009) 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 420; Scott 
James Meyer, ‘Responsibility for an Omission? Article 28 of the ICC Statute on Command 
Responsibility’ (2011) 8 Miskolc J. Int’l L. 27; see also Christine Bishai, ‘Superior Responsibility, 
Inferior Sentencing: Sentencing Practice at the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2013) 11 Nw. U. 
J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 84. 
99 The majority of scholars assume that the ad hoc tribunals’ implementation is in accordance with 
the customary law as well as customary precedents. Cf. Gregory Bart, ‘Special Operations Forces 
and Responsibility for Surrogates’ War Crimes’ (2014) 5 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 513, 516; see also 
William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th. edn., CUP 2012) 233-
235; see also  supra (n 98). 
100 Rome Statute, Art. 21 (1) (a). 
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Art. 28, the principle of interpretation for the purpose of developing ambiguous 
rules is unlikely to be used for CR under the ICC.101 
The first elaboration on CR at the ICC was in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision on confirming the charges against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo [Bemba]. 
Bemba was the President of the rebel Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) 
and Commander-in-Chief of its military wing the Armée de Libération du Congo 
(ALC).102 Bemba was charged under Art. 28 (a) alone for the crimes committed by 
MLC troops in the Central African Republic (CAR).103 The court, in its 
interpretation of the nature of responsibility under Art. 28, confirmed that CR is a 
criminal liability for omission, by failing to fulfil the duty to act.104 It then 
emphasised that, under CR, the accused is charged for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court (i.e. war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) 
committed by subordinates.105  
In March 2016, the Trial Chamber delivered its judgment in Bemba. It 
confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s interpretation of CR under Art. 28 (a) and  
ruled that for such responsibility the following requirements must be proved: (a) 
that crimes under the Rome Statutes have been committed by forces; (b) that the 
accused was the forces’ commander; (c) that the accused   had effective command 
over these forces; (d) that the accused either knew or should have known about the 
forces’ crimes; (e) that the accused failed to take necessary measures to prevent, 
repress or report the commission of such crimes; and (f) that these crimes were 
committed as a result of the accused’s failure properly to exercise control over the 
relevant forces.106    
                                                          
101 Cf. Lou Ann Bohn, ‘Proceeding with Caution under Article 28: An Argument to Exempt Non-
Governmental Civilians from Prosecution on the basis of Command Responsibility’ (2004) 1 Eyes 
on the ICC 1, 13. 
102 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-TC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-
01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, paras 453-458; see also Johan D. Van Der Vyver, ‘Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba’ (2010) 104 AM. J. Int’l L. 241. 
103 Bemba Pre-TC 2009, para 501. 
104 Bemba Pre-TC 2009, para 405. 
105 Ibid. para 407; see also Chantal Meloni, ‘Command Responsibility, Joint Commission and 
‘Control over the Crime’ Approach in the First ICC Jurisprudence’, in Triestino Mariniello (ed.), 
The International Criminal Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity (Routledge 2015) 45-47. 
106 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, TC III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, para 170. Cf. the discussions in Chapter 5 regarding the 
requirements of CR by the ad hoc tribunals.   
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The Trial Chamber then highlighted the debate in the literature;107 and 
stated that “[w]hile there has been considerable debate regarding the precise 
nature of superior responsibility, the Chamber concurs with the Pre-Trial Chamber 
that Article 28 provides for a mode of liability, through which superiors may be 
held criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by his or her subordinates”.108 Note that this is consistent with the 
customary nature of CR as formulated in the customary precedents. The UN 
Secretary-General, for instance, re-affirmed the nature of responsibility under CR 
and commented that the TC judgment “sends a strong signal that commanders will 
be held responsible for international crimes committed by those under their 
authority”.109 
The Chamber then noted - in response to the defence regarding the 
defendant’s lack of ‘unity of command’ - that “there is an overlap between factors 
relevant to assessing (i) the status of someone effectively acting as a military 
commander, and (ii) a person’s effective authority and control”.110 The Chamber 
therefore relied on the interpretation of the Popović case regarding the differences 
between the military principle of ‘unity of command’ and the assessment of 
effective control.111 The Chamber therefore concluded that evidence showed that 
Bemba had maintained effective command over the MLC troops.112  
It then stated that the evidence showed that Bemba knew about the crimes 
committed, via direct, as well as indirect, communications. The direct 
communications were through radios, satellite phones and mobile telephones, as 
well as through his having visited a number of the sites of those crimes.113 The 
indirect communications were through appointed commanders such as Colonel 
                                                          
107 The Trial Chamber referred to: Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (2nd. 
edn, 2009) 187 to 197; Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law (OUP 2013), Vol. 1,  
189 to 197; Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility in International Criminal Law (2010) 191 to 
207; Guénaël Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (2009),  37 to 95; and Otto Triffterer, 
“Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors”, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd. edn, C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 815 to 
822.  
108 Bemba TC 2016, para 171. 
109 United Nations (UN), ‘Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson of the Secretary-General on 
Judgement of the International Criminal Court regarding Jean-Pierre Bemba’, 22 March 2016, 
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-03-22/statement-attributable-
spokesperson-secretary-general-judgment> accessed 30 September 2016. 
110 Bemba TC 2016, para 696. 
111 Bemba TC 2016, para 698; see also Popović TC, paras 2023-2026. 
112 The Chamber accepted a range of evidence such as ‘maintaining direct contact with senior 
commanders in the field, receiving numerous detailed reports and providing logistical support or 
equipment to the MLC’ troops. Bemba 2016, paras 700-705. 
113 Bemba TC 2016, para 707-710. 
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Mondonga and Colonel Moustapha, who had operated under the orders of 
Bemba.114   
The Chamber then noted that Bemba had established the Mondonga 
Inquiry to investigate the commission of crimes by troops under his command.115 
The Inquiry resulted in a formal prosecution on minor charges of pillaging small 
sum of money.116 The Chamber found that this Inquiry “did not address the 
responsibility of commanders, and the investigations did not question the suspects 
about the crimes of murder and did not pursue reports of rape”.117 The Chamber 
noted also that Bemba had established “the Zongo Commission in light of public 
allegations of murder, rape, and pillaging by MLC” troops.118 
The Chamber found, however, that “there is no evidence that any action, 
including by Mr. Bemba, was taken to pursue leads uncovered during the Zongo 
Commission’s investigations”.119 The Chamber therefore decided that “the 
measures Mr. Bemba took were a grossly inadequate response to the consistent 
information of widespread crimes committed by MLC soldiers in the CAR of which 
Mr. Bemba had knowledge”.120 The Chamber asserted therefore that Bemba’s 
“primary intention was not to genuinely take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his material ability to prevent or repress the commission of 
crimes, as was his duty”.121  
The Chamber established thus that “had Mr. Bemba taken [necessary or 
reasonable measures], the crimes would have been prevented or would not have 
been committed in the circumstances in which they were”.122 Accordingly, the 
Chamber held proved all of the requirements for CR and concluded that “Mr 
Bemba is criminally responsible under Article 28(a) for the crimes against 
humanity of murder and rape, and the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging 
committed by his forces”.123   
                                                          
114 Bemba TC 2016, para 712 and 217. 
115 Bemba TC 2016, para 711. 
116 Bemba TC 2016, para 720.  
117 Bemba TC 2016, para 589.  
118 Bemba TC 2016, para 722. 
119 Bemba TC 2016, para 722. 
120 Bemba TC 2016, para 727.  
121 Bemba TC 2016, para 728; Cf. Chapter 5 (nn 158-168). The AC in Hadžihasanović 
controversially concluded that disciplinary measures are sufficient to fulfil the duty to act, which is 
contrary to the ICL purpose and the requirements of CR that only necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent crimes may be counted.   
122 Bemba TC 2016, para 741.  
123 Bemba TC 2016, para 742. 
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In 21 June 2016, the Trial Chamber reached its decision on sentence of Mr. 
Bemba. During this, the prosecution argued for no less than 25 years of 
imprisonment for the accused. The defence, however, argued that “a sentence 
outside the range of 12 to 14 years of imprisonment would infringe Mr. Bemba’s 
rights”.124 The Chamber, after balancing the mitigating and aggravating factors, 
sentenced Mr. Bemba to 18 years of imprisonment pursuant to Article 28(a), for 
crimes committed by his subordinates.125  
This most recent case under ICL about CR is of great value and 
importance not only for the ICC but more precisely for the doctrine of CR in 
international criminal law.126 It contains the answers for the controversial issues 
regarding the nature of CR as well as the requirements of such responsibility.127 It 
responded also to the controversy over the precise nature of the responsibility 
under CR and the criticisms that Art. 28 is inconsistent with the ad hoc tribunals’ 
practice of CR.128 The following discussions examine the consistency of the ad hoc 
tribunals’ judgments and their decisions on CR.  
 
B) Re- characterising the nature of CR:-  
Under the API and the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes, CR was briefly 
formulated. This impacted on the standard of clarity regarding the nature and 
requirements of CR in comparison with, for instance, Article 28 of the ICC. In this 
Mettraux, for example, addresses the ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes as the 
“skeletons”.129 Accordingly, these skeletons need to be covered by the flesh, which 
means to be generally developed through interpretation. This corresponded to the 
IMT stating that:- 
 
                                                          
124 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, TC III, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of 
the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 June 2016, para 90. 
125 Bemba, Decision on Sentence, para 95. 
126 See Janine Natalya Clark, ‘The First Rape Conviction at the ICC: An Analysis of the Bemba 
Judgement’ (2016) 14 JICJ 667, 687. 
127 Cf. Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Pre-Trail Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges 
against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, 12 June 2014, para 262-263; Cf. also Prosecutor v. 
Dominic Ongwen, Pre-Trail Chamber II, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic 
Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, 23 March 2016, para 146. In these two cases the Chambers provided 
the controversial interpretation of Article 28 that the responsibility under CR is for violation of 
duties in relation to the underlying crime. Such interpretation was corrected by this recent 
judgment in Bemba.  
128 Cf. Kia Ambos, ‘Critical Issues in the Bemba Conformation Decision’ (2009) 22 LJIL 715, 721. 
129 Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (OUP 2005) 5. 
96 
 
“This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a 
changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express 
and define for more accurate reference the principles of law already 
existing”.130   
 
Although in the process of codifying an already existing customary law, minor 
differences might occur, the substance of that law should always be maintained. 
Once the substance is changed, the law is regarded as ex post facto (retroactive), 
violating the principle of legality.131 Thus, the interpretation of rules of an 
applicable law is governed by the legality principle under (international) criminal 
law, so the purpose of interpretation is developing the law and never creating a 
new law. 
In this context, the IMT stated that the Laws and Customs of War neither 
adequately articulated the nature of responsibility nor were there courts for 
interpreting those rules.132 Thus, the IMT Charters demanded such a mechanism 
for interpretation.133 Although this reasoning for the IMTs was sufficient to 
develop the law and primarily to avoid lacunae, that cannot be deemed to have 
been so for the ad hoc tribunals – especially regarding CR. This is because CR has 
evolved and been interpreted through the customary precedents. Thus it forms 
what one could regard as the customary nature of CR, which recognised an already 
existing law. In order to develop this customary nature, the process should not 
jeopardise the legality principle to the extent of creating a new law.  
 
i) Developing CR in accordance with its true sui generis nature:-  
 
The IMTs, when they interpreted and developed CR, relied on recognised 
(or common) values for its interpretation: (a) morality as part of establishing 
(customary) international law, and (b) values of military society. Then it 
interpreted the criminal nature of CR in conjunction with the nature of atrocities 
being considered crimes under/against international law as the accused is 
                                                          
130 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
Volume I, 12 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. 221.   
131 See discussions in Chapters 4 & 5, 
132 Law Reports Vol. X, 366. 
133 Chapter 2 (n 109 et seq).  
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punished for these crimes.134 The IMTs’ interpretation of CR was in line with Mr. 
Henry Stimson’s emphasis that:-   
“we must bring our law in balance with the universal moral judgment of 
mankind”.135  
Accordingly, the IMT to some extent combined “the moral duty” and “the legal 
duty” for interpreting forms of criminal responsibility.136 The distinction between 
those two duties brings back the relation between morality and law 
philosophically. Fuller, particularly, argued for the “internal morality” of the 
law,137 which corresponded to the IMTs’ interpretation regarding criminal 
responsibility and CR. In fact, two important values had been essentially 
influential during the interpretation process at the IMT judgments. First, that 
international law is a law of nations deduced from the natural law, stating that the 
history of international wars “proves that such conflicts of necessity tend to 
precede the inner consolidation of states with almost the force of natural law”.138  
Second, its social nature is a fundamental element of natural law,139 thus the 
IMTs to interpret CR resort to some of the military society’s values – mainly duty, 
responsibility and “officership/leadership” - for articulating the nature of the 
doctrine. In this, and particularly for military society, “moral values make up what 
[commanders are] as persons…Failure here is drastic not just unfortunate” that is 
because “the purpose of military, its very existence, is based upon the giving and 
taking of life”.140 It follows that the military values considered “officership” as the 
“executive branch” in every military society.141 According to the concept of 
officership, commanders are to be held responsible for their troops’ acts under CR 
in connection with other ‘personal obligations’ as described by the UN Commission 
of Experts’ Final Report.142     
Interpretation and implementation of CR, thereafter, should be carried out 
through considering not only the nature of international law and the committed 
                                                          
134 See Chapter 2 (n 111 et seq). 
135 Law Reports Vol. X, 110. 
136 Law Reports Vol. X, 401. 
137 See Chapter 1 (n. 92 et seq). 
138 Law Reports Vol. X, 157. This also in accordance with Grotius’ description of natural law “that 
has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity”. H Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in 
International Law’ (1946) 23 Brit Y.B. Inti’l L 1, 7. 
139 Ibid Lauterpacht 24.  
140 Sam C Sarkesian (chapter 1 n 86) 201. 
141 Ibid 204.  
142 See (n 55). 
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crimes, but also of the military values as being the basis of creating the customary 
rules for the nature of CR.  
 
ii) Developing CR by the ad hoc tribunals:- 
 
As illustrated above, IMTs judgements sought to develop vague aspects of 
CR. The IMTs’ interpretation resorted to the three components of the sui generis 
nature of CR. The ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation therefore should be consistent 
with the customary nature of CR to avoid vagueness and particularly the ICTY to 
comply with its applicable law.143 
It is important to reiterate that, in the process of codifying an already 
existing customary law, minor differences might occur; nevertheless, the substance 
of that law should always be maintained. Once the substance is changed, the law is 
regarded as ex post facto (retroactive), violating the principle of legality. As 
highlighted by Christopher Greenwood, “…the codification of a hitherto unwritten 
rule will almost invariably affect the content of the rule. In selecting words to 
codify a customary principle, those responsible for the draft are generally forced to 
try to resolve the ambiguities about the scope and content of that rule and their 
choices may have the effect of creating new ambiguities. Attention in the future 
will focus upon the text so that the scope of the customary rule will tend to become 
a matter of textual interpretation.”144  Interpretation is therefore an essential 
principle needed to clarify ambiguous rules.  
Note that under customary law commanders are obliged to fulfil their 
duties, in the first place as a military value, in that the responsibility is associated 
with the fulfilment of these duties.145 Accordingly, when the commander’s failure 
has resulted in his subordinates committing Crimes under International law, the 
commander will be held criminally responsible for the resultant crimes pursuant to 
CR,146 which is the customary nature of this doctrine as developed by the IMTs.  
 
                                                          
143 The ICTY is obliged to only apply the law “which has beyond doubt become part of international 
customary law”. See chapter 4 (n 96). 
144 Christopher Greenwood, ‘Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols’, in Delissen and 
Gerard Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour 
of Frits Kalshoven (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991) 97. 
145 Chapter 2 (n 135). 
146 Cf. Jamie Allan Williamson, Some Considerations on Command Responsibility and Criminal 
Liability, (2008) 90 International Review of Red Cross 303. 
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C) CR at the ad hoc tribunals:-   
As illustrated above, the ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes were “thin” regarding 
the nature of CR,147 which was the reason for employing interpretation.148 The 
Čelebići case, which was the first case to examine, interpret and implement CR at 
the ad hoc tribunals, stated that CR is a “type of individual responsibility for the 
illegal acts of subordinates”.149 It then stated that:-  
 
“From the text of Article 7 (3) it is thus possible to identify the 
essential elements of command responsibility for failure to act as 
follows:- 
(i) The existence of a superior-subordinate 
relationship; 
(ii) The superior knew or had reasons to know that the 
criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the 
perpetrator thereof.”150    
 
This finding was practically employed as the core precedent to refer to the 
“essential” requirements of CR for the subsequent cases, not only at the ICTY but 
also - although not binding - by the ICTR and the SCSL.151 Note that these three 
requirements alone are not fully in accordance with the customary application of 
the precedent for CR.152 They are, in fact, in accordance with the Commentary on 
the API.153 Moreover, the duty to punish appeared only once in the already existing 
                                                          
147 Fenrick, for example, argued that “Article 7(3) is infelicitously worded”. W Fenrick, ‘Some 
International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’ (1996) 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 103, 111.  
148 Note that the ad hoc tribunals – particularly the ICTY – are obliged to apply only customary law. 
See Chapter 4 (n 96); see also Beatrice Bonafé, ‘Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility’ 
(2007) 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 599, 603. 
149 Čelebići para 331. 
150 Čelebići para 346. These requirements seem to have been deduced from the Commentary’s 
findings rather than the customary cases listed in Čelebići. Cf. supra (n 22). Cf. chapter 4 (n 105 et 
seq). 
151 This can be seen through a number of judgments, Aleksovski TC, para 69; Blaškić TC, para 289; 
Kordić TC, para 401; Halilović TC, para 55; Limaj et al., TC, para 520; also this Judgment has had 
an impact on the ICTR in many cases, see Akayesu TC, para 486; Kayishema and Ruzindana TC, 
paras 208-9; Rutaganda TC, para 31; also this Judgment has had an impact on the SCSL in Alex 
Tamba Brima et al., TCII, paras 782-799; and Issa Hassan Sesay TCI, paras 282-317.  
152 See Chapter 2 (nn 47, 48 & 145). 
153 See (n 22); Cf. also Čelebići, paras 354 and 371. 
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body of customary case law at Toyoda; interestingly, even this single trial did not 
explicitly require the commander to punish offenders.154  
 
The Tribunal then - citing the ILC and API Commentary - stated explicitly 
that CR is a form of omission “that criminal responsibility for omissions is 
incurred only where there exists a legal obligation to act”.155 The Tribunal then – 
controversially – stated that “we conclude that a superior should be held 
responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his material 
possibility. The Trial Chamber accordingly does not adopt the position taken by 
the ILC on this point, and finds that the lack of formal legal competence to take the 
necessary measures to prevent or repress the crime in question does not 
necessarily preclude the criminal responsibility of the superior”.156 
 
In other words, there were two problems; first, after the tribunals 
interpreting CR as a type of individual responsibility for the illegal acts of 
subordinates, it ruled that the commander should be held responsible for failing to 
take such measures. Second, the Tribunal, after resorting to the ILC and API 
Commentary, which stated that only de jure command is culpable under CR as a 
customary norm, contradicts these instruments, creating inconsistency. 
Development of the law is required, but changing the law means violating the 
legality principle. It would have been more appropriate had the Tribunal stated 
that a legal obligation can exist whenever the position of command is voluntarily 
assumed.157  
D) The search for an applicable nature of CR:-  
Note that the Čelebići case for the ICTY case-law is a precedent and that it is 
also perceived as a precedent – although not binding - for other ad hoc tribunals. 
More precisely, the characteristics of CR as a norm of customary law are 
controversially argued to be found in the Čelebići case.158 Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
154 See Chapter 2 (n 231).   
155 Čelebići, para 334. This was confusing also to the subsequent cases at the ICTY. See Aleksovski, 
TC, para 72 (at footnote 106). 
156 Čelebići para 395. 
157 See (n 51).   
158 See, for example, van der Wilt, addressing the Čelebići to be the origin of CR. Harmen van der 
Wilt, ‘Command Responsibility in the Jungle: Some Reflections on the Elements of Effective 
Command and Control’, in Charles Chernor Jalloh (ed), The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its 
Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law (CUP 2014) 149; see also Chapter 
4 (n 38). 
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Čelebići case did not recognise the essential elements originating in the sui generis 
nature of CR; nor did it regard the customary case-law to deduce and articulate the 
nature of CR.159  
 
This had an impact on the subsequent cases. For example, as a result of the 
Čelebići case’s controversial findings mentioned above, the Blaškić case stated that 
“the commander need not have legal authority to prevent and punish acts of his 
subordinates. What counts is his material ability” to act.160 This interpretation 
affected the subordination as a requirement, as it led to disregard the role of duty 
in relation to this requirement.161 In this, the ad hoc Tribunal departed farther 
from the sui generis nature of CR, by disregarding the importance of duties to the 
nature of this doctrine. 
 
Thus not only the values element was undermined, but also the essence of 
the customs element - embodied in the concept of ‘responsible command’ - was 
disregarded.162 Nevertheless, the TC in Blaškić, acknowledging eventually the 
importance of the duty for the doctrine of CR, by implication as being part of the 
values element, concluded that:- 
 
“when a commander fails in his duty to prevent the crime or to punish the 
perpetrator thereof he should receive a heavier sentence than the 
subordinates who committed the crime insofar as the failing conveys some 
tolerance or even approval on the part of the commander towards the 
commission of crimes by his subordinates and thus contributes to 
encouraging the commission of new crimes”.163 
 
It then emphasised that:- 
 
“Command position must therefore systematically increase the 
sentence…”.164 
                                                          
159 Čelebići merely listed the customary cases, to prove that CR was a pre-existing rule; and these 
cases were never used to deduce the nature of CR. See the discussions in Chapter 4. 
160 Blaškić TC, para 302.  
161 See Chapter 5 (nn 180 et seq). 
162 See (n 167). 
163 Blaškić TC, para 789. Cf. Rogers (chapter 1 n 22); see also Williamson supporting the Blaškić TC 
that the commander should receive a heavier sentences, although his arguments was of considering 
the commanders position as an aggravating factor only rather than as one element of the threefold 
nature of CR. Jamie Allan Williamson, ‘Some Considerations on Command Responsibility and 
Criminal Liability’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 303, 312-313. 
164 Ibid. 
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Although this was rejected by the AC,165 the above illustrates that the importance 
of the threefold nature of CR. Balancing the three elements is essential for 
interpreting the nature of this responsibility being considered as a norm created 
under international law. The TC interpretation in Blaškić recognised the three 
parts which constitute the military values element: the duty and the responsibility 
and leadership. Note that the TC rationale of duty was not an integral part under 
the nature of CR: therefore, the TC finding was not overall persuasive. More 
precisely, the TC relied extensively on the military values element that jeopardised 
the implementation of other elements; thus, it was rejected by the AC. This 
conclusion resulted in more controversy, as the subsequent cases continued to 
search for a more justifiable interpretation of the nature of CR. These cases can be 
regard as the first generation of CR under the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence.166  
 
The sui generis nature of CR was therefore not clear in the first generation. 
In fact, undermining the customary nature of CR has resulted in this failure to take 
into account the importance of the values element as part of the sui generis nature 
of CR. Most precisely, the ICTY initially stated “that the concept of responsible 
command looks to duties comprised in the idea of command whereas that of 
command responsibility looks at liability flowing from breach of those duties. …the 
elements of command responsibility are derived from the elements of responsible 
command.”167 The decision stated further that “military organization implies 
responsible command and that responsible command in turn implies command 
responsibility”. 168 
Note that ‘responsible command’ was created on the basis of ‘military 
values’.169 This decision appears, therefore, to be in agreement with some findings 
                                                          
165 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, AC Judgement, IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, para 89. 
166 Note that Sliedregt argued for three generations. Although the classifications proposed in this 
thesis may share similarities to those in the Sliedregt, the generations in this thesis are specifically 
established to examine only the nature of CR. Therefore, generations in this study differ from those 
in other works. Cf. Elies von Sliedregt, ‘Command Responsibility at the ICTY – Three Generations 
of Case-law and still Ambiguity’ in Bert Swart et al., The Legacy of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (OUP 2011) 380. 
167 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging 
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, IT-01-47-AR72, 16 July 2003, para 22. 
168 Ibid para 17.  
169 Chapter 1 (n 102 et seq).  
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of this study, although subsequent implementations contradict the essence of this 
decision, as discussed below.170 
 
3. Command responsibility per se as a crime:-  
 
Although the Čelebići case resulted in a controversial judgment, it ruled that 
CR is a form of criminal responsibility and not per se a crime.171 Accordingly, it 
concluded – during the sentencing - that the “Chamber has found [the accused] 
guilty, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute, for: the wilful killing and murder … 
by his failure to prevent or punish the violent acts of his subordinates…”.172 This is 
in accordance with the customary nature of CR, the commander was accordingly 
held responsible for core crimes under international law as a result of his failure to 
act.173 This did not, however, resolve the problem caused by the failure to articulate 
the nature of CR explicitly at the beginning of the Čelebići judgment.  
 
Hence, the ICTY, in Krnojelac (AC) stated that, “[i]t cannot be 
overemphasised that, where superior responsibility is concerned, an accused is not 
charged with the crimes of his subordinates but with his failure to carry out his 
duty as a superior to exercise control”.174 The TC in Halilović argued, accordingly, 
that as a result of the lack of definition of the nature of CR in the Čelebići 
judgment, it found it important to examine this issue.175 It ruled that, because CR 
is a form of liability for omission,176 only “[t]his omission is culpable”.177 
 
The Krnojelac and Halilović interpretations, therefore, not only departed 
from the customary case-law and Čelebići as a precedent binding on the ICTY, but 
also violated the legality principle.178 This could be ascribed to two reasons: (a) 
judges’ interpretation of CR as a liability for omission based on theories under 
national criminal law traditions rather than its creation under international law, 
                                                          
170 The interpretation of CR during the ICTY judgments shows the lack of examination of this 
concept as well as the values element in relation to the true nature of CR. See infra Chapter 4. 
171 Čelebići, para 331; see also Aleksovski TC, para 118. 
172 Čelebići para 1237. 
173 This was followed by the Blaškić case stating that “a commander may incur criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed by … subordinates”. Blaškić TC, para 301. 
174 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, AC Judgment, IT-97-25-A, 17 September 2003, para 171. 
175 See Chapter 4 (n 132). 
176 The Halilović case confused the forms of liability for omission. See infra Chapter 7. 
177 Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilović, TC Judgment, (IT-01-48) 16 November 2005, para 54. 
178 The legality principle was jeopardised as this interpretation changed CR from being a form of 
liability to being a crime in itself. This amounted to creating a new law or an ex post facto law, 
which is against the principle of legality. See infra Chapter 6. 
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which was problematic already,179 and, therefore, (b) disregarding the true sui 
generis nature of CR.  
Subsequently, the Tribunal in the Hadžihasanović case supported the 
Krnojelac and Halilović cases’ findings that CR is a “responsibility for an 
omission”.180 Note that, in Hadžihasanović, the accused was charged only on the 
basis of Article (7) 3 of CR; therefore it stated that “the question arises as to 
whether a commander who has failed in his obligation to ensure that his troops 
respect international humanitarian law is held criminally responsible for his own 
omissions or rather for the crimes resulting from them”.181 This was important for 
this case as Hadžihasanović was charged solely under CR. The nature of CR was 
explicitly provided for through the Halilović judgment mentioned above; therefore 
Hadžihasanović, without examining the customary case-law or the API drafting, 
found the Halilović interpretation to be more appropriate.182   
 
It is suggested that, although the Čelebići case recognised CR as a 
responsibility for the crimes committed by subordinates, Čelebići is only an 
authority for characterising CR as a norm of customary law.183 Čelebići is not, 
therefore, an authority for the criminal nature of CR, because this nature was 
solely examined by the Halilović case.184 Note that the sui generis nature claimed 
by the Halilović case differs from the true sui generis nature of the doctrine 
suggested by this thesis. Halilović decided that the nature of:-  
 
“…command responsibility is responsibility for an omission. The commander is 
responsible for the failure to perform an act required by international law. This omission 
is culpable because international law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors to prevent 
and punish crimes committed by their subordinates. Thus “for the acts of his 
subordinates” as generally referred to in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal does not mean 
that the commander shares the same responsibility as the subordinates who committed 
the crimes, but rather that because of the crimes committed by his subordinates, the 
commander should bear responsibility for his failure to act. The imposition of 
responsibility upon a commander for breach of his duty is to be weighed against the 
crimes of his subordinates; a commander is responsible not as though he had committed 
                                                          
179 This was the core problem during the drafting of the API. See infra Chapter 4. 
180 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, TC Judgment, IT-01-47-T, 15 March 
2006, paras 73-4. 
181 Hadžihasanović TC, para 68. 
182 Hadžihasanović TC, para 71. 
183 Hadžihasanović TC, para 70. 
184 Hadžihasanović TC, para 71. 
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the crime himself, but his responsibility is considered in proportion to the gravity of the 
offences committed. The Trial Chamber considers that this is still in keeping with the logic 
of the weight which international humanitarian law places on protection values”.185   
 
Accordingly, the Hadžihasanović TC concluded that CR is a “responsibility 
for an omission to prevent or punish crimes committed by his subordinates”.186 
This was followed by the Orić TC stating explicitly that “superior criminal 
responsibility is characterised by the mere omission… the superior bears 
responsibility for his own omission”.187 In other words, the second generation 
cases – Halilović, Hadžihasanović and Orić - contradicted the first generation’s 
interpretation by re-characterising the nature of the doctrine - that the commander 
is responsible for his own act no matter what the resultant crimes. In this it re-
characterised the nature (or changed the law) that was affirmed by the first 
generation case-law mainly of Čelebići. This also contradicted the reason of 
creating CR under ICL as well as the purpose of establishing the tribunals. 188  
 
In other words, the Halilović judgment’s interpretation deviated from the 
applicable law of CR; thus, the ICTY jurisprudence seems to suggest two different 
natures of the doctrine, so far. This deviation had an impact on the ad hoc 
tribunals’ judgements not only at the ICTY but also the ICTR and SCSL. The ICTR, 
however, seems more in line with the Čelebići ruling,189 and more precisely the 
verdict at the ICTR reflects the customary purpose of establishing CR.190 The SCSL 
in Fofana, on the other hand, referred to the Čelebići case to emphasise the 
                                                          
185 Halilović TC, para 54; Hadžihasanović TC, para 75; and Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, TC Judgment, 
IT-03-68-T, 30 June 2006, para 293. 
186 Hadžihasanović TC, para 75. 
187 Orić, TC, para 293. 
188 The purpose is to find individuals responsible for international crimes. Cf. supra (nn 38-39). 
189 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, TC Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-96-13-A, 27 January 2000, 
para 951; see also Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, TC Judgement, ICTR-98-44A-T, 1 December 
2003, paras 843 and 906; see also Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, TC Judgment, ICTR-2000-
55A-T, 12 September 2006, para 473 & 497; see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., AC Judgment, 
ICTR-99-52-A, 28 November 2007, para 359. Although the nature of the doctrine seems to be 
somehow consistent - holding the superior responsible for the crime committed - the ICTR created 
a problem in applying the requirements of CR inconsistently, due to the tribunal’s failure to 
articulate the nature of CR. See infra Chapter 5. 
190 The ICTR consistency here could be attributed to the gravity of the underlying crime being 
genocide which “was far more serious” therefore “the individual culpability of the defendants far 
more grave”. Jens David Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’ in Bert Swart et al., The 
Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (OUP 2011) 323. In 
Kayishema sentence, for example it was ruled that “Kayishema was a leader in the genocide 
in…and this abuse of power and betrayal of his high office constitutes the most significant 
aggravating circumstance”. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TCII Sentence, ICTR-95-1 T, 
21 May 1999, para 15.  
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customary characteristics of CR as a form of liability,191 then Halilović case’s 
classification of CR as a liability for omission.192 This was without noticing the 
extent of inconsistency between these two cases. Most importantly, this offers two 
possibilities: (a) a chamber might follow the ICTY first generation cases of CR, 
where the responsibility was for the underlying crime; or (b) the second generation 
cases’ interpretation, where CR was per se a crime.  
 
In the Brima case, the Tribunal, on the one hand, suggested that CR is a 
customary norm as affirmed by Čelebići,193 then referred to Halilović and stated 
that CR is a liability for an omission that “a superior is not responsible for the 
principal crimes, but rather for what has been described as a ‘dereliction’ or 
‘neglect of duty’ to prevent or punish the perpetrators of serious crimes”.194 
Nevertheless, the SCSL, contrary to this interpretation, concluded that it “finds … 
Brima guilty of the following crimes pursuant to Article 6(3) … Rape, a crime 
against Humanity”.195  
 
This inconsistent verdict in Brima has impacted on the subsequent case at 
the SCSL. The TC in Seray, stated at the beginning that “the Accused [is] 
responsible pursuant to Article 6 (3) of the Statute for the crimes” committed by 
his subordinates.196 After that, it regarded CR as a responsibility for the failure to 
prevent crimes - and not for the underlying crime - referring to the Halilović 
interpretation.197 Interestingly, it found the accused guilty “of murder pursuant to 
Article 6(3)”,198 which contradicts its interpretation about CR at the beginning of 
the judgment. 
 
This controversial issue became more notable at the “lenient” sentences, as 
in the Čelebići case the verdict was clear that the accused was responsible for the 
                                                          
191 Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana et al., TC Judgment, SCSL-04-14-T-785, 2 August 2007, 
(hereafter Fofana) para 233.  
192 Ibid para 234.   
193 Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et al., TC Judgment, SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007, (hereafter 
Brima) para 782. 
194 Ibid para 783.  
195 Ibid para 2114.  
196 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., TC Judgment, SCSL-04-15-T-1234, 2 March 2009, 
(hereafter Sesay) para 281. 
197 Ibid paras 282-3. 
198 Ibid 680.  
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crimes committed but the sentence was too lenient.199 As a result of the single 
charge of CR in Hadžihasanović and Orić of the second generation cases,200 
however, the accused was convicted of: “[f]ailure to discharge his duty as a 
superior to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the occurrence of 
murder”.201 This means that the crimes committed went unpunished, which is 
contrary to the purpose of creating these international criminal courts and 
tribunals.202 Most importantly, this jeopardised the principle of legality, as well as 
of the accused person’s right to know the nature of the accusation against him.203 
 
This uncertainty about the nature of CR was from the beginning inevitable, 
because judges themselves were uncertain about this doctrine’s nature, therefore 
judgments concerning CR appear contradictory.204 Judge Shahabuddeen, for 
instance, disagreed with the majority ruling in the Hadžihasanović Interlocutory 
Decision205 and stated that:- 
 
“I prefer to interpret the provision as making the commander guilty for 
failing in his supervisory capacity to take the necessary corrective action 
after he knows or has reason to know that his subordinate was about to 
commit the act or had done so. Reading the provision reasonably, it could 
not have been designed to make the commander a party to the particular 
crime committed by his subordinate”.206 
 
Judge Shahabuddeen, interestingly, declared in the Orić case that: 
 
“…the language of several cases does suggest that the commander himself 
committed the crime of the subordinate. However, in my view, those cases 
are to be construed as resting on the basis that punishment for the actual 
                                                          
199 Cf. supra (n 163); see also (n 190); see Christine Bishai (n 98) 87; see also Barbora Holá et al. ‘Is 
ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical Analysis of ICTY Sentencing Practice’ (2009) 22 LJIL 
79, 91; also Ohlin (n 190) 340; see also chapter 7 (n 57). 
200 Hadžihasanović was sentenced to three and half years and Kubura to two years. Hadžihasanović 
AC, paras 356-358. Orić the TC sentenced him to two years before the AC acquittal. Orić AC, paras 
6 and 188. 
201 Orić, TC, para 782. 
202 See supra (n 38). 
203 See infra Chapter 6.  
204 Cf. A M M Orie, ‘Stare Decisis in the ICTY Appeal System? Successor Responsibility in the Case’ 
(2012) 10 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 635, 635-636.  
205 See (nn 167-168).  
206 Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, on Hadžihasanović Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal, supra (n 112). Here, Judge Shahabuddeen did not consider the fact that this 
provision was created based on Art. 86 of the API. Art. 86 functions to codify the already existed 
customary nature of CR. Cf. Chapter 4 (n 57 et seq). 
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crime committed by the subordinate is only the measure of punishment of 
the commander for his failure to control the subordinate. Considered in 
this way, those cases are correct. If they are not to be so construed and have 
as a result led to punishment of the commander for participating in the 
actual crimes committed by his subordinates, they have misrepresented the 
true meaning of the doctrine of command responsibility in international 
criminal law. Practitioners are familiar with the procedure of construing a 
case so as to reconcile it, if possible, with common sense. One should speak 
of a contradiction only where such a procedure fails to achieve harmony. I 
do not consider that there is a contradiction in this case, and so do not 
propose to express a view on the assumption that there is.”207 
 
 This oscillation was debated in the literature;208 Cryer, for example, 
challenged Judge Shahabuddeen’s view and accurately criticised these inconsistent 
interpretations of CR.209 However, as found above, the inconsistency about the 
nature of CR came about  because of the Halilović  interpretation of CR as being a 
liability for omission. Although CR was correctly regarded as a liability for 
omission, the interpretation was inadequate, as it was examined per se as a crime 
of omission rather that a commission by omission.210 However, neither the values 
element was included as an integral part of CR nor was its true sui generis nature 
recognised in the literature.   
 
Thus, it must be noted that Article 28 of the ICC accurately defines that 
nature when it states that:- 
 “[a] commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, 
as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
forces”.211  
 
                                                          
207 Prosecutor v. Orić, AC Judgment, IT-03-68-A, 3 July 2008, Declaration of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, para 25. 
208 Elies van Sliedregt (2012) 195-6; see also Chantal Meloni (2010) 132-7. But as Stewart suggested 
that this practice was the reason for “the vast majority of academics agree that failures to punish 
must constitute a separate conduct-type offense”. J. G. Stewart, The end of “modes of liability” for 
international crimes (2012) 25 LJIL 165, 190-192.   
209 Robert Cryer, ‘The Ad hoc Tribunals and the Law of Command Responsibility: A Quiet 
Earthquake’ in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International 
Criminal Tribunals (OUP 2010) 174-181. 
210 See the discussions in chapter 7. 
211 Art. 28 (a), ICC. 
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This is, indeed, the simplest and clearest description of the nature of CR.212 Thus 
the ICC should resort to this Article alone for the nature of CR.213 The ICC in 
Bemba somehow resorted to the problematic interpretations of the ad hoc 
tribunals.214 Nevertheless, the ICC ruled – more recently – that “the language of 
Article 28 expressly links the responsibility of the commander to the crimes 
committed by subordinates” accordingly “the crimes for which the commander is 
held responsible are “committed” by forces, or subordinates, under his or her 
effective command and control, or effective authority and control, rather than by 
the commander directly”.215 
 
4. Ongoing inconsistency of the nature as a form of responsibility:-  
 
As illustrated above, the first generation case-law of the ad hoc tribunals 
implemented CR as a form of responsibility and the accused commanders were 
found responsible for the underlying crimes. The second generation case-law, 
however, implemented CR as a crime per se and accordingly found the accused 
commanders responsible for a dereliction of duty. Although the second generation 
was controversial as it deviated from the interpretation of CR by the first 
generation case-law,216 the second generation case-law interpretation received 
more support as being more in line with the precise nature of CR.217 Nonetheless, 
in a recent ruling, Popović stated that, under CR, an accused is “charged as a 
commander for the acts of his subordinates, with the same crimes” committed by 
these subordinates.218  
 
                                                          
212 Cf. N Karsten, ‘Distinguishing Military and Non-military Superiors: Reflections on the Bemba 
Case at the ICC’ (2009) 7 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 983, 984. Karsten described Art. 28 as being “long and 
complicated”. See also Watt responding to Vetter’s criticisms about CR in the Rome Statute. Daniel 
Watt, ‘Stepping Forward or Stumbling Back? Command Responsibility for Failure to Act, Civilian 
Superior and the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 17 Dalhousie J. Legal Stud. 141, 143 et seq. 
213 Although it is clear that the responsibility for the crime as a result of an omission and not vice 
versa, some scholars were confused as a result of the ad hoc tribunals’ implementation as they 
attributed the commander’s responsibility to the omission as a crime. Cf. Scott Meyer, 
‘Responsibility for an Omission? Article 28 of the ICC Statute on Command Responsibility’ (2011) 8 
Miskolc J. Int’l L. 27, 33. 
214 Bemba, paras 409, 424 & 495.  
215 Prosecutor v. Bemba, TC III, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 
21 March 2016, para 173. 
216  Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law (OUP 2008) 271. 
217 See, for example, Hadžihasanović and Orić, supra; see also Judge Bakone Justice Moloto, 
‘Command responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals’ (2009) 3 Publicist 12, 15. 
218 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., TC Judgment, IT-05-88-T, 10 June 2010, paras 1432, 1838 and 
2016. 
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Popović, therefore, found the commander “criminally responsible, pursuant 
to Article 7(3), for murder as a crime against humanity as well as for murder as a 
violation of the laws or customs of war”.219 It then emphasised that the commander 
is “responsible pursuant to Article 7(3) for murder with respect to the murder of” 
victims.220 Most importantly, the Popović AC affirmed the TC’s ruling that under 
CR an accused commander is charged for the result of his omission; thus, the 
commander is responsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates.221 Note 
that the Popović ruling is identical to the ICC recent interpretation of the nature of 
CR in Bemba.222  
 
This recent change by Popović constituted the third generation case-law for 
the nature of CR at the ad hoc tribunals. It precisely defined the nature of CR being 
a mode of responsibility for omission and not a crime per se. This re-interpretation 
of the nature of CR by Popović resulted in re-consideration of the requirements of 
CR. Therefore Popović AC re-interpreted, for instance, the test of effective control 
in a way more appropriate to its precise nature.223 It thereafter adequately 
articulated the duty to acquire information in line with the ‘values’ component.224 
These recent developments resulted from the court’s articulation of the precise 
nature of CR. 
 
In other words, the ad hoc tribunals – particularly the ICTY – have recently 
recognised the precise nature of CR in Popović.225 It is noteworthy that this precise 
nature, as re-interpreted by Popović, is compatible with CR in the ICC 
implementation. On the one hand, the ICTY in Popović implemented the true sui 
generis nature of CR. On the other, the differences between the first, second and 
third generations of case-law might have jeopardised the accused’s right to be 
informed of the precise nature of the accusation(s) against him.226 Especially is 
this so in that the more recent case of Karadžić has provided an interpretation of 
CR that differs from these three generations’ implementation.  
 
                                                          
219 Popović TC, para 1576. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., AC Judgment, IT-05-88-A, 30 January 2015, para 2117. 
222 Cf. Bemba 2016, supra (nn 105-106).  
223 Popović AC, para 1745.  In this, the test examines whether the commander “had the ability to 
act, such that there were means available to him to fulfil his duty”. Cf. Chapter 5 (n 228). 
224 The “duty of inquiry”. Popović AC, para 1754. See Chapter 5 (n 229). 
225 Popović AC, para 2117; Cf. also Christine Bishai (n 98) 97.     
226 See infra, Chapter 6.  
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The ICTY in Karadžić stated that an accused, under CR, is charged “with 
respect to a crime for which his subordinate is criminally responsible”.227 This 
interpretation created a different category – the fourth generation case-law - for 
the nature of responsibility under CR. While Popović held the accused responsible 
for the crimes committed by his subordinates, Karadžić found him responsible for 
a dereliction of duty.228 The court’s verdict in Karadžić was accordingly for his 
failure to fulfil his duty rather than the crimes committed by his subordinates.229   
 
Note that CR under Article 7(3) of the ICTY has been interpreted in four 
different forms (or “generations”). This issue has also affected the practice of the 
other ad hoc tribunals. In the ICTR, Judges Pocar and Liu recently dissented that 
“[t]he Majority appears to concede that superior responsibility under Article 6 (3) 
of the Statute is no less culpable than individual criminal responsibility under 
Article 6 (1) of the Statute. However, notwithstanding this concession, the Majority 
fails to provide persuasive reasons to justify its decision to significantly reduce the 
sentence … Such reduction may appear to suggest that … it does not apply this 
principle in practice”.230 The excessively lenient sentencing of individuals charged 
under CR at the ad hoc tribunals illustrates that judges consider CR to be in a 
lower category than other forms of direct liability.231  
 
Such inconsistency in implementation has had an impact on the effectiveness of 
CR as an operative form of individual criminal responsibility in ICL.232 In fact, the 
precise nature of CR seemed ambiguous because of the lack of consistency in 
interpretation and implementation of this doctrine in ICL. Judges at the ad hoc 
tribunals, as a result, considered CR to be a secondary form of responsibility 
compared to other modes of liability, because of the failure to declare the precise 
nature of CR. The process of interpretation is therefore discussed in the following 
Chapter. 
                                                          
227 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, TC Judgment, IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016, para 579. The Chamber 
seems to have adopted Sliedregt’s justification of the second generation of Orić’s findings that “the 
superior is not ‘responsible for’ but ‘responsible in respect of’ or ‘with respect to’ the crimes of 
subordinates”. Elies van Sliedregt, Individual criminal responsibility in international criminal law 
(OUP 2012) 195-196. 
228 Karadžić, para 5852. 
229 Karadžić, para 6005. 
230 Bagosora AC, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pocar and Liu, para 2. 
231 See, for instance, Hadžihasanović and Orić sentences: supra (n 200).   
232 Stakić, for instance, ruled that “it is in general not necessary in the interest of justice … to make 
finding under Article 7 (3) if the Chamber is already satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of … 
responsibility under 7 (1)”. It justification being that: “it would be a waste of judicial resource to 
enter into a debate on Article 7 (3) knowing that Article 7 (1) responsibility subsumes Article 7 (3)”. 
Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, TC-II Judgement, IT-97-24-T, 31 July 2003, para 466. 
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5. Conclusion:- 
 
 This chapter analysed the codification of CR and then examined the 
consistency of implementing the nature of CR accordingly. It examined, therefore, 
the consistency of various statutory codifications of the threefold nature of CR. It 
then examined the extent of consistency in the implementation of this nature in 
various courts under ICL. It observed, first, that the nature of CR has been - and 
remains - the most challenging issue of its implementation as a mode of criminal 
responsibility. It found that the codifications – with the exception of the ICC – did 
not articulate the nature of CR. This is primarily because the structure of the 
responsibility under CR differs fundamentally from that under other forms of 
liability.  
 
This chapter has found the implementation of CR under ICL to be 
inconsistent, because neither the codifications nor the implementation were 
consistent with each other or with the threefold nature of CR. The ad hoc tribunals 
correctly found CR to be a liability for omission (the criminal element). They also 
accurately identified the nexus between CR and responsible command (the custom 
element). They implicitly recognised the significance of duty, leadership and 
responsibility for the nature of CR (the values element). It found the problem to 
be, however, that these three elements had never been considered explicitly 
together as an integral part of the nature of CR. Although the three components 
were by implication considered in some cases, the balance of these three elements 
was implicitly articulated only in Popović.  
 
The current problems of the inconsistent nature of CR resulted, therefore, 
from the imbalance between these three elements. Judgments appeared 
contradictory because the application process was inconsistent regarding the 
balance of implementing the nature’s elements. This can be seen through this 
chapter’s findings about the four different generations of CR at the ICTY, namely 
that: (1) an undefined nature; (2) responsibility for dereliction that excluded the 
underlying crime; (3) responsibility for the crime(s) but without explicit 
consideration of the three elements; and (4) responsibility with respect to the 
crime(s). 
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This inconsistency in implementing the nature of CR produced three 
results: (a) contradictory judgments, because the nature of CR was not clearly 
specified in the influential judgment in Čelebići; (b) the lack of any clear nature of 
CR, allowing judges controversially to change the nature, and subsequently to 
create, a new standard of CR as a crime per se; and (c) because of these 
inconsistency, a tendency to sentence convicted criminals too leniently and 
disproportionally for the international law crimes committed. This put CR in a 
category lower than other modes of liability, which is contrary to the ad hoc 
tribunals’ statutes. 
As a result, the ad hoc tribunals’ implantations of CR were not consistent 
with the customary precedents or with the purposes of these courts’ creation. The 
purpose of creating these international criminal tribunals was to prosecute 
individuals responsible for core crimes committed under ICL. This inconsistency 
was because of the inconsistent formulation of various codifications, from the API 
through the ad hoc tribunals to the ICC, with the customary precedents. The 
nature of CR would have not been affected had judges resorted to the customary 
precedents to deduce the law as the applicable law of CR.  
 
Nonetheless, the criminal element has been correctly, and repeatedly, 
considered in relation to the nature of CR as a liability for omission; but this was 
not implemented in accordance with CR’s threefold nature. The ad hoc tribunals 
changed/re-characterised CR, from being a form of criminal responsibility for the 
crime(s) resulting from a commander’s omission to being regarded as a punishable 
crime per se. This re-characterisation resulted from the inconsistent interpretation 
of CR by the ad hoc tribunals. The following Chapter, therefore, discusses the 
process of interpretation and its legitimacy. 
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Part II 
The Legitimacy and Impact of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ 
Interpretation of CR 
 
The foregoing discussions under Part I examined the creation development 
and implementation of CR by judges especially during post-WWII, which 
constituted the customary precedents of CR. It found that CR was created under 
international law by judges rather than states. In this, judges interpreted then 
implemented CR in accordance with the three elements of its sui generis nature 
(military values, customary rules and criminal responsibility). The uniqueness is 
therefore attributed to the judges’ success of implementing these three elements 
simultaneously, rather than the mere establishment of this doctrine by judges. 
However, neither the codifications of this doctrine nor judges’ implementation of 
CR recently reflected these three elements.  
Therefore, the nature was vaguely formulated under various legislations 
such as the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes. As a result of this ambiguity, the ad hoc 
tribunals’ implantations of CR were not inconsistent with the customary 
precedents nor was it with these courts purposes’ of creation. In this, the purpose 
of creating these international criminal tribunals was to prosecutor individuals 
responsible for core crimes committed under international law. 
However, the preceding discussions demonstrate the inconsistency in 
implementing the nature of CR, that can be summarised as following: existed in 
four forms: (a) early judgments appeared contradictory due to failure to articulate 
the nature of responsibility; (b) the second generation argued the lack of clear 
nature of CR, therefore, judges changed the nature and subsequently created a new 
standard of CR; and (c) the inconsistency resulted in the tendency to sentences the 
accused criminals too lenient and disproportion. This puts CR in a category lower 
than other modes of liability, which is contrary to statutes’ of these courts. 
These findings of Part I supported accordingly this thesis’s argument that 
the implementation of CR in the ad hoc tribunals was inconsistent. Part II is 
designated to dissect the reasons for and the impact of the inconsistency. The 
purpose of this part is to examine whether these inconsistent implementations 
were resulted from inconsistent interpretation and to analyse the impact of these 
inconsistencies. 
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 This Part therefore consists of three chapters:- 
Chapter Four analyses the process of interpretation adopted by the ad hoc 
tribunals particularly the ICTY being the germane for the alleged developments of 
the nature of CR.  
Chapter Five examines the impact of the process of interpretation on the 
requirements of CR. It discusses the impact of the inconsistency on the unique 
rationale and purposes of establishing these requirements.  
Chapter Six dissects the impact of these inconsistencies on the process of 
conducting international criminal proceedings. In this it only examine the extent 
of jeopardy and potential violations of the accused person’s rights as a result of 
these inconsistencies. 
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IV. Chapter Four 
The legitimacy of the interpretation method of Command 
Responsibility 
 
As illustrated above, judicial interpretation was used by judges at the 
International Military Tribunals of Nuremburg and Tokyo (IMTs) to develop and 
articulate the nature of Command Responsibility (CR). In fact, interpretation for 
the purpose of developing CR can be traced back to 1919.1 Accordingly, different 
interpretations regarding the concept of CR were significantly discussed 
historically.2 The successful application of CR in Yamashita resulted from judicial 
interpretation of its nature.3   
The IMTs at the beginning of the trials relied on the principle of 
interpretation, allowing judges, therefore, to develop CR.4 The ad hoc tribunals’ 
provisions regarding CR were “thin” about the nature of responsibility.5 Therefore, 
the ICTY in its seminal case - Čelebići - interpreted CR, attempting to articulate its 
true nature. This chapter argues that inconsistent implementation of CR resulted 
from that Tribunal’s vaguely interpreted CR and it therefore examines this method 
of interpretation. 
As demonstrated above, interpreting CR at the ad hoc tribunals could be the 
reason for its inconsistent implementation and their continued re-characterisation 
of this doctrine’s nature.6 Thus, in order to assess the legitimacy of the interpreted 
rules and the judicial decision thereafter, two issues are important: the process of 
interpretation and the sustainability of the resultant rules.7 In that sense, the 
outcomes of the judicial decision need to be weighed against the process of 
interpretation.  
                                                          
1 See Chapter 1 (n 143) et seq.  
2 See the American and Japanese representatives’ impact on the Commission’s final report. See 
Chapter 1 (n 153) et seq. Note that the nature of CR was consistent that commanders were 
responsible for the underlying crimes. 
3 That “the gist” of [CR] is violating a duty “as an army commander to control” subordinates 
activates “permitting them to Yamashita commit” crimes under IL. See Chapter 2 (n 72). This issue 
of interpretation was undermined in the literature as a result of the problematic procedure at the 
Yamashita Trial. See Chapter 2 (n 92) et seq. 
4 See Chapter 2 (n 109). 
5 See Chapter 3 (nn 39 & 58). 
6 Cf. Darryl Robinson, ‘How Command Responsibility Got so Complicated: a Culpability 
Contradiction, its Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution’ (2012) 13 Melb. J. Int’l L. 1. 
7 Joseph Powderly, ‘Distinguishing Creativity from Activism: International Criminal Law and the 
‘Legitimacy’ of Judicial Development of the Law’ in William A Schabas and others (eds.), The 
Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate 
2013) 225. 
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This process of interpreting CR at the ad hoc tribunals is therefore the main 
purpose of this chapter, which examines and analyses the process of CR’s 
interpretation adopted mainly by the ICTY. The chapter argues that customary 
precedents of CR should have a superior role during the interpretation of its 
nature, created through customary precedents. The following, therefore, dissects 
the process of interpreting CR at the ad hoc tribunals and the role of the doctrine’s 
precedents in recent interpretations.   
 
 
1. Interpretation and International Criminal Law:- 
A poorly drafted or vague rule is common in any newly created law. Thus, 
judicial ‘law-making’ – through interpretation - emerged to resolve such 
vagueness, for the rule to be applicable as a law and to avoid non liquet.8 
Hernandez suggested that “the interpretation of a principle or rule by a judicial 
body channels it into a concrete form”.9 In addition, interpreting such a rule 
“bestows it with meaning and authoritative weight”.10  
International Criminal Law (ICL) is regarded as a “hybrid branch of law: it 
is [Public International Law] PIL impregnated with notions, principles, and legal 
constructs derived from national criminal law, IHL as well as HRL”.11 ICL is more 
importantly regarded as a “rudimentary branch of law”, thus it requires constant 
development.12 Interpretation, therefore, became an essential principle in ICL. 
Above all, interpretation is regarded as a legal method of revealing the true 
meaning of the law when the general understanding breaks down.13 In fact, 
interpretation is an essential principle that is necessary for articulating the true 
application of the law in practice.14 Patterson, accordingly, described 
interpretation as the repairer of ‘the fabric of the law’.15 
 
                                                          
8 Sir David Baragwanath, ‘The Interpretative Challenges of International Adjudication Across the 
Common Law/Civil Law Divide’ (2014) 3 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 450, 453-454. 
9 Gleider I. Hernandez, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (OUP 2014) 
88. 
10 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007) 272. 
11 A Cassese, International Criminal Law (3rd. edn, OUP 2013) 7. 
12 Ibid 4-5.  
13 Dennis Patterson, ‘Interpretation in Law’ (2005) 42 San Diego L. Rev. 685, 696-7.  
14 Ibid 708-9.  
15 Ibid 697.  
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A) The procedure of interpretation:- 
Interpretation for, especially, ICL is “subject to the “principles of legality” 
which derive from “general principles of law” as applied in ICL”.16 The legality 
principle “in this case serves to preserve legal certainty and avoid arbitrariness”.17 
As a result of the ICL’s nature, the principle of interpretation was formulated 
mainly from national law systems.18 In general terms, western national law 
systems can be divided into two systems: Common Law and Civil Law.19 Civil Law 
is defined generally as the “legal tradition which has its origin in…the codified 
Roman law” that is “highly systematized and structured and relies on declarations 
of broad, general principles, often ignoring the details”.20 The main feature of the 
Civil Law tradition is that it is written broadly in statutes. Common Law is defined 
as the “law established on the basis of decisions by courts, rather than by 
statute”.21 The essential feature is that common law generally depends on judicial 
precedents (stare decisis) to form the applicable law.22  
These two legal systems, when interpreting a disputed rule, rely on the 
principle of interpretation to deduce or explain the true meaning, by referring to 
the source of that law. They thus vary in their implementation.23 In the Civil Law, 
the statute is the primary source: therefore, in interpreting a rule, the “intention of 
the legislator” is to be identified.24 In the Common Law the precedent is the core 
factor: therefore interpreting a rule needs to be weighed against, or examined 
through, case-law. Thus, the function of the judges in Civil Law is the application 
of the law that was purposely created by the legislator; that of the judges in the 
                                                          
16 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Discipline of International Criminal Law’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), 
International Criminal Law: Sources, Subject, and Contents Volume I ( 3rd. edn., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2008) 5. 
17 I Bantekas, ‘Reflection on Some Sources and Methods of International Criminal and 
Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 6 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 121, 125. 
18 Čelebići TC, paras 158-9. 
19 Although there are other national laws, such as those based on the Islamic ‘Sharia’ law, the 
Common and Civil laws are the national laws that impacted on the ICL. Čelebići TC, para 159. 
20 William Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified)’ 
(2000) 60 La. L. Rev. 677, 683. 
21 Peter H. Collin, Dictionary of Law (4th. edn., Bloomsbury Publishing 2004) 55.  
22 Precedent is “[a] judgment or decision of a court…used as an authority for reaching the same 
decision in subsequent cases. In English law, judgments and decisions can represent authoritative 
precedent (which is generally binding and must be followed) or persuasive precedent (which need 
not be followed)”. Elizabeth A. Martin and Jonathan Law (eds.), A Dictionary of Law (6th. edn., 
OUP 2006) 404. 
23 See William Tetleyn(n 20) 704-5. 
24 Ibid.  Judges may therefore examine the relevant travaux préparatoires at the creation of this 
legislation to identify the legislators’ intention.  
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Common Law is to find rules through ‘judge-made’ law deduced from 
precedents.25    
Accordingly, purposes of interpretation are three-fold. First, to identify the 
“objective meaning” of the text: this is concerned only with the literal meaning of 
the words (the traditional approach). Secondly, to find the treaty-drafter’s true 
intention: this is concerned only with the history of a treaty and its historical 
‘travaux préparatoires’ (the historical approach). Thirdly, and lastly, to consider 
the drafter’s objectives though application: this is concerned with the application 
of the provision(s) for what the drafters’ aims were to regulate, regardless of their 
intention at the time of the creation of  the treaty (the teleological approach, also 
known as the ‘progressive’ or ‘extensive’ approach).26  
Accordingly, the essential purpose of interpretation is to deduce the 
applicable law - through explanation of the “true” meaning of the rules in question 
- by referring to the source of that relevant law. Note that CR was created and 
developed through case-law under international law. Therefore, these cases - 
particularly those of the IMTs – became more important as a source of law for the 
application of CR.  
 
B) Interpretation process at international criminal law:-  
The ICTY provided that “The Tribunal’s Statute and Rules consist of a 
fusion and synthesis of two dominant legal traditions…the common law system 
…and the civil law system”.27 The Tribunal, hence, stated that “the essence of 
interpretation is to discover the true purpose and intent of the statute in question, 
invariably, the search of the judge interpreting a provision under whichever 
system, is necessarily the same”.28 
 
 Interpretation in national law systems will be based on the relevant source 
of law, mainly statutes or precedents. Similarly, in International Criminal Law, 
                                                          
25 Ibid 701. 
26 Each approach has some drawbacks: the traditional approach is so strict as to the linguistic 
issues rather than the legal issues. The historical approach seems to be strict as to the historical 
implementation of the treaty, without recognising any development that might have occurred from 
the time of its creation to the time of interpretation. The teleological approach could be regarded as 
illegitimate if it is not recognised by all state -parties. See Jan Klabbers, International law (CUP 
2013) 52-3. 
27 Čelebići TC, para 159. 
28 Ibid.  
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interpreting rules of law is deduced from one or more of the international law 
sources.29 The ICTY stated, accordingly, in its judgment that: “[i]t is obvious that 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal is constituted by provisions of 
international law. It follows, therefore, that recourse would be had to the various 
sources of international law as listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ…”.30  
It is therefore accepted that Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ)31 is the legal authority of the sources of International 
Criminal Law.32 Analogy to this Article the primary sources of ICL are “treaties, 
customs and general principles of law”; and the subsidiary sources are “judicial 
decisions and the most highly qualified publicists”.33 It is important to highlight 
that judicial decisions function practically as a primary source for ICL and 
particularly for CR.34 
 
With regard to the development of CR, the IMT resorted to those sources to 
interpret the nature and requirements of CR. The IMT emphasised the importance 
of, first, interpretation and, secondly, of these sources of ICL.35 Accordingly, 
interpretation is used in ICL to resolve ambiguity by identifying the applicable law. 
The rules of this applicable law are to be derived from one or more of the sources 
of ICL. For the IMTs, these sources were: treaties, customs, general principles of 
justice, jurists’ practice and judicial decisions of military courts.36  
Both the ICJ Statute and IMT statement provided identically for the 
primary sources of ICL. The ICJ Statute, which is the most authoritative body, 
articulated more precisely the two subsidiary sources: judicial decisions and 
distinguished writers’ opinions.  Note that the interpretation process at the IMTs is 
considered generally to “stem from natural law and are therefore higher principles 
                                                          
29 These sources are regarded as the means that are used to create “legally binding rules”. See A. 
Cassese, International  Law (2nd. edn., OUP 2005) 153. Brownlie also described these sources as 
“legal procedures and methods for the creation of rules of general application which are legally 
binding”.  I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th. edn., OUP 1998) 1. 
30 Čelebići TC, para 414. 
31 See <http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/?p1=9> accessed 14 August 2014; see also A. Cassese (n 11) 9. 
He also suggested that the only variation between IL and ICL is with the general principles, as each 
branch of IL has some distinctive principles.  
32 See Shaw (Chapter 1 n 117) 70. 
33 ICJ Statute, Article 38 (1). 
34 See infra (n 167) et seq. 
35 Chapter 2 (n 109).   
36 Ibid. The IMT recognised judicial decisions through its practice. See Chapter 2 (nn 113 and 161). 
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of morality, and for this reason… their application would not violate the principle 
of legality”.37 
 
2. The interpretation of command responsibility:-  
It is noteworthy that, when CR is referred to as a norm of customary law, – 
whether in a judgment or a scholarly work– the source is mainly the Čelebići 
judgment.38 The following discussions will therefore predominantly examine the 
ICTY jurisprudence and judgments as a result of their direct and influential 
participation in interpreting CR. 
As illustrated above, the sources of ICL are largely similar to those of PIL.39 
The ICL is a relatively new branch of law; therefore it is generally regarded as 
under-developed law and judges therefore frequently resort to sources of ICL to 
interpret poorly drafted rules.40 The IMT’s statement corresponded identically to a 
suggestion that the ad hoc Tribunals’ Statutes are established to provide a general 
framework, rather than a set of strict and specific rules.41 Accordingly, in Čelebići, 
‘interpretation’, as a term, could be defined in two senses:-  
“In its broad sense, it involves the creative activities of the judge in 
extending, restricting or modifying a rule of law contained in its 
statutory form. In its narrow sense, it could be taken to denote the 
role of a judge in explaining the meaning of words or phrases used in 
a statute”.42 
 
                                                          
37 Noora Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of 
interpreting the concept of custom in international criminal tribunals (Routledge 2014) 39. 
38 This can be seen through a number of judgments, see: Aleksovski TC , para. 69; Blaškić TC, para 
289; Kordić and Cerkez. TC, para 401; Halilović, TC, para 55; Limaj et al., TC, para 520; also this 
Judgment has had an impact on the ICTR in many cases, see: Akayesu, TC, para 486; Kayishema 
and Ruzindana, TC, paras 208-9; Rutaganda TC, para 31; also this Judgment has had an impact 
on the SCSL in: Alex Tamba Brima et al., TCII, paras 782-799; and Issa Hassan Sesay, TCI, paras 
282-317. SeeHyder Gulam, ‘Command responsibility under the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2004) N.Z. 
Armed F. L. Rev. 8, 15; also Andrew Mitchell (chapter 2 n 124) 400. See also Chapter 3 (n 158). 
39 Supra (n 30).  
40 In fact, this is conceded as one of the main features of the international criminal law. Even 
though one could argue that it is more of a negative aspect, in general this was the justification of 
the need to develop the law. See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd. edn., OUP 2008) 4-
10.   
41 For example, Mettraux addressed the ad hoc Tribunals’ Statutes as the “skeletons”. See Guénaël 
Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (OUP 2005), p. 5. Accordingly, these 
skeletons need to be covered by the flesh, which means to be articulated through interpretation.  
42 Čelebići TC, para 158. 
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It is noteworthy that the ICTY was in favour of interpretation in its broad sense. 
This could be seen through its judgment stating that:- 
 
“The ‘teleological approach’, also called the ‘progressive’ or ‘extensive’ 
approach, of the civilian jurisprudence, is in contrast with the 
legislative historical approach. The teleological approach plays the 
same role as the ‘mischief rule’ of common law jurisprudence. This 
approach enables interpretation of the subject matter of legislation 
within the context of contemporary conditions. The idea of the 
approach is to adapt the law to changed conditions, be they special, 
economic or technological, and attribute such change to the intention 
of the legislation.”43  
 
Therefore the purpose for adopting this approach was to utilise the ‘creative 
activities through judicial law-making, ‘gap-filling’ or ‘judge-made law’ which the 
teleological approach44 will allow through interpretation.45 It was, therefore, 
concluded that the nature of an ad hoc international tribunal requires “a purposive 
interpretation” for articulating the applicable law.46  
 
According to the above, one could assume that precedent would play a 
significant role in the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation of vague rules of law, 
particularly when such rules were created and developed through case-law.47 This 
assumption is mainly for two reasons: (1) judicial decision is one of the sources of 
ICL; and (2) purposive interpretation is more relevant to the common law 
tradition, which is based on judicial decisions.48 Precedent therefore functions to 
allow the development of a rule: by resorting to the purpose of its creation, and 
through using interpretation through a teleological approach.49 Analogically, for 
developing (CR), precedents should be prioritised – to reveal their true meaning 
and purpose - because this doctrine is a case-law creation.    
 
                                                          
43 Ibid para 163. 
44 The teleological approach’s impact will be examined further below. Infra (n 90) et seq.  
45 Čelebići TC, para 165. 
46 Ibid para 170.  
47 This is logical as the ‘literal, golden and mischief rules’ related generally to common law systems,  
which require a form of consistency between the case-law (precedent) and interpretation. Supra 
(nn 21 & 22). 
48 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005) 85. 
49 Ibid 86-7.  
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The following section analyses the ICTY application of the teleological 
approach, raising the following question: was the ad hoc Tribunals’ interpretation 
of CR accurately and legitimately conducted pursuant to the teleological approach? 
This is discussed below.  
   
A) Treaty as a source of ICL:-50 
When applying sources of ICL, these sources should be resorted to in their 
written order, to provide a form of hierarchal application.51 In general, when 
interpreting a treaty, there is a number of rules to be followed. Generally, to 
implement provisions of international treaties, some form of interpretation is 
usually required for their accurate application.52 Therefore, the principles of treaty 
interpretation are governed strictly by Articles 31, 32 & 33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.53  
Article 31 provides the “General Rules of Interpretation”.54 Article 32 covers 
the “Supplementary Means of Interpretation”.55  Article 33 is concerned with the 
“Interpretation of Treaties Authenticated in two or more Languages”.56 
                                                          
50 Treaty is less important as a source for ICL, compared to its role for other IL branches. See 
Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (3rd. edn.,OUP 
2014) 57.  
51 See A Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd. edn., OUP 2003) 26. 
52 This is actually similar to the statutory law in many national legal systems, which requires a form 
of explanation or interpretation before or through its application. See Gerhard Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law (2nd. edn., T.M.C. Asser Press 2009) 59.   
53 This is, or could be seen as, contradictory. As Klabbers, for instance, has commented, it is 
interesting that “the rules on interpretation of treaties are themselves laid down in a treaty”. Jan 
Klabbers, ‘International Legal History:  the declining importance of Travaux Préparatoires in 
treaty interpretation?’ (2003) 50 Netherlands International Law Review 267, 270. 
54 Article 31 stated that“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:- 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 
55 Article 32, provided that “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
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Most importantly, it could be argued that when treaties codify an already 
existing law (a situation similar to the CR codified by the Additional Protocol I of 
1977 ‘API’), it means that such a treaty primarily emphasises the validity of that 
already existing law.57 However, the Čelebići case, after considering CR as a norm 
of customary law, relied on the API. In this the ICTY, when confronted with the 
vaguely drafted provision of CR at the API, resorted to the Commentary on API 
rather than to the customary precedents. It thus contradicted the hierarchal 
application required for the teleological approach, as will be discussed below.  
In ICL, “Treaty” means the court’s Statute, which is the primary source of its 
applicable law.58 This was explicitly provided under Art. 21 of the ICC.59  
 
The ICC and other tribunals’ Statutes – such as the SCSL - are treaties by 
nature; however, the ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes, such as the ICTY/R, are 
considered as “proximate in nature to a treaty”.60 Although the judgements of 
other ad hoc tribunals – such as ICTR and SCSL – for the purpose of 
interpretation prioritise treaties over customary law,61 the controversy of the 
ICTY’s problematic process of interpretation is extendable to all courts. This is 
because all ad hoc tribunals relied on the API of 1977 - for interpreting CR - either 
                                                                                                                                                                                
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when 
the interpretation according to article 31 :- 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
56 It provided for rather technical rules when writing in more than one language.  
57 Werle and Jessberger (n 50) 57; see also D J Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 
(6th. edn., Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 43. 
58 Dapo Akande, ‘Sources of International Criminal Law’ in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP 2009) 44.  
59 Rome Statute, Art. 21: “The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of 
the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and 
with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any 
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, 
race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
wealth, birth or other status.”. 
60 Joseph Powderly, ‘Judicial Interpretation at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: Method from Chaos?’ in 
Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal 
Tribunals (OUP 2010) 34; see also Akande (n 58) 44. 
61 Noora Arajärvi (n 37) 58. 
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per se as a treaty law provision or as codifying a pre-existing customary rule under 
a treaty. 
 
The Tadić stated that, when interpreting the ICTY Statute, it should be 
interpreted in accordance with “Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties”.62 Note that the reference to rules of treaties “are not applied qua treaty 
but rather as the context for a rule of customary law”, and this is mainly to avoid 
violating the legality principle.63  
 
B) Rules of customary law under treaties:- 
In its practice of interpretation, the IMT was confronted by the defence 
argument that the application of the Hague Conventions – being treaties - is 
limited to the parties to them, pursuant to the Hague Convention of 1907, Article 
(2).64 Therefore, the IMT provided that “by 1939 these rules laid down in the 
Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being 
declaratory of the laws and customs of war”.65 Later, the ICRC supported this 
interpretation of the classification of the Hague Conventions and stated that these 
Conventions and partly the two protocols of the Geneva Convention “are 
considered as embodying rules of customary international law. As such they are 
also binding on States which are not formally parties to them”.66 
 
 The Geneva Conventions are significant,67 as sources, in developing ICL in 
general;68 and the Additional Protocol I is important for, particularly, the 
codification of CR.69 Certain treaties’ provisions function as customary law rather 
                                                          
62 Prosecutor v. Tadić , AC Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999,  para 300. (Hereafter, Tadić AC). 
63 Akande (n 58) 48. 
64 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Volume 
XXII, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, p. 497; see also the Hague Convention IV of 1907: 
Article 2 stated that: “The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as well as 
in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting powers, and then only if all the 
belligerents are parties to the Convention”. 
65 See (n 64).  
66 See <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195> accessed 14 August 2014.  
67 The ICJ stated that The Hague and Geneva Conventions “… are considered to have gradually 
formed one single complex system, known today as international humanitarian law”. Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1996, 226, para 75.  
68 For example, Article 2 of the Statues of the ICTY reads as follows: “Grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949”. In this, the ICTY Statute directly referred to the acts that are prohibited by 
the Geneva Conventions not as treaties’ provisions but rather as customary rules. This alone 
illustrates the significance of customary law over treaties as sources of ICL.  
69 The API of 1977 constitutes the first codification of the contemporary CR. Chapter 3 (n 11). 
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than as provisions as such, which renders treaties - as a source of ICL - less 
important for the purpose of interpretation if they lack pre-existing rules.  
 
The Krstić case laid down the process of interpreting a customary rule 
under a treaty to identify the nature of such a rule to declare the applicable law. 
The TC stated, therefore, that it is generally important to identify “the state of the 
customary international law at the time of the events”. 70 In this, it stated that for 
the applicable law to be identified the following should be examined: (a) “the 
codification work undertaken by international bodies”, mainly treaties as well as 
“the object and purpose of the Convention”; (b) it may, therefore, “consult the 
preparatory work and the circumstances which gave rise to the Convention”; and 
(c) it then should examine “the international case-law” most relevant to the instant 
matter of interpretation.71  
Note that, “[j]udicial practice naturally has great significance for the 
formation of customary law in the area of international criminal law”.72 CR as a 
principle was created under international law, and then it was developed through 
case-law before being codified by the API. Most importantly, during the 
codification, judicial practices were significant factors during the drafting of the 
API. The following discusses whether the ad hoc tribunals’ process of interpreting 
CR was consistent and whether the purpose was to identify the applicable law.  
 
C) Interpreting CR: a customary rule under a treaty:-  
It is important to reiterate that a treaty (the API) for the purpose of CR 
functions in practice as an organised set of customary norms. In this, at the TC in 
Blaškić the defence argued that the API “did not constitute part of established 
customary international law”.73  The TC concluded that it was not “necessary to 
rule the applicability of [API]”,74 but it did not deem the API to be of a customary 
nature. Instead, it stated that the parties to the conflict ratified the API and that 
                                                          
70 Krstić TC, para 541.  
71 Ibid. The TC has also stated that other instruments could be resorted to, such as the “Report of 
the International Law Commission (ILC)…also…the work done in producing the Rome Statute”.   
72 Werle (2009) 59. 
73 Blaškić TC, para 163. 
74 Blaškić TC, para 170. 
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they were therefore bound by its rules, regardless whether it was of a customary 
nature.75  
However, the Čelebići judgement, regarding the status of the API, stated 
that it is not necessary to examine the status if the provisions in question already 
“constitute customary international law”.76 CR was one of those provisions under 
the API; nevertheless, this complexity generates controversy in practice. The ICTY 
and ICTR statutes are not treaties themselves; however, it was concluded that:- 
“Although the Statute of the International Tribunal is a sui generis legal 
instrument and not a treaty, in interpreting its provisions and the 
drafters' conception of the applicability of the jurisprudence of other 
courts, the rules of treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties appear relevant”.77  
However, based on the ad hoc tribunals’ practice, CR was interpreted, 
problematically, as a norm of customary law.78  
 In spite of the debate over the status of the API as to whether it should be 
regarded as customary international law,79 CR is recognised de facto as a norm of 
customary law due to its creation through precedents under international law. The 
codification of the doctrine therefore merely placed an emphasis on the already 
existing law. In this, Čelebići explicitly stated regarding drafting CR under the API 
that:-  
“A survey of the travaux préparatoires of these provisions reveals that, 
while their inclusion was not uncontested during the drafting of the 
Protocol, a number of delegations clearly expressed the view that principles 
expressed therein were in conformity with pre-existing law”.80 
                                                          
75 Blaškić TC, para 172. 
76 Čelebići TC, para 314. 
77 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, A/K/A “DULE”, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, TC Decisions, IT-94-1, 10 August 1995, para. 18. 
This view was also adopted by the ICTR. See Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagosora and 28  others, 
Decision on the Admissibility of the Prosecutor’s Appeal from the Decision of a Confirming Judge  
dismissing an Indictment against Theoneste Bagosora and 28 others, AC Decisions, ICTR-98-37-
A, 8 June 1998, para 28.  
78 Infra (n 97) et seq. 
79 For this debatable issue, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: a contribution to the understanding of and respect for the rule of law in armed 
conflict’ (2005) Volume 87 Number 857, International Review on the Red Cross.  
80 Čelebići TC, para 340. 
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The TC then cited two delegations that referred to: (a) the case-law of post WWII; 
and (b) military codes.81 Although the TC acknowledged that the nature of CR was 
problematic during drafting, it did not examine those problems. Nevertheless, 
Čelebići acknowledged that the delegations, during the drafting of the API, 
intended the nature of CR to be applied as if it were the customary precedents.    
The API, although being a treaty, functions generally as a supplementary 
instrument to the Geneva Convention.82 The Commentary on the API is an effort 
by a respectable number of experts to provide an explanation of the text of the 
API.83 Neither the API nor its commentary is considered entirely to be customary 
law. Hence, they should each be used in accordance with their actual function. In 
other words, the ad hoc tribunals’ judges’ interpretation of CR was controversial, 
as the API’s commentary was accorded priority over judicial decisions of the 
customary precedents.84 
 
The Commentary – as declared by its author - “is considered a scholarly 
work and aims to explain the provisions of the protocol”.85 The Commentary 
explains only the provisions based on the legal text; the commentator, therefore, 
comments on the basis of a personal opinion and not through examining the 
sources of ICL. This – examined further below - is in line with Vladimir-Djuro 
Degan’s suggestion that the notion of the judges (and some publicists) about 
customary law differs from its actual meaning; therefore, some judges and 
publicists tend to create their own opinio juris when interpreting a rule of 
customary law, without examining states’ practice or relevant precedents.86 
 
This opinio juris means that the state believes that a rule is an accepted law; 
therefore, it is practised. The practice of a state is the source from which the nature 
                                                          
81 The Swedish & Yugoslav Delegations. See Čelebići TC, para 340. 
82 Fausto Pocar, ‘To What Extent Is Protocol I Customary International Law?’ in Andru E . Wall 
(ed.), Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’s Kosovo Campaign, International Law Studies Vol. 78, 
(Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 2002) 338. The API is a treaty but it was established for 
two reasons: (a) to codify the already existing customary law; and (b) to develop the law of the 
Geneva Conventions. Thus, it aims to complement the Geneva Conventions’ rules; it therefore 
functions as a supplementary document.     
83 See the Forward to the commentary, available at:- 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/RC_commentary-1977.html> accessed on 16 
September 2014. 
84 This could be seen through the determination of the requirements of CR. See Čelebići, paras 354 
& 371.  
85 See the Forward to the commentary, supra (n 83).  
86 He correctly argued that judges’, as well as legal experts’, opinio juris cannot be the opinio juris 
of any state. See Vladimir-Djuro Degan, ‘On the Sources of International Criminal Law’ (2005) 4 
CJIL 45, 64-6.   
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of the rule can be deduced. Thus, case-law is important for identifying the nature 
of such a rule. The ICTY judges, for instance, created the concept of de facto 
command even though this lacks customary characteristics,87 which was contrary 
to the applicable law as set out by the UNSG’s Report.88 Accordingly, the ad hoc 
tribunals’ judges based their interpretation on what they – the judges - had 
accepted as law through reliance on selective instruments, which eventually led 
them to disregard the actual elements of customary law.  
 
Thus, CR characteristics are to be found through the application of 
customary law, and likewise its sui generis nature.89 Thus, a court should examine 
precedents of that ‘already existing law’ for its characteristics, particularly because 
CR is a case-law creation.90 The ad hoc tribunals – especially the ICTY - ignored 
this required examination of precedent as a source of law91 and focused more on 
the Commentary on the API, which is a writer’s opinion.92   
 
3. CR under the API: the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation:- 
As discussed above, the teleological approach was the method for 
interpreting CR at the ad hoc tribunals. However, CR as a provision under a treaty 
needs to be interpreted in accordance with two core factors: first, Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention, which states that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose…”.93 Second, the teleological 
approach requires examination of sources of law when interpreting a problematic 
rule prior to considering travaux préparatoires (the preparatory work for the 
treaty).94  
Judges at the ad hoc tribunals, however, tended to use travaux 
préparatoires selectively to justify their decisions, which made these decisions 
                                                          
87 Mettraux (2009) 143. 
88 Infra (n 96). 
89 See the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2. 
90 Supra (nn 79-80). 
91 Infra (n 141) et seq.  
92 Supra (nn 83 and 85). This is in line with Cryer’s criticism of the ICRC customary law study that 
focused on the ad hoc tribunals’ practice alone. See Robert Cryer, ‘Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars 
and the Gavel: the Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law 
Study’ (2006) 11 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 239, 239-420. 
93 The Vienna Convention, Article 31 (1). Supra (n. 54). 
94 Supra (nn 43-49).  
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questionable as discussed above.95 Another example of using travaux 
préparatoires is when the ICTY relied on the Report of the United Nations’ 
Secretary-General (UNSG Report), being part the preparatory work for the Statute. 
The Report spells out the applicable law for the purpose of interpretation, which 
stated that:- 
“The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond 
doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in 
armed conflicts as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
for the Protection of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Regulations annexed thereto of 
18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945”.96 
 
While the abovementioned Conventions undoubtedly reflect the rules of customary 
international law by which all states are bound, CR is slightly different. The 
doctrine was codified only under the API, which is not binding on all countries and 
was created primarily to emphasise the already existing (customary) law 
particularly for CR.97 
 
In other words, when interpreting CR (as a provision under API), a court 
has to examine its historical circumstances. According to the teleological approach, 
if the provision is ambiguous the court should resort to the preparatory work of 
this provision during the drafting process.98 The judgment in Čelebići, however, 
after referring to the UNSG Report (above) mentioned chronologically – without 
adequate examination- the historical development of CR. In this it referred to 
precedents and conventions from the Hague Conventions to Article 28 of the ICC; 
nevertheless, this was without a thorough examination and more precisely without 
deducing rules of the applicable law.99 
 
                                                          
95 Supra (n 62) et seq. 
96 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General  Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, para 35. 
97 Supra (n 76).  
98 Supra (nn 26 & 94). 
99 Čelebići TC, paras 335-342. Vetter argued, however, that CR for military commanders under the 
ICC “is essentially the current customary international law standard”. Greg Vetter, ‘Command 
Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Courts (ICC)’ (2000) 25 
Yale J. Int’l L. 89, 95 
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The obvious purpose of listing these events was not to deduce the rules of 
CR, but only to conclude that CR did exist under customary law. It is important to 
reiterate that this is contrary to the teleological method, which calls for examining 
the historical framework for articulating and deducing the applicable law. This is 
partially the reason for the judgement appearing contradictory to the reader.100 
Nevertheless, Čelebići based its findings on the API, which is already vague about, 
particularly, the nature of CR.101 Interestingly, this judgment relied on the 
Commentary on the API,102 rather than considering the preparatory work for this 
Treaty as being the actual travaux préparatoires, and more in line with the 
discussed below findings about the delegations’ opinions.103 
 
A) The core problem:- 
The court first should, alternatively, have articulated the nature of CR and 
then its requirements. This should have been carried out through examining the 
preparatory work for the API in accordance with the nature and requirements of 
CR as intended by states’ delegations. Had the judgement examined these 
discussions, the findings would have been more legitimate and in line with the 
teleological approach. Interestingly, during the drafting of the API the ICRC 
delegation pointed out that the core problem was the “differences between national 
penal systems, some of which did not provide for failure to act”.104 Note that the 
differences between states - regarding the liability for omission (failure to act) - are 
still behind the problem of interpreting CR, as will be discussed below.105 
 
This issue impacted also on the requirements of CR. The Blaškić TC stated 
that the “pertinent question is that: was customary international law altered with 
the adoption of Additional Protocol I, in the sense that a commander can be held 
accountable for failure to act in response to crimes by his subordinates only if 
specific information was in fact available to him which would provide notice of 
such offences?”106 The TC concluded that “this is not so”, but this was through 
                                                          
100 Mettraux, (2009) 48. 
101 Chapter 3 (n 155).  
102 Throughout the allocated section for examining the nature of CR there was no reference to the 
preparatory work for Art. 86 of the API. Čelebići, paras 330-343.   
103 Infra (n 106) et seq. 
104 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 27. 
105 Chapter 7. 
106 Blaškić TC, para 324. 
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interpretation of CR as a treaty provision under the API, contrary to the Čelebići 
method, above.  
 
The Blaškić TC interpreted CR through referring explicitly to the Vienna 
Convention articles that govern the interpretation of treaties.107 Nevertheless, due 
to the nature of CR being created through customary case-law, the TC’s judges 
prioritised adequately this case-law over the Commentary on the API, stating that: 
“Article 86(2) must be interpreted … on the basis of post-World War II 
jurisprudence”.108 Note that the Blaškić TC was among those few cases that 
recognised – although not explicitly - aspects of the true nature of CR.109 In this, it 
not only placed its interpretation in conjunction with the commander’s duties, but 
also the sentence based on the ‘officership’ value.110   
 
Most importantly, the nature of CR was a problem during the drafting of the 
API. In relation to this, there were three categories of states’ delegations: (a) 
delegations from states which recognised failure to act as a potential basis of 
liability under their national law; (b) delegations from states in which failure to act 
was unrecognised under their national law as a possible basis of liability; and (c) 
delegations that recognised CR as including a failure to act, under international 
law based on the Yamashita and IMTs’ Trials regardless of their national system.  
 
The nature of CR was a problem particularly for delegations from states in 
which liability for failure to act did not exist under their national law. Because of 
these differences between states’ systems, the ICRC representative changed the 
initially proposed form of CR and stated instead that:- 
 
 “[a]ccount had been taken, in accordance with the wishes of the experts 
consulted, of the appreciable differences between different national penal 
systems, some of which did not provide for failure to act. Despite those 
difficulties, the ICRC had bowed to the wishes of those for whom the failure 
of the officer-in-charge of a prisoner-of-war camp to provide food for his 
prisoners or a non-commissioned officer to stop a mob lynching prisoners 
of war constituted breaches which could not be left unpunished”.111 
                                                          
107 Ibid paras 326-7.  
108 Ibid para 328.  
109 See Blaškić and Popović, Chapter 3 (nn 165-166, 221-222 and 224). 
110 Blaškić TC, para 733. 
111 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 27. 
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Nevertheless, this resulted in more confusion in understanding the separation 
between the failure to act Art. 76 (Art. 86 currently) and the duty of commanders 
Art. 76 bis (Art. 87 currently).   
 
For instance, Israel’s delegation stated that “a distinction should be drawn 
between grave breaches involving a heavy responsibility and simple breaches 
where the responsibility was administrative or disciplinary”.112 The Japanese 
delegation also interpreted these provisions as two categories, one of penal and the 
other of disciplinary responsibility.113 The nature of CR was not provided for in the 
final results, because of the differences between states’ national systems, as 
pointed out above by the ICRC delegation.114 
 
Delegations in category (c) recognised CR as an already existing principle as 
implemented by the customary precedents, regardless of the status of this theory 
in their national systems. The Netherlands’ delegation, for example, stated that 
“the responsibility of superiors was strongly emphasized in the existing law of 
war”115: therefore, “failure to act could be regarded as criminal negligence”, 
pursuant to the Nuremberg trials.116 The Philippines’ delegation asserted that 
Yamashita had endorsed the nature of CR as being a failure to act.117 More 
precisely, the Swedish delegation reaffirmed that Yamashita had been important 
for the nature of CR, but that the judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials 
had been of more importance to the nature of CR and to ICL generally.118 
Accordingly, CR is recognised as a form of criminal liability for the underlying 
crime(s) potentially incurred by reason of failure to act to prevent subordinates’ 
crimes.119 
 
It follows that the teleological approach requires a court to examine these 
preparatory discussions in order to identify the intention of the drafters. However, 
the judgement in Čelebići, considered CR as a norm of customary law that existed 
                                                          
112 CDDH/I/SR.51, para 3. 
113 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 59. 
114 See also the delegation of Austria pointing out that this liability for failure to act “CR” might have 
an impact on “national legislation” due to the lack of specifying the nature of responsibility. 
CDDH/I/SR.50, para 37. 
115 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 33. 
116 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 34. 
117 CDDH/I/SR.52, para 30. 
118 CDDH/I/SR.64, para 61; see also CDDH/I/SR.71, para 60. 
119 See discussions in Chapter 2. 
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under the API, but did not practically examine the stance or intention of the 
drafters.120 Thus this judgment assumed that the nature of CR was clear and it was 
therefore not examined throughout the Čelebići judgment for the nature of 
responsibility under CR.  
 
The Tribunal stated also that “two highly influential domestic military 
manuals” had considered the doctrine of CR within their rules: the U.S121 and the 
British122 Manuals.123 The Tribunal did not, however, examine or cite the actual 
text of these manuals within its judgment. In other words, it is a paradox to state 
that something is “highly influential” on a matter that a court is endeavouring to 
establish for the first time, when these “highly influential” instruments went 
unexamined by the judges. Nevertheless, this illustrates the importance of military 
codes and values concerning the nature of CR. 
 
But had the Čelebići judgment examined the nature of CR they would have 
analysed the preparatory discussions, accordingly it would have been possible to 
acknowledge that, due to the differences between national law systems, the nature 
of CR was understood to exist in Yamashita and the IMTs’ judgments (the 
customary precedents). This is also more appropriate to its unique nature being 
established during these precedents. This “rashness” in determining customary 
rules (without further examination) could be attributed to the judges’ 
concentration having been on law-making rather than on applying or revealing the 
actual and true rules of CR.124 
 
                                                          
120 This logically seems to be correct as Čelebići, for example, interpreted CR based on the API but 
did not refer to the treaty rules of interpretation provided for by the Vienna Convention; it rather 
referred to the Protocol as customary law. See Čelebići, para 340.  
121 The United States Department of the Army, the Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, July 1956, para 
501. It provided that “…a military commander may be responsible for war crimes committed by 
subordinates … if he has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports received by 
him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to 
commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to 
insure compliance with the law of war or to punish the violators thereof”.  
122 CR provision under this manual did not ask for to punish the violators, which made the US 
manual the only manual recognised this duty to punish. The War Office, The Law of War  on Land, 
Being Part III of the Manual of Military Law (The War Office, 1958) para 631. It stated that “The 
commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through 
reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control 
are about to commit or have committed a war crime, and if he fails to use the means at his disposal 
to ensure compliance with the laws of war”. Cf. Chapter 5 (n 105). 
123 See Čelebići, para 341. 
124 Indeed, this is an example of judges creating their own opinio juris. For instance, Vladimir -
Djuro Degan criticised generally this practice and stated that the ad hoc Tribunals’ judges “will 
better fulfil their mission by insisting on the respect of customary rules which form positive 
international law”. See Degan (n 86) 66.    
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This hypothesis is more in line with the Secretary-General’s Report stating 
that the ICTY can apply only the law “which has beyond doubt become part of 
international customary law”.125 Indeed, such a statement would justify the ICTY 
assertion that CR is a principle of customary law rather than a treaty provision 
under API.126 A treaty could be used as a justification, or rather as evidence, of 
customary international criminal law.127 The ad hoc Tribunal needed, therefore, an 
authority to justify its view. It thus introduced the Secretary-General’s Report as a 
source of the “legal character of command responsibility and its status under 
customary international law”.128 Although the Tribunal was aware that the API is 
also “thin” regarding CR and that Art. 28 of the ICC is more informative and also 
functions as an evidence of state practice and of opinio juris, they resorted 
predominantly to the Commentary on API instead.  
 
CR was therefore interpreted by the judges of the ad hoc Tribunals as a 
customary norm, but through resorting to the API and its Commentary instead of 
the delegations’ opinio juris that the nature of CR is to be found in the post-WWII 
trials.129 This seems to have allowed the judges’ opinio juris to replace states’ 
opinio juris during the interpretation of CR. The current status of the nature of this 
customary norm was not investigated, thus Art. 28 of the ICC was avoided as 
evidence of the current status of the customary law of CR. Additionally, the ICC 
Statute could constitute state practice and opinio juris for the true customary 
nature of CR.130 In this regard, Judge Liu suggested that the “best starting point for 
ascertaining the state of customary law in force at the time the crimes were 
committed is Additional Protocol I, Articles 86 and 87 respectively”.131  
 
The problem, however, is that the nature of CR was not specified 
throughout the early jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, including the Čelebići 
case; also because the API Articles were rather vague regarding this nature. This 
                                                          
125 Supra (n 96). 
126 Cf. (n 76).  
127 William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (CUP 2006) 98-100; see also Werle and Jessberger (n 50) 57. 
128 In fact, the Tribunal provided for the Report’s definition immediately after stating that CR is a 
“norm of customary and conventional international law”. Čelebići, para 333. 
129 The Tribunal, in referring to the API, stated that it “will interpret Article 86(2) in accordance 
with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention”. Blaškić TC, para 327. Cf. Maria Nybondas, ‘Civilian 
Superior Responsibility in the Kordić’ (2003) NILR 59, 66.  
130 Klabbers, for example, suggested that the conclusion of a treaty may be used as evidence of state 
practice or opinio juris. See Jan Klabbers (n 26) 29. 
131 Orić AC (2008), Partially Dissenting Opinion and Declaration of Judge Liu, para 14. Note that 
Blaškić TC referred to the ICC in interpreting CR, but these finding were rejected by the AC. See 
(chapter 7 n 194). 
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was stated more explicitly in Halilović’ problematic finding that both the API132 
and “the post-World War II case-law contained differing views as to the nature of 
command responsibility, that is as liability for crimes of subordinates, or as a sui 
generis responsibility for dereliction of duty”.133 According to this judgement 
sequence - judges seemed to assume that there is a non liquet possibility and that 
it should therefore provide an interpretation to avoid such possibility. 
 
Note that the legality principle and the consistency of the applicable law are 
among those reasons to be considered together in determining the applicability of 
the law. Fuller’s theory,134 for instance, proposed eight rules to be avoided during 
interpretation, presenting them as “the eight failures”:- 
 
 “(1) a failure to achieve rules… (2) a failure to publicize… (3) the abuse of 
retroactive legislation,(4) a failure to make rules understandable, (5) the 
enactment of contradictory rules, or (6) rules that require conduct beyond 
the power of an affected party, (7) introducing such frequent change in the 
rules…; and, finally (8)  a failure of congruence between the rules as 
announced and their actual administration”. 135 
 
In a situation similar to the Halilović case, a court may find it more appropriate to 
apply the law as it should be (lex ferenda), rather than the law as it stands (lex 
lata).136 Interpretation of the rules of ICL is, however, subject to the principle of 
legality.  
Note that the CR problem is not one of the application of lex ferenda against 
the legality principles; rather it is of a lex lata interpretation. Nevertheless, the lex 
ferenda of CR means Article 28 of the ICC, which was not supported through the 
ad hoc tribunals’ judgments. Furundžija stated that, subject to the legality 
principle, “the Rome Statute may be taken to restate, reflect or clarify customary 
rules or crystallise them”.137   
 
Note that the API was deemed to have the customary nature of CR over the 
more recent ICC, because the API implies “customary law in force at the time of 
                                                          
132 Halilović TC, para 53. 
133 Ibid para 42.  
134 Fuller Op. cit 42. 
135 Ibid 39.   
136 Noora Arajärvi, ‘Between Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda? Customary International (Criminal) Law 
and the Principle of Legality’ (2010-2011) 15 Tilburg L. Rev. 163, 166 & 168-9. 
137 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, TC Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para 227. 
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the crimes”.138 However, the API was vague; thus the nature of CR needed to be 
interpreted to find the applicable nature. Interestingly, the judges did not place 
this interpretation according to the teleological approach requirements, such as 
investigating the preparatory work or the Commentary on the API. Instead, they 
directly ruled that CR is a form of omission and that this omission was culpable. 
Accordingly, they provided an interpretation that was rather vague, as the 
Halilović TC Judgment concluded that:-  
 
“[c]ommand responsibility is responsibility for omission…This omission is 
culpable because international law imposes an affirmative duty on 
superiors to prevent and punish crimes committed by their 
subordinates.”.139 
 
In fact, this interpretation was not only inconsistent with the wording of the API 
and with the intention of the delegations during the drafting, but it was also 
inconsistent with the ICTY precedents and with its applicable law.  
 
The liability for an omission is well established in some domestic law 
systems and it is twofold: commission by omission; and omission as a crime. The 
commission by omission is a form of criminal responsibility for the resultant 
crimes, whereas the other type of omission is per se an offence, regardless of the 
result of the omission. However, the problem is that some states recognised only 
one of these two forms. The problem was thus exacerbated by this form of liability 
being already problematic due to the differences between states’ systems.140   
 
 
4. CR between customary law and judicial decisions:- 
The ad hoc Tribunals have repeatedly cited the ICTY emphasis that the 
principle of CR is a norm of customary international law.141 Nevertheless, the 
interpretation process was not adequately in line with the essence of the 
                                                          
138 Orić AC (2008), Partially Dissenting Opinion and Declaration of Judge Liu, para 14. 
139 Halilović, TC, para 54; see also Chapter 3 (n 185). 
140 Regarding the liability for an omission, see Chapter 7. 
141 See for example, Čelebići, the most authoritative judgment regarding CR in the ad hoc Tribunals’ 
jurisprudence. Čelebići AC, para 195. See also Hadžihasanović TC, paras 65 and 70. See also the 
East Timor Special Panels at Prosecutor v. Jose Cardoso, Judgment, 04/2001, 05 April 2003, para 
507; Brima et al., TCII, SCSL-04-16-T, paras 782-799; also Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC, ICTR-
95-1, para 209.  
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teleological approach, as discussed above. Thus, Halilović, after a rapid review of 
selective cases (although stating that “the consistent jurisprudence of the Tribunal 
has found that a commander is responsible for the crimes of his subordinates 
under Article 7(3)”) ruled, however, that:- 
 “[t]he post-World War II case-law was divergent as to the question of the 
exact nature of command responsibility, and Article 86(2) of Additional 
Protocol I and Article 7(3) are silent as to the nature of the responsibility of 
commanders, whether command responsibility is a mode of liability for the 
crimes of subordinates or responsibility of a commander for dereliction of 
duty has not been considered at length in the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal”.142 
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Tribunal relied primarily on Judge 
Murphy’s opinion in re Yamashita and findings from Toyoda, to state that the 
post-WWII case-laws were not consistent about the nature of CR.143 It relied also 
on Judge Shahabuddeen’s dissenting opinion in the Hadžihasanović AC 
decision.144 Halilović concluded, therefore, that because CR is a “responsibility for 
an omission…This omission is culpable”.145 Note that this is inconsistent with the 
teleological approach being already adopted as the method for interpretation.  
The teleological approach calls for examining the preparatory work of, in 
the context of this study, Article 86 of the API. However, as a result of Čelebići’s 
failure adequately to determine the nature of CR at the API, this had an impact on 
the subsequent cases, although the Čelebići Judgment stated that CR “is best 
understood when seen against the principle that criminal responsibility [is] for 
omission”.146 Interestingly, precedents of customary CR were referred to in the 
Čelebići and Halilović Judgments, but these precedents were not used as sources 
from which to deduce the applicable law. In this, the Halilović TC claimed that the 
Čelebići findings were limited to “whether command responsibility was part of 
customary international law” and did not relate to the nature of liability.147  
It is almost impossible, however, to understand where a court would find 
the nature of CR, if not in the early case-law where this principle was created. CR is 
                                                          
142 Halilović TC, para 53.  
143 Ibid para 44 and 47. 
144 Halilović TC, para 53; see also Judge Shahabuddeen’s dissenting opinion, (Chapter 3 nn 197 & 
206). 
145 Ibid para 54.  
146 Čelebići TC, para 334. 
147 Halilović TC para 53, [at footnote 125]. 
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a creation of precedents in international law rather than of national law systems. 
Halilović disregarded the differences between national systems - as already 
examined throughout the preparatory discussions mentioned above - and based its 
interpretation of the nature of CR merely on liability for an omission, which is 
already problematic in national systems. It is therefore, the inadequately 
implemented teleological approach which was behind such a problem.  
Accordingly, there were two interpretations for the subsequent cases in 
front of the ICTY to choose from. Hadžihasanović was in a position to choose 
between the Čelebići and the Halilović interpretations. The Hadžihasanović TC 
stated that “the Chamber in Čelebići noted that “the type of individual criminal 
responsibility for the illegal acts of subordinates […] is commonly referred to as 
‘command responsibility’”.”148. Hadžihasanović supported the Halilović finding 
that “examination shows that post-World War II case law diverges on the [nature 
of CR]. Similarly, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions make no 
determination as to the nature of command responsibility”.149 Thus, it concluded 
that it “subscribes to the findings of the Halilović Chamber”.150 This resulted in CR 
per se being classified as a crime for omission, as illustrated previously.151 
Nevertheless, this was not endorsed the most recent CR case. In Popović, 
commanders were held responsible for crimes committed by a subordinate, that is, 
akin to the Čelebići findings. It is noteworthy that Popović managed to avoid being 
in the Hadžihasanović position. It avoided examining CR’s nature altogether: 
neither the TC nor the AC discussed the status of nature of CR.152 In this case, the 
nature of CR was not explicitly articulated until reaching the sentence stage, where 
it stated that the commander is “criminally responsible, pursuant to Article 7(3) for 
murder as a crime against humanity as well as for murder as a violation of the laws 
or custom of war”.153   
In Karadžić, however, the tribunal interpreted the accused responsibility 
under CR to be “with respect to a crime for which his subordinate is criminally 
responsible”.154 The tribunal ruled accordingly that “[t]he Accused failed in his 
duty as Supreme Commander to take necessary and reasonable measures to 
                                                          
148 Hadžihasanović TC, para 70. 
149 Hadžihasanović TC, para 71. 
150 Hadžihasanović TC, para 75. 
151 See Chapter 3 (n 171) et seq. 
152 Chapter 3 (n 218) et seq. 
153 Popović AC, para 2073. 
154 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, TC Judgment, IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016, para 579.  
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punish the commission of [crimes] as an underlying act of prosecution. He is 
therefore criminally responsible for such failure pursuant to Article 7 (3)”.155 This 
more recent interpretation endorsed the Hadžihasanović position, although the 
nature was differently formulated as responsibility with respect to (a) crimes by 
subordinates.  
The inconsistent implementation of the nature of CR has resulted from the 
inadequate interpretation of the nature of responsibility under CR. This 
inconsistency was inevitable as the process of interpretation was inconsistent with 
the teleological method, primarily because judges’ interpretation overlooked the 
role of precedents when interpreting the nature of CR. The ECCC approach was, 
however, more in line with the customary precedents while interpreting the nature 
of CR. In Duch the tribunal hold the non-military superior, by implication on the 
bases of the voluntary assumption of the position of command, responsible for the 
crimes committed by subordinates.156 
In Ieng Sary the defence argued about the customary status of CR between 
1975 and 1979 and that CR did not exist as a customary norm before the adoption 
of the API in 1977.157 The tribunal in response to this allegation examined the 
evolution of CR as a mode of liability under ICL. In doing this, it discussed the 
development of CR in the 1919 report of the Commission on Responsibility of 
Authors of the War; Yamashita, re Yamashita, IMT and IMTFE;158 and then it 
concluded that CR “existed as a matter of customary international law” before and 
during the creation of the API159. The ECCC elaborated on the customary 
precedents to declare the customary status and then deduce the nature of CR to 
interpret its applicable law accordingly. The literature was influenced, however, by 
the ICTY problematic interpretation. Therefore, the ECCC discussion was 
criticised, although it agreed with the ICTY’s and other ad hoc tribunals that CR is 
a customary norm.160  
 
                                                          
155 Ibid para 5848.   
156 Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav “Duch”, Judgment, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 
2010, 548-549. 
157 Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary, Decision on Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against the Closing Order, Case No. 
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC75), 11 April 2011, 399. 
158 Ibid 421-458. Note that the tribunal examined thoroughly the customary nature of CR more 
accurate than Čelebići or Halilović discussed above.  
159 Ibid 460.  
160 Cf. Rehan Abeyratne, ‘Superior Responsibility and the Principle of Legality at the ECCC’ (2012) 
44 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 39, 78. 
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A) The role of precedents for the purpose of interpreting CR:- 
 
Although there are inconsistencies regarding the nature of CR, it seems to 
be settled that CR is an already existing law.161 Customary law is the only ICL 
source that is binding on all states.162 This theory of binding customs evolved from 
the general concept of states’ practice perceived as an applicable and binding law, 
as Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute provides for “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law”.163 Subsequently, there are two essential 
elements to constitute customary law: (a) state practice as the general practice; 
and (b) such practice as has to be accepted as binding and, therefore, in effect a law 
(opinio juris).164  
Note that the meaning of CR being a creation of international law is that CR 
was established primarily through international judicial decisions. This is in line 
with the findings in Kupreškić, that:- 
“Being international in nature and applying international law principaliter, 
the Tribunal cannot but rely upon the well-established sources of 
international law and, within this framework, upon judicial decisions.”165 
 
It stated also that these judicial decisions are not binding by nature. Rather, they 
are “subsidiary means…, which must be regarded as declaratory of customary 
international law”.166 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether judicial decisions would 
declare the status of a rule or declare the nature of the rule.  As discussed above, 
Čelebići was more declaratory of status, although it acknowledged that, for the 
nature of CR, post-WWII case-law was of more importance. 
 
                                                          
161 Supra, (nn 57, 76 and 97). 
162 Indeed, treaties bind only the parties to them; customs on the other hand bind all states. This is 
what distinguishes customary law from others. See Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law, 
(4th. edn., OUP 2014) 91.  
163 The IMT statement provided that “customs and practices of states which gradually obtained 
universal recognition” are a source of IL. Supra (n 36).  
164 Jan Klabbers (n 26) 26.  
165 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et. al., TC Judgement, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para 540. 
166 Ibid.   
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5. Judicial decisions:- 
 
Kupreškić ruled that, even though judicial decisions are a subsidiary source, 
for ICL they are significant for finding the basis of this rudimentary law.167 In fact, 
this could arguably be the most important source for the creation and development 
of CR and its requirements. Nonetheless, international criminal courts and 
tribunals are not bound by precedents of other courts.168 Thus, the ICC stated that 
“decisions of other international courts and tribunals are not part of the directly 
applicable law under Article 21 of the Statute”.169  
 
Similarly, the ad hoc Tribunals are not bound by precedents from other 
courts and, therefore, the ICTY stated that “the International Tribunal is not 
bound by past doctrines but must apply customary law”.170 In practice, however, 
this is problematic, as various international tribunals referred repeatedly to the 
judgment and decision of Čelebići.171 Here, the interpretation of CR was confused 
with the general role of judicial decisions. Thus inconsistent application was to be 
the result, and then CR was continually re-characterised.172  
 
A) The nature of CR and judicial decisions:- 
 The Tribunal added emphasis and asserted that it “is not bound by 
precedents established by other international courts such as the Nuremberg or 
Tokyo Tribunals, let alone by cases brought before national courts…”.173 The  
Tribunal noted that binding precedent (“stare decisis”) is a doctrine to be found in 
                                                          
167 Supra (n 165). This is also the opinion of some notable scholars. For instance, Cassese claimed 
that as a result of the absence of a universal mechanism of law-making, the judicial decisions 
became a more important source of interpretation. Cassese 2005 (n 29)194-5; see also Damgaard 
cited Oppenheim notes that “judicial decision has become a most important factor in the 
development of international law, and the authority and persuasive power of judicial decision may 
sometimes give them greater significance than they enjoy formally”. Ciara Damgaard, Individual 
Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (Springer 2008), 35.  
168 Infra (n 173).  
169 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March 2012, para 603.   
170 Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC Judgment, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para 654. Also the ECCC decision, 
regarding the precedents of other courts, that “this Chamber emphasises that these cases are non-
binding and not, in and of themselves, primary sources of international law”; Kaing Guek Eav, 
Appeal Judgment, 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, 3 February 2012, para 97. See also the SCSL which 
stated that it “is not bound by decisions of the ICTY”,  Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, et. al., Trial 
Chamber I Judgment, SCSL-04-15-T-1234, 2 March 2009, para 295.  
171 Supra (n 38). 
172 See the four categories of the nature of CR, (Chapter 3 n 216) et seq. 
173 Kupreškić TC, para 540.   
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common law systems which establishes a form of hierarchy for judicial decisions; 
but that the absence of such a hierarchy within the international framework 
renders it inapplicable in that context.174 
 
Nevertheless, the ICTY frequently referred to a number of judgments and 
decisions from the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. This is due to: (a) the nature 
of CR being developed through case-law; and (b) “the Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions make no determination as to the nature of command 
responsibility”.175 The ad hoc tribunals resorted to judicial decisions whenever 
confronted with a problem about CR; but they predominantly resorted to such 
decisions to support their findings selectively rather than deducing (or declaring) 
the applicable law. The question then arises as to what role judicial decisions play 
with regard to customary rules of interpretation.  
 
B) The role of judicial decisions for interpreting customary rules:- 
Tadić, which is a seminal case for various international criminal courts and 
tribunals, stated that:- 
 
“In appraising the formation of customary rules or general principles one 
should therefore be aware that, on account of the inherent nature of this 
subject-matter, reliance must primarily be placed on such elements as 
official pronouncements of States, military manuals and judicial 
decisions”.176  
 
Accordingly, judicial decisions – with statements of states’ delegations and military 
manuals - are important for finding the nature of a customary norm. Therefore, 
the Tadić AC examined – although it was debatable -177 the customary case-law to 
deduce the nature of the JCE rather than to declare its status. The AC cited a 
considerable number of case decisions in order to declare the applicable nature 
and requirements of the JCE rather than its customary status.178  
                                                          
174 Ibid.   
175 Supra (n 149). 
176 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, para 99. 
177 The debate is about the customary status of (JCE 3). See Danner and Martinez (Op. cit Chapter 
1) 110-112 and 117-120.; see also Pamela Stephens, ‘Collective Criminality and Individual 
Responsibility: the Constraints of Interpretation’ (2014) 37 Fordham Int’l L. J. 501, 529-533. 
178 Tadić AC, paras 195-229. 
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This method was not followed for interpreting CR, as Čelebići, under the 
Section designated for the ‘legal Character of Command Responsibility and its 
Status under Customary International Law’, cited the High Command, Medical & 
Hostage Cases, but this was not for declaring the nature of CR.179 In this the 
Čelebići judgment declared the status of CR, but did not specify the nature or its 
characteristics. These references were to list evidence for the existence of CR as an 
already existing rule, using those cases as examples of state practice and not as 
(judicial decisions) a source of ICL.  
 
 In spite of the contradictory standard of responsibility adopted in the 
Yamashita case, the Tribunal, in order to prove the validity and applicability of CR, 
first referred to Yamashita as somewhat ‘state practice’. In this it – without 
examining the nature of CR or its requirements - referred to the conclusion of the 
US Supreme Court regarding the re Yamashita case.180  
 
The ad hoc tribunals undermined, however, the importance of judicial 
decisions – as a source – not only of CR but also of ICL. Cassese, for example, 
suggested that judicial decisions are more significant regarding ICL for two 
reasons. Generally, they are resorted to in order to support, or as evidence of, the 
already existing rules reflecting ‘customary law’. They are more precisely used as 
“means to establish the most appropriate interpretation to be placed on a treaty 
rule”.181 However, - subject to the legality principle - this interpretation must be in 
line with those judicial decisions.  
 
Note that a judicial decision as evidence of customary law is not limited to 
declaring only the existence of the rule, but more precisely it is evidence for 
identifying the applicable law.182 This is in accordance with Art. 38 of the ICJ, 
stating that judicial decisions are “subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law”.183 Judicial decisions’ function, to identify the applicable law, seems to be 
the settled part; nevertheless, its priority within the hierarchy of Art. 38 for, 
                                                          
179 Čelebići TC, paras 338, 366 & 367. 
180 Ibid para 338 (at footnote 351).   
181 Cassese et al. (2013) 18. 
182 Arajärvi (n.37) 100. 
183 ICJ Statute, Article 38 (1) (d). 
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particularly, ICL is the debatable issue in practice.184 Gallant articulated accurately 
that judicial decisions for ICL “are no longer “subsidiary” sources as that word in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice”.185  
 
A distinction should always be drawn between identifying the applicable law 
as being deduced from judicial decisions, and whether these judicial decisions are 
of an instant binding nature. As discussed above, international criminal courts are 
not bound by other courts’ decisions. Nevertheless, judicial decisions are 
recognised, particularly for ICL, as a source from which the applicable law should 
be deduced for the purpose of implementation. This is in accordance with the ICTY 
practice in Tadić, which was a seminal case.186  
 
C) The impact on CR:- 
The Aleksovski case stated that, in general, “the Appeal Chamber should 
follow its previous decisions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent 
reasons in the interest of justice”.187  Generally, courts’ decisions are referred to as 
state practice and opinio juris. Some cases are, however, recognised as being of 
more importance because of their nature, as based on international law.188 In this, 
some judicial decisions were important to identify and deduce that applicable law 
in Tadić, concerning JCE.189 
 
It is important to reiterate that Čelebići is widely cited when referring to the 
customary nature or status of CR.190 The core issue here is that the Čelebići 
Judgment overlooked the nature of CR, and focused merely on declaring that CR 
was a pre-existent rule. Accordingly, Halilović found this a cogent reason to re-
examine and then interpret such nature. Therefore, it was possible for Halilović to 
depart from Čelebići regarding the nature of CR. One can, thus, assume that, based 
on the teleological approach, the Halilović would re-visit the customary case-law 
to identify the true nature of CR. 
                                                          
184 Mia Swart, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the Sources of 
International Law and “Adventurous Interpretation” ` (2010) 70 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 459, 471. 
185 Kenneth Gallant, ‘International Criminal Courts and the Making of Public International Law: 
New Roles for International Organizations and Individuals’ (2010) 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 603. 
186 Supra (n 176). 
187 Aleksovski AC, para 107.  
188 Werle and Jessberger (n 50) 65. 
189 Danner and Martinez (n 177).  
190 Supra (n 38). 
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This was not the case, however, as Halilović listed some customary cases 
and then rapidly concluded that the nature of CR was not consistent throughout its 
existing case-law from Yamashita to Čelebići.191 Therefore, Halilović also 
overlooked the fact that, in the drafting of the API, the issue had been the 
differences between national law systems, regarding liability for omission.192 
Halilović overlooked this issue and concluded that CR is a form of omission and 
that “omission is culpable”.193 This conclusion was confusing for the subsequent 
cases, because it shifted the liability of the commander from the crime(s) 
committed to the omission, rendering CR per se a crime, as applied in Orić, 
Hadžihasanović and more recently Karadžić.194 
 
The failure to acknowledge the problem at the preparatory discussion on the 
drafting of CR in the API was the reason behind this inconsistency of 
interpretation. Judges may also be affected by this issue of whether their original 
national system recognised the liability of omission.195 Analogy to the delegations 
at the preparatory discussions,196 judges can also be divided as follows: (a) judges 
who endorse failure to act because it exists as a form of liability under their 
national law, (b) judges who do not endorse failure to act because it is 
unrecognised under their national law; and (c) judges who recognise CR as a 
failure to act under international law based on Yamashita and the IMTs’ Trials, 
regardless of their national systems. 
 
 Accordingly, judges recognising that liability for omission exists in their 
national systems would be more able to understand its theoretical challenges. Most 
importantly, judges who recognise the nature of CR as being based on the 
customary precedents would find their task less complex in interpreting the nature 
as well as the requirements of CR. The extent of this issue of liability for omission 
in national law systems and its impact on CR will, therefore, be discussed in 
Chapter 7.   
 
 
                                                          
191 Halilović TC, paras 44-54. 
192 Supra (nn 104 and 111). 
193 Halilović TC, para 54. 
194 See Chapter 3 (nn 177 et seq. and 216 et seq.).  
195 Cf. James Meernik et al., ‘Judicial Decision Making at the ICTY: the Influence of Home Country 
Characteristics’ (2012) 95 Judicature 171, 176. 
196 Supra (n 106) et seq. 
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6. Conclusion:- 
 
This chapter examined the consistency, and legitimacy, of the process of 
interpretation of this doctrine’s nature at the ad hoc tribunals, which have resulted 
in the uncertain nature of CR. In assessing the legitimacy of an interpreted rule, 
that rule should be consistently implemented; and, when this rule needs to be 
developed, this process should be carried out through a consistent method of 
interpretation. As discussed previously, the implementation of CR was not 
consistent; therefore, assessing the legitimacy of the interpretation process of CR 
was the aim of this chapter. The method and process of interpreting the nature of 
CR was inconsistently carried out at, particularly, the ICTY being the germane 
authority for developing the law of CR in the ad hoc tribunals. This inconsistency 
can be summarised as follows:-  
 
(a) the API was regarded in Blaškić as a treaty that need a specific method 
of interpretation; but later, during the judgment, this was changed, which 
impacted on whether CR was interpreted as a customary rule or as a treaty’s 
provision;  
(b) Čelebići examined customary precedents which were referred to during 
the drafting of  the API as the sources of the nature of CR; but Čelebići used them 
as examples of state practice, to declare the status of CR as being an already 
existing norm, rather than deducing the applicable law; and 
(c) Halilović exacerbated the inconsistency as, on the one hand, it defined 
the nature of CR as based on criminal theory in national law systems, whilst, on 
the other, acknowledging its creation as being based on international law and 
without any equivalent form in domestic criminal law. 
 
This chapter has found this process inconsistent, because the ICTY deemed 
the teleological approach the method for interpreting its applicable law. The 
teleological approach required judges to consider the drafter’s objectives; in the 
case of CR the drafter’s of the API. With regard to CR, the drafters endorsed the 
nature of CR as that which was interpreted and implemented in the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Trials (as customary precedents for the doctrine). It has found that the 
role and priority of judicial decisions (particularly customary precedents for CR) 
were overlooked in the ICTY, especially in Čelebići and Halilović. 
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It has shown that, although the majority of the ad hoc tribunals’ cases of CR 
followed Čelebići, which did not explicitly articulate the nature of CR. Thus, it had 
an impact on the interpretation of CR: that caused inconsistency, not only between 
the ICTY and other international courts, but also within the ICTY’s case-law. It is 
questionable, therefore, whether such interpretation could be deemed legitimate, 
as neither the process of interpretation was consistent nor were the resultant rules 
sustainable or consistently implemented. Chapter Six examines, accordingly, the 
impact of these inconsistencies on the rights of accused persons. Before that, 
however, the following chapter evaluates the legitimacy of the development of CR 
by the ad hoc tribunals, through examining the impact of this inconsistency on the 
requirements of CR. 
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V. Chapter Five 
       Re-characterising the requirements of command responsibility 
 
As discussed above, the inconsistent and continued re-characterisation of 
the nature of CR resulted in inconsistent and vague implementation of CR. This 
essentially resulted from the failure to acknowledge the true, threefold, sui generis 
nature of CR. However, aspects of this nature were initially recognised by the 
ICTY, in that the “concept of responsible command looks to duties comprised in 
the idea of command whereas that of command responsibility looks at liability 
flowing from breach of those duties. …the elements of command responsibility are 
derived from the elements of responsible command…”.1   
This decision supports by implication the argument in this thesis that CR is 
threefold, in the sense that CR flows from a breach of duties under IHL and those 
duties flow from military laws and values. The breach of duties accordingly 
infringes (a) ICL (because of the underling crime), (b) IHL (because of the duty); 
and, lastly, (c) military values (because of the nature of operations and being the 
sources by which those duties can be interpreted). This is – or should always be – 
the rationale of the nature and requirements of the liability under CR.2   
According to the ad hoc tribunals, duties are therefore part of the doctrine 
of CR, which are deduced from the concept of responsible command. CR was, 
however, separated from the essential elements constituting its nature due to the 
continual re-interpretation. The implementation of CR was thus inconsistent. As 
the ICTY stated, above, duties are sources forming the requirements of CR. The 
duty of commanders is also part of the values element, which is a component of the 
nature of CR.   
This chapter therefore aims to examine the impact of re-characterising CR 
through the inconsistent interpretation of its nature. It scrutinises the impact of 
these re-characterisations the nature on the implementation of the doctrine’s 
requirements; and also evaluates the role of duties in relation to these 
requirements. The chapter consists of two parts. The first provides an overview of 
                                                          
1 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging 
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, IT-01-47-AR72, 16 July 2003, para 22. It also 
stated that “military organization implies responsible command and that responsible command in 
turn implies command responsibility”; para 17.  
2 Cf. Mitchell (chapter 2 n 124).  
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these requirements, where some controversial aspects of interpreting these 
requirements will be discussed. The second scrutinises the extent of re-
characterising CR, more precisely the practical impact of the continued 
inconsistency on the implementation of its requirements.    
 
 
1. The requirements of CR:- 
The requirements of CR, as generally where the commission of crime is at 
issue, are divided into two categories: the actus reus and mens rea. However, for 
the purpose of this thesis – while maintaining this traditional division - these 
requirements will be categorised as follows: (a) the requirements for responsibility 
that are derived from the ‘responsible command’ (customs element) and military 
society (values element); and (b) the requirements for criminality, which is 
deduced from the ‘criminal law’. This categorisation aims to simplify the 
complexity of the requirements of CR,3 which was behind the inconsistent 
interpretation at the ad hoc tribunals’ judgments.  
This criminality requirement consists of two elements: crime and causation, 
which are essential for raising the issue of and determining criminal responsibility 
within any jurisdiction.4 Crimes perpetrated by units causally link their 
commander to responsibility for these crimes as a result of that commander’s 
failure to act that is also consistent with the military values of commanders.5 The 
responsibility requirement, however, is important for finding who in the relevant 
chain of command was supposed to act but failed to do so. Therefore, these crimes 
were recognised to be the result of his failure, thus raising the question of his 
responsibility.6 This requirement determines the identity of the commander who 
was under duties: (a) to control; (b) to know; and (c) to prevent, subordinates’ 
crimes.  
 
                                                          
3 Cf. Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, ‘Prosecuting Superiors for Crimes Committed by Subordinates: a 
Discussion of the First Significant Case Law Since the Second World War’ (2001) 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 
747, 784-5. 
4 Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law Text, Cases, and Materials (6th. edn. OUP, 2014) 70.   
5 These values for commanders are: duty, responsibility and leadership. See (chapter 1 n 59). 
6 Cf. R A Duff, Who is Responsible, for What, to Whom? (2004-2005) 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 441, 
442. 
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A) The requirement for criminality:- 
This is the first requirement to hold commanders criminally responsible for 
crimes committed by subordinates. Criminal law consists of two essential 
elements: the crime and the person who caused this crime. These requirements 
conveyed the answers of an accused person asking: for what I am became being 
held responsible?7 
 
The ad hoc tribunals overlooked the importance of considering the first 
factor of the underlying crime when examining CR. They also rejected causation as 
a separate element for CR. The ICC, in contrast, required a causal link to be proved 
for the purpose of CR, and the crime committed to constitute a crime under 
international law.8 
 
i) The crime committed:- 
Under ICL, there are a number of crimes – also known as the “core crimes” 
- that are under the jurisdiction of international criminal courts and tribunals,9 
entitling these courts to prosecute individuals who commit or contribute – directly 
or indirectly - to the commission of such crimes. These crimes share a distinctive 
key feature, which is the gravity of their characteristics. It is the gravity of the 
nature of those offences which make them international crimes.10  
 
Čelebići, for instance, stated that the underlying crime “is a necessary 
prerequisite” for the application of CR; but it is not an essential requirement for 
this doctrine.11 According to the ad hoc tribunals, the underlying crime is not a 
requirement for CR: this had an impact, however, on the implementation of CR, as 
discussed below.12   
                                                          
7 Cf. David Akerson and Natalie Knowlton, ‘President Obama and the International Criminal Law of 
Successor Liability’ (2009) 37 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 615; also Cf. infra (nn 233-9). 
8 See Houston Goodell, ‘The Greatest Measure of Deterrence: a Convection for Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo’ (2012) 18 U.C. Davis L. Int’l L. & Pol’y 191, 201-2. 
9 Generally, there are four international crimes: war crimes, genocide, aggression and crimes 
against humanity. See Cryer et. al.(2010) 4-5. However, Bassiouni, has defined 27 crimes as 
international crimes. See M Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law: Second 
Revised Edition (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 144-5. 
10 Cf. (Chapter 2 n 119) et seq.  
11 Čelebići, para 346. 
12 Čelebići TC excluded the role of crime at the sentence; the AC therefore included the crime as an 
aggravating factor. Čelebići AC, para 732. But Orić inconsistently interpreted the crime as a 
requirement of CR. Orić TC, para 295. Cf. Infar (nn 241-245). 
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ii) Causation:-  
 In criminal law, causation “is necessary to show not only that the defendant 
performed an act, but that the act caused a particular consequence”.13  
Accordingly, it is regarded principally as an essential element of the theory of 
criminal liability.14 However, the ad hoc tribunals, on the one hand, rejected the 
need for causation to be proved for CR, discussed below. On the other, the ICC 
required proof of a causal link between the commander’s failure and the crime 
committed.15 
 
Above all, causation is a fundamental requirement of all modes of liability. 
In domestic criminal law, therefore, causation is perceived - implicitly or explicitly 
- as a requirement for all forms of responsibility.16 It follows that, with regard to 
CR, causation is a requirement for criminality. In Yamashita, causation was 
implicitly required as to link his omission with his criminal liability. General 
Yamashita was, therefore, responsible for those crimes where his failure permitted 
their commission.17  
 
The IMTs, more explicitly, stated that, for the commander to be responsible 
under CR, “a causative, overt act or omission” is required to be proven.18 It also 
placed emphasis on the proof of causation for CR as a matter of being a 
requirement of criminal law. The Foertsch case stated that “[t]he evidence fails to 
show the commission of an unlawful act which was the result of any action, 
affirmative or passive…His mere knowledge of the happening of unlawful acts does 
not meet the requirements of criminal law”.19  
 
The API, more precisely, provided that states “shall repress grave breaches 
and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches…which resulted from a 
failure to act…”.20 The ICC recognised the “resulted from” as a requirement of 
                                                          
13 Jonathan Herring, n. 4, p. 85. See also H Hart & T Honore, Causation in the Law (2nd. edn., OUP 
1985) 84. 
14 A Ashworth & J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th. edn., OUP 2013) 102. 
15 The crime is required to be of international characteristics to apply CR. Cf. Sarah Perkins, ‘The 
Filer to Protect: Expanding the scope of Command Responsibility to the United Nations at 
Srebrenica’ (2004) 62 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 193, 202 and 211-2.   
16 Markus D Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (OUP 2014) 291 
& 293. 
17 See (Chapter 2 nn 36, 47 & 72). 
18 Hostage 1261. 
19 Law Report, XV, 76-7.  
20 API of 1977, Article 86 (1).  
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causation within Art. 2821 and stated that the commander is responsible “as a 
result of his or her failure”, and therefore that it was required for both military and 
civilian superiors.22 In sum, the ad hoc tribunals neither consistently followed the 
customary precedents nor the ICC regarding the criminality requirement.   
 
B) The requirements for responsibility:- 
This category encompasses the traditional actus reus and mens rea 
elements. In fact, it consists of the central three elements required by the ad hoc 
tribunals: (a) the superior-subordinate(s) relationship; (b) the failure to prevent or 
punish; and (c) the knowledge.23  
 
i) Subordination: the duty and the requirement:-   
The concept of subordination is primarily derived from the military 
hierarchal structure. As a concept, it was the key element of the ancient theory of 
responsible command; and it is well recognised under customary law. Foremost as 
a requirement for the CR doctrine but pre-dating it, it was and is the duty of every 
commander to exercise command and control.24  
The customary precedents prosecuted predominantly the officially 
appointed commander. This is known as the de jure command,25 where a 
commander, by virtue of such a position, is required to exercise the authority 
necessary to control subordinates26. It is usually argued that the problem in 
Yamashita was his lack of knowledge about the crimes committed. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
21 Delegations found this sufficient as a requirement to prove causation and therefore “thought that 
a provision on causation was not necessary”. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, 33. 
22 ICCS Art. 28 (a) & (b). See Kai Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’ in Antonio Cassese and others 
(eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary Volume III (OUP 
2002) 841-2. Ambos noted that the standard “as a result” was clearly required as causation. See 
also Bemba, TC III, (2016), paras 211 and 213. 
23 API Commentary, para 3543; see also Čelebići, para 346. 
24 See for example the ancient nature and historical development of CR in Chapters 1 & 2.  
25 Few, however, were found responsible because of the voluntary assumption of the command. See 
(Chapter 2 n 186) et seq.  
26 Čelebići, para 348. 
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this view is slightly inaccurate,27 as the core problem was that his duty was 
confused with his ability to exercise control.28  
 
a) Obligation to exercise this duty: de jure and de facto:- 
The Commentary on the API of 1977 recognised the importance of the duty 
to exercise command and control, from which the subordination requirement was 
established.29 The ad hoc tribunals – particularly the ICTY - after supporting the 
importance of this duty,30 stated that this concept “is problematic in situations … 
where previously existing formal structures have been broken down … thus 
individuals in positions of authority, whether civilian or within military structures, 
may incur criminal responsibility under the doctrine of command responsibility on 
the bases of their de facto as well as de jure positions as superiors”.31 
In other words, the Tribunal, while recognising the importance of the duty 
to control, supported the prosecution’s proposition of its de facto application even 
though it lacks the customary characteristics required for the applicable law at the 
ICTY.32 Thus, the de facto command was perceived as “a creation of the ad hoc 
Tribunals”.33 This could be seen as an example of crafting new law, which violates 
the legality principle.34 Therefore the key element became the test of possessing 
“material ability to control”, which is more appropriate to this type of conflict.35  
The rationale of this de facto concept is that “persons effectively in 
command of such more informal structure” may be held responsible for crimes 
committed by their subordinates.36 Nevertheless, this application jeopardised the 
legality principle. Thus, it would have been more appropriate had the Tribunal 
referred to the practice of the IMTs trials, which developed this issue by resorting 
to the concept of “the voluntary assumption of command”.37 
                                                          
27 Infra (n 46) et seq. 
28 Judge Murphy (Chapter 2 n 103). 
29 API Commentary, para 3544. See also Čelebići , para 354. 
30 Čelebići, para 354; see also supra (n 1). 
31 Ibid, see also Nahimana AC, para 787. 
32 Ibid, see also the UNSG’s Report (chapter 4 n 96).  
33 Čelebići judgment rejected the ILC Draft Code where the International Law Commission 
required, for CR, the existence of “formal legal competence”. Čelebići, para 395; see also Mettraux 
(2009) 143. 
34 Chapter 6.  
35 Čelebići, para 354. 
36 Blaškić TC, para 301-2. 
37 Chapter 2 (n 186) et seq. 
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b) Ability to exercise effective control:- 
As a duty, effective control is essential, because it is the reason for 
exercising the subsequent duties.38 In other words, exercising effective control 
requires the establishment of an effective monitoring system, to enable the 
commander to know about his troops’ actions. Subsequently, this would enable 
him to prevent the commission, or to identify the potential perpetrators of those 
crimes.   
The ICC, however, recognised the importance of this issue and, therefore, 
Art. 28 of the ICCS provided that: commanders will be responsible for the crimes 
committed by troops under their “effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly…”.39 The ad hoc tribunals, however, overlooked the 
importance of this duty, which was, therefore, left out of their Statutes.40 The ICC 
highlighted two issues: (a) effective control as a duty; and (b) the ability to exercise 
effective control at the time41.  
The separation of the military from the non-military at the ICC does not per 
se reflect customary law. With regard to the concept of control, however, Art. 28 of 
the ICC accurately included the duty to exercise control; and, by separating the 
military from civilian superiors, it recognised both de jure and de facto command, 
while maintaining the role of duty.42 In this it developed the customary law and 
required that, for civilian superiors, the underlying crimes must be “within the 
effective responsibility and control of the superior”.43 This explains also the ICC 
                                                          
38 API Commentary, para 3549.   
39 The ICC Statute, Art. 28 (a). 
40 The role of duty was sometimes examined during judgments but not as part of the nature of CR. 
See Čelebići TC, para 378. Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Trial Chamber I, Judgement and 
Sentence, ICTR-96-13-A, 27 January 2000, para 135. Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana et al., TC 
Judgment, SCSL-04-14-T, 2 August 2007, para 238. 
41 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Pre-TC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 
June 2009, para 414.  
42 Ibid para 406.  
43 ICCS Art, 28 (b) (ii). 
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rationale for a sub-provision for civilian superiors,44 in that the concept of “duty” is 
more military than civilian by nature.45 
 
ii) The duty to take measures:-  
As illustrated above, the actual problem - in Yamashita - was the inability 
(impossibility) to exercise control over his subordinates, as a test. Nevertheless, 
the Court in re Yamashita – articulated the extent of this duty: stating that he was 
obliged “to take such measures as were within his power … to protect prisoners of 
war and the civilian population”.46 These measures, therefore, are the steps that 
should enable the commander to fulfil the essential duty to control subordinates.47 
The knowledge is perceived accordingly as a prerequisite measure and therefore a 
sub-duty.48  
Judge Ozaki articulated in Bemba recently the rationale as well as the role 
of this duty to the nature of responsibility under CR and stated that: “[t]he duty of 
a commander to exercise control properly may extend both temporally and 
substantively beyond the specific Article 28(a)(ii) duties. … Further examples of 
measures undertaken in exercise of proper control may include maintaining order, 
and setting out operational system of supervision”;49 therefore, “[t]he specific 
duties are the core of the duty to exercise control properly”.50 However, Judge 
Ozaki resorted to the Commentary on the API. Conversely, Popović resorted to the 
military values to articulate the commentary and not vice versa.51 
 Note that, neither the API nor its Commentary examined the status of the 
duty to acquire information. Therefore, it could be argued that the knowledge 
                                                          
44 Cf. Nora Karsten, ‘Distinguishing Military and Non-military Superiors’ (2009) 7J. Int’l Crim. 
Just. 983, 989. 
45 UN Diplomatic Conference, infra. n. 80. This is also in line with the personal obligation. Chapter 
1 (n 59). Cf. Hirota (chapter 2 n 214) et seq. 
46 Re Yamashita 16.  
47 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, Report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly on the work of its forty-eight session, Volume II Part Two, A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/ASS.1 
Part2 (Hereafter ILC Report, 1996) 25. 
48 Chapter 2 (nn 56 and 64). 
49 Separate Opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki, Bemba TCIII, (2016), para 15 
50 Ibid para 16.   
51 Popović AC, para 1932. 
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requirement was derived as one of these measures, which can accordingly be 
regarded as a subsidiary duty.52 
 
 
iii) Mens rea:-  
 
a) Is there a duty to know?  
 Pursuant to customary law (or CIHL), the commander was obliged only to 
command his subordinates.53 The CIHL thereafter imposed on the commander a 
duty to “take all measures in his power to restore…public order and safety…”.54 For 
the commander to take such measures, he needs to know about troops’ activities. 
This process of being informed could be regarded, therefore, as one of the 
measures required indirectly by the law. It could, accordingly, be regarded as a 
constructive duty to meet the obligation to take reasonable measures.  
Nevertheless, under CIHL, commanders do not have any explicit obligation 
to know.55 In fact, this duty to acquire information was developed – as part of 
military values - through customary precedents.56 Čelebići stated, therefore, that 
the duty to know was recognised as a commander’s obligation through the WWII 
jurisprudence.57 This is more consistent with it as a subsidiary duty, under the 
duty to take measures, than as an affirmative duty per se. 
 
 
                                                          
52 Cf. Victor Galson, ‘The Constructive Knowledge Standard of Command Responsibility’ (2009) 7 
Dartmouth L. J. 223, 230; also Cf.  David Nersessian, ‘Whoops, I Committed Genocide! The 
Anomaly of Constructive Liability for Serious International Crimes’ (2006) 30 Fletcher F. World 
Aff. 81, 90-1. 
53 The Hague Convention (II) 1899, Annex Article 1. 
54 The Hague Convention (IV) 1907, Article 43.  
55 Besides Article 43 of the Annex to the Hague Convention (IV), Article 19  of the Hague 
Convention (X) stated that:  “[t]he commanders-in-chief of the belligerent fleets must see the above 
articles are properly carried out, they will have also to see to cases not covered thereby…”. In this it 
might be argued that “to see” is to know but this is still controversial as a duty for every 
commander.  
56 See (Chapter 2 nn 167-176).  
57 Čelebići, paras 388 & 389. 
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b) Developing the knowledge requirement:- 
 
Generally, the Yamashita controversy was attributed - in the literature - 
mainly to the mens rea standard.58 Yamashita concluded that “widespread 
atrocities”59 were indicia of the commander’s knowledge.60 The Prosecutor – after 
explaining the widespread occurrence of the crimes – submitted that:-  
“[t]hey must have been known to the accused if he were making any effort 
whatever to meet the responsibilities of his command or his position: and 
that if he did not know of those acts, notorious, widespread, repeated, 
constant as they were, it was simply because he took affirmative action not 
to know. That is our case”.61 
This is consistent with the UN Commission of Experts finding that military 
commanders are under personal obligations and responsibilities. This also 
solidifies the importance of the military commander’s values (being: duty, 
leadership and responsibility) to CR.62 However, as discussed above, it was 
impossible for Yamashita to exercise control.   
The Tokyo Tribunal finding illustrated the duty to know. The ad hoc 
Tribunal in Čelebići supported – before it later re-characterised - the customary 
precedents’ finding that the commander is responsible if he “knew, or should have 
known” about the crimes; and supported the conclusion in Mummenthey that lack 
of knowledge cannot be pleaded as a defence.63 However, this was reinterpreted 
and, without the consideration of the role of duty, it became controversial.64 
                                                          
58 See for these criticisms: Reel (chapter 2 n127); see also Courtney Whitney, The case of General 
Yamashita: A Memorandum, 1949, 1. Richard Lael, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and 
Command Responsibility (Scholarly Resources Inc. 1982) 123-27. See also Antonio Cassese, 
International Criminal Law (2nd. edn., OUP 2008) 322; see also William A. Schabas, ‘Victor's 
Justice: Selecting "SITUATIONS" at the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 
535, 536; see  also Arthur Thomas O' Reilly, ‘Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine 
with Principles’  (2004-2005) 20 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 71, 78. 
59 The Prosecutor stated that “atrocities were spread from the northern portion … to the southern 
portion”. Law reports, Volume IV, 17.  
60 This is a presumption of knowledge rather than actual knowledge. Vagueness is inevitable here, 
because the actual issue was the inability to exercise effective control. 
61 Law reports, Volume IV, 17. 
62 Supra (n 5).  
63 Čelebići, para 389. 
64 Infra (n 131) et seq. 
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c) Structuring the requirement:- 
Article 86 (2) of the API of 1977 provided that commanders may be held 
responsible “if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them” to 
knew about crimes committed within their areas of jurisdiction and command.65 
In other words, the API partially followed the IMTs’ judgments that either the 
commander had actual knowledge or, based on the circumstances, he should be 
presumed to have known. Nevertheless, Article 87 – concerning the commander’s 
duty - did not explicitly impose a duty to know. This, on the one hand, could be 
seen in contrast to the post-WWII judgments already mentioned; but, on the 
other, it could be argued that, under IHL, there is no separate duty to know.66 
The Commentary on the API provided that Article 87 should be read in 
conjunction with Article 80, concerning “Measures for execution”, thus imposing 
on the states parties, inter alia, a duty to observe and supervise.67 The 
Commentary also stipulated that “[e]very commander at every level has a duty to 
react by initiating “such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations68… The 
object of these texts is to ensure that military commanders at every level exercise 
the power vested in them…”.69 Thus, the commanders’ “role obliges them to be 
constantly informed of the way in which their subordinates carry out the tasks 
entrusted them, and to take the necessary measures for this purpose”.70 
Accordingly, the necessary measures encompass the knowledge as a sub-duty and 
a requirement for CR.   
 
C) The role of the values element:- 
As there is no explicit duty to know, the mens rea requirement was and is 
one of the issues that generate controversy. The Law Reports commented that “the 
most interesting issue in [CR] is the question to what extent the accused’s 
                                                          
65 The API of 1977, Article 86 (2). Cf. (n 206). 
66 The API of 1977, Article 87. 
67 API Commentary, para 3550. Article 80, which was directed to the state parties and not to 
commanders, obliged those states (1) to “take all necessary measures for the execution of their 
obligations”; and (2) said “and [they] shall supervise their execution”. 
68 API Commentary, para 3561.   
69 API Commentary, para 3562.  
70 The Commentary stated that it is because of the position occupied by the commander that he 
comes under a duty to be informed. API Commentary, para 3560. 
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knowledge of offences … must be proved”.71 Accordingly, the Law Reports argued 
that:- 
“… here it is probable that the widespread nature of the offences proved 
was an important factor in so far as it may have convinced his judges either 
that the accused must have known or must be deemed to have known of 
their perpetration, or that he failed to fulfil a duty to discover the standard 
of conduct of his troops”.72   
The UN Commission of Experts’ reported that the “mental element” for CR is 
divided into actual and constructive knowledge.73 This constructive knowledge 
required that the commander “must have known about the offences”; thus, the 
Commission proposed a number of indicia, including:-   
 “ (a) the number of illegal acts; (b) the type of illegal acts; (c) the scope of 
illegal acts; (d) the time during which the illegal acts occurred; (e) the 
number and type of troops involved; (f) the logistics involved, if any; (g) the 
geographic location of the acts; (h) the widespread occurrence of the acts… 
(l) the location of the commander at the time”.74 
In other words, these indicia suggest that, pursuant to the personal obligations, 
commanders cannot ignore or deny knowledge which they, based on primarily the 
military values (duty, leadership and responsibility), must have known.  
Before turning to the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation of this issue, it would 
be more appropriate to shed light on the ICC perspective of this requirement. 
According to the ICC, there are two standards of this requirement, one concerning 
the military commander and the other a civilian superior, which was a matter of 
debate and criticism in the literature.75   
First, the ICC stated that commanders may be found responsible if the 
“military commander or person either knew or owing to the circumstances at the 
time, should have known”.76 That is, that the commander has actual knowledge or, 
                                                          
71 Law Reports, Vol. VIII, 89. 
72 Ibid.     
73 UN Doc. S/1994/674, para 58.  
74 UN Doc. S/1994/674, para 58; see also Čelebići, para 386. 
75 ICCS, Art. 28. 
76 ICCS, Art. 28 (a) (i). 
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based on the circumstance of the crimes committed, he should have known 
constructively.77 
Secondly, the ICC, with regard to civilian superiors, stated that: “[t]he 
superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such 
crimes”.78 The ICC attributed the separation between military and civilian 
superiors to the different nature of responsibility and authority between them.79 
However, the ad hoc tribunal standard of constructive knowledge is similar to that 
of civilian superiors in the ICC. 
Note that the U.S. representative who actually proposed the current 
formulation of Art.28 of the ICC at ‘the conference of establishment’ attributed this 
generally to the affirmative duty and responsibility attached to the military 
commander, there being no equivalent rule regarding the civilian superior.80 This 
is, however, debatable, as the duty to know is a sub-duty to the obligation to take 
reasonable measures, which is required whenever the position of command is 
voluntarily assumed.81  
 
iv) Failure to prevent or punish:- 
The Commentary on the API provided generally that a commander is 
obliged to control his subordinates.82 The Commentary, therefore, emphasised 
that the commander “shall take all measures in his power to achieve this…even 
with regard to troops which are not directly subordinate to him…he is obliged to do 
everything in his power to deal with this, particularly by informing the responsible 
commander”.83 This was consistent with the personal obligations derived from the 
values as an element of the nature of CR. 
 
                                                          
77 Cf. Yamashita standard of knowledge. See (Chapter 2 n 48). 
78 ICCS, Art. 28 (b) (i). 
79 Bemba, para 433.  
80 The American delegate stated that the “authority rested on the military discipline system, which 
had a penal dimension” that is lacking in the civilian system. He concluded, accordingly, that “a 
military commander was expected to take responsibility if he knew or should have known”. UN 
Diplomatic Conference of the ICC, A/CONF.183C.1/SR.1, para 67,  
81 Cf. Infra (nn 127-130). 
82 API Commentary, para 3552. 
83 API Commentary, para 3555.  
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a) The controversy:- 
In the literature,84 there are two misleading assumptions that result from 
incorrect interpretation. First, it is widely claimed that, based on Customary Law, 
CR depends on the failure to prevent or punish crime;85 but this reflected only the 
ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation,86 and, as discussed below, this affected the 
implementation of CR.87 The second error is in limiting the duty to take necessary 
and reasonable measures to institute preventive and punitive steps,88 which is also 
incorrect, as initiating an effective system to acquire information is also a sub-
measure.89 These issues resulted from undermining not only commanders’ duties, 
but also the role of the values element regarding CR. 
 
The ICC, however, adopted a different method regarding the duty to take 
necessary and reasonable measures. It required three phases, instead of the two of 
the ad hoc tribunals. In this, it illustrated that there are three duties in dealing 
with the “commission of the crimes: before, during and after”.90 It emphasised that 
there are “three duties listed under Article 28 (a) (ii) of the Statute: the duty to 
prevent crimes, the duty to repress crimes or the duty to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution”.91 These three duties not 
only correspond to legal duties but, more precisely, they are more commensurate 
with the sui generis nature of CR and its values elements. 
 
The acquiring of information is regarded– for the purpose of this study - as 
the first step of the required ‘necessary measures’. Nevertheless, these measures, 
according to the ad hoc tribunals, are either preventive (required before the 
occurrence of the crime), or punitive (required after the crime being committed). 
 
 
 
                                                          
84 See Cassese (2008) 238-9; see also Meloni (2010) 46-48. 
85 Cassese (2013) 182.  
86 Customary law, practice and the ICC all agreed that such responsibility resulted from the failure 
to exercise effective control. See discussion in previous chapter. Cf. infra (n 97) et seq. 
87 Cf. Infra (n 158) et seq. 
88 Cassese (2013) 189-90.  
89 This is contrary to the customary precedents, at the IMTs, and contrary to the API. 
90 Bemba, para 436. 
91 Bemba, para 435. Note that the competent authority is responsible to investigate and not the 
commander. This was followed recently in Popović AC. Infra (n 229). 
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v) Duty to take preventive measures:- 
 
 Under Art. 87 of the API, commanders are obliged to prevent their 
subordinates from committing crimes and to suppress such crimes if they are 
being committed and to report these crimes to the authority. However, there is no 
explicit duty to suppress under the ad hoc tribunals’ provisions of CR, although it 
it is understood primarily as part of the commander’s duty to act – or, as the 
Commentary on the API suggested, duty to react - as “[t]here is no member of the 
armed forces exercising command who is not obliged to ensure the proper 
application” of the rules of international law.92  
 
A commander is under a duty to prevent crimes only if the first step of 
knowledge is met: to prevent a crime, he needs to know about its likelihood of 
occurrence. Nevertheless, this duty to take measures is generated essentially from 
the duty to act, which was developed through “customary” precedents concerning 
CR.93 Thus, the ICTY - in Čelebići - relied on “failure to act” as a standard that 
encompasses the duty to take measures,94 prior to the re-characterisation in the 
Halilović.95 
 
vi) Duty to take punitive measures:- 
Art. 87 of the API imposes a duty “to initiate disciplinary or penal action 
against” subordinates who commit crimes under international law.96 On the one 
hand, it can be read so that initiating disciplinary or penal actions does not 
require the commander himself to punish; on the other, it might be interpreted as 
the commander being obliged to punish the perpetrator because this Article is 
directed to commanders. It is, therefore, important to scrutinise the source of this 
duty.  
 
                                                          
92 API Commentary, para 3553. 
93 Čelebići, para 338. 
94 Čelebići examined the necessary measures as part of the duty to act. See Čelebići, paras 223, 230 
& 277. 
95 Chapter 4 (n 141) et seq. 
96 API, Art. 87 (3). Cf. infra (n 158) et seq.  
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a) Is there a legitimate duty to punish?:- 
The clause “and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action 
against violators thereof” of Art. 8797 was controversial during its drafting and was 
therefore voted on in a separate session.98 The French delegation led the 
opposition to the retention of this clause, arguing that it would work “to transfer 
certain responsibilities – mainly in the field of disciplinary or penal action - from 
the level of governments to that of commanders in zones of military operation”.99 
The delegation argued also that it might have an impact on the principle of the 
independence of the investigation and the prosecution,100 as well as on that of the 
judicial system.101 This argument is also against the ad hoc tribunals’ suggestion 
that the “duty to punish” was actually limited to investigation only.102  
 
  Nevertheless, in justifying the inclusion of this clause it was argued, on the 
other hand, that this duty was “already in the military codes of all countries”.103 
This is not, however, adequate. Advocates of this duty to punish, such as 
Sivakumaran, argue that it is a duty deduced from the national military discipline 
of all states,104 but this is mostly concerned with crimes differing from crimes 
under international law. 
 
More precisely, in this argument, it was stated that “[a]rticle 76 bis 
consisted of provisions which were already in the military codes of all 
                                                          
97 Ibid. 
98 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), Volume IX, 
CDDH/I/SR. 71, 393 & 399.  
99 See CDDH/I/SR. 71, para 17. This is consistent with the ICC. Supra (n 91). 
100 Cf. (n 92). Note that the investigation of a crime differs from that about the general conduct of 
troops.  
101 Ibid. 
102 This duty to investigate appeared first under the API Commentary were it stated that “[i]n this 
way, for example, a commander… would act like an investigating magistrate”. API Commentary 
para 3562. In Limaj, the TC concluded that the “superior’s duty to punish the 
perpetrators…encompasses the obligation to conduct an effective investigation…to ensure that the 
perpetrator will be punished”. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., TCII Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 
November 2005, para 529. See infra (nn 238-239). But this might be seen as obliging the 
commander to do the impossible. Cf. Yasmin Naqvi, ‘Enforcement of Violations of IHL: The ICTY 
Statute – Crimes and Forms of liability’ (2014) 33 U. Tas. L. Rev. 1, 25-6. 
103 See CDDH/I/SR. 71, para 2. 
104 Sivakumaran cited: Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Vol. II: Practice (Cambridge U.P., ICRC, 2005) 3738-51. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Command 
Responsibility in the Sierra Leonean Conflict: The Duty to Take Measures to Prevent Crimes and 
Punish the Perpetrations’, in Charles Chernor Jalloh (ed.), The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its 
Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law (CUP 2014) 131. 
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countries”.105 Therefore, Sivakumaran,106 as a result of this misleading argument, 
suggests that this duty pre-exists in military codes and referred to Henckaerts & 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2005. According to 
this work, however, the only explicit inclusion of this duty to punish, prior to the 
drafting of the API of 1977, was in the US Field Manual (1956) alone.107  
 
Sivakumaran incorrectly, does not distinguish between the two duties and 
cites a number of references that discuss only the duty to prevent.108 Even if the 
duty to punish was referred to within some cases or reports, this should have been 
declared through the recorded discussions for the drafting of the API; however, 
there was no evidence of such a duty to punish other than in the above US Field 
Manual (1956).109  
 
D) The requirements of CR: the rationale:-    
Affirmatively, “[t]he first duty of a military commander, whatever his rank, 
is to exercise command”.110 The commander could thus be responsible for failure 
to command (failure to act). The duty to command requires the individual 
occupying such a position (de jure or de facto) to take measures that should enable 
him to exercise command effectively. As discussed above, these measures 
encompass sub-duties, such as to acquire knowledge and prevent crimes, which 
are deduced from the military values111 and then required to comply with the laws 
of armed conflict. Thus, the customary case-law found commanders responsible 
for failure to act as a result of their failure to take reasonable measures and this 
failure to act permitted these crimes or increased the risk of their being 
committed.112     
To assess the culpability for failure to act, a test of effective control was 
required, which Čelebići defined as “the material ability to prevent and punish” 
                                                          
105 See CDDH/I/SR. 71, para. 2.  Note that Art. 87 of the API of 1977 was, during the drafting, Art.76 
bis.  
106 Supra (n 104).  
107 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck Op. cit 3738-3751. 
108 For example, Sivakumaran cited Yamashita, where the only duty was the duty to prevent. See 
Sandesh Sivakumaran 131. 
109 See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra, n. 104; also see Official records of the Diplomatic 
conference, (n 98). See UN Doc. S/1994/674, para 60; Cf. (chapter 4 nn. 121-122).   
110 API Commentary, para. 3549. 
111 Chapter 2 (nn 171 and 176). 
112 See (n 17).  
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crimes.113 It is acknowledged that, on the one hand and unlike the Yamashita 
situation, “international law cannot oblige a superior to perform the impossible”.114 
On the other, international law recognised the significance of the position and role 
of commanders to ensure compliance with IHL.115 Therefore, Art. 28 of the ICCS 
attributed - the commander’s culpability for the underlying crime - to his or her 
“failure to exercise control properly”,116 which seems to be consistent with the 
customary case-law findings about the nature and requirements.   
 
2. Re-characterising the requirements:-  
 
The ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation of the nature of CR was inconsistent 
and that impacted on the rationale of the requirements of CR. This resulted 
primarily from undermining the role and rationale of duty, as argued above. The 
following considerations, therefore, aim to examine the extent of the re-
characterising of these requirements. It examines the ad hoc tribunals’ 
inconsistent interpretation and implementation in four phases that are 
correspondent to the four generations of the nature of CR.117 Each phase analyses 
the impact of this inconsistency on the implementation of these requirements at 
the ad hoc tribunals.  
 
A) Restricting the application:- 
The commander’s ability to control at the time of the commission of the 
alleged crime is a required test to find the person responsible for failure to act 
under the CR doctrine, whether military or civilian. The initial purpose of this test 
was to identify the commander who bears the responsibility. The API commentary 
stated therefore that: “the text does not limit the obligation of commanders to 
                                                          
113 Čelebići, para 378; also Bemba, para 415; see also Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli AC, ICTR-98-
44A-A, 23 May 2005, para 86. 
114 Čelebići, para 395. 
115 Nichael A. Newton and Casey Kuhlman, ‘Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the Critical 
Path: Reframing the Theory of ‘Effective Control’’ (2009) 40 Netherlands Year of International Law 
3, 9.   
116 ICCS, Art. 28 (a) & (b).   
117 Chapter 3 (n 216) et seq. 
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apply only with respect to members of the armed forces under their command; it is 
further extended to apply with respect to "other persons under their control".”.118  
The practice of the ad hoc tribunals, however, was controversial.119 The UN 
Commission of Experts listed factors when testing commanders’ connection to 
crimes committed by subordinates; these include “the number … the type … [and] 
the scope of illegal acts; … the number and type of troops involved; the logistics 
involved… the widespread occurrence of the acts…”.120 Accordingly, providing 
logistics is evidence (or, at least, an indicium) to establish the ability to control 
under CR. 
As an illustration, Alfred Musema was an influential individual who was 
assigned, by a Presidential Decree, to be the Director of a public enterprise, the 
Gisovu Tea Factory in Rwanda.121 The Tribunal held him responsible – as a de jure 
superior - for the genocide committed by his employees.122 He was held 
responsible only for the crime committed by his direct employees,123 even though, 
from the evidence, Musema had authority over the “soldiers, guards” and other 
units that perpetrated crimes.124  
The Tribunal overlooked the fact that effective control means, in the first 
place, the ability and authority to control.125 Musema’s ability to control can be 
deduced from his ability, inter alia, to provide logistical support tantamount to 
those available to responsible commanders. Musema knew of, and at the time had 
been able to prevent, those logistics which would have prevented those crimes. 
Nevertheless, because the duty was not weighed against the test, Musema’s 
responsibility was restricted only to his direct subordinates, even though the 
Tribunal acknowledged that although:-  
“[t]he Chamber is satisfied that such individuals perceived Musema as a 
figure of authority and as someone who wielded considerable power in the 
                                                          
118 API Commentary, para 3555.  
119 It could be argued that the judgment in Čelebići was devoted to justifying the applicability of CR 
to civilian superiors and that the judgment therefore avoided considering the duty, as it  might have 
been  more difficult to find support through customary law. Cf. Mettraux (2009) 143. 
120 UN Doc. S/1994/674, para. 58. See also Čelebići, para 386. 
121 Musema TC, para 12.  
122 Ibid, paras 880 & 894. 
123 Cecile Aptel & Jamie A Williamson, ‘A Commentary on the Musema Judgment Rendered by the 
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,’ (2000) 1 Melb. J. Int’l L. 131, 140. 
124 Musema TC, para 491. 
125 Cf. Art. 28 ICCS. 
168 
 
region, it is not satisfied … that Musema did, in fact, exercise de jure and de 
facto control over these individuals”.126 
 
Whenever, therefore, a commander, superior or any person assumes 
command, this should be considered a voluntary assumption of duty and of 
responsibility attached to such a position of command or leadership.127 
Consequently, such an individual should be held responsible for crimes committed 
by subordinates under his presumed command as a result of his failure to act. This 
is in line with the Bagilishema AC finding that “[i]t is sufficient that, for one 
reason or another, the accused exercises the required “degree” of control over his 
subordinates, namely, that of effective control”.128 
In Nahimana, the AC did not endorse the Musema findings. The Nahimana 
AC emphasised that effective control means “material capacity” to prevent or 
punish: it “does not have to be established that the civilian superior was vested 
with “excessive power” similar to that of a public authority”.129 Therefore, it 
concluded that “the authority vested in” the accused is the criterion by which to 
assess the capacity to exercise effective control.130   
 
i) Restricting the necessary measures:- 
The Čelebići Judgment stated that “[w]here a superior has knowledge of 
violations of the laws of war by his subordinates, he is under a duty to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts”.131 Note that these 
requirements of CR should not be confused with the requirements of the principal 
perpetrator of the crime. In this, “it is not necessary to establish that a superior 
knew of the specific intent of his subordinates”,132 as what rendered him causally 
linked to the crime is his omission (failure to act) and not any form of direct 
participation.   
 
                                                          
126 Musema TC, para 881.  
127 Cf. Pohl and Mummenthey: (Chapter 2 n 187) et seq. 
128 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, AC Judgment, ICTR-95-1 A-A, 3 July 2002, para 55. 
129 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., AC Judgment, ICTR-99-52-A, 28 November 2007, para 785. 
130 Nahimana AC, para 795; see also Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., TC Judgment, ICTR-99-52-T, 
03 December 2003, para 972. 
131 See also Čelebići, para 771.  
132 Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, AC Judgment, ICTR-98-41 A-A, 8 May 2012, Joint Declaration of 
Judges Pocar and Liu, para 1. 
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The Tribunal stated that these measures will be specified on a case-by-case 
basis, as the implementation of the duty generally depends on the circumstances of 
each case.133 Thus, the Blaškić AC stated that “what constitutes such measures is 
not a matter of substantive law but of evidence”.134 Nevertheless, the ICC provided 
a number of general steps as indicia of what is expected from commanders if they 
are to fulfil this duty, such as to secure a reporting system.135 Hence, the ICC 
recognised the duty to acquire information as part of the duty to take measures 
necessary for exercising effective command. The knowledge of the commander 
therefore differs from the intent of the perpetrator.136  
 
The ICTR in Akayesu, initially by resorting to the API Commentary, 
required that the knowledge element amount to a level to “ensure that there has 
been malicious intent, or, at least, ensure that negligence was so serious as to be 
tantamount to acquiescence”.137 This is inconsistent with the knowledge standard 
under CR as a customary norm, as the knowledge requirement is derived from the 
sub-duty to know. This was, however, resolved as the ICTR endorsed the Čelebići 
finding of the information,138 which required that:-   
 
“a superior had some general information in his possession, which would put 
him on notice of possible unlawful acts by his subordinates would be sufficient 
to prove that he “had reason to know”… This information does not need to 
provide specific information about unlawful acts committed or about to be 
committed. For instance, a military commander who has received information 
that some of the soldiers under his command have a violent or unstable 
character, or have been drinking prior to being sent on a mission, may be 
considered as having the required knowledge”.139 
 
In other words, if general information were open to the commander, he 
would be presumed to have the knowledge of the crime.140 Nevertheless, this was 
                                                          
133 These measures will ultimately depend on “the degree of effective control he wielded over his 
subordinates”. Blaškić AC, para 72.  
134 See Blaškić AC, para. 72; see also Čelebići AC, para 198. 
135 Bemba, para 438. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Akayesu  TC, para. 489; also Bagilishema TC, para 1007; see also the API Commentary, para 
3541.  
138 Bagilishema AC, para 42. 
139 Čelebići AC, para 238.  
140 Cf. James Levine II, ‘The doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Application to Superior 
Civilian Leadership: Does the International Criminal Court Have the Correct Standard?’ (2007) 193 
Mil. L. Rev. 52, 74. 
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not always consistent as the focus gradually shifted away from the duty to know. 
The Krnojelac AC for example, ruled that “the court must ascertain whether [the 
accused] had sufficiently alarming information to alert him to the risk of acts”.141 
This is contrary to the standard of knowledge as interpreted by Čelebići. It is as a 
result of disregarding the duty to know that the Tribunal focused only on the type 
of information (from general to alarming) rather than on the obligation to know or 
to establish a reporting system. The Krnojelac AC, accordingly, overlooked the fact 
that general information was available to the commander, which is the actual 
requirement. 
 
B) Deflating from essence:- 
The essence of these requirements is primarily to assess whether the 
accused controlled his troops when he was able to exercise control. Naser Orić,142 
for instance, was appointed Commander of the Srebrenica Armed Forces Staff 
before he became the Commander of the Joint Forces of the Sub-Region for 
Srebrenica.143 The Srebrenica Armed Forces consisted of a number of irregular 
fighting groups144 under Orić’s command from which the Srebrenica Military 
Police was established.145 The TC found the Srebrenica Military Police detained, at 
the Srebrenica Police Station and elsewhere,146 a number of Bosnian Serbs who 
were subjected to cruel treatment and murder, which was the first ground of 
charges against Orić under CR.147  
The TC then affirmed that the superior-subordinates relationship existed 
between Orić and the Military Police.148It concluded, accordingly, that Orić was 
responsible for his failure “to prevent the occurrence” of the crimes but that he 
“cannot be held criminally responsible for having failed … to punish”.149 Note that 
the ICTY changed the responsibility from “responsible for crimes” to a dereliction 
                                                          
141 Krnojelac AC, para 155. 
142 He was a police officer who served mostly in Srebrenica. Orić TC, para 1. 
143 Ibid para 2. 
144 Ibid para 140-1. 
145 Ibid para 181.  
146 Ibid para 355. The Tribunal noted that the Military Police were commanded by Mirzet Halilović 
and Atif Krdzić, who were responsible for the omissions and acts committed against the detainees. 
Orić TC, paras 490-6. 
147 Ibid para 289. 
148 Orić TC, para 532. 
149 Ibid para 578.  
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of duty that impacted subsequently on the requirement.150 The focus was thus on 
which duty the commanders had failed to fulfil rather than on the resultant 
international crime. 
The prosecution argued that Orić, as a de jure commander, possessed the 
effective control and had thus failed in this duty.151 The AC, however, suggested 
that, due to the chaotic conditions and loose chain of command, he was unable to 
exercise control.152 Note that particularly the de jure commander is obliged to 
command: that means that his duty is to resolve the chaotic situation or - at least – 
initiate the necessary measures to do so. But, due to this re-characterised 
requirement, the Tribunal could not recognise the essence of the prosecution’s 
arguments about the role of duty, when it was examining the requirement. 
This finding is also contrary to Čelebići, which affirmed that, in such chaotic 
circumstances, the hierarchical structure is tested differently.153 Čelebići stated, 
accordingly, that the nature of any such chain of command will be loose;154 
nevertheless, commanders remain obliged to know their rights and duties.155 Thus, 
the Orić TC should have considered: (a) his background and role in creating the 
Military Police unit;156 and (b) his duty to exercise effective control over the 
Military Police as an operational - if not an executive - command.157   
 
i) The impact on the duty to take necessary measures:-  
In Hadžihasanović, the TC considered the use of disciplinary action 
sufficient to fulfil the duty to punish under Art. 7 (3) of the ICTYS.158 In his Appeal, 
the Prosecutor argued that this was an error, as disciplinary action is an 
insufficient punishment for international crimes.159 The AC, however, confirmed 
                                                          
150 Cf. (Chapter 3 n 187). 
151 The Prosecutor indicated that it was Orić’s duty to exercise effective control. Orić, AC, para 145. 
152 Orić AC, para 149. 
153 Supra (nn 30-31). 
154 Orić TC, para 142.  
155 The Prosecutor’s argument was that a “de jure power always results in a presumption of effective 
control.”. Orić AC, para 91. It would have been more accurate had he argued that a commander, 
whether de jure or de facto, is under an affirmative duty to exercise control that would have been 
consistent with the API. Cf. supra (nn 110 and 127).  
156 The Tribunal, in its judgment, stated that Orić was the “overall commander” of the Srebrenica 
Forces, including his establishing of the military police. See Orić TC, paras 143 and 174. In addition, 
Orić’s high profile was significant, especially in terms of prisoner exchanges. Orić AC, para 139. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Hadžihasanović TC, paras 2056-58.  
159 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, AC Judgement, IT-01-47-A, 22 April 2008, para 32.  
172 
 
the TC conclusion, asserting that these measures are “not a matter of substantive 
law but of evidence”.160 It then ruled that these measures might be “disciplinary or 
penal”, depending on the circumstances of each case, as “the use of disciplinary 
measures will be sufficient to discharge a superior of his duty to punish crimes 
under Article 7 (3)”.161 It should be noted that the AC, in reaching this conclusion, 
referred to the API Art. 87, which, as discussed above, was misleading.162  
 
Accordingly, the AC’s finding shows that, when troops commit acts 
recognised as crimes under international law, some disciplinary actions are 
sufficient to provide justice.163 This problem can be attributed to two causes: first, 
the misleading clause: (“and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal 
action against violators thereof”).164 Note that it is contrary to the ICL purpose: in 
Alic Sefik case, for example, the Trial ruled that the violation of a disciplinary duty 
– which requires disciplinary action - “is not the subject of criminal 
proceedings”.165 
 
The second cause is the undermining of the role of duty: there is no 
examination of the existence of this duty anywhere in the judgments of the ad hoc 
tribunals.166 Had there been an examination of the customary law by these 
tribunals, they would have found that this “requirement to punish” appeared only 
once; nevertheless, it did not suggest a duty.167 The Nahimana AC stated, however, 
that the Tribunal needed to find that the accused had had the power to prevent; 
thus, it “did not need to specify the necessary and reasonable measures that he 
could have taken. It needed only to find that the [accused] had taken none” of 
those reasonable measures.168 
   
The ICC drafters were notably more cautious and aware of the inevitability 
of such a problem, as punishing perpetrators of crimes under international law is a 
                                                          
160 Ibid para 33. 
161 Ibid. The ad hoc tribunals tried to resolve such a difficult problem but, again, it was not sufficient 
to justify this duty because it is judicial by nature. Cf. Orić TC, para 336; also Prosecutor v. Strugar 
TC II Judgement, IT-01-42-T, 31 January 2005, para 376. See also Brima TC, para 799. 
162 Supra (n 97) et seq. 
163 This is against the purpose of creating the ad hoc tribunals. Cf. (Chapter 3 n 38).  
164 Supra (n 103).  
165 Prosecutor v. Alic Sefik, Verdict, X-KR-06/294, 11 April 2008, 51. 
166 Cf. supra (n 107). Note that duty as part of CR was considered in few judgments but this was not 
consistently implemented. See supra (n 1); see also Blaškić TC, (chapter 3 n 163).  
167 Toyoda, Cf. (Chapter 2 nn 228 and 321). 
168 Nahimana AC, para 792. 
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judicial duty. It therefore adopted different duties that truly did already exist “in 
the military codes of all countries”.169  
 
C) Replacing the requirement by forming a separate requirement:-  
The rationale of taking measures is to enable the commander to control 
subordinates and subsequently prevent crimes. Therefore, the Kayishema TC 
emphasised that CR “cannot demand the impossible. Thus, any imposition of 
responsibility must be based upon a material ability of the accused to prevent or 
punish the crimes in question”.170 The AC endorsed this finding and asserted that 
“it is the effective capacity of the Accused to take measures which is relevant”.171 
The ICTY and ICTR interpretations were inconsistent regarding the meaning and 
implementation of material ability as a standard.  
Enver Hadžihasanović172, for instance, was the commander of the 3rd. Corps, 
and later Chief of Staff, of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(the ABiH).173 He was held responsible for crimes committed, inter alia, by El 
Mujahedin174 for failure to prevent crimes, before his acquittal on this count.175 
Initially, Hadžihasanović reported to the authority his concern about the activities 
of the El Mujahedin who fought side-by-side with his troops: the prosecution 
considered this as evidence for de facto command.176 More precisely, 
Hadžihasanović, in his report, requested the creation of an El Mujahedin 
detachment (EMD),177 to be an organised unit under his control and command.178 
Despite the evidence, the Tribunal rejected the prosecution’s argument regarding 
the accused’s de jure or de facto command over El Mujahedin before the creation 
of EMD.179  
                                                          
169 Cf. supra (nn 90-91).  
170 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TC Judgment, ICTR-95-1 T, 21 May 1999, para 511. 
171 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, AC Judgment, ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, para 302; 
see also Prosecutor v. Mpambara, TC Judgement, ICTR-01-65-T, 11 September 2006, para 32.  
172 Hadžihasanović TC, para 403. 
173 Ibid para 330.  
174 Ibid para 407 & 413. El Mujahedin eventually became a force unit that consisted of (a) foreign 
fighters (b) local forces (c) regular units of the ABiH and (d) Bosnian volunteers. Hadžihasanović 
TC, para 463.  
175 He was sentenced to three years and six months, but on other counts. Hadžihasanović AC, para 
357. 
176 Hadžihasanović TC, para 464. 
177 Ibid paras 809, 812 & 843. 
178 Ibid.     
179 Ibid para 479 & 580. 
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Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that the accused exercised effective 
control over the EMD only, its reasons being: “the power to give orders and have 
them executed; the conduct of combat operations involving the forces in question; 
the absence of any other authority over the forces in question”.180  In this, the court 
recognised only the duty for de jure command, being the source of the test of 
effective control. The TC, therefore, found Hadžihasanović responsible, inter alia, 
for the failure to prevent crimes committed by the EMD and sentenced him to 5 
years’ imprisonment.181  
 The Appeal Chamber, however, rejected the TC finding and concluded that 
Hadžihasanović lacked the material ability to exercise effective control over the 
EMD.182 In so doing, the Appeal Chamber overlooked the fact that the EMD was 
created, controlled and commanded by the accused; whence he became obliged to 
fulfil his duty to exercise command and control over such a unit. Although the AC 
stated that: “[s]uch material ability is a minimum requirement for the recognition 
of a superior-subordinate relationship”,183 the so-called “minimum” requirement 
(a test), practically, replaced the “subordination” requirement.  
The AC here stated that, according to the Čelebići AC, “the possession of de 
jure authority constitutes prima facie a reasonable basis for assuming that an 
accused has effective control”.184 It suggested, however, that the prosecution has to 
prove that the commander – regardless of his/her de jure authority and duty - did 
actually exercise effective control. 185 This is contrary to the purpose of the test of 
effective control, as the rationale of this test is to assess whether, at the time of the 
crime’s being committed, the commander was able to act, regardless of whether 
he/she did.  
The undermining of the role of duty affected the interpretation and 
implementation of these requirements of CR. The Halilović AC, therefore, to 
establish the effective control, stated that the “material ability to prevent and 
punish crimes” needs to be evidentially demonstrated.186 Nevertheless, it rejected 
the evidence by the Prosecutor that, inter alia, the accused issued orders.187 It 
                                                          
180 Ibid para 851 & 853.  
181 Ibid para 2085. 
182 Hadžihasanović AC, para 231-2. 
183 Ibid para 321.  
184 Ibid para 21. 
185 Cf. supra (n 1).   
186 Halilović AC, para 208. 
187 Ibid para 205.   
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ruled that it is more important that the accused’s “orders are actually followed”.188 
Although this is partly correct to assess the extent of authority, the AC overlooked 
the role of duties vested in the position of command.  
 
i) Replacing the requirement of knowledge:- 
The ICC – in Bemba – mentioned a number of those factors relevant when 
determining knowledge, including, inter alia, “the number of illegal acts, their 
scope, whether their occurrence is widespread, the time…” also the commander’s 
position etc.189 These factors can be considered when determining the “should 
have known” standard,190 as well as other factors, such as the existence of general 
information about crimes.191 The  Chamber stated that “had reasons to know” by 
the ad hoc Tribunal “sets a standard different from the “should have known” 
standard … “However…the criteria or indicia developed by the ad hoc 
tribunals…may be useful when applying the “should have known” requirement”.192 
The ad hoc tribunals’ - following Čelebići - considered the UN Commission 
of Experts’ report of indicia such as “the time during which the illegal acts 
occurred… the widespread occurrence of the acts…”.193 The ICTY, however, after 
presenting and supporting the customary practice regarding the “existence of a 
duty of commanders to remain informed”194 and that “command responsibility 
applies to the commander who “knew, or should have known, by use of 
reasonable diligence” of the commission of atrocities”195, mistakenly interpreted 
Art. 86 of the API of 1977. 
In doing so, it referred to the debate during the drafting of this Article, 
where it – incorrectly - considered some discussions to have been a rejection of the 
“should have known” standard.196 It then, erroneously, concluded that the 
Customary Law regarding the “should have known” requirement was changed 
                                                          
188 Halilović AC, para 207. 
189 Bemba, para 431. 
190  Ibid para 434. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid.   
193 UN Doc. S/1994/674, para. 58. See also Čelebići, para 386. 
194 Čelebići, para 388.  
195 Ibid para 389.  
196 Čelebići, para 391. See Ilias Bantekas, Principles of direct and superior responsibility in 
international humanitarian law (MUP 2002) 112; see also Monica Feria Tinta, ‘Commanders on 
Trial: The Blaškić. Case and the Doctrine of Command Responsibility under International Law’ 
(2000) NILR 293, 319. 
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accordingly.197 Reviewing these debates, however, it is clear that the parties’ actual 
concern was the clarity of the formulation, rather than the substance, of this 
provision. For example, the Swedish representative supported the “should have 
known” requirement, as it is:- 
“[o]ften … extremely difficult … to prove that a commander actually knew 
what was going on, which would deprive the provision of some of its deterrent 
effects. It would have been desirable that a commander should be held 
responsible for acts which he, as a commander, should know were taking 
place”.198  
 The Swedish representative thus was in favour of “a wording more in line 
with the original United States amendments”.199 He also considered that “there 
would be an inducement for the commander to ensure that he was at all times kept 
fully informed and thereby enabled to prevent breaches”.200 This corresponds to 
this study’s argument, about the relevance of the values element and that 
knowledge is a sub-duty under the necessary measures.   
The Netherlands’ representative stated that “[h]is delegation supported the 
United States’ amendment” and “was willing to assist, if necessary, in the 
improvement of the text”.201 The Syrian delegation also commented that the ‘words 
“or should have known”… seemed unclear’.202 Similarly, the Argentinian 
representative stated that ‘the words “or should have known” introduced a lack of 
clarity’.203 He also expressed his support for this standard and asserted that a 
“superior, indeed, should always have knowledge of any breach committed by his 
subordinates”.204 
It is, therefore, Čelebići that erroneously re-characterised the mental 
standard, and also contradicted the customary law, through its interpretation 
which violated the legality principle. It accordingly replaced the “should have 
known” with a now standard form of “had reason to know”. This incorrect 
interpretation by the ICTY affected the other ad hoc tribunals, as they followed the 
                                                          
197 Čelebići, para 391.  
198 CDDH/I/SR. 64, para 62.  
199 CDDH/I/SR. 64, para 63. The US amended text was “or should reasonably have known”. See 
also CDDH/I/SR.50, para 30, where the US representative stated that the amendment of wording 
was “designed to make the article clearer”.  
200 CDDH/I/SR. 64, para 62.  
201 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 36. 
202 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 51.  
203 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 55. 
204 CDDH/I/SR.50, para 56. 
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“had reason to know” standard as being part of customary law.205 Note that the 
Commentary on API referred to the draft Article where the standard was of 
“should have known”.206  
 
However, as a result of the re-characterisation of the duty to know, the “had 
reason to know” standard became similar to the civilian standard of the knowledge 
requirement under the ICCS.207 This could be considered a justification of the 
separation - due to the lack of personal obligations and the different nature of 
duties - between military and civilians regarding the knowledge requirement at the 
ICC.208 It serves also to alert the ICC to the need, when referring to the ad hoc 
tribunals’ knowledge standard, to be as limited as possible only to those ICC cases 
involving civilian superiors.   
 
D) Reconsidering the rationale of the requirements:- 
The abovementioned inconsistent interpretations affected the application of 
CR as a form of responsibility. Nevertheless, a change has recently emerged 
through the ad hoc tribunals’ judgments. Although this, negatively, constitutes 
another inconsistent re-characterisation, the commander’s duty was re-considered 
for the true rationale of the requirements of CR.  
The SCSL, in Brima known also as AFRC, stated that, “[t]he doctrine of 
effective control was traditionally applied to commanders in regular armies, which 
tend to be highly structured and disciplined forces. The AFRC was less trained, 
resourced, organised and staffed than a regular army. However, it mimicked 
one”.209 It then emphasised the significance of the commander’s role in such a 
situation, stating that “[r]ules and systems facilitating the exercise of control 
existed … [and] were legitimated not by law but by the authority of the individual 
commanders”.210 
                                                          
205 Indeed the Čelebići finding was adopted by the ICTR and SCSL. See Musema, supra (nn 125-6); 
see also Brima TC, para 794. 
206 API Commentary, para 3526 footnote 2. But this was overlooked by the judges in the ad hoc 
tribunals.   
207 Cf. Cassese (2013) 190. 
208 Supra (nn 78-80).  
209 Brima TC, para 539.   
210 Ibid. 
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The SCSL then asserted that the less organised nature of these entities 
cannot be used to exclude liability,211 as the ability to control subordinates is 
“derived at least in part by virtue of their positions within this organisation”.212 
The TC recognised, accordingly, duties vested in the position of command in 
determining the culpable commander within the chain of command, even when it 
is loosely structured.213 This is in line – although not explicitly – with the voluntary 
assumption of command.214 
The Kordić Judgment, for example, failed to establish subordination, 
because effective control was erroneously considered a separate requirement, even 
though the Tribunal found that Dario Kordić “wore a military uniform, held the 
title of ‘Colonel’, issued orders for military equipment and supplies, managed 
personnel, represented the Croatian forces in UN negotiations, exercised control 
over roads, roadblocks, and prisoners, participated in planning, was physically 
present during military operations, and provided “political authorization” for 
ethnic cleansing campaigns”.215 This illustrates the impact of undermining the duty 
when examining the exercise of effective control as a test. 
The SCSL, however, was torn between two views: (a) examining the 
accused’s ability “to actually exercise effective control”;216 and (b) examining 
whether the accused did in practice exercise effective control. This illustrates the 
importance of the duty to exercise control in determining the effective control 
correctly as a test and not as a separate requirement.217 The SCSL seems, therefore, 
partly to have departed from the implemented test of effective control as a separate 
requirement, by not following the above findings of the ICTY/R.  
The Knowledge requirement was also reinterpreted recently in 
reconsidering the role of “duty”. Previously, however, mens rea for CR was 
confused with the mens rea of the principal perpetrator, especially in the case of 
                                                          
211 Cf. the ICTY and ICTR conclusions: supra (nn 123-4 and n 182). 
212 Brima TC, para 540. 
213 Newton & Kuhlman suggested that the Court seemed to recognise the linkage between the 
concept of ‘responsible command’ and the doctrine of ‘command responsibility’.  See Newton and 
Kuhlman, supra (n 115) 48-51. Cf. also (nn 69-70). 
214 Cf. supra (nn 37, 81 and 127). 
215 Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, TC, IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001, paras 838-841; see also 
Brima TC, para 1660. Note that this can be ascribed to the reliance on the Commentary on the API 
rather than the customary precedents. Cf. Maria Nybondas, ‘Civilian Superior Responsibility in the 
Kordić’ (2003) NILR 59, 66. 
216 Brima TC, para 1723. 
217 Brima TC, paras 788-9.  
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responsibility for genocide, which requires a specific intent.218 For example, 
Judges Pocar and Liu emphasised that, “it is sufficient for a superior to know or 
have reasons to know that his subordinates are about to commit a crime but it is 
not necessary that he be aware of their specific mens rea”.219  
The concept of personal obligations required of military commanders was 
also applied by the ad hoc tribunals’ more recent case-law. The ICTR found that 
commanders’ actual knowledge is evident when crimes are committed by 
“organised military operations”, because such operations require “authorisation, 
planning and orders from the highest levels…when the vigilance of military 
authorities would have been at its height”.220 This was endorsed also at the AC.221 
Nevertheless, this issue was in debate as Judges Meron and Robinson 
disagreed, arguing that there was no reasonable evidence to show the actual 
knowledge of the accused.222 In this, however, the Judges considered neither the 
values element of the duty nor the personal obligations vested, more explicitly, in 
the military commander. Although there was no discussion of personal 
obligations, the context of the majority judgments was in line with this 
interpretation.  
 
i) Reinterpreting the requirements:-   
The duty as a concept is important, not only as being the source of these 
requirements but, more precisely, as being part of the nature of CR. Although this 
was never explicitly acknowledged by the ad hoc tribunals’ case-law, the 
Nahimana AC stated recently that the “superior who enjoyed power of effective 
control… (he) was under an obligation to exercise that power, even if it was shared 
with others”.223 It emphasised that, even when power is shared, such a superior 
remains under a duty to control, and that informing the authority cannot, alone, be 
a reasonable measure.224  
                                                          
218 Cf. Alexander Zahar, ‘Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for Genocide’ (2001) 14 
LJIL 591; see also William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2nd. 
edn., CUP 2009) 364. 
219 Ntabakuze AC, Joint Declaration of Judges Pocar and Liu, para. 1, supra (n 162). 
220 Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., TC Judgment, ICTR-98-41-T, 18 December 2008, para 2082. 
221 Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., AC Judgment, ICTR-98-41-A, 14 December 2011, para 298. 
222 Bagosora AC, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Meron and Robinson, paras 1 - 7. 
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224 Ibid para 854.  
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The Brima TC commented on the applicability of the misinterpreted test of 
effective control, especially to irregular forces, and stated that:-  
“[i]n a conflict characterised by the participation of irregular armies or rebel 
groups, the traditional indicia of effective control provided in the 
jurisprudence may not be appropriate or useful. As the Trial Chamber has 
observed, the formality of an organisation’s structure is relevant to, but not 
determinative of, the question of the effective control of its leaders. The less 
developed the structure, the more important it becomes to focus on the 
nature of the superior’s authority rather than on his or her formal 
designation”.225 
The duty in the informal situation is not, however, as definitive as that of formal 
forces; this test thus became more important by assessing the extent of authority 
and exercising duty. The SCSL in Fofana asserted that the degree of control might 
be lower in relation to civilian superiors, but that this should not affect the test of 
ability to control.226  
The SCSL was, therefore, criticised for departing from the “original concept 
of superior responsibility”.227 One can wonder, however, what is the original 
concept? Is it based on Čelebići or Halilović, which partly diverged from customary 
law? Is it based on Yamashita and the IMTs, where the nature of CR was 
considered differently? Or is it based on the ICC view that, although evidence of 
actual state practice and opinio juris, it does not explicitly imply customary law? 
The core problem is the inconsistent implementation of CR, which resulted from 
the rationale being overlooked in the inconsistent interpretation of its 
requirements. 
The ad hoc tribunals’ judgements confused the test with the actual 
requirement, as a result of undermining the role of duty; it was thus inconsistently 
applied. The ICTY recognised this issue recently, however, stating that:- 
“[t]he test of effective control relates to the relationship between the 
individuals and is not limited to a consideration of whether actual control is 
being exercised at any given moment. Otherwise the responsibility would 
                                                          
225 Brima TC, para 787. 
226 Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana et al., AC Judgment, SCSL-04-14-A, 28 May 2008, paras 174 & 
187. Nevertheless, the AC seems to have confused actual exercise of control and the capacity to 
exercise control. See also Fofana AC, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Honourable Justice George 
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be significantly narrowed – restricted to those who were in control and not 
reaching those who could have taken that control to prevent these crimes or 
punish them. Thus, in assessing effective control for these purposes, the 
issue is not whether the superior was in command or exercising control at 
any given moment but rather whether he or she had the material ability to 
prevent or punish the perpetrators of the crimes. It is this ability that 
evidences a superior-subordinate relationship”.228 
In this, it implicitly recognised the rationale of the requirement, in conjunction 
with the role of the duty as the source of these requirements.  
More precisely, the duty was implicitly recognised as part of the “values 
element”. The Popović AC resorted to military practice –rather than the 
controversial Commentary on API- to assess the function and process of reporting, 
and concluded that “in military practice such reports may sometimes be made 
either directly to the competent authority or through a superior officer”.229 
However, “in order to constitute a necessary and reasonable measure to punish, 
the commander’s report must be sufficient to trigger the action of the competent 
authority”.230 The Tribunal also rejected Hadžihasanović,231 and concluded that if 
“initiating the disciplinary offence procedure was an option [the accused] could 
have taken, such action on its own would not have satisfied the obligation to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to punish his subordinates”.232 
This, on the one hand, illustrates that the prior re-characterisation or 
inconsistent interpretation of the requirement was an error of law.233 On the other, 
this jeopardised the legality principles and the accused person’s rights because the 
substance of these requirements was, and is still, inconsistently interpreted and 
then inaccurately implemented.   
 
                                                          
228 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., AC Judgment, IT-05-88-A, 30 January 2015, para 1858; see also 
Popović TC, para 2023. 
229 Popović AC, para 1932.   
230 Ibid.  
231 Cf. supra (nn 158-169). 
232 Popović AC, para 1942. 
233 Cf. Judge Niang, who disagreed with the majority opinion because he supported the effective 
control test being actually exercised. Popović AC, Separate and Dissenting Opinions of Judge 
Mandiaye Niang, para 61. 
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3. The role of duty and the boundaries of CR:- 
The duty – as part of the values element – is important in defining the 
boundaries of the nature of CR. The Tribunal - in Popović - asserted “the 
importance of a superior’s duty to enforce the rule of international humanitarian 
law”; therefore, “a failure to fulfil a legal duty is a serious form of responsibility, 
particularly when it contributes” to international crimes, as the commander’s 
“omission thus cannot be trivialized”.234 Accordingly, the ICTR recently reiterated 
that the “superior need not necessarily know the exact identity of his or her 
subordinates who perpetrate crimes”.235 The issue of concern is whether duties 
were effectively fulfilled at the time of armed conflict.   
The duty is an important factor in justifying the extent of applying CR as a 
component of its nature, rather than as a source of requirements only. In this, the 
concept of successor command was denied recognition as part of the nature of CR. 
It was rejected during the early decisions of the ICTY, but Judge Liu recently 
argued that it should be recognised as part of CR, claiming that “the 
Hadžihasanović et al. Appeal Decision erred in finding that customary 
international law excludes such a mode of successor command”.236 He emphasised 
that “superior responsibility is meant to ensure that commanders comply with the 
laws and customs of war and international humanitarian law generally”.237 
Judge Liu argued, also, that this successor command is within the meaning 
of the duty to punish and should thus be recognised as part of CR; but Judge Liu’s 
suggestion contradicts the rationale of CR. Note that the duty to punish is per se 
problematic; nevertheless, even under the duty to investigate crimes, the 
commander prior to his assumption of command is obliged only to report these 
crimes.238 The failure to investigate or report is not, alone, sufficient to raise CR, 
because causation is required, among others (whether explicitly or implicitly) for 
CR, between the omission and the crime.239 This omission is recognised only if the 
commander was able to control subordinates at the time of commission. Successor 
                                                          
234 Popović AC, para 1997. 
235 Prosecutor v. Ndindilymana et al., AC Judgement, ICTR-00-56-A, 11 February 2014, para 251. 
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command cannot, accordingly, be recognised as part of CR.240 This suggestion 
resulted from overlooking the criminality requirement of CR. 
 
4. Re-characterising the criminality requirements:- 
 
A) The underlying crime:- 
The ad hoc tribunals do not recognise the underlying crimes as a 
requirement for CR. This finding, however, impacted on the sentence, as the focus 
was on the accused’s failure to prevent and not on the connection between his 
omission and such crime. Initially, it was argued that the gravity of the offences 
should have been considered in the sentence,241 as a result of the too lenient 
sentence for CR.  The Čelebići AC therefore ruled that there were two implicit 
elements under Art. 7 (3) relating to the underlying crime:- 
 
“(1) the gravity of the underlying crime committed by the convicted person’s 
subordinate; and 
 
(2) the gravity of the convicted person’s own conduct in failing to prevent or 
punish the underlying crimes”.242  
  
This was the settled practice of the ICTY until Orić found that the underlying crime 
is a fourth requirement to be proven for CR.243 Although this was used  only to 
clarify that the commission of crime is an obvious condition for the court’s 
jurisdiction, it was, however, introduced as a fourth requirement inconsistent with 
the ICTY case-law.244 But the abovementioned two elements of gravity did not 
resolved the lenient verdicts of CR.245 
   
                                                          
240 Cf. Barrie Sander, ‘Unravelling the Confusion Concerning Successor Superior Responsibility in 
the ICTY Jurisprudence’ (2010) LJIL 105, 134-135. Cf. Carol Fox, ‘Closing A loophole in 
Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commanders’ Duty to Punish Knowing Past Offenses’ 
(2005) 55 Cases W. Res. L. Rev. 443, 458.  
241 Čelebići AC, p. 258. 
242 Ibid para 732.   
243 Orić TC, para 295.  
244 Ibid; see also Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, AC Judgment, ICTR-2001-64-A, 7July 2006, 
para 143; also Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., AC Judgment, ICTR-99-46-A, 7 July 2006, para 152. 
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B) Causation:-  
 Čelebići stated that “a necessary causal nexus may be considered to be 
inherent in the requirements of crimes committed by subordinates and the 
superior’s failure to take measures within his powers to prevent them”.246 This was 
contradicted, however, by its conclusion that “causation has not traditionally been 
postulated as a conditio sine qua non for the imposition of criminal liability on 
superiors for their failure to prevent or punish offences committed by their 
subordinates”.247   
 
The ICTY, by assuming that customary law does not indispensably require 
proof of a causal link, has clearly undermined first the requirements of CR post-
WWII, but more precisely has overlooked some of the explicit findings of the 
customary cases of causation.248 It could be argued, therefore, that it partially 
departed from the already existing customary law, as if a principle not precisely 
examined does not mean it was not important. In its justification in Čelebići, it 
argued however, that “no such causal link can possibly exist between an offence 
committed by a subordinate and the subsequent failure of a superior to punish the 
perpetrator of that same offence”.249 Causation was, therefore, a problem, as the 
trigger of culpability – at the ad hoc Tribunal - was the failure to prevent and 
punish.250 
 
Hadžihasanović – although not explicitly – provided, however, an example 
of the extent of, and potential to resolve, this issue when it slightly shifted the 
culpability based on the duty to act. The Hadžihasanović TC stated that “[s]uch a 
nexus is implicitly part of the usual conditions which must be met to establish 
command responsibility”.251 It then declared that “the Chamber considers that the 
existence of a link between the failure to act to prevent a crime and the 
commission of the crime is implicit and therefore presumed”.252  
 
                                                          
246 Čelebići, para 399.  
247 Čelebići, para.398. 
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Hadžihasanović corresponded to the finding in Bemba that for causation “it 
is only necessary to prove that the commander’s omission increased the risk of the 
commission of the crimes”.253 The Hadžihasanović TC explained accordingly 
that:- 
 
“Firstly, a superior who exercises effective control over his subordinates and 
has reason to know that they are about to commit crimes, but fails to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent those crimes, incurs 
responsibility, both because his omission created or heightened a real and 
reasonably foreseeable risk that those crimes would be committed, a risk he 
accepted willingly, and because that risk materialised in the commission of 
those crimes. In that sense, the superior had substantially played a part in the 
commission of those crimes. Secondly, it is presumed that there is such a nexus 
between the superior’s omission and those crimes. The Prosecution therefore 
has no duty to establish evidence of that nexus. Instead, the Accused must 
disprove it”.254  
 
Hadžihasanović AC rejected, however, this finding and concluded that the TC had 
erred in law; subsequently, the AC supported Blaškić255 and Halilović,256 which 
were based on Čelebići’s findings.257 In sum, the inconsistent interpretation of the 
nature impacted on the rationale of implementing the requirements of CR. Zahar 
and Sluiter articulated that the ad hoc Tribunals’ “have lived the life of hunter-
gatherers in a legal wilderness. They have had to track down and synthesise for 
themselves the law to apply to the facts”.258 
 
These controversial uses of inconsistent interpretation have impacted on the 
implementation of CR as a form of responsibility. Consequently, the accused’s 
right “to be informed promptly…of the nature and cause of the charges against 
him”, was affected.259 In fact, Čelebići stated that the defence had “misunderstood” 
and “misconceived” the purport of some of the arguments about CR.260 It did, 
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however, disregard its own role in creating and exacerbating such confusion, 
through problematic interpretation and inconsistent implementation. 
 
5. Conclusion:- 
This chapter has examined the impact of the inconsistent process of 
interpreting the nature of CR on the doctrine’s requirements, in the ad hoc 
tribunals. It has observed, first, the rationale of creating these requirements, as 
acknowledged by the tribunals’ early decisions that these requirements were 
deduced from commanders’ essential duties. The responsibility under CR flows, 
therefore, from breach of these duties.      
The requirements of CR were, however, inconsistently interpreted, without 
considering the role of duty. This primarily resulted from overlooking the true 
meaning of the threefold nature of CR. The values element was disregarded as part 
of CR, although, when judges were confronted with difficulties concerning CR’s 
nature or the requirements application, they predominantly by implication 
resorted to commanders’ duties. The extent of implementing some requirements 
was highly controversial, such as the requirement to punish and the constructive 
knowledge of crimes. This chapter has found that these controversies resulted 
from overlooking the rationale of commanders’ duties.  
These inconsistent interpretations have resulted in inadequate 
implementation of these essential requirements of CR. This was found through 
examining the re-characterisation of requirements in four phases that 
corresponded to the four generations found (in Chapter 3) of the nature of CR. It 
also found that overlooking the role of duty with regard to these requirements 
rendered them contradictory within the ad hoc tribunals’ case-law and also 
inharmonious with those in the ICC and the customary precedents.  
These findings reinforce the argument of previous chapters that the process 
of interpretation was the reason for the inconsistent implementation of the nature 
and requirements of CR. Such inconsistency has, it is argued, had an impact on the 
accused’s rights: it (a) jeopardised the legality principle; and (b) violated his right 
to be informed. If this argument were proven, the right to a fair trial would have 
been affected. The following chapter, accordingly, examines these two potentially 
violated principles of the rights of the accused.  
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VI. Chapter Six 
The impact of re-characterising Command Responsibility on the Rights 
of the Accused 
 
 
As discussed above, inadequate interpretation of the rules for Command 
Responsibility (CR) was the reason for the inconsistent implementation (re-
characterisation) of its nature and requirements. The extent of such re-
characterisations affected the essence of the information provided to an accused 
charged under CR. This chapter argues that these re-characterisations resulted in 
the jeopardising of the accused’s rights and aims to evaluate the impact of these re-
characterisations on those rights. It is therefore divided into two parts.  
 
The first part discusses the violation of the requirement of specificity as an 
essential element of the principles of legality. The second examines the violation, 
as a result of these re-characterisations and the inconsistent interpretation of CR, 
of the right of the accused to be fully informed about the nature of the accusation.   
  
 
1. The principle of legality and the requirement of specificity:- 
The principle of legality is recognised worldwide in national law and part of 
customary international law accordingly;1 but, most precisely, it was codified 
internationally in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)2, the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)3 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).4 This principle generally comprises nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege.5 The ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes were deficient with 
                                                          
1 Susan Lamb, ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law’, in Antonio 
Cassese and others (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
Vol. I (OUP 2002) 734.  
2 The UDHR, Art. 11 (2).  
3 The ECHR, Art. 7. 
4 The ICCPR, Article 15.  
5 See Cryer et al. (2010) 17. In fact, the nullum crimen consists of a number of elements required for 
a fair trial, as follows: (a) nullum crimen sine lege scripta, which prevents the creation of new rules, 
by judges, retrospectively applicable before the commission of the criminal act; (b) nullum crimen 
sine lege certa (the requirement of specificity and the prohibition of ambiguity), which precludes 
the use of analogy by judges; and (c) nullum crimen sine lege previa, which prevents the use of 
retrospective rules unless they are in favour of the defendant. These are in conjunction with nulla 
poena sine lege, with regard to providing for the rules of penalties specifically. Accordingly, the 
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regard to the principle of legality. Nonetheless, it was applied, through their 
judgments, as a result of its worldwide recognition; therefore the ICTY stated 
that:-  
 
“The principles nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege are well 
recognised in the world’s major criminal justice systems as being 
fundamental principles of criminality. Another such fundamental principle 
is the prohibition against ex post facto criminal laws with its derivative rule 
of non-retroactive application of criminal laws and criminal sanctions.”6  
 
Most importantly, regarding the requirement of specificity, the Tribunal asserted 
that:- 
“Associated with these principles are the requirement of specificity and the 
prohibition of ambiguity in criminal legislation. These considerations are 
the solid pillars on which the principle of legality stands. Without the 
satisfaction of these principles no criminalisation process can be 
accomplished and recognised.”7 
 
Accordingly, one can assume that ad hoc tribunals would apply the 
principle of legality without any limitation or reservation. However, the Čelebići 
Judgment stated that, regarding the implementation of these principles:- 
 
“It is not certain to what extent they have been admitted as part of 
international legal practice, separate and apart from the existence of the 
national legal systems. This is essentially because of the different methods of 
criminalisation of conduct in national and international criminal justice 
systems.”8 
 
In applying the principles of legality to national systems, there are two different 
approaches. First, the strict approach, which means that, in accordance with the 
principle of legality, no person shall be punished for crimes without there being a 
relevant law.9 This approach is concerned primarily with the status of the act being 
a defined crime under the law at the time when the act was committed. Second, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
principle of legality is generally called nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. See Vladimir-Djuro 
Degan (chapter 4 n 86) 51; also Cassese (2013) 22. 
6 Čelebići, para 402.  
7 Ibid.   
8 Čelebići, para 403. 
9 Cassese (2013) 22. 
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substantive approach, which aims to prevent any criminal conduct, regardless of 
its status under the law.10 This approach is concerned primarily with the nature of 
the act being a crime, even if it is not yet criminalised by the law at the time of 
commission.     
 
Most importantly, the nature of ICL in general, and the ad hoc tribunals’ 
Statutes specifically, being rudimentary and the latter poorly drafted, might be a 
justification for avoiding the strict application of the principle of legality by the ad 
hoc tribunals’ judges.11 In contrast, Art. 21 of the ICC stated that “interpretation of 
law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized 
human rights”;12 it therefore provided for the principle of legality extensively in the 
Rome Statute under Articles 22, 23 & 24.13 This might indicate that the ICC will 
not follow the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation process regarding the 
implementation of the legality principle, as it is obliged to apply, above all, its 
Statute.14  
 
As a result of the difference between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC with 
regard to the applicable law as well as to the inclusion of the principle of legality, it 
could be argued that the ICC should adopt a cautious approach – amongst the 
strict and the substantive approach(es) - more appropriate to its treaty nature, 
applicable law, interpretation, and to its high standard regarding implementing 
human rights’ principles.  
                                                          
10 Ibid 22-3. Cassese provided for an example of the substantive approach against the Nazi 
criminals, but it should be noted that there were extraordinary temporary circumstances for such 
application.  
11 For instance, Degan argued that this principle obliged the judges to limit the use of what is known 
as ‘judge-made law’. But, as a result of the poor drafting of the ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes, the judges 
seemed to compromise extensively on the application of this principle. Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Op. 
cit, 51-2.  
12 Rome Statute, Art. 21.  
13 Rome Statute, Articles 22, 23 and 24 laid down that:  “Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege 
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition 
of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the 
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international 
law independently of this Statute. 
Article 23 Nulla poena sine lege 
A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute. 
Article 24 Non-retroactivity ratione personae 
1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into 
force of the Statute. 2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final 
judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall 
apply.” 
14 According to Art. 21(1) (a) of the Rome Statute, the ICC is required to apply “[i]n the first place, 
this Statute”. 
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A) Significance in practice:-  
As illustrated above, customary international law (CIL) is the most 
important source of ICL for the interpretation of CR.15 The legality principle is 
equally important for both CR and the international criminal courts’ proceedings. 
While the importance of the principle of legality regarding the ICC is clear 
throughout its Statutes’ provisions, the reason for the reliance of both the ICTY/R 
on the rules of CIL was to avoid any potential accusation of violating the principle 
of legality. This is consistent with the Tribunal’s decision in Tadić that:- 
“It should be emphasised again that the only reason behind the stated 
purpose of the drafters that the International Tribunal should apply 
customary international law was to avoid violating the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege”.16   
With regard to the application of the principle of legality for the purpose of CR, the 
Appeal Chamber in Hadžihasanović stated that:- 
“The Appeals Chamber holds the view that this Tribunal can impose 
criminal responsibility only if the crime charged was clearly established 
under customary law at the time the events in issue occurred. In case of 
doubt, criminal responsibility cannot be found to exist, thereby preserving 
full respect for the principle of legality.”17 
Although the principle of legality was not included under the ad hoc 
tribunals’ Statutes, it was recognised and implemented as a norm of customary 
law.18 Most importantly, the ad hoc tribunals – especially the ICTY – were 
required to apply only customary norms, to avoid violating that principle. Among 
its components, there is one standard of greater importance regarding the 
development of CR: that is, the standard of specificity, meaning clarity and 
exactitude.   
 
                                                          
15 See (Chapter 4 n 76) et seq. 
16 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 143; see also Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić  & Mario Čerkez,AC 
Judgement, IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004, para 46. 
17 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, AC, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, IT-01-47-AR72, 16 July 2003, 
para 51. See also Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, AC Judgement, IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, para 
141. 
18 Supra (nn 1 and 6); see also Stefan Glaser, ‘Nullum Crimen Sine Lege.’ (1942) 24 J. Comp. Legis. 
& Int’l L. 3d. ser. 29.  
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B) The requirement of specificity:- 
Generally, to conform with the principle of legality, its requirements or 
components have to be fulfilled if a fair trial is to be achieved.19 The requirement of 
specificity is thus closely related to the standard of clarity, as both are aimed at 
avoiding vagueness and ambiguity in the interpreted law.20 The ICTY, in 
Kupreškić, concluded therefore that the principle of legality is violated if a rule 
“lacks precision and is too general to provide a safe yardstick of the work of the 
Tribunal and hence, that it is contrary to the principle of the “specificity” of 
criminal law”.21 Note that CR was interpreted too generally: that resulted in two 
different implementations of it: (a) as a mode of liability; and (b) per se as a 
crime.22  
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) considers the principle of legality 
and the requirement of specificity essential for a fair trial.23 The principle of 
legality is therefore a fundamental factor for the protection of the right of the 
accused to a fair trial.24 This principle is an essential part of both criminal and 
human rights’ law. The requirement of specificity, according to Cassese, means 
that “criminal rules must be as detailed as possible, so as to clearly indicate to 
their addressees the conduct prohibited, both the objective elements of the crime 
and the requisite mens rea”.25  
Analogically, this standard aims to define the nature of rules to avoid any 
ambiguity for accused commanders in knowing ‘for what are they held 
responsible?’.26 The criminal law role is thus important in adequately interpreting 
vague rules to clarify the nature of the applicable law. The human rights’ law plays 
an equally important role in maintaining the accused’s right to a fair trial and, for 
the purpose of CR, the right to be informed of the nature of the accusation(s).27 
The Rome Statute, contrary to the ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes, stated therefore that 
                                                          
19 Cian C. Murphy, ‘The Principle of Legality in Criminal Law under the ECHR’ (2009) 2 European 
Human Rights Law Review 192.  
20 Michael J. Glennon, ‘The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression’ (2010) 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 71, 85.  
21 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., TC Judgment, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, paras 563 & 609. 
22 See (Chapter 3 n 171) et seq.  
23 See Mark Klamberg, ‘International Criminal in Swedish Courts: the Principle of Legality in the 
Arklöv Case’ (2009) 9 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 395, 402; also Rhona K. M. Smith, Textbook on 
International Human Rights (4th. edn., OUP, 2010) 260-1. 
24 For the right to a fair trial: infra (n 54). 
25 Cassese (2008) 41.  
26 See (Chapter 3 n 98). 
27 Infra (n 77) et seq.  
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“[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by 
analogy.”28 
   
 Note that this prohibition of analogy is to prevent judges from creating rules 
which do not already exist; this differs from analogy for the purpose of articulating 
an interpretation, which is legitimate.29  
 
C) The applicability of the principle of specificity in ICL:- 
The application of the requirement of specificity varies: on the one hand, it 
could be claimed that this standard is limited only to defining elements of 
crimes.30 On the other, it can be argued that it is extended to any principle that has 
direct relation with or influence on crimes under ICL.31 It seems that Cassese’s 
definition of the requirement was in favour of extending its applicability to 
criminal rules, which includes CR as a mode of liability directly relevant to crimes 
under ICL.32 In determining which approach would be the more applicable to 
contemporary ICL, it is essential to consider the problematic re-characterisation of 
CR and to weigh it against the need for specificity, as a requirement under the 
principle of legality.   
 
As illustrated previously, the re-characterisation problem appeared when 
the ad hoc tribunals inconsistently interpreted the rules of CR. They changed the 
responsibility from that for the crime committed to CR being per se a crime.33 This 
re-characterisation, more importantly, has had an impact on CR’s requirements 
and has resulted in first, inconsistency regarding these requirements34 and, 
secondly, the problem of the inconsistent nature of responsibility under CR.  
This problem of re-characterising CR was created as a result of misusing the 
principle of interpretation.35 The requirement of specificity (RS) was established 
                                                          
28 Art. 22, the ICCS.  
29 Bruce Broomhall, ‘Article 22: Nullum crimen sine lege’  in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (C.H.Beck . Hart . Nomos, 2008) 725; see 
also Susan Lamb (n 1) 752-3. 
30 Broomhall, Op. cit, 723-4. 
31 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(OUP 2010) 410. 
32 See Cassese (n 25). 
33 See (Chapter 3 n 98) et seq. 
34 See the discussions in the previous Chapter. 
35 See the discussions in Chapter 4.  
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essentially to ensure that interpretation serves to clarify any vagueness.36 
However, the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation resulted in the nature of CR being 
ambiguous. Accordingly, the specificity requirement was eroded by the ad hoc 
tribunals, in that not only did that interpretation create new law37 but such an 
interpretation also increased the vagueness of CR.38     
 
D) Eroding the RS through re-characterising CR:- 
 Extending the applicability of the requirement of specificity, generally to 
encompass criminal rules, was more appropriate for the purpose of RS as a 
requirement.39 Since modes of responsibility are most relevant to crimes under 
ICL, the ad hoc tribunals should – for the purpose of clarifying the nature of CR – 
have applied the broader approach of the specificity requirement. Indeed, the 
application is to be extended to modes of liability for the fulfilment of the legality 
principle and of its essential components, inter alia the specificity requirement. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) therefore stated that:-  
“From these principles it follows that an offence must be clearly defined in 
the law. This requirement is satisfied where individuals can know from the 
wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the 
court’s interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him 
criminally liable”.40  
The ICTY recognised the importance of the requirement of specificity under the 
principle of legality in criminal proceedings:- 
“From the perspective of the nullum crimen sine lege principle, it would 
be wholly unacceptable for a Trial Chamber to convict an accused person 
on the basis of a prohibition which, taking into account the specificity of 
customary international law and allowing for the gradual clarification of 
the rules of criminal law, is either insufficiently precise to determine 
conduct and distinguish the criminal from the permissible, or was not 
sufficiently accessible at the relevant time”.41  
 
                                                          
36 The ICC, Art. 22 (2). 
37 CR was implemented per se as a crime. See (Chapter 3 n 174) et seq. 
38 As the question remains ‘for what are commanders held responsible?’. Supra (n 26). 
39 Infra (n 41). 
40 Veeber v. Estonia (No. 2), Judgment, Application no. 45771/99, 21 January 2003, para 31.  
41 Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, TC II Judgment, IT-98-32-T, 29 November 2002, para 193. 
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In respect of the extended applicability of the requirement of specificity over 
modes of liability, the Tribunal supported the ECtHR – above - and emphasised 
that:- 
  
“A criminal conviction should indeed never be based upon a norm which 
an accused could not reasonably have been aware of at the time of the acts, 
and this norm must make it sufficiently clear what act or omission could 
engage his criminal responsibility”.42  
 
Analogically, the specificity required clarity regarding the nature of CR for the 
purpose of the legality principle, which was impossible as a result of the ad hoc 
tribunals’ re-characterisation. However, as stated by the ICC, in case of vagueness 
a court should interpret the rule in favour of the accused.43 This is largely intended 
- from the human rights perspective - to protect the rule of law;44 and – from a 
criminal law viewpoint – to ensure a fair trial.45  
 
This failure to recognise the essence of the problem of re-characterising CR 
was affected by examining the requirement of specificity in relation to crimes 
only,46 although in principle this requirement is extended to the clarity of modes of 
liability.47 The ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation and implementation of specificity as 
a requirement under the legality principle is, accordingly, very narrow. The ICTY 
thus stated that “the emphasis on conduct, rather than on the specific description 
of the offence in substantive criminal law, is of primary importance”.48  
 
It seems that the judges at the ad hoc tribunals acknowledged the 
importance of the requirement of specificity, but then applied the narrow 
approach, which affected the accused’s comprehension of what he could be held 
responsible for. Judge Meron, for instance, examined the principle of legality in its 
                                                          
42 Ibid.   
43 Rome Statute, Art. 22 (2). 
44 The ECtHR stated that the legality principle “is an essential element of the rule of law … It should 
be construed and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide 
effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment”. Puhk v. Estonia, 
Judgment, Application no. 55103/00, 10 February 2004, paras 24. 
45 The ECHR stated that under the legality principles there are a number of principles and “[f]rom 
these principles it follows that an offence must be clearly defined in the law”. Puhk v. Estonia, para 
25. 
46 See for example, Jennifer Lincoln, ‘Nullum Crimen Sine Lege in International Criminal Tribunal 
Jurisprudence: the problem of the residual category of crime’ (2010-2011) 7 Eyes on the ICC 137.  
47 Supra (n 39); also Cassese supra (n 25) 41-3. 
48 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic et al., TC II, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 
IT-01-47-PT, 12 November 2002, para 62 (at footnote 18).    
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narrowest form, while agreeing that it has a more applicable broader form.49 Judge 
Shahabuddeen also, in his argument about whether the requirement of specificity 
prevents the development of law, limited that requirement to its applicability to 
only crimes under ICL.50 Interestingly, in his conclusion, Judge Shahabuddeen 
supported the decision of the ECtHR that the principle of legality does not prevent 
the law from development “provided that the resultant development is consistent 
with the essence of the offence”.51 
 
 However, the ad hoc tribunals’ development of CR, examined previously, 
was not consistent with the essence of the underlying crimes under ICL. Thus, two 
issues resulted from such inconsistent interpretation. First, the nature of CR was 
not clear as to whether the responsibility is based on the underlying crime or on 
dereliction of duty.52 Second, the requirements of CR at the ad hoc tribunals were 
unclear to the accused, as a result of this inconsistency: this inevitably had an 
impact on the right to a fair trial.53  
 
2. The right to a fair trial:-    
IHRL considers the principle of legality and its components essential for a 
fair trial; more precisely, it is primarily a general principle at national criminal law 
systems and also a norm of customary law.54 The accused’s rights are recognised as 
principles under IHRL, but more importantly they are required to guarantee 
justice in criminal proceedings. Thus, proceedings at ICL are interdependent on 
not only respecting but implementing such principles.55 The ICTY, in Furundzija, 
emphasised the interaction between ICL and IHRL.56 Fair trial is thus an essential 
principle that links those two different branches of laws together.  
                                                          
49 Cf. Theodor Meron, The Making of International Criminal Justice: a view from the bench (OUP 
2012) 110.  
50 Cf. Mohammed Shahabuddeen, ‘Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive 
Development of Law?’ (2004) 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1007.  
51 Ibid 1017; see also C.R. v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, A.335-C, 22 November 1995, para 34.  
52 See for example, the four generations at the ICTY. (Chapter 3 n 216) et seq.  
53 Compare for example the Orić and Hadžihasanović findings with the Popović ruling about 
effective control. See (Chapter 5 nn 151, 185 & 228). 
54 Cf. (n 6). 
55 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2nd. edn., Pearson Education Limited, 2010) 
715. 
56 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, TC Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, paras 143-6. 
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The right to a fair trial is as ancient as the concept of CR.57 The 
contemporary fair trial is recognised, however, as a norm of IHRL that contains a 
number of the accused’s rights, one of which is the right to be informed.58 It was, 
accordingly, included in a number of international criminal courts’ and tribunals’ 
statutes and charters, discussed below. 
 
The right to a fair trial has been recently, however, mis-interpreted by the 
ad hoc tribunals, jeopardising the accused’s rights. McDermott, for example, 
suggested, in a related context, that the interpretation of “fair trial” being extended 
to include the prosecutor resulted in violating the accused’s right to a fair trial 
without undue delay.59 The following discussion, for the purpose of this study, 
argues that mis-interpreting “fair trial” resulted in infringing the accused’s right to 
be informed of the nature and cause of CR.  
 
A) The right to be informed:- 
The right to be informed is generally recognised as a component of the right 
to a fair trial. The principle of legality and the right to a fair trial were both 
considered under the early instruments of ICL to promote justice. Note that, the 
right to be informed (or the right to information) is a specific right in criminal 
procedures: it should not be confused with generic concepts, such as the right of an 
accused to be informed of his rights generally.60 The following discussion will 
therefore be limited to two rights: first - primarily - the right to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the charges; and second - where relevant - the right to know 
the reasons for arrest; those two rights sometimes might overlap.61 
 
                                                          
57 See Judge Patrick Robinson, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific 
Reference to the Work of the ICTY’ (2009) 3 Berkeley J.L Int’l L. Publicist 1, 1-3.  
58 Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, “What Is A Fair Trial? a basic guide to legal standards 
and practice” (March 2000) 1.  
59 Yvonne McDermott, ‘Rights in Reverse: A Critical Analysis of Fair Trial Rights under 
International Criminal Law’ in William A. Schabas and others, The Ashgate Research Companion 
to International Criminal Law: critical perspectives (Ashgate, 2013) 165.  
60 According to, for example, Art. 14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR, everyone is entitled “[t]o be informed, if 
he does not have legal assistance”, which is a general right at any trial, whether civil or criminal.  
61 For example, the Open Society Justice Initiative did not distinguish between those two rights. Cf. 
Open Society Justice Initiative, Arrest Rights Brief No. 2: the right to information, June 2012. As 
discussed below, the first right differs from the second, as one is part of the right to a fair trial while 
the other is part of the right to liberty and security. See infra (n 69) et seq.   
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B) The right to be informed as between international criminal and 
Human Rights jurisprudence:- 
The right to be informed was recognised by a number of international 
instruments under the accused’s right to a fair trial. The Nuremberg62 and Tokyo63 
Charters provided a number of ‘procedural’ elements of fair trial. They both stated 
that the accused, through his defence counsel, has to be supplied with adequate 
information to prepare for the trial. Note that this information is for a procedural 
purpose. In other words, according to these Charters, this right can be fulfilled 
once the information is passed to the defendant and is in a language that he 
understands, regardless of its substance.64  
 
As a result of this narrow scope of implementing the right of an accused to 
be informed, it was essential to develop this right from being merely procedural to 
be applied as a fundamental right. Accordingly, the UDHR laid down the general 
principles of human rights, including the right to a fair trial.65 However, the 
essential development was acknowledged through the adoption of the (binding, on 
the parties to it) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 
(ICCPR), and, regionally, through the European Convention on Human Rights, 
1950 (ECHR).66    
 
It is, therefore, the UDHR which specified the general principles of HR, 
while the ICCPR explained these principles in more details. Accordingly, Art. 14 (3) 
(a) of the ICCPR stated that “everyone shall be … informed promptly and in detail 
in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against 
him”.67 This right is unique and significant to the accused; thus, the ICCPR 
distinguished it from, for instance, the right to know the reasons for arrest.68  
 
                                                          
62 The Nuremberg Charter, Sec. IV, Art. 16. 
63 The Tokyo Charter, Sec. III, Art. 9.  
64 This was an implicit problem at Yamashita, as the defence team was unable to understand the 
nature of the charge or the Bill of Particulars. See (Chapter 2 n 35).  
65 The UDHR, Art. 10. 
66 Karolina Kremens, ‘The Protection of the Accused in International Criminal Law According to the 
Human Rights Law Standard’ (2011) 1 Wroclaw Review of Law 26, 29; See also Haji NA Noor 
Muhammad, ‘Due Process of Law for Persons Accused of Crime’ in Louis Henkin (ed.), The 
International Bill of Rights. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University 
Press, 1981) 139. 
67 ICCPR, Art. 14 (3) (a). 
68 Pursuant to Art. 9 (3) of the ICCPR: “Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of 
arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him”. 
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The ECHR also distinguished between those two rights. Thus, it first stated, 
in Art. 5, on the right to liberty and security, that “[e]veryone who is arrested shall 
be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his 
arrest and any charge against him”.69 After that, Art. 6, concerning the right to a 
fair trial, stated that the accused shall be “informed promptly, in a language which 
he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him”.70 
 
Note that, whilst the right to know the reasons for arrest is considered part 
of the right to liberty and security,71  the right to be informed about the nature and 
cause of the charge(s) is – within these HR instruments - recognised as a 
component of the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings.72 It is, therefore, the 
right to know the reasons for arrest which primarily guarantees the right to be 
“adequately informed of the reasons why he has been deprived of his liberty”.73 
The purpose of the right to know the reasons for arrest, according to the ECtHR, is 
thus “an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded” by the right to liberty 
and security.74  
 
This right, therefore, even though it might be relevant to a criminal case, is 
not recognised as part of the accused’s right to a fair trial. Accordingly, it is “by 
virtue of [the right to know the reasons for arrest] any person arrested must be 
told, in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the essential legal 
and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if he sees fit, to apply to a court 
to challenge its lawfulness”.75   
 
In other words, the right to know the reasons for arrest is focused on the 
rights of a suspected person at the moment of arrest and detention, whereas the 
right to be informed about the nature and causes of the charge is required after the 
                                                          
69 ECHR, Art. 5 (2). 
70 ECHR, Art. 6 (3) (a). 
71 Supra (n 61). 
72 Infar (n 115). 
73 See the European Court of Human Rights, Van der Leer v. The Netherlands, Judgment, 
11509/85, 21 February 1990, para 28; See also Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, 
Judgment, 36378/02, 12 April 2005, para 413; See also X v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 
7215/75, 5 November 1981, para 66. 
74 See the European Court of Human Rights, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. The United Kingdom, 
Judgment, 12244/86, 30 August 1990, para 40.  
75 Ibid para 40.  
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issue of the charges at the trial stage.76 Additionally, the information provided at 
the moment of arrest should be in a language the suspected person understands, 
simple about the reasons for his being deprived of his liberty. However, the right to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the charges – discussed below – is 
considered a requirement under the right to a fair trial.   
 
3. The right to be informed of the nature of the charge:-  
There are two approaches regarding the application of the right to be 
informed of the nature of the charge(s). First, the “Functional approach”, which 
considers this right to be subsidiary to the right to prepare the defence.77 
According to this narrow approach, in examining a potential violation of this right, 
the violation must be weighed against the right of preparing the defence. Second, 
the “Absolutist approach”, which recognises this right as a separate right.78 
According to this broader approach, this right may be violated “even in the absence 
of evidence that better information would have increased the defence’s possibilities 
of success”.79 Therefore, the broader approach weighs this right against the right to 
a fair trial.  
 
As illustrated above, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
charge(s) is distinguishable from other rights to be informed. In fact, this is the 
only right to information that is required directly for satisfying the right to a fair 
trial.80 Differing implementations of this right are therefore discussed below.  
 
A) Application of the IHRL jurisprudence:- 
Art. 14 of the ICCPR obliges the judicial authority, first, to inform 
“promptly” and, secondly, to inform “in detail” the accused about the “nature” and 
                                                          
76 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (3rd. edn., OUP, 2014) 480. It is the duty of the police to 
communicate the reasons for arrest, while it is the duty of the judicial authority to guarantee the 
right to be informed about the nature of the charge. 
77 Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP, 2006) 193. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid 193-4. Trechsel strongly supported the broader approach, due to the importance of this right 
to the fair trial.     
80 For other rights to be informed; see, supra, n. 60; also, under the ICC, a number of other general 
rights to information. See Art. 55 (2), Art. 60 (1), and Art. 61 (3) (b). 
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“cause” of the charge(s).81 It follows that those two obligations together require the 
accused to comprehend through the supplied information the nature of the 
accusation; otherwise, according to the -more favourable in this thesis- “Absolutist 
approach”, this right is violated. Similarly, the ECHR distinguished between the 
right to know the reasons for arrest82 and the right to be informed of the nature of 
the charge(s).83 The American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 (ACHR) also 
included – but not as comprehensively as the ICCPR and ECHR - the right to be 
informed. Pursuant to Art. 8 – regarding the Right to a fair trial - the ACHR stated 
that every person is entitled to “prior notification in detail to the accused of the 
charges against him”.84  
 
The right to be informed of the nature of the accusation under ICL – 
discussed below – corresponds therefore to the ICCPR and ECHR formulations. 
Accordingly, the following discussions examine the judicial application of this right 
through various Courts; more attention will be given to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) than to the others. This is primarily because the ECtHR 
has more influence on the judges of not only the international criminal courts and 
tribunals,85 but also those of other International Human Rights Courts, such as the 
IACtHR.86 
  
B) The extent of application by the IHRL judicial systems:- 
 
As illustrated above, there are two approaches for applying the right to be 
informed of the nature of the accusation: (a) as a subsidiary right to the right to 
prepare the defence;87 and (b) as a separate right under the right of the accused to 
a fair trial.88 Note that the latter is the favoured approach for the purpose of re-
characterising CR by judges during judgments. The discussion below examines the 
extent of the application of these two approaches at the major human rights courts.   
                                                          
81 ICCPR, Art. 14 (3) (a). See supra (n 67). 
82 ECHR, Art. 5 (2). 
83 Supra (n 70). 
84 ACHR, Art. 8 (2) (b). 
85 Supra (nn 41-42); see also infra (n 110); also, Olivier de Frouville, ‘The Influence of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on International Criminal Law of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment’ (2011), 9 JICJ 633. 
86 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen and Amaya Úbeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Case law and Commentary (OUP, 2011), paras 25-26.  
87 This is the narrow or “Functional approach”, supra (n 77). 
88 This is the broad or “Absolutist approach”, supra (n 78). 
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i) The IACtHR:- 
The ACHR formulated this right differently in a way that would inevitably 
narrow its application.89 Moreover, from a linguistic perspective, although the 
words “notify” and “inform” can be used synonymously, each one has a slightly 
different connotation. The word ‘notify’ means “to make a person aware of 
something”, but the word ‘inform’ means “to make a person knowledgeable about 
something”.90 
 
 In this regard, de Torres, for example, argued that, based on the American 
Convention, the right to be informed of the nature of the charge(s) is in a lower 
category.91 He claimed that, pursuant to the ACHR, the rights of an accused person 
are divided into two categories: (a) essential rights, such as the right to be 
presumed innocent; and (b) non-essential rights dependent on the circumstances 
of each case, to assist the application of rights such as that to be notified about the 
nature and cause of the charges.92 Although this division might be logical for 
classification purposes,93 the aim is (or should) always be to guarantee the accused 
a fair trial.   
 
It is, therefore, this right to be informed of the nature of the charge(s) which 
became limited in application, mainly to the pre-trial stage.94 In Castillo Petruzzi, 
the defence argued that everyone “has the right to know the charges against him 
and to have adequate time and means to prepare his defense” (Art. 8 (2) (b) and 
Art. 8 (2) (c), respectively); and that right was violated by the relevant authority.95 
The court concluded that:- 
                                                          
89 Cf. supra (nn 67 and 70). 
90 A S Hornby, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (7th. edn., OUP, 2005) 
797 and 1039.  
91 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen and Amaya Úbeda de Torres, supra (n 86) paras.25-34. 
92 Ibid 664-5.  
93 As, for example, the ICCS provided for a similar division under Art. 66 (“presumption of 
innocence”) and Art. 67 (“rights of the accused”). This should not, however, jeopardise the 
applicability of the right to be informed.  Cf. re-characterising CR: (Chapter 3 n 171) et seq.   
94 Roza Pati, Due Process and International Terrorism: An International Legal Analysis (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 101. 
95 Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H. R. No. 52, 30 May 1999, para 136.  
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“[T]he accused did not have sufficient advance notification, in detail, of the 
charges against them; the conditions under which the defense attorneys 
had to operate were wholly inadequate for a proper defense”.96 
 
The court therefore found that the rights of the accused, specified in Art. 8 (2) (b) 
and Art. 8 (2) (c), had been violated.97 In a more recent case, Vélez Loor, the court 
concluded that this right had been violated as the notification was not provided to 
the defendant directly; as a result the time was insufficient for the defendant to be 
prepared.98 These are examples of adopting the narrow or functional approach, 
where the essence of this right is shifted toward the time to be prepared.  
 
Nevertheless, the court provided – in Barreto Leiva - a slightly different 
interpretation of this right and stated that:- 
“To comply with Article 8(2)(b) of the Convention, the State must notify the 
accused not only of the charges against him, that is, the crimes or offenses 
he is charged with, but also of the reasons for them, and the evidence for 
such charges and the legal definition of the facts. The defendant has the 
right to know, through a clear, detailed and precise description, all the 
information of the facts in order to fully exercise his right to defense and 
prove to the judge his version of the facts.”.99 
 
The court also emphasised that such right:- 
 
 “[M]ust be necessarily exercised as from the moment a person is accused 
of being the perpetrator or participant of an illegal act and ends when the 
jurisdiction thereby ceases, including, where applicable, the enforcement 
phase. The opposite would imply to subordinate the conventional 
guarantees that protect the right to defense, including Article 8(2)(b)”.100 
 
In both Castillo Petruzzi and Vélez Loor, the court applied the narrow scope, 
which limited the application of this right to the indictment or the pre-trial stage. 
In Barreto Leiva, however, the court applied a different interpretation, akin to the 
                                                          
96 Castillo Petruzzi, para 141. 
97 Castillo Petruzzi, para 142. 
98 Vélez Loor v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H. R. No. 218, 23 November 2010, paras 149 – 
150.  
99 Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H. R. No. 206, 17 November 2009, para 28.  
100 Barreto Leiva, para 29. 
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broad approach. Nevertheless, this right in the IACtHR was, overall, not 
recognised as a separate requirement for the right to a fair trial. 
 
 
ii) The ICCPR:- 
According to Art. 14 (3) (a) ICCPR, concerning the right to be informed of 
the nature and cause, “the duty to inform the accused … is more precise than that 
for arrest under article 9, paragraph 2”.101 This is because “the details of the nature 
and cause of the charge need not necessarily be provided to an accused person 
immediately upon arrest”.102 Accordingly, it is sufficient, to satisfy Art. 9 (2), “for 
an arrested person to be aware” of the reasons for arrest, but this cannot be said 
regarding Art. 14 (3) (a).103 Therefore, in Kurbanov v. Tajikistan it was concluded 
that:- 
 
“the delay in presenting the charges to the detained author and in securing 
him legal assistance affected the possibilities of Mr. Kurbanov to defend 
himself, in a manner that constitutes a violation of article 14, paragraph 3 
(a)”.104 
 
This could be seen as a way of applying the narrow scope of application. It seems, 
however, that the Committee recognised that this right could be violated even if a 
delay in supplying the required information had had an impact on the accused’s 
right to know the nature of the relevant charges in due time.  
 
It is plain, therefore, that the ICCPR’s clear formulation resulted in a better 
interpretation, even though such interpretation was not always consistent.105 Art. 
14 (3) (a) required the information to provide the accused with sufficient 
understanding about the nature of the charge(s).106 As a result, Art. 14 (3) (a) is 
                                                          
101 Clifford McLawrence v. Jamaica, CCPR/C/60/D/702/1996, 26 April 1996, par. 5.9. 
102 Ibid.  
103 Joseph and Castan, supra (n 76) para 14-114. See also Vicente et al. v. Colombia, 
CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, para 8.7.  
104 Abduali Ismatovich Kurbanov v. Tajikistan, CCPR/C/79/D/1096/2002, 2003, para 7.3. 
105 See for the inconsistency, Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary (2nd. rev. edn., N.P. Engel, Publisher, 2005) 331 – 332; see also, Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, supra (n 58) 15.  
106 Ibid Nowak 331 – 332.  
204 
 
guaranteed applicable at all stages of a trial until the termination of the 
proceedings.107  
 
 
iii) The ECtHR:- 
As illustrated above, among international courts of human rights the ECtHR 
is one of the most influential, on both international criminal and human rights’ 
courts.108 In the seminal case of Tadić, for instance, the Appeal Chamber 
deliberated on the principle of fair trial and resorted to the ECtHR,109 ruling that 
“guidance may be taken from Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights”.110  
 
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charge(s), under Art. 
6 (3) (a) of the ECHR, obliges the authority to provide detailed information to the 
accused about the charge.111 The ECtHR, therefore, emphasised that such 
information should enable that accused “to understand fully the extent of the 
charges against him with a view to preparing an adequate defence”.112 The court 
also observed that the information needs to be sufficient and adequate; therefore, 
“the information must be assessed in relation to … the right to have adequate time 
and facilities for the preparation of their defence, and in the light of a more general 
right to a fair hearing”.113 
 
Accordingly, this provision obliges the authority to ensure that the accused, 
through the information provided, will have “sufficient knowledge” of the 
accusation.114 The Court, therefore, asserted that “[i]n criminal matters the 
provision of full, detailed information concerning the charges against a defendant, 
and consequently the legal characterisation that the court might adopt in the 
                                                          
107 Ibid 318 – 319.   
108 Frouville, supra (n 85) 644. Olivier de Frouville also argued that this influence of IHRL has 
declined in recent cases of ICL, as the international criminal tribunals tended to refer to their own 
precedents instead.  
109 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, AC Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, paras 30-43. 
110 Tadić AC, para 321. 
111 ECHR, Art. 6 (3) (a). Supra (n 70).  
112 Mattoccia v. Italy, Judgment, Application No. 23969/94, 25 July 2000, para 60.  
113 Ibid. The violation of this right is therefore an infringement of the right to fair trial. See Varela 
Geis v. Spain, Judgment, Application No. 61005/09, 5 March 2013. 53-55; see also Abramyan v. 
Russia, Judgment, Application No. 10709/02, 9 October 2008, 38-40. 
114 Brozicek v. Italy, Judgment, Application No. 10964/84, 19 December 1989, para 41. 
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matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings are fair”.115 
Art. 6 (3) (a), therefore, required that such information must be in a language the 
accused understands.116  
 
The Court also observed that there is “special attention to be paid to the 
notification of the “accusation” to the defendant”.117 The Court, therefore, 
reiterated that the accused is guaranteed the right to “be informed in detail not 
only of acts he is alleged to have committed, that is, of the facts underlying the 
charges, but also of the legal characterisation given to them”.118  In other words, an 
accused is entitled to understand fully not only the underlying crime alleged 
against him, but also the form of his responsibility.119 
 
Most relevant to the re-characterisation of CR, the Court examined the 
“change in the characterisation of the offences during the trial” or the “re-
characterisation” of the elements of the offence in relation to the accused’s right to 
be informed of the nature of the charge(s).120 In this, the Court concluded that 
such re-characterisation can directly violate the accused’s right to be informed of 
the nature of that/those charge(s) and therefore adversely affect his right to a fair 
trial.121 The right to be informed of the nature of the accusation(s) could, therefore, 
be violated by changing (or re-characterising) the nature of the charge through 
judges’ (re)interpretation.122  
 
The court more explicitly observed that violation of this right could be 
brought about through re-characterising the nature of not only the offence but also 
the relevant mode of liability.123 The ECtHR, in Pélissier and Sassi v. France, 
found that the nature of “aiding and abetting” was re-characterised by the 
authority rendering the accused unable to comprehend the re-characterised form, 
concluding that his right to be informed of the nature of the charge was violated.124 
Accordingly, this right could be violated through re-characterising the nature of 
                                                          
115 Sejdovic v. Italy, Judgment, Application No. 56581/00, 1 March 2006, para 90. 
116 Alastair Mowbray, Case, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human 
Rights (3rd. edn., OUP, 2012) 457. See also Brozicek v. Italy, supra (n 114).  
117 Kamasinski v. Austria, Judgment, Application No. 9783/82, 19 December 1989, para 79. 
118 Penev v. Bulgaria, Judgment, Application No. 20494/04, 7 January 2010, para 42. 
119 Dallos v. Hungary, Judgment, Application No. 29082/95, 1 March 2001, para 47.  
120 Sadak et al. v. Turkey, Judgment, Application Nos. 29900/96–29903/96, 17 July2001, para 43. 
121 Ibid para 59.  
122 Cf. Halilović TC, para 54; see also (Chapter 3 n 172) et seq.  
123 Pélissier and Sassi v. France, Judgment, Application No. 25444/94, 25 March 1999, paras 20 – 
29. 
124 Ibid paras 48, 49, 56 & 63.  
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modes of liability. Re-characterising the nature of CR – at the ad hoc tribunals – 
analogically with the ECtHR jurisprudence is therefore in violation of the right of 
the accused to know the nature of the accusation.  
  
C) Application in ICL:-   
The Nuremberg and Tokyo (IMTs) Charters provided a provision about the 
right to a fair trial for the accused person.125 The right to be informed of the nature 
of the accusation, however, was not as explicitly covered as in the HRL 
instruments mentioned above. Unlike the HRL, which guarantee the accused the 
right to be informed throughout the proceedings,126 the IMTs limited this right of 
the defence only to the indictment. HRL obliges the authority to ensure that the 
accused fully comprehends, in detail, the nature of the charges against him; 
whereas the IMTs obliged the authority only to ensure that the indictment 
presented the charges in detail.  
 
Thus, while HRL views this right as being in the interest of the rights of the 
accused, the IMT applied it as the fulfilment of a procedural requirement 
(formalities). In fact, HRL became more influential, particularly on ICL. The 
degree of this influence varies, however, regarding the implementation of human 
rights’ principles between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. Bassiouni criticised, 
for instance, the structure of the ad hoc tribunals for their failure to allocate a 
separate defence division where such a deficiency would most probably affect the 
defendant’s right(s) at some points.127  
 
i) The right to be informed under the ad hoc tribunals:- 
Generally, international criminal courts and tribunals are established 
primarily for purposes, inter alia, of protecting human rights.128 Those individuals 
who violate international human rights and humanitarian laws are therefore 
prosecuted under ICL jurisdiction. The ICTR stated therefore that the main reason 
                                                          
125 Supra (nn 62-63). 
126 The IACtHR (n 89) et seq.; also the ICCPR (n 101) et seq.; see also for the ECtHR (n 108) et seq.  
127 M Cherif Bassiouni and Peter Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers Inc., 1996) 798.  
128 Rome Statute’s Preamble. 
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for its creation is “to prosecute persons responsible for serious violation of 
international human law”.129 The ICTY also emphasised that:- 
 
“The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well 
as human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every 
person, whatever his or her gender. The general principle of respect for 
human dignity is the basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être 
of international humanitarian law and human rights law; indeed in modern 
times it has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the 
whole body of international law”.130 
 
Accordingly the ICTY declared that ‘international criminal tribunals should 
resort to HRL’ and stated that:- 
 
“Because of the paucity of precedent in the field of international 
humanitarian law, the Tribunal has, on many occasions, had recourse to 
instruments and practices developed in the field of human rights law. 
Because of their resemblance, in terms of goals, values and terminology, 
such recourse is generally a welcome and needed assistance to determine 
the content of customary international law in the field of humanitarian law. 
With regard to certain of its aspects, international humanitarian law can be 
said to have fused with human rights law”.131  
 
Accordingly, the ad hoc tribunals’ clearly acknowledged the importance of HRL 
jurisprudence to its judgements.  
 
ii) Formulating this right at the ad hoc tribunals:- 
As a result of this influence of HRL, the right to a fair trial was drafted in the 
ad hoc tribunals’ statutes akin to that of the HRL formulation. Hence, the ICTY, for 
instance, first obliges all Trial Chambers to “ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious and that proceedings are conducted … with full respect for the rights of 
the accused…”.132 The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes laid down the “rights of the 
accused”, one of which is the right to be informed of the nature and causes of the 
                                                          
129 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, TC Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para 4.  
130 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, TC Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para 183. 
131 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, TC Judgment, IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001, para 467. 
132 ICTYS, Art. 20 (1); ICTRS, Art. 19 (1). 
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charge. The ad hoc tribunals’ statutes – regarding this right to be informed – 
stated that the accused person is entitled:-  
 
“To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he or she 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her”.133 
 
The formulation of this provision corresponds exactly with those of HRL regarding 
this right to be informed, such as Article 14 (3) (a) of the ICCPR134 and Article 6 (3) 
(a) of the ECHR135. It can therefore be expected that the application of this right 
would correspond to that of HRL courts, mainly the ECtHR because of its 
influence.  
 
 
4. The ad hoc tribunals’ implementation:- 
 
The HR courts lay obligations mainly on the prosecutor,136 whereas the ad 
hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) oblige all Trial Chambers to ensure fair trial.137 This 
wider duty calls for the application of the “broad approach” to the right to be 
informed to be followed;138 and it is clear, therefore, that this right should not be 
limited to the indictment.139 Based on the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes, this right 
should be considered a separate right, being formulated as one of the fair trial 
requirements.   
 
A) The overlapping and inconsistent implementation:-  
As illustrated above, this right should not be confused with other rights to 
information, such as the right to know the reasons for arrest.140 Nevertheless, due 
to similarities between some of those rights, they may overlap. For example, 
                                                          
133 ICTYS, Art. 21 (4) (a), ICTRS, Art. 20 (4) (a) and SCSLS, Art. 17 (4) (a).  
134 Supra (n 67). 
135 Supra (n 70). 
136 See for example, the ECtHR stating, regarding this right,  that “the duty rests entirely on the 
prosecution authority’s shoulders and cannot be complied with passively by making information 
available without bringing it to the attention of the defence”. Mattoccia v. Italy (n 112) para 65.  
137 Supra (n 132). 
138 Supra (nn 78 and 88).  
139 Otherwise the ad hoc tribunals’ implementation, after acknowledging and adopting the IHRL 
approach, would correspond to that of the IMTs. Supra (nn 126-127). 
140 Cf. (nn 61 and 80).  
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Wolfgang Schomburg,141 although initially distinguishing between those two 
rights, provided a number of case-law instances related to the right to know the 
reasons for arrest as being examples of the right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the charge(s).142 This most probably occurred as a result of the 
overlapping grounds of appeal in these cases referred to by Schomburg. In those 
cases, the grounds of appeal were, inter alia, (a) the right to be informed of the 
nature of the charges; and (b) the right to know the reasons for arrest.  
 
In Barayagwiza, the defendant challenged the lawfulness of his 
detention.143 He argued that his rights, inter alia the right to know the reasons for 
his arrest and the right to be informed about the nature and cause of the 
accusation, had been violated. The court, however, centralised its discussion on the 
violation of the right to know the reasons for arrest. It therefore examined only 
Rule 40 bis – concerning the “transfer and provisional detention of suspects”-144 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.145   
 
The AC concluded that the right of the accused to know the reasons for his 
arrest had been violated and stated that “[i]nternational standards require that a 
suspect who is arrested be informed promptly of the reasons for his arrest and the 
charges against him”.146 Accordingly, “any person arrested should know why he is 
deprived of his liberty”.147 Thus, it seems that Schomburg confused the right to be 
informed of the nature of the charge(s) – which is a component of the accused’s 
right to a fair trial – with the right to know the reasons for arrest, which is in 
essence a component of the right to liberty.148  
 
 This was the case in a number of trials where the accused appealed on the 
ground that a number of his rights had been violated, among which was the right 
to be informed of the nature of the accusation. For example, in the Laurent 
Semanza appeal, the defendant alleged that his rights had been violated during the 
                                                          
141 Wolfgang Schomburg is a former Judge of the ICTY and ICTR. 
142 Wolfgang Schomburg, ‘The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for 
Fair Trial Rights’ (2009) 8 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 1, 11-12. 
143 Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, AC Decision, ICTY-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, 
para 11. 
144 Rule 40 bis, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTR, as amended on 26 June 2000. 
145 The court rarely mentioned the accused’s right to be informed of the nature of the charge(s). 
Rather, it concentrated on the right to know the reasons for arrest.  
146 Barayagwiza, AC Decision, para 80. 
147 Barayagwiza, AC Decision, para 81. 
148 Supra (nn 73-76). 
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period of his detention.149 Similarly with Barayagwiza, the Semanza AC 
concluded that the defendant’s rights, inter alia that to be informed of the nature 
of the charge(s), had been violated.150 Interestingly, the AC discussion was directed 
to the extent of applying Rule 40 bis.151   
 
5. Specificity, the right to be informed and CR:- 
Although those three principles vary with regard to their legal origins and 
characteristics, they are directly related to the legal status of an accused during 
criminal proceedings. An important nexus which exists between those three 
principles is the process by which the information has become available to the 
accused. The standard of specificity requires the information to be clearly – 
without vagueness or ambiguity – provided to the defendant, based on the legality 
principle.152 The right to be informed about the nature of the accusations - together 
with the standard of specificity – exists to ensure that the accused (defence) 
comprehends the accusation.153 Thus, that an accused comprehends the nature of 
accusation against him – in this study the nature of CR – means his acknowledging 
for what it is he is being held responsible.154  
 
A) Re-characterising CR and violating the accused’s rights:- 
The information supplied to the accused at the ad hoc tribunals about the 
nature of CR was always problematic.155 Its nature and requirements were 
repeatedly re-characterised through judges’ inconsistent interpretations in their 
judgments in various trials and not by the prosecutor at the indictments. Note that 
HRL obliges primarily the prosecution – through the indictment – to ensure that 
the defendant comprehended the charges sufficiently for him to be regarded as 
having been fully informed in detail.156 This duty on the prosecution was created 
to guarantee the right to a fair trial. 
                                                          
149 Laurent Semanza v. The Prosecutor, AC Decision, ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, para 1-2. 
150 Semanza, AC Decision, para 127. 
151  Supra (n 144). 
152 Supra (nn 19, 26, 36 and 41). 
153 Supra (nn 81 and 124). 
154 Cf. the discussions about four generations in Chapter 3; also the four phases of the requirements 
in chapter 5. 
155 As the definition of its nature remains vague about what the responsibility is for and, most 
importantly, what triggers the culpability.  
156 See supra (nn 112 and 119). 
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With regard to ICL, at the ad hoc tribunals (particularly the ICTY/R) this 
obligation was/is more on the judges to guarantee fair trial.157 The principle of 
interpretation was supposed to enable the judges to ensure that a fair trial takes 
place, by clarifying and specifying the ambiguous nature and requirements of CR. 
This therefore justifies the duty – in ICL – being on the judges to guarantee fair 
trial, as this principle of interpretation is available only to them.158  
 
B) Shifting the priorities:- 
According to the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes, judges are obliged to ensure fair 
trial with, most probably, a higher degree of obligations and requirements 
attributable to HRL.159 This is mainly as a result of the rudimentary nature of ICL, 
which requires more clarity and specificity through judges’ interpretations. Where 
there is vagueness, the issue should be interpreted in favour of the defendant.160 
This is in accordance with the ad hoc tribunals’ conclusion – in the seminal case of 
Tadić - that “the inconsistency is viewed most favourably to the accused”. 161 
 
Nevertheless, the ad hoc tribunals, by adopting the narrow approach of the 
right to be informed of the nature of the charge(s), limited this right to the 
indictment. The ad hoc tribunals, to justify their approach, stated that:- 
 
“The massive scale of the crimes with which the International Tribunal has 
to deal makes it impracticable to require a high degree of specificity in such 
matters as the identity of the victims and the dates for the commission of 
the crimes – at any rate, the degree of specificity may not be as high as that 
called for in domestic jurisdictions”.162 
 
                                                          
157 See supra (n 132). 
158 For IHRL courts’ nature and framework see; Rhona K M Smith, Textbook on International 
Human Rights (6th. edn., OUP, 2014) 106.    
159 See (n 132).  
160Art. 22 (2) of the ICCS stated, of judges’ interpretation, that in the “case of ambiguity, the 
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted”.   
161 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić,TC judgment, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para 301. See also Čelebići, 
where this was considered as a general principle of criminal law. Čelebići TC, para 450.  
162 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., TC decision on defence preliminary motions on the form 
of the indictment, IT-98-30/1, 12 April 1999, para 17.  
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In other words, duties to specify and ensure fair trial shifted from the judges to the 
prosecutor at the indictment. Thus, the principle of interpretation was used 
frequently for law-making rather than for clarifying the already existing law.163  
 
Interestingly, in Krnojelac, the prosecution, as a result of the above 
justification, claimed that “it can provide no better particulars”.164 The Prosecutor 
argued that adequacy of information is limited only to “whether or not the accused 
can prepare his defence”.165 This approach, as Jordash and Coughlan contended, is 
more of a ‘slippery slope’ approach,166 as not only does it limit the fair trial 
requirement to this single element of preparing the defence, but also it limits this 
right to the presentation of information in the indictment alone. It ignores the fact 
that implementing this right to be informed at ICL is (a) a duty placed on the 
judges167; and (b) required throughout the proceedings.168  
 
 This approach limited the ad hoc tribunals’ implementation of this right to 
the indictment alone, although the tribunals recognised that the nature and cause 
of charges required a wider scope of information to be supplied to the 
defendant.169 This was once again justified by the judges, in that the only 
parameter was the accused’s ability to prepare his defence, but not his right to a 
fair trial.  
 
In fact, the ad hoc tribunals re-characterised the right to be informed of the 
nature of the charge(s), limiting it to the indictment. As a result, the subsequent 
alleged development of this right170 was actually improving only the standard of 
information at the indictment and not improving the implementation of this right 
to be informed of the nature of the charge(s). In Kupreškić, for instance, the 
defendant appealed against convictions based on an ambiguous amended 
                                                          
163 This is the core problem about the vagueness of CR. See infar (n 166). 
164 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, TC decision on preliminary motion on form of amended 
indictment, IT-97-25-PT, 11 February 2000, para 37. 
165 Prosecutor v.Tihomir Blaškić, TC decision on the defence motion to dismiss the indictment, 
based upon defects in the form thereof (Vagueness/Lack of adequate notice of charges), IT-95-14, 4 
April 1997, para 32. 
166 Wayne Jordash and John Coughlan, ‘The Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the 
Charges: A Potentially Formidable Jurisprudential Legacy’ in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly, 
Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (OUP, 2010) 289. Although they argued 
that the recent case-law indicates a different approach to improve this right, it obviously was 
limited to the indictment only and failed to recognise this right as a separate element of the right to 
a fair trial.  
167 Supra (n 132). 
168 Supra (nn 133-137). 
169 Blaškić TC decision (n 165) para 11. 
170 Jordash and Coughlan (n 166). 
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indictment and the AC therefore stated the indictment should be consistent with 
the accused rights’ to be informed of the nature of the charge and this:-  
 “…translates into an obligation on the part of the Prosecution to state the 
material facts underpinning the charges in the indictment, but not the 
evidence by which such material facts are to be proven. Hence, the question 
whether an indictment is pleaded with sufficient particularity is dependent 
upon whether it sets out the material facts of the Prosecution case with 
enough detail to inform a defendant clearly of the charges against him so 
that he may prepare his defence”.171  
 
This conclusion was, however, limited to the standard of specificity of the 
indictment. Although it considered the right to be informed as a requirement for a 
fair trial, this was limited only to the Prosecutor at the indictment. Most 
importantly, the AC shifted the duty from all Chambers – as imposed by the 
Statute – to only the prosecution.172 Thus, although the ad hoc tribunals declared 
their consideration of HRL through judgment,173 with regard to the right to be 
informed of the nature of the charge(s) the ad hoc tribunals rather followed the 
IMT’s approach, which was merely procedural and formal.174   
 
C) The application between international criminal courts:- 
The ICC – discussed below - is clearly the superior judicial body with the 
highest standard of fairness requirements, followed by the ICTY/R and then, lastly, 
the SCSL, as being the lowest regarding the requirement, obligation and standard 
of fairness.175 The ICTY/R, regarding the right to be informed, limited it to the 
indictment, therefore: it stated that the “question is not whether particular words 
have been used, but whether an accused has been meaningfully “informed of the 
nature of the charges” so as to be able to prepare an effective defence”.176 However, 
this right practically, at the ICTY/R is limited to the prosecution at the indictment, 
for the reason of preparing the defence. 
                                                          
171 Kupreškić AC, para 88.   
172 Ibid.  
173 Supra (n 130) et seq. 
174 Supra (nn 126-127). 
175 With regard to the SCSL practice see, for example, Cecily Rose, ‘Troubled Indictments at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Pleading of Joint Criminal Enterprise and Sex-Based Crimes’, 
(2009) 7 JICJ 353. In this, Rose argued that the accused’s rights had been violated, as the 
information in the indictments was neither specific nor in accordance with the rights of the 
accused.  
176 Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, AC Judgment, ICTR-2001-64-A, 7July 2006, para 165. 
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It clearly disregarded the actual purpose of this right as a separate 
component of the right to a fair trial, rendering it a right subsidiary to that to 
prepare a defence: that is contrary to the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes.177 The SCSL, as 
a result of the low standard of fairness provided by its Statute, was criticised for 
that standard, specifically with regard to its interpretation of the right to be 
informed of the nature of the charge(s).178 Although the ad hoc tribunals limited 
this right to the indictment, the SCSL went beyond this, by allowing the Prosecutor 
to present indictments with a lower standard of specificity than had other 
tribunals.  
 
For example, the SCSL examined briefly the Sesay Motion about: “(A) lack 
of specificity regarding different forms of individual criminal responsibility” and 
“(B) lack of specificity regarding various counts”.179 Despite the fact that the 
indictment was presented with a lower degree of adequacy than was the case in 
other tribunals,180 the SCSL rejected the defence motion, permitting the 
prosecution to provide a lower degree of information and concluded that this was 
“in substantial compliance with [the right to be informed of the nature and 
cause]”.181 While the ICTY/R regarded the purpose of this right as being subsidiary 
to that of the right to prepare a defence, the SCSL – by rejecting the defence 
motion - rendered the right to a fair trial inaccessible for the accused. 
 
The ICC implementation of the right to be informed required a higher level 
of fairness. This can be seen throughout the ICC informative Statute, which 
provided for a wider scope of protection regarding fair trial. The Statute first 
obliged all Chambers to ensure fair trial.182 It also emphasised that judges’ 
directions at a trial should be carried out so as to ensure fairness.183 Most 
importantly, under Art. 67, an accused is entitled to a fair trial; therefore, the 
                                                          
177 According to the statutes, the right to be informed is a separate component. Supra (n 133). 
178 See for instance, Wayne Jordash and Scott Martin, ‘Due Process and Fair Trial Rights at the 
Special Court: How the Desire for Accountability Outweighed the Demands of Justice at the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone’, (2010) 23 LJIL 585. 
179 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, TC Decision and order on defence preliminary motion for 
defects in the form of the indictment, SCSL-2003-05-PT, 13 October 2003, para 2. 
180 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment, SCSL-
2004-15-PT, 2 August 2006. See also Wayne Jordash and Scott Martin, ‘How the Approach to JCE 
in Taylor and the RUF Case Undermined the Demand of Justice at the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone’ in Charles Chernor Jalloh (ed.), The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy: The Impact 
of Africa and International Criminal Law (CUP, 2014) 101-103. 
181 Sesay TC Decision, para 34. 
182 ICCS, Art. 64 (2) and (3) (a). 
183 ICCS, Art. 64 (8) (b).  
215 
 
accused is to “be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content 
of the charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks”.184 
 
The formulation of this right to information in the ICCS differs from that at 
the other international criminal tribunals. It seems that the drafters desired more 
clarity of what it is to which the accused is actually entitled.  For instance, some of 
the international instruments’ formulations indicated that the language is more 
important than the substance of the information provided.185 According to the ICC, 
the nature, cause and content of the charge(s) are to be clearly supplied in detail to 
the defendant. This information about the nature, cause and content should be in a 
language the defendant understands (and speaks). It is, therefore, clear that the 
right is to know the nature and cause of the charge against the defendant; it thus 
added the content, to indicate higher specificity as a requirement.  
 
Nevertheless, the language of the information, rather than the actual 
substance of information, still attracts the commentators’ attention.186 This most 
probably occurred as a result of limiting the scope of this in the ad hoc tribunals’ 
practice.187 The ICC’s practice, however, seems more to consider the actual right as 
being information about the nature, cause and content of the charge. In spite of 
some ICC cases where the language was the important issue,188 the nature and 
cause of the charge was a major factor in others.  
 
In Lubanga, the TC – relying on Regulation 55 -189allowed190 the re-
characterisation of the charges against the accused following the prosecution’s 
allegation, permitting the victims’ legal representative to participate.191 
Nevertheless, Judge Fulford dissented and “questioned whether any modification 
                                                          
184 ICCS, Art. 67 (1) (a). 
185 Supra (nn 70 and 133). 
186 Schabas (n 31) 802-804. See also William A. Schabas, ‘Article 67: Right of the accused’ in Otto 
Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (C.H,Beck . 
Hart. Nomos 2008) 1256-7.  
187 Ibid; see for example, Meester, Pitcher, Rastan and Sluiter after suggested that this right was 
inconsistently implemented in ICL, they limited their argued to the right to have an interpreter. K 
Meester et al., ‘Investigation, Coercive Measures, Arrest, and Surrender’ in Hakan Friman et al., 
International Criminal Procedure: Rules and Principles (OUP 2013) 252. 
188 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Pre-TC-I, Decision on the Request of the Defence of 3 
and 4 July 2006, 5-6.  
189 ICC, Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04, 26 May 2004, Regulation 55 concerning the 
“authority of the chamber to modify the legal characterisation of facts”. 
190 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, AC Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 15 OA16, 8 
December 2009, para 42 . 
191 Ibid para 2 et seq.   
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of the legal characterisation would not automatically lead to an “amendment” of 
the charges”.192  
 
The AC concluded that, although the right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation “does not preclude the possibility that there may be a 
change in the legal characterisation of facts in the course of the trial”, this “must 
not render the trial unfair”.193 Even though this was partly - but not only - related 
to the indictment, the ICC implemented this right as a separate component of fair 
trial. This alone illustrates the difference between the ICC’s and the ad hoc 
tribunals’ implementation.194 Analogically, it can be concluded that the re-
characterisation of CR through the ad hoc tribunals’ judgments violated the rights 
of the accused. 
 
 
D) The inconsistency of CR as excuse for the violations:-  
As discussed above, judges at the ad hoc tribunals shifted their obligation to 
ensure fair trial, to being the prosecution’s duty only and limited to the 
information provided at the indictment. It should be noted that the SCSL lacked 
the imposition of any duty upon judges to ensure fairness in all Chambers;195 its 
standard of fairness therefore appeared lower than of that at the ICTY and ICTR.196 
The ICTR, in Semanza, stated therefore that this right is guaranteed to every 
accused, but limited it to the indictment,197 stating that:- 
 
“The fundamental question in determining whether an indictment was 
pleaded with sufficient particularity is whether an accused had enough 
detail to prepare his defence”.198 
 
The ad hoc tribunals thus undermined the right to be informed as a separate 
component of the right to a fair trial.  
 
                                                          
192 Ibid para 46.  
193 Ibid paras 84-85.   
194 Supra (n 175) et seq. 
195 No equivalent provision is in the SCSL Statute. 
196 See Jordash and Coughlan (n 166) 310. 
197 Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, TC Judgment, ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003, para 42. 
198 Semanza TC, para 44.  
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This had an impact on the right of the accused to know the nature of the 
accusation with regard to an allegation based on CR. This led the Blaškić AC to 
suggest that the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence distinguished the “level of 
specificity required when pleading” to: (a) direct and (b) indirect participation in 
crimes under Art. 7 (1); and (c) CR under Art. 7 (3).199 Excluding CR, the AC stated 
that, for the modes of responsibility under Art. 7 (1), a certain level of specificity 
“may be required to avoid ambiguity with respect to the exact nature and cause of 
the charges against the accused, and to enable the accused to effectively and 
efficiently prepare his defence”.200    
 
 
6. Conclusion:-  
This chapter has discussed the potential impact of the inconsistent nature 
and requirements of CR on the accused person’s rights in criminal proceedings. It 
examined the two principles that would be most likely to be affected by such 
inconsistency: (a) the standard of specificity of the information available to the 
accused and (b) the right to be informed about the nature of the accusation(s). It 
observed that IHRL, particularly through the ECtHR, has influenced ICL, through 
promoting the standard of fair trial. International criminal courts and tribunals 
endorsed this influence and subscribed initially to that standard in their 
application. This chapter found, however, that the ad hoc tribunals’ 
implementation was inconsistent with that initial endorsement. 
 
It has argued that a nexus exists between CR, the specificity requirements 
and the right to be informed about the nature of accusation(s). In that sense, those 
three principles are intersected by the information which becomes available to the 
accused. The vagueness, or ambiguity, of, more precisely, the essence of 
information impacted on the fairness standard of those trials. In fact, the 
inconsistent interpretations of these rights, together with the inconsistently 
implemented CR, eroded such entitlements and eventually precluded the accused 
from securing his right to a fair trial.  
 
                                                          
199 Blaškić AC, para 211.  
200 Blaškić AC, para 212.  
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It has found that not only is the right to be informed of the nature of the 
charge(s) limited to the initial indictment, but also the specificity level of 
information was lower, especially for the CR doctrine, at the ad hoc tribunals. Note 
that CR was re-characterised through judges’ interpretations during their 
judgments. Thus it should have been the CR, re-formed inconsistently through 
judgments, that required a higher level of specificity instead. As a result, however, 
of (a) the lower degree of specificity regarding CR; (b) limiting the right to be 
informed to the indictment only; and (c) shifting the duty of ensuring fairness from 
judges to the Prosecutor alone, the nature of CR remains ambiguous.  
 
The inconsistent interpretation and implementation of the principle of 
specificity and the right to be informed of the nature of accusations, resulted in 
precluding the defendant from securing his rights. The re-characterisation of CR 
by the ad hoc tribunals would have been recognised as a violation of the rights of 
the accused, had the interpretation of these two rights been consistent with their 
actual purpose and the initial subscription to the practice of the ECtHR.  
 
The legitimacy of the CR interpretations by the ad hoc tribunals is therefore 
questionable. This inconsistency resulted from judges interpreting the nature of 
CR on the basis of the theory of liability for omission, most probably based on 
national law systems rather than its creation under ICL. The following chapter 
examines the extent of differences between national systems regarding this theory, 
which attracts the attention of judges and has thus affected the nature of CR. 
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Part III  
The Future of CR as a Sustainable Form of Criminal Responsibility 
 in ICL 
 
In assessing the adequacy and legitimacy of an interpretation process, the 
resultant rule should be weight generally against two factors: (a) the ability for 
such a result to be consistently implemented as a sustainable and constant rule; 
and (b) the consistency of the method adopted for reaching or finding such a 
result. Neither (a) nor (b) was satisfied during the interpretation process of the 
nature of CR or its requirements in the ad hoc tribunals. The ICTY was given pride 
of place as a result of being practically the superior authority for developing the 
law of CR for other ad hoc tribunals. The preceding discussions found that the 
rationale and purposes of establishing these requirements were inconsistently 
interpreted, as a result these requirements implementation was problematic. 
Providing these inconsistencies in the nature, requirements and the process 
of interpretation, paved the way for examining the likelihood for violating the 
accused rights to a fair trial as a result. In this it examined the standard of 
specificity required in the applicable law as well as the consistency of the 
information provided to the accused person about the nature of accusation against 
him. It found accordingly that the right of the accused person to a fair trial was 
jeopardised as a result of these inconsistencies in interpreting and implementing 
CR. 
Part III dissects the essence of the problem in order to prospect CR as a 
sustainable form of criminal responsibility under ICL. In this it sheds light on 
philosophical difficulties regarding the liability for omission as a theory under 
relevant national criminal law systems. In this case, it examines the extent of these 
difficulties in conjunction with the nature of CR. Therefore, this Part could be 
regarded as the conclusion of this thesis as it sums up the key problem for the 
ongoing debates about the nature of criminal liability under CR. It then advocates 
CR as identified throughout this study of being threefold. It finally ends with the 
conclusion remarks as a summary of this thesis’s findings. 
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VII. Chapter Seven  
The future of CR as an operative form of liability   
 
As seen above, the complexity of the problems of command responsibility 
(CR) resulted from a number of issues. First, there is the divergence between the 
customary nature of CR and the ambiguous codifications of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I (API).1 This resulted, secondly, in the inconsistent interpretation and 
continual re-characterising of CR by judges of international criminal courts and 
tribunals.2 In the third place, there is the problem of – indirectly - violating human 
rights principles in respect of the accused.3 
The core issue, however, that causes the current ambiguity of CR is 
isolating, or disregarding, its true nature. This true nature is complex because it is 
not rooted in the concept of ‘responsible command’ alone. It originated more 
precisely from essentially the duty, responsibility and leadership values (the 
personal obligations), forming the “values element” that derived from military 
society. These two elements, together with the crystallisation of criminal 
responsibility as a third element, constituted the contemporary CR in ICL.4  
These three (values, custom and criminal) elements are the reason for 
regarding CR as having a sui generis nature.5 However, neither the ad hoc 
tribunals nor the ICC recognised explicitly its true nature, most probably because it 
was not codified – although it was by implication discussed - in the API.6   
This chapter, therefore, will verify this theory of the “threefold nature” 
application, aiming prospectively to resolve the inconsistent application of CR. It 
discusses the criminal theory of liability for omission as the origin of CR since its 
creation. It aims to show why the Halilović interpretation of the nature of CR, 
although based on liability for omission, was problematic and changed the nature 
                                                          
1  See Chapter 3. The ambiguity partially resulted from the fact that IHL lacks an authoritative body 
for interpreting its rules, which affected CR and its customary nature in ICL. Infra (n 164) et seq. 
2 See the discussions in Chapter 4. 
3 The irony is that the reason for the ad hoc tribunals’ re-characterisation of CR seems, in part, to 
be motivated by the desire to avoid repeating the violation of the human rights of the accused in 
Yamashita and the IMTs’ trials, which had led to the ad hoc tribunals violating human rights. 
Supra, Chapters 2 & 6. 
4 Lippman M, ‘Humanitarian Law: the Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility’ (2002) 9 
Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1, 93.   
5 CR is referred to as a sui generis doctrine but for different reasons. See Meloni (2010) 136.  
6 The API codified the duties and some aspects of the concept of CR, but laid down nothing 
regarding the nature of the responsibility. See the discussions in chapter 3. 
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of CR. Liability for omission was discussed during the drafting of CR by the API 
but, because of the differences between national criminal law traditions, this 
theory of omission was controversial.7 The ad hoc tribunals’ judges tended to 
justify the nature of CR by – implicitly or explicitly – resorting to domestic law.  
However, judges overlooked the fact that CR was an ICL creation and is 
thus distinguishable from other traditional modes of liability.8 The first part of this 
chapter therefore discusses – for the purpose of CR - aspects of liability for 
omission as a criminal theory, where some of CR’s characteristics are rooted.9 In 
the light of this, the second part identifies and suggests a solution, through 
incorporating the values elements for adequate interpretation and consistent 
implementation of the nature of CR as a sui generis mode of liability.   
 
1. Omission and Command Responsibility:-          
Some national law traditions recognised failure to act as a possible basis of 
liability, while other systems did not. These differences were behind the debate 
and difficulty in codifying CR, which was settled eventually through referring to 
military values (or military basic principles), Yamashita and the IMTs trials as the 
customary precedents.10 Nevertheless, domestic law theories of liability for 
omission attract judges’ attention when interpreting the nature of CR; and so 
liability for omission is discussed below.  
Omission as a criminal law theory is generally the result of failing to carry 
out an existing duty to act, which is the core of the liability for an omission.11 The 
nature of this criminal responsibility, therefore, results from a failure to act. This 
nature is of undisputed importance for both national and international criminal 
law. Whilst CR is the only statutory form of omission under ICL, omission in 
                                                          
7 See the discussions in chapter 4. 
8 CR is at least the only explicit form of liability for omission in ICL. E Sliedregt, Individual 
criminal responsibility in international criminal law (OUP 2012) 54. 
9 Mainly in the common and civil law traditions, as they are the major – if not the only - interactive 
legal systems at ICL. Čelebići TC, para 159.  
10 The differences between criminal laws at the API drafting. See (Chapter 4 n 111). 
11 See Larry Alexander, ‘Criminal Liability for Omission: An Inventory of Issues’ in Stephen Shute 
and A P Simester (eds.), Criminal Law Theory (OUP 2002) 121-2; see also Catherine Elliott, 
French Criminal Law (Willan Publishing, 2001) 60. This is also the interpretation of international 
criminal courts and tribunals. Bemba, para 405 Čelebići TC, para 334. 
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national criminal law can occur in one of two forms: (a) the omission is per se an 
offence;12 (b) the omission is a form of responsibility for the resultant crime. 
In both common and civil law systems13 the first is known as the offence of 
omission; while the liability for the resultant crime by omission is widely known as 
“commission by omission”.14 Although the latter is the focus of this study - because 
CR is a mode of liability for the crime resulting from the omission - the ‘offence of 
omission’ will be discussed when relevant to illustrate differences between systems 
which might have influenced judges’ interpretation and caused the inconsistent 
implementation of CR.15  
 
A) The philosophy and the failure to act:- 
In the traditional philosophy of criminal responsibility, morality is deemed 
to be the determining element for criminality. According to Grotius, “[t]he law of 
nature is a right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in 
conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral 
necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by 
the author of nature…”.16 This is not limited to only an act as it is common - when 
establishing a general law – to focus on the “active [an act] rather than the passive 
[an omission] conduct”17; hence, Grotius in his philosophy focused on the active 
conduct, which does not necessarily exclude omission as a fundamental mode of 
criminal liability. 
Most importantly, Grotius emphasised that what renders the conduct right 
or wrong is dependent on answering how moral or immoral it can be regarded as 
being.18 But, one may argue that morality varies, as in reality there are different 
levels of moral conduct, even though it is understandable that only harmful 
                                                          
12 The law usually specifies the omission as a crime and individuals are punished for the omission, 
which is not applicable in ICL. See Michael Duttwiler, ‘Liability for Omission in International 
Criminal Law’ (2006) 6 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 and 7-8. 
13 Čelebići TC, para 159; see also (Chapter 4 n 19) et seq. 
14 Commission by omission is also known as improper omission. See Kai Ambos, Treaties on 
International Criminal Law, Volume I: Foundations and General Part (OUP 2013) 181. 
15 Infra (n 34) et seq. 
16 Stephen C Neff, Hugo Grotius on The Law of War and Peace (CUP 2012) 28-9. 
17 Robert Sullivan, ‘Conduct and Complicity: Liability based on Omission and Risk’ (2008) 39 
Cambrian L. Rev. 60.  
18 There is unity that morally wrong behaviour is reprehensible, yet it is debatable whether to 
concede immorality as a principle of criminality over that of harm caused. See Andrew Ashworth 
and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th. edn., OUP 2013) 35-8.  
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morality is relevant here.19 Nevertheless, these moral values are distinctive and 
commonly determined by societies rather than individuals.20 Laws may thus vary 
from one society - or one national criminal law - to another as a result of the 
variation of these societies’ values.21   
Lord Devlin generally viewed those moral values as the most significant – if 
not the only – element for the enforcement of law.22 Hart, although he argued for a 
different application of moral values, emphasised that the development of the law 
was “influenced by morals”.23 In contemporary philosophies of criminal law moral 
values are, also, essential for distinguishing between right and wrong when 
criminalising conduct. In this, Duff stated that:-  
“Some moral considerations are action-guiding. They generate direct 
reasons for action; they concern what, as moral agents, we may, must, 
should, or ought to do (or not to do); they can figure in the practical 
reasoning of a moral agent who asks herself ‘What am I to do?’… Such 
moral considerations identify actions as right, or wrong, or 
permissible…”.24 
Moore also emphasised that in criminal responsibility, morality “plays the crucial 
justificatory role”;25 accordingly, he summarised his philosophy of criminal 
responsibility by stating that:- 
 
“Punishing those who deserve it is good and is the distinctive good that 
gives the essence, and defines the borders, of criminal law as an area of law. 
Such function demands that those subject to punishment: (1) have done 
something morally wrong, and (2) did so in a culpable way”.26 
                                                          
19 Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (OUP 1995) 22. For example, homosexual conducts were 
criminal offences under the German Criminal Law before 1969. One of the reasons for 
decriminalising homosexual conducts was because there was no harm caused by this conduct to 
others (i.e. no harmful immorality). See Carl Constantin Lauterwein, The Limit of Criminal Law: A 
Comparative Analysis of Approaches to Legal Theorizing (Routledge 2016) 11. 
20 Catherine Elliott, ‘Liability for Manslaughter by Omission: Don’t Let the Baby Drown!’ (2010) 74 
J. Crim. L. 163.  
21 Moral values are the foundation not only of criminal but also of social justice. See Christopher R 
Williams and Bruce A Arrigo, Ethics, Crime, and Criminal Justice (Pearson Prentice Hall 2008) 16-
7. See also Elies Sliedregt, ‘Criminal Responsibility in International Law: Liability Shaped by Policy 
Goals and Moral Outrage’ (2006) 14 Eur. J. Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 81, 113. 
22 Lord Devlin argued for the enforcement of law based on the immorality of conduct to a society. 
However, he eventually linked his argument with religious principles as a source of morality and 
law. Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (OUP 1965) 24-5.    
23 H Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (OUP 1963) 1. 
24 R A Duff, ‘Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings’ in Stephen Shute and A P Simester (eds.), Criminal 
Law Theory (OUP 2002) 47. 
25 Michael S Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (OUP 1997) 105.  
26 Ibid 79.  
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Tadros, likewise, stated that - in criminal responsibility - “[c]entral to the idea of 
criminal conviction is that the agent is morally criticised in a public forum for 
performing the act in question”.27 
Note that Moore argued – in his most controversial argument28 – that 
omission cannot cause harm.29 Tadros argued that, on the contrary, such an 
assumption is insufficient, as it confuses the failure to act (the core issue in 
liability for omission) with non-action, concluding that “[w]here one has a duty to 
act, where there is no other morally legitimate thing that one could have done, 
failing to act is sufficiently culpable to warrant the imposition of criminal 
responsibility”.30  
These differences in the philosophical sphere are not isolated from the 
ongoing problem of CR. The following scenario may illustrate one aspect of such a 
problem for CR that: (a) the true nature of CR holds the commander responsible 
for crimes resulting from his failure to act, which encompasses his failure to 
control and the subsidiary duty to prevent a crime;31 (b) CR at the ad hoc tribunals 
holds the commander responsible only for failing to prevent (that is, only a 
subsidiary duty), restricting the implementation of CR.32 This is akin to the 
“commission by omission” in civil law, where the focus will be on what type of duty 
was legally established, rather than the underlying crime as the result of the failure 
to act, discussed below.33   
 
B) Omission and differences of rationale:-  
The differences between societies regarding their values (also known as 
basic principles) resulted in different application and interpretation of the liability 
                                                          
27 Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2005) 71. 
28 F M Kamm, ‘Action, Omission, and The Stringency of Duties’ (1994) 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1493. 
29 Michael S Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal 
Law (OUP 1993) 54-9. Moore defended his argument, responding to the major criticisms: Moore, 
Placing Blame (n 25) 333-399.  
30 Tadros (n 27) 207. Cf. Ambos (n 14) 181. Ambos defines omission as “non-action, absence of 
action, failure to act”; and he does not differentiate between them. Note that non-action does not 
imply a form of accountability.  
31 See Separate Opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki, Bemba TCIII, 21 March 2016, paras 15-7. 
32 See for example, in Karadžić the tribunal first distinguished between the duty to prevent and the 
duty to punish in order to find his responsibility as for failure to prevent of failure to punish. 
Karadžić, TC, 24 March 2016, paras 589 and 5833. 
33 Cf. Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 40-41. 
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for omission as a criminal theory. This can be illustrated through the classic 
example of ‘a stranger walking past a drowning baby’ and especially how the 
common law system views the death of the baby (no responsibility because of 
individuals’ liberty to act when there is no relationship) in comparison with a civil 
law system (criminal responsibility for failure to rescue as a general duty).34  
The practice of common law regarding the liability for the drowning baby is 
debatable, as some common law lawyers argued that criminal liability for an 
omission should be applied in “line with society’s moral values”.35 Others argued 
that this would be against the basic principle of individual liberty,36 which is a 
higher value recognised by society. Note that such a debate is within a single 
society – the common law system. While both societies – common and civil law 
traditions - are in favour of promoting their society’s values, their conclusions 
differ regarding the above example of a drowning baby. This could be attributed to 
their differences in prioritising those values and the associated duties and 
responsibilities accordingly.  
Note that, on the on hand, at the preparatory discussion on the drafting of 
CR in the API was influenced by whether participant delegations’ original national 
system recognised the liability of omission, which was resolved eventually by 
resorting to the customary precedents.37 On the other, CR was interpreted by the 
judges at the ad hoc tribunals and those judges shared either the view of common 
law or that of civil law when interpreting CR. In common law, for example, there 
are only two types of omission: (a) commission by omission; and (b) offences of 
omission. In civil law, however, a third category exists, for failure to act in some 
special situations.38 That may be a reason for the recent suggestions by some 
scholars that CR should be sub-divided into at least three categories.39  
 
                                                          
34 Elliott (n 20). Traditionally, common law in such a situation will find no reason for liability, as 
the stranger was under no duty to act, whereas under civil law there is a general duty to act or 
rescue: as a result the stranger can be held liable for the baby’s death. This general duty to rescue 
resulted from a moral value (or requirement to act).  
35 Elliott (n 20) 179.  
36 Ibid 163-4; see also Bohlander (n 33) 40; Not that individuals’ autonomy as an element of  the 
concept of liberty was originally considered a moral value of society, which then the supporters of 
Hart – opponent of Lord Devlin – claimed to be of more importance than other moral values. See 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (first published 1851,CUP 2011) 7-8; see also Andrew Ashworth and 
Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn., OUP 2013) 35. 
37 See (Chapter 4 nn 111) et seq.  
38 Jacobo Dopico Gómez-Aller, ‘Criminal Omission: a European Perspective’ (2008) 11 New Crim. 
L. Rev. 419, 420-421. This is in line with the Spanish Penal Code, which consider a third form of 
liability for omission of medium gravity. Gómez-Aller, 448. 
39 Cf. infra (nn 82-92). 
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C) Responsibilities under the liability for omission:-  
Omission is a failure to act, rather than a non-action.40 Theoretically, an 
accused is punished for action, but in some cases the accused “person bears moral 
responsibility for creating” the criminal risk passively.41 Accordingly, common law 
tradition requires (for commission by omission) a specific form of relationship 
between the party failing in his duty and the party harmed thereby. Based on this 
relationship, the former needs to be under a specific duty to act; and the 
punishment is for the resultant, but no punishment without a specific duty in both 
forms: commission by omission and proper omission.42  
Whereas, in the civil law tradition, such a duty can be imposed as a general 
duty to act, even when there is no relationship between those parties, but the 
punishment is for the failure to act and not for the resultant crime (offences of 
omission).43 Nevertheless, Smith, for example, suggested that, in common law 
societies, in the ‘drowning baby’ instance, “the bystander …may well be morally 
rebuked”, but not criminally responsible for the omission, as there is no general 
duty to act or rescue in common law.44   
A general duty to act (also known as the duty to aid or rescue)45 is imposed 
on individuals in the civil law tradition, even when there is no relationship between 
                                                          
40 Tadros (n 27); see also Nersessian, (Chapter 5 n 52) 88-9. 
41 Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 129. 
42 A specific duty to act is required for both forms of the liability for omission; but commission by 
omission in common law tradition means that the offender as a result of his omission will be held 
responsible for the resultant crime. The accused is, therefore, punished for the occurrence of the 
harm and not for his omission. Thus, when comparing this approach to the French, which imposes 
penalties only for the omission per se, the “French law is [therefore] less severe”. See John Bell, 
‘Criminal Law’ in Johan Bell, Sophie Boyron and Simon Whittaker, Principles of French Law (OUP 
2008) 251-261. 
43 Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law Text, Cases, and Materials (6th. edn. OUP 2014) 71 et seq.; see 
also, regarding relationships and duties in civil law, Bohlander (n 33) 42. 
44 Alexander McCall Smith, ‘The Duty to Rescue and the Common Law’ in Michael A Menlowe and 
Alexander McCall Smith (eds.), The Duty to Rescue: The Jurisprudence of Aid (Dartmouth 
Publishing 1993) 55-6. 
45 The German Criminal Code, s.323c (Failure to Render Assistance): “Who does not render 
assistance in the case of a misadventure, common danger or disaster, although it is required and 
can be expected of him under the circumstances, especially, if assistance is possible without 
substantial danger to himself and without violation of other important duties, will be punished with 
imprisonment of not more than one year or a fine”.  
The French Penal Code, Art. 223-6, “Anyone who, being able to prevent by immediate action a 
felony or misdemeanor against the bodily integrity of a person, without risk to himself or to third 
parties, wilfully abstains from doing so, is punished by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 
75,000. The same penalties apply to anyone who wilfully fails to offer assistance, to a person in 
danger, which he could himself provide without risk to himself or to third parties, or by initiating 
rescue operations”.  
The French Penal Code, Art. 223-7, “Anyone who voluntarily abstains from taking or initiating 
measures, which involve no risk to himself or third parties, to combat a natural disaster likely to 
endanger the safety of others is punished by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 30,000”.; see 
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the parties.46 This ‘general duty to act’ is derived fundamentally from society’s 
values and construed as a duty to act positively, even though it is recognised to be 
deduced from the religious principle of “Good Samaritan” law.47   
Generally, liability for omission as per se an offence depends fundamentally 
on society’s values.48 Although common law rejects the general duty to act which 
informs offences of omission, the liability for “commission by omission” seems to 
be more consistent in the common law than in the civil law tradition. In civil law, 
countries tend to adopt either the German or the French approach regarding 
commission by omission.49 
In French criminal law, only the omission per se is criminalised: the 
Criminal Code makes the conduct (the omission itself) punishable, no matter what 
the result of the failure to act.50 Therefore, commission by omission is not 
applicable as, under the Criminal Code, there is no provision for such a mode of 
liability.51 The main reason for this interpretation is that omission cannot be 
analogous to commission: therefore, the French Criminal Code does not endorse 
this liability.52 
In Germany, however, the Criminal Code provides for liability for 
“commission by omission” and states that:- 
“Whosoever fails to avert a result which is an element of a criminal 
provision shall only be liable under this law if he is responsible under law to 
ensure that the result does not occur, and if the omission is equivalent to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
also Markus D Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (OUP 2014) 
218-9. 
46 Ibid 207.   
47 It is more accurate – in my opinion - to regard it as a moral value, even though it could be argued 
that it evolved from or was enhanced through religious principles such as the Good Samaritan. See 
Kathleen M Ridolfi, ‘Law, Ethics, and Good Samaritan: Should there be a Duty to Rescue?’ (2000) 
40 Santa Clara L. Rev. 957; see also Ernest J Weinrib, ‘Good Samaritan Law’ in Gerald Dworkin 
(ed.),  Morality, Harm, and the Law (Westview Press 1994) 134-144; see also Joel Feinberg, The 
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume 1, Harm to Others (OUP 1984) 126 et seq. 
48 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 
Publishing 2007) 108-9. 
49 Sarah Mitchell and Emilia Powell, Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and 
International Courts (CUP 2011) 22-23.  
50 Elliott (n 11) 60-1; see also Catherine Elliott, ‘France’ in Kevin Heller and Markus Dubber (eds), 
The Hand Book of Comparative Criminal Law (SUP 2011) 215-6. 
51 George A Bermann and Etienne Picard, Introduction to French Law (Wolters Kluwer 2008) 112-
3.  
52 Ibid.   
228 
 
the realisation of the statutory elements of the offence through a positive 
act”.53  
Despite the complex formulation of this provision, the German law in practice is 
focused on identifying a special duty known as the guarantor duty.54 This 
provision does not explain in what circumstances the accused will be responsible 
by omission (as requirements), just as if he had actively committed the crime 
which occurred as a consequence of his omission.55 It is argued, therefore, that this 
might enable judges to decide when this omission is equal to action, but this could 
be seen as “a transfer of legislative functions to [judges]”.56  
Accordingly, judges might incline towards creating offences that are not, per 
se, within the criminal code, although the element of the crime is already defined 
under the legislation. Through the application of this provision, therefore, an 
accused might be responsible for the result but generally would be punished only 
for his omission, judges thus tending to impose (too) lenient punishment.57 In 
other words, “commission by omission” – as in common law, which punishes the 
result and not the omission – is not identically recognised in civil law practice.58  
This practice suggests that this form is “less reprehensible than actively” 
perpetrating crimes,59 but this does not fully reflect the purpose of commission by 
omission. This explains the lenient sentencing of CR by the ad hoc tribunals.60 In 
this Judges Pocar and Liu contended that CR “is no less culpable than [other] 
                                                          
53 The German Criminal Code, Section 13 (1). This liability is also known as “the improper omission 
or the derivative omission offences”. See Bohlander (n 33) 40-1; see also Dubber and Hörnle (n 45) 
213; also for official translation see< https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html> accessed 14/2/2016.   
54 However, this is problematic in theory. For example, “the father whose child drowns is guilty of 
murder if he fails to [act]” but a non-guarantor will be guilty of “Failure to Render Assistance” 
pursuant to s.323c. See Bermann and Picard (n 51). 
55 This could potentially cause a dispute if it is compared with the German Criminal Code, s.323c 
(Failure to Render Assistance); see also Dubber and Hörnle (n 45) 219. 
56 Gómez-Aller (n 38) 447. 
57 See Jacobo Dopico Gómez-Aller (n 38) 447-9. International criminal courts –especially the ad 
hoc tribunals – are criticised for their leniency regarding sentencing. This divergence between 
common/civil laws can be a reason for this leniency. Cf. Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of 
the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 1263-4; Cf. also Silvia D’Ascoli, ‘Reconciliation and 
Sentencing in the Practice of the ad hoc Tribunals’ in William A Schabas and others (eds.), The 
Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law (Ashgate 2013) 307 et seq.  
58 Jesús-María Silva Sánchez, ‘Criminal Omissions: Some Relevant Distinctions’ (2008) 11 New 
Crim. L. Rev. 452, 456-7; see also Gómez-Aller (n 38) 448-450. 
59 Thomas Weigend, ‘Germany’ in Kevin Heller and Markus Dubber (eds), The Hand Book of 
Comparative Criminal Law (SUP 2011) 261. 
60 Cf. Arthur O’Reilly, ‘Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles’ (2005) 
20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 71, 95; Cf. Darryl Robinson, ‘How Command Responsibility Got so 
Complicated: a Culpability Contradiction, its Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution’ (2012) 13 Melb. J. 
Int’l L. 1, 11-12. 
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individual criminal responsibility”.61 They argued that, based on current practice 
of CR, “foot soldiers would face the most stringent sentences while those at the top 
of the chain of command would be deemed less blameworthy, which we believe 
would be unjust”.62 
Note that one of the German criminal system’s justifications of liability for 
commission by omission is that “moral obligations” are recognised as an element 
of legal obligations.63 Therefore, the general duty to act, which is an imposed duty 
in civil law tradition, was created, based on the virtue of moral obligation.64 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, implementing liability for failure to act seems to 
be controversial in both common law and civil law traditions mainly because of the 
differences between their basic social principles (common law is controversial in 
proper omission whereas civil law is inconsistent about commission by omission). 
Hence, values - for the purpose of omission – are better regarded as an 
essential component of the criminal nature of failure to act rather than as per se a 
cause of liability.65 Its complex application in both traditions might, however, have 
impacted on judges’ interpretation of CR. Judges would build their interpretation 
of a vague rule, such as CR, through comparing the implementation of their 
national law tradition. Subsequently, a controversial national theory such as 
commission by omission would influence their interpretation about a form of 
liability that was (a) created through international cases; and (b) regarded – 
because of developing its three elements – as a sui generis liability.66 
Consequently, scholars eventually discussed the nature of CR as if it were akin to 
those national criminal theories only, thereby re-characterising its true nature.67  
 
                                                          
61 Bagosora AC, 14 December 2011, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pocar and Liu, para 2. 
62 Ibid para 2 (in footnote 4).  
63 Note that this became a complex issue as the German Federal Court of Justice, controversially, 
rejected morality as a notion of criminality; see Dubber and Hörnle (n 45) 220. 
64 Supra (nn 43-47). 
65 There are two views about the enforcement of morality: (a) the moderate (utilitarian), which 
generally distinguishes between harmfulness and immorality for legal enforcement purposes; and 
(b) the extreme, which generally does not distinguish between harm and morals for the purpose of 
legal enforcement. Hart (n 23) 53-5.   
66 Judge Steiner prefers the word “additional instead of sui generis liability”. This could be as a 
result of the in consistent practice of CR that the term sui generis liability resulted in the 
inconsistent interpretation. See Bemba TC III, 21 March 2016, para 174 (footnote 388). 
67 See, for example, Olasolo, questioning whether commanders’ duty constitutes a guarantor duty 
rather than an affirmative duty under international law. See Hector Olasolo, ‘International 
Criminal Court and International Tribunals: Substantive and Procedural Aspects’ in Carlos Jimenez 
Piernas (ed.), The Legal Practice in International Law and European Community Law: A Spanish 
Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 188. 
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2. The values element and Command Responsibility:- 
As discussed above, morality, although being theoretically controversial, 
remains the essence of liability for omission. The controversy, however, evolved 
from the nature of society’s (moral) values – and being unregulated generally. 
These values to CR, on the other hand, are largely regulated and governed by 
military ethics and training, as well as by the laws and customs of war, for both 
military commanders and civilian superiors.68   
Generally, morality and ethics might be used interchangeably;69 
theoretically, however, they are distinct in their usage.70 Ethics is generally defined 
as “the study of the concept involved in practical reasoning: good, right, duty, 
obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice”.71 The controversial aspect of ethics 
is largely philosophical, as, for example, in Aristotle’s argument that the notion 
behind ethics is individuals’ aim, whereas Kant argued that that notion is 
individuals’ duty.72 Most importantly, these schools – and presumably all 
philosophical schools – agreed that ethics are derived from society’s values.73 
In other word, ethics, as a subject, is the codification of some major values 
of a society that can be regarded as ‘moral obligatory actions’.74 Accordingly, 
individuals ought to act in accordance with those values even if they are not 
ethically codified75, because ethics practically are “private regulatory efforts” 
                                                          
68 During armed conflicts military ethics are applicable to civilian superiors, since “[a]uthorizing a 
machine to make lethal combat decisions is contingent upon political and military leaders resolving 
legal and ethical questions”. United States Air Force, ‘United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft 
System Flight Plan 2009-2047’, 18 May 2009, 41.  
69 Alfred P. Rubin, Ethics and Authority in International Law (CUP 1997) 8. 
70 See, for example, Blackburn summarising the differences and complexity,  stating that 
“[a]lthough the morality of people and their ethics amount to the same thing, there is a usage that 
restricts morality to systems such as that of Kant, based on notions such as duty, obligation, and 
principles of conduct, reserving ethics for the more Aristotelian approach to practical reasoning, 
based on the notion of a virtue, and generally avoiding the separation of ‘moral’ considerations 
from other practical considerations. The scholarly issues are complex, with some writers seeing 
Kant as more Aristotelian, and Aristotle as more involved with a separate sphere of responsibility 
and duty, than the simple contrast suggests”. Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy (OUP 2005) 241.  
71 Ibid 121; see also Williams and Arrigo (n 21) 4-5. 
72 Roger J Sullivan, ‘The Kantian Critique of Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy: An Appraisal’ (1974) 28 
The Review of Metaphysics 24, 24-8. 
73 Jonathan Barnes and Anthony Kenny, Aristotle’s Ethics: Writing from the Complete Works 
(Princeton UP 2014) 13; also Julia Driver, Ethics: The Fundamentals (Blackwell Publishing 2007) 
9-10.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Julia Driver, Op. cit, 14. Such codification could be seen as a reason for the confusion between 
ethics and morality; see also Paul Robinson, Nigel de Lee and Don Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education 
in the Military (Ashgate 2008) 1.  
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designed for a specific institution or society.76 Thus, training in military ethics – as 
a unique society - varies between countries’ armies and depends on how much 
values are being regulated.77 Nevertheless, the training process itself would 
normally be carried out in accordance with these values, although uncodified.78   
 
A) The impact of values on CR:-  
As discussed above, the liability for an omission is theoretically 
controversial among national criminal traditions. Hence, judges and scholars 
focusing only on theoretical aspects will be immersed in the theoretical question of 
the nature of CR, whether of common or civil law, and of the extent of 
implementing “commission by omission” in domestic law. This affected the 
interpretation of CR, as the focus was on justifying the criminal theory rather than 
on implementing the actual nature of CR being threefold. The values of a society 
are the core reason not only for criminalising conduct but also for justifying its 
status as criminal.79 
 
However, those who criticised the nature of CR disregarded this essential 
component of the nature of this form of liability. Consider the differences between 
Common and Civil law traditions regarding the situation of a drowning baby: one 
society accepted the failure to act - of the stranger who stands by doing nothing to 
help the drowning baby - to be morally acceptable or less important than 
individual autonomy; thus common law viewed this as  legitimate conduct.80 The 
other society viewed such conduct to be against their society’s moral values: thus, 
civil law considered it fair and legitimate to criminalise and punish such conduct.81  
 
The question is not whether this should be morally or legally accepted in 
that society; more precisely the question should be what the determinant factor is? 
The difference is that, although both traditions consider the conduct to be 
immoral, only one considers it to be criminal. The determinant factor is the 
                                                          
76 Larry Catá Backer, ‘From Moral Obligations to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets 
and The Regulation of Multinational Corporations’ (2008) 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 591, 595. 
77 Jessica Wolfendale, ‘What is the Point of Teaching Ethics in the Military?’ in Paul Robinson and 
others, Ethics, Education in the Military (Ashgate 2008) 161. 
78 See the discussions in Chapter 1. 
79 Kirsten J Fisher, Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law: Holding Agents of 
Atrocity Accountable to the World (Routledge 2012) 94-5. 
80 Supra (n 34) et seq. 
81 Ibid.  
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society’s values role, influence and priority. This is not only in relation to offences 
of omission, because values also play an important role in interpreting liability for 
commission by omission. The implementation of this liability therefore varies 
between different national criminal systems because of the influence of values in 
each society, as illustrated above.  
 
Thus, overlooking the values of the military - as a society – seems to be the 
reason behind a number of scholars’ arguments for re-characterising CR and 
advocating the (inconsistent) practice of the ad hoc tribunals.82 Meloni, for 
example, supported the position of the German Criminal Code (VStGB) against 
International law,83 which divided CR (Art. 28 of  the ICC) into three forms: (a) 
under s.4 VStGB as accomplice liability; (b) under s.13 VStGB as a dereliction of 
duty of supervision; and (c) under s.14 VStGB as a dereliction of duty  to report  a 
crime.84  
 
The reason for this division of CR under the German Code is that, for CR to 
be applied domestically, this would have to be in accordance with the civil law 
tradition’s theory of liability for omission pursuant to the German Criminal Code, 
discussed above.85 Sliedregt, similarly, argued that such a division would solve and 
enhance the nature of CR, following the practice of civil law traditions about 
omission.86 Note that, unlike the civil law, common law, because of the different 
application of ‘commission by omission’ - regarding CR, Art. 28 of the ICC - did 
not divide the actual nature of the doctrine of responsibility that punishes for the 
crime committed.87 The UK, for instance, adopted the wording of Art. 28 - under 
The International Criminal Court Act, 2001, s.65 - but it was regarded as a form of 
“aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring”, which might be problematic in its 
                                                          
82 See, for example, Volker Nerlich, ‘Superior Responsibility under Article 28 ICC Statute: For What 
Exactly is the Superior Held Responsible?’ (2007) 5 J. Int’l. Crim. Just. 665, 667 et seq. Nerlich 
argued that CR could be divided into ‘four’ forms. 
83 The Code was the basis, in 1 July 2002, for the implementation of the Rome Statute. 
84 Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility in International Criminal Law (T.M.C Asser Press 
2010) 205-7; see also Kia Ambos, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility’ (2007) 
5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 159, 176 (in footnote 117); also E. van Sliedregt, The criminal responsibility of 
individuals for violations of international humanitarian law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2003) 212-213. 
85 This is an example of isolating the moral value and focusing merely on the theoretical aspect. 
Supra (n 48) et seq.  
86 Elies van Sliedregt, ‘Article 28 of the ICC Statute: Mode of Liability and /or Separate Offense?’ 
(2009) 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 420, 431-2. 
87 The UK, International Criminal Court Act, 2001, Chapter 17, s. 65. Note that the Canadian 
approach differs, than that of the other common law countries such as the UK, because of the 
Canadian Constitutional Jurisdiction. See Sliedregt  (n 8) 203. 
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implementation.88 This shows also the extent of the overlooking of the true nature 
of CR and the true meaning of this doctrine’s being under ICL.89  
 
Indeed, overlooking the values element as part of the nature of CR confused 
not only the academic scholars but also some of their military counterparts. Root, 
for example, argued that CR is an unfair mode of liability under ICL.90 In his 
justification, he claimed that “the punishment does not fit the crime” and that 
“[t]here is no moral link between punishment and guilt”.91 Root, however, 
confused the nature of CR with the nature of complicity as, under CR, commanders 
have not been punished as the main perpetrators.92   
 
B) The values as obligations under CR:- 
Military, before WWII, was “a closed society” or perhaps an isolated society, 
that consisted exclusively of military personnel.93 Gradually, however, military 
societies around the world became more open, especially regarding “civilian-
military interface and civilian value”, which elevated the military moral standard 
even more94, but this does not change the fact that military society is a distinctive 
society by nature. Thus, more precisely, military ethics and basic principles are 
both “manifested in the concepts of personal integrity, duty, honor, country and 
officership”.95 These values are recognised also to encompass: “loyalty, duty, 
respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage”.96 Most 
importantly, the distinctive values for commanders are essentially: duty, 
responsibility and leadership.97 In the sense that, as a result of the commander’s 
                                                          
88 Note that, although the UK’s ICC Act of 2001 adopted the wording of Art. 28, it stated in Section 
65 (4) that “[a] person responsible under this section for an offence is regarded as aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring the commission of the offence”. This is as a result of excluding the values 
element. Cf. Constantine Mortopoulos, ‘Kobayashi Maru: Arduous Effort and Scan Incorporation of 
the Yamashita Standard to the Hellenic Law’ (2011) 19 Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 199, 
234.  
89 See the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2. 
90 Joshua L. Root, ‘Some Other Men’s Rea? The Nature of Command Responsibility in the Rome 
Statute’ (2014) 23 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 119, 151. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid. Root claimed that CR will “[t]urn a commander into a murderer”; Root confused the main 
perpetrator with the commander and, more precisely, overlooked the values element. 
93 Sam C Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: the New Military Professionalism (New York 
Pergamon Press Inc. 1981) 205. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid 202. 
96 Diane H Mazur, Military Values in Law (2007) 14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 977, 994. 
97 Cf. Paul Robinson, ‘Introduction: Ethics Education in the Military’ in Paul Robinson and others 
(eds.), Ethics Education in the Military (Ashgate 2008) 7. 
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duty and position of command, he will be responsible for the (criminal) conduct of 
his subordinates. 
 Duty and ‘officership’ - morally more than ethically - are characteristic of 
military society. Therefore, duty – militarily - is defined as “a commitment to carry 
out the dictates of his position and office”, and officers are the executive group in 
the military “based on the idea of “special trust and confidence” as spelt out in the 
oath of office”.98 Therefore, Triffterer commented on the practical importance of 
CR in ICL during armed conflicts because of the “unlimited power and influence of 
superiors over forces”; thus “superior(s) by an indifferent attitude may cause 
crimes by simply letting them appear through the hands of others”.99  
Therefore, commanders are to be held responsible for the crimes their 
subordinates commit, because these crimes result from those commanders’ failure 
to exercise control over those subordinates. Such responsibility is imposed because 
of the omission, the failure to fulfil a duty under international law that is  against 
the values obligations, which constitute the nature of CR. Accordingly, if these 
three elements were acknowledged, Greenwood’s description of CR would be 
logically understood, that:- 
“[i]n a command responsibility case, the commander is punished for his 
failure to control those under his command – not for participation in the 
crimes which they commit. Yet the commander is punished not for a 
separate offence of failure to control, but for the actual offences committed 
by his subordinates”.100 
But the lenient sentencing indicates that commanders are being punished for a 
separate offence of failure to prevent.101 The reason for such leniency is the 
overlooking of the values element.102 The nature of liability under CR is thus a 
threefold responsibility: (a) the criminal responsibility for crimes committed by 
subordinates; (b) the legal accountability of holding a commander responsible for 
                                                          
98 Sarkesian, Op. cit, 203- 204. 
99 Roberta Arnold and Otto Triffterer, ‘Article 28: Responsibility of Commanders and other 
Superiors’ in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (C.H.Beck - Hart - Nomos 2008) 809. 
100 Christopher Greenwood, ‘Command Responsibility and the Hadzihasanovic Decision’ (2004) 2 
J. Int’l Crim. Just. 598, 599. 
101 Cf. supra (n 57); also Cf. (Chapter 3 n 199) et seq. See also the four generations that indicate the 
uncertainty about the nature of CR and interpreting this nature akin to the domestic theories of 
liability for omission. 
102 Cf. Robert Cryer, ‘The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Law of Command Responsibility: A Quiet 
Earthquake’, in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International 
Criminal Tribunals (OUP 2010) 173-4.   
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his failure to act (violation of the element of ‘customary rules’); and (c) the 
personal culpability for violating the values obligations as dictated by military 
society. 
Therefore, when the defence argued that General Yamashita neither 
committed, nor ordered the commission of, crimes, the U.S. Supreme Court 
responded that this:- 
“…overlooks the fact that the gist of the charge is an unlawful breach of 
duty by petitioner as an army commander”.103  
 
The Court emphasised that, with CR, the “gist” is violating: (a) the duty (b) 
officership as values that allowed the commission of crimes by subordinates, which 
he is (c) responsible for their conduct based on commanders personal 
responsibility. The Yamashita problem, however, is the reliance only on the values 
element and unbalancing the three elements of the nature of CR. The three 
elements form, accordingly, the sui generis nature of CR;104 and this was 
completely disregarded when CR was codified and interpreted. 
 
The importance of values was highlighted in the IMTs’ case-law. For 
example, the High Command Judgment stated that “[t]he duty and responsibility 
for maintaining peace and order, and the prevention of crime rests upon the 
commanding general” generally;105 but, if a commander “merely stands by while 
his subordinates execute a criminal … [act, he] violates a moral obligation under 
International Law”106. This issue of values regarding CR should have been 
acknowledged at the codification stage of CR. But neither the API of 1977 nor its 
Commentary referred to such an essential component of the nature of the doctrine; 
hence, the nature of CR was highly controversial.107 
  
                                                          
103 Chapter 2 (n 72).  
104 Note that the nature of CR should not be confused with the fairness of the Yamashita Trial. The 
nature of CR was dominated, however, by the values element at that time. See (chapter 2 nn 1 and 
60). 
105 The High Command Case, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 
Vol. XI, 631-2. 
106 High Command 521.  
107 Greenwood argued that “…the codification of a hitherto unwritten rule will almost invariably 
affect the content of the rule”. Christopher Greenwood, ‘Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva 
Protocols’, in Delissen and Gerard Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges 
Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991) 97.  
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This “forgotten” part of CR thus needs to be revived, not only as an inner 
element of the criminal theory108 but, more precisely, as a separate element of the 
nature of CR. Accordingly, CR needs to be re-interpreted, based on its true nature; 
and that “the criminal law as a morally-loaded regulatory tool” need to be 
acknowledged.109 CR needs to be re-identified pursuant to the values of military 
society’ and their interpretation and implementations, particularly to re-consider 
those values of commanders: duty, responsibility and leadership.110 Consider also 
the fact that the accused commander essentially “bears moral responsibility for 
creating” the risk of perpetrating crimes.111  
 
3. The Interpretation of Military Values:- 
 
Judges are the direct means in ICL for providing, through interpretation, 
the required clarity and specificity of legal rules.112 As discussed above, CR was 
inaccurately interpreted, through isolating its essential part of the values element, 
rendering its nature vague and its implementation inconsistent.113 The 
interpretation in the ad hoc tribunals was based on the API of 1977 codification, 
where the nature of CR was controversial and undefined.114  
 
The process of interpreting CR was also problematic - and inconsistent. In 
this its essential component - the values element – was overlooked throughout the 
interpretation processes at the ad hoc tribunals. CR should therefore be re-
interpreted, taking into account the values element as part of constituting the true 
nature of the doctrine.  
 
                                                          
108 Fuller (chapter 1 n 92).  
109 A P Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart Publishing 2011) 11. 
110 The scholarly debate focused only on two aspects of CR: the criminal theory and the IHL rules. 
Excluding the military aspect from the nature of liability under CR was the reason for the 
inconsistent implementation of CR as well as the ongoing debate about this doctrine’s nature in the 
literature. Cf. Lars C Berster, ‘‘Duty to Act’ and ‘Commission by Omission’ in International Criminal 
Law’ (2010) 10 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 619, 624-626 
111 Tadros (n 41). 
112 Alexander Knoops, ‘Superior responsibility under International Criminal Law: Concurrence with 
Military Ethics’ (2010) 7 Int’l Study. J. 1, 16. Knoops suggested an international military code as a 
guideline to be considered by judges during judgment in ICL. Although it could be argued that a 
treaty regarding CR might radically solve this issue, this is unlikely to happen, as states are 
generally reluctant to ratify treaties that potentially go against their interests or restrict their 
military capacity. This thesis suggests, however, a new direction for interpreting CR under ICL 
through acknowledging its nature’s components.   
113 Supra (n 79) et seq. 
114 See the previous discussions in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
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Even if a court were de novo interpret CR, it is unlikely that judges who 
have no military background would be able to identify, comprehend and then 
implement the values of a military society.115 What is needed is, therefore, 
knowledge both of the armed services’ justice system in general and of military 
values for the nature of CR. In fact, a Judge-advocate could resolve problems116 
(inter alia, for the purpose of CR) as a permanent judge at international criminal 
courts and tribunals. Nonetheless this alone would not ensure the needed balance 
of interpretation and implementation of the threefold nature of CR.  
 
The ICC focuses on diversity, especially in terms of judges representing 
different legal traditions, regions and gender, which is in harmony with a number 
of international norms.117 It also required State Parties to nominate judges with 
special expertise in specific issues such as – but not limited to - violence against 
children or women under Article 36 (8).118 Note that this provision emphasised 
that it is extendable to any specific issues, as for instance “[j]udges with expertise 
on certain issues, such as military operations and laws of war, might become 
crucial in some cases”.119  
 
Some recent proposed suggestions for reforming the judges’ selection 
process were for: “(1) transparency; (2) independence and non-politicization; (3) 
competence and merit; and (4) diversity and representation”.120 The nomination of 
a judge with military expertise was not suggested as a reason for reform. This 
could be a result of the literature’s focus being mainly on the theoretical aspect of 
criminal law and isolating the practical need based on the nature of the cases.121 In 
                                                          
115 From Čelebići to Popović, this was problematic. See the previous discussions in Chapters 3 & 5. 
116 Georg Nolte (ed.), European Military Law Systems (De Gruyter Recht. Berlin 2003) 161. 
117 Thordis Ingadottir, ‘The International Criminal Court Nomination and Election of Judges: A 
Discussion Paper’ (June 2002) PiCT, ICC Discussion Paper 4, 12-20; see also Zhu Wen-qi/Sureta 
Chana, ‘Article 36 Qualifications, nomination and election of judges’ in Otto Triffterer (ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd. edn., C.H.Beck;  Hart . 
Nomos 2008) 944-7. 
118 The ICC, Art. 36 (8); Ibid Zhu Wen-qi/Sureta Chana. 
119 Thordis Ingadottir (117) 22. Cf. William Driscoll, Joseph Zompetti and Suzette W. Zompetti 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court: Global Politics and the Quest for Justice (International 
Debate Education Association 2004) 87-8.  
120 Ruth Mackenzie and others, Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics 
(OUP 2010) 137. 
121 A number of scholars argued for more diversity of judges at international criminal courts, but 
their arguments were limited to diversity on a set of issues, none of which took into account the real 
need in practice. Cf. Mackenzie (n 120); see also Leigh Swigart and Daniel Terris, ‘Who are 
International Judges?’ in Cesare P R Romano and others, The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication (OUP 2014) 632-4; see also Ruth Mackenzie (n 120) 746-8. 
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fact, the majority of cases before international criminal courts require judges with 
military expertise, especially for the purpose of interpreting the doctrine of CR.  
 
In practice, judges, when confronted with military-related issues, would 
seek the opinion of militarily-knowledgeable expert witnesses, whether military or 
civilian.122 Nevertheless, an expert opinion is limited to the direct question; and 
this expert is not permitted to express an opinion if the question relates to a legal 
issue.123 For example, the ICTY stated in its decision on the admissibility of experts 
participation that:- 
  
“The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Professor Schabas is an expert in his 
field. However, the Chamber is of the view that the subject on which his 
expertise is offered in this case is a matter which falls directly within the 
competence of the Trial Chamber. Accordingly, neither the Report nor 
Professor Schabas’ proposed testimony would enlighten the Trial Chamber 
on specific issues of a technical nature that are outside of its experience and 
knowledge”.124 Thus, “the Trial Chamber hereby holds that the joint 
Defence will not be permitted to call Professor Schabas as an expert 
witness, nor tender the Report as an expert report”.125 
 
Ironically, the Defence was arguing that misinterpretation of “genocide” resulted 
in “conflicts and uncertainty” in application by various international courts.126   
Analogically, an expert military witness’s legal opinion would have been rejected 
on a similar basis, had any of the parties requested the military expert’s specialist 
opinion of the significance of military values in trials concerning CR.127 
 
Nonetheless, even Judge-advocates or any military expertise might overlook 
military values particularly regarding the implementation of CR. These values 
should be acknowledged as being part of the nature of responsibility of CR. 
                                                          
122 The ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 89 and 94 bis. 
123 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, TC II, Decision on Report of Prosecutor 
Expert Klaus Reinhardt, IT-01-47-T, 11 February 2004; see also Vladimir Tochilovsky, 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of Human Rights: 
Procedure and Evidence (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 470.  
124 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., TC II, Decision on the Admissibility of the Expert Report and 
Proposed Expert Testimony of Professor Schabas, IT-05-88-T, 1 July 2008, para 8. 
125 Ibid para 9. 
126 Ibid para 3.  
127 One of the notable downsides of the expert witnesses is that experts during the investigation 
“may be considered as being too closely involved with the Prosecution team, affecting their 
independence and objectivity”. Reynaud Theunens, ‘The Role of Military Expertise in the 
Prosecution of and Trials for International Crimes’ (2009) 48 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 119, 133. 
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Because the problem is that these three elements were overlooked by judges during 
the interpretation process of CR. Note that when these elements were considered 
in interpreting CR, such interpretation was criticised and rejected.128 This not only 
overlooked the fact that CR is a military concept but more precisely disregarded 
the rationale of creating CR as a mode of liability under ICL. Bassiouni clarified 
that “[b]ecause military law is based on a hierarchical structure of command and 
control, those in the chain of command have the duty to develop measures 
designed to prevent the commission of violative acts, to investigate information 
about violative acts, to punish the perpetrators, and to institute measures to 
prevent and correct situations leading to potential violations”129  
 
The rationale of command responsibility from a military law aspect is more 
direct than it under ICL. In line with this, Dahl explained, as a Judge-Advocate, the 
rationale of creating CR as a mode of liability under ICL and stated that “[i]f a 
commander is to be held responsible for losing battles by not controlling his men, 
it is obvious that he should also be held responsible for spoiling the good 
reputation of his army or even his country, by his omission to control his man”;130 
therefore, “a commander must generally be prepared to be held responsible for 
acts or omission by his subordinates, if he could corrected matters by his own 
activity”.131 Greenwood’s and Triffterer’s justifications of the nature of CR in ICL 
are, therefore, consistent, by implication, with the values element as being part of 
the nature of CR.132 The following  examples illustrate the importance of values in 
judgments. Although these cases were not for CR, they were for crimes committed 
against the international law and military values of commanders were determinant 
factors. 
 
A) Sergeant Blackman:- 
Sergeant Blackman was the commander of a small unit during a patrol in 
Helmand, in Afghanistan. He was held responsible for murdering an unknown 
                                                          
128 Cf. Rehan Abeyratne, (chapter 4 n 160). See Blaškić TC, (chapter 3 n 163). Cf. also (n 200) et seq. 
129 M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary 
Application (CUP 2011) 529. 
130 Dahl is a distinguished Norwegian Judge-Advocate General. See Arne Willy Dahl, ‘Command 
Responsibility’ (2002) 41 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 215, 218. 
131 Ibid 217.  
132 See (nn 99-100). 
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Afghan insurgent who was wounded after a lawful attack by a helicopter.133 
Sergeant Blackman treated the insurgent brutally and then unlawfully shot him in 
the chest, killing him.134 Sergeant Blackman then asked his unit-members not to 
disclose the incident, admitting that he had committed a crime under international 
law, saying: “I just broke the Geneva Convention”.135   
 
The court-martial, accordingly, convicted him of murder and sentenced him 
to imprisonment for life, with a minimum term of 10 years in prison (subsequently 
reduced, on appeal, to 8 years),136 to be stripped of his rank and to be dismissed 
from the service with disgrace.137 The case was debated in the media and in society 
at large, but for reasons irrelevant to this study.138 Most importantly, His Honour 
Judge Jeff Blackett, the then Judge Advocate General, in his remarks on the case, 
highlighted the significance of military values.139  
 
Judge Blackett articulated a number of factors which conflicted with the 
values of military society, as reasons for imposing the criminal responsibility. For 
example, the Judge stated of Sergeant Blackman that, by committing the crime, 
“you have betrayed your Corps and all British Service personnel who have served 
in Afghanistan, and you have tarnished their reputation”.140 This illustrates the 
importance of the notion of responsibility being the DNA of commanders’ values. 
Judge Blackett illustrated the significant role of a court-martial in such 
circumstances and stated that: “you have been judged here by a Board made up of 
Service personnel who understand operational service because they too have 
experienced it. That is one of the strengths of the Court Martial system”.141 
 
                                                          
133 Regina v. Alexander Wayne Blackman and Secretary of State for Defence, Appeal Judgment, 
The Courts Martials Appeal Court, Royal Courts of Justice, Case No. 2014/00049/B5, 
22/05/2014,para. 2-3; at < https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-v-sergeant-alexander-
wayne-blackman-and-secretary-of-state-for-defence/> accessed 17/09/15.   
134 Regina v. Sergeant Alexander Wayne Blackman (“Marine A”), Sentencing Remarks by His 
Honour Judge Jeff Blackett, Judge Advocate General, Case Ref. 2012CM00442, 6 December 2013, 
1; at < https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-v-sergeant-blackman/>. 
135 See also Regina v. Sergeant Alexander Wayne Blackman ("Marine A") at 
<http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1236> accessed 17/09/15. 
136 Blackman was initially sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 10 years before 
being reviewed for parole. See Blackman, Sentencing Remarks, 5. On appeal, the sentence was 
reduced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 8 years. See Blackman, Appeal Judgment, 
para 77. 
137 Blackman, Sentencing Remarks, 5.  
138 Ibid 2.  
139 Ibid.  
140 Ibid 2.  
141 Blackman, Sentencing Remarks, 2. 
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 Judge Blackett also emphasised that, by committing such a crime, Sergeant 
Blackman not only had “increased the risk of revenge attacks against [his] fellow 
service personnel” but he also “[has] failed to demonstrate the self-discipline and 
restraint that is required of service personnel on operations”.142 This is consistent 
with duty as a value rather than as a legal obligation. Judge Blackett, lastly, 
considered the accused leadership role in the light of military values and stated 
that “[l]ong before you shot the insurgent you should as a Senior NCO have 
showed better leadership to young and less experienced men”.143 The judge also 
considered and applied a number of mitigating circumstances about the military 
operation.144 These values are crucial for liability in such a society as, for example, 
when the Royal Navy’s review of Blackman’s case classified his conduct above all as 
“moral disengagement”.145 
 
The judgment in Blackman might have reached a different conclusion had 
the Judge Advocate General overlooked those military values mentioned above. 
The following example illustrates the impact of excluding military values in a case 
with similar circumstances but more relevant to CR.  
 
B) Medina - The My Lai Massacre:- 
During the Vietnam War three platoons of U.S. troops (Platoons 1, 2 & 3) 
landed near the village of My Lai. The three platoons were under the command of 
Captain Medina, who was informed by his superior that the civilians were either 
Viet Cong (the rebels) or allied to them.146 He then conveyed this to his troops and 
“ordered his men to destroy all crops, to kill all livestock, to burn all houses, and to 
pollute the water of the village”.147 
 
Captain Medina then ordered the 1st. Platoon to enter the village first, 
followed by the 2nd. Platoon; lastly, Captain Medina and the 3rd. Platoon would 
                                                          
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid 4. 
144 Ibid.    
145 Royal Navy review, Op Telemeter internal review: Executive summary and recommendations 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/461067/20150
916_Op_Telemeter_Exec_Summary_Recommendations_for_release.pdf> p. B2, accessed 
19/09/15;  
146 Major Michael L Smidt, ‘Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in 
Contemporary Military Operations’ (2000) 164 Mil. L. Rev. 155, 188. 
147 William George Eckhardt, ‘My Lai: An American Tragedy’ (2000) 68 UMKC L. Rev. 671, 675 & 
678. 
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follow once the area was secured.148 The 3rd. Platoon and Captain Medina at that 
time were – not far from the operation - located at his headquarters, only 150 
metres from the village.149 The troops moved towards the hamlet and the 1st. 
Platoon, although not facing any fire, started to shoot at several unarmed fleeing 
Vietnamese.150 They thereafter grouped the civilians in a “ditch”, and then 
hundreds of civilians were killed.151 The 2nd. Platoon then joined the 1st. Platoon 
and, while they were moving through the village, more fleeing civilians were 
killed.152   
 
Eventually, they stopped shooting, and Captain Medina moved to the 
village. Even though hundreds of civilians had been killed, Captain Medina denied 
seeing the ditch.153 In this incident alone, over 500 hundred civilians were killed.154 
As a way of covering up the truth, Captain Medina reported that his troops had 
killed about 90 Viet Cong.155 After an official investigation, a court-martial tried 
those who were believed to be responsible for those crimes.  
 
The prosecution charged Captain Medina – under CR – for crimes 
committed by his troops.156 The Prosecutor argued that Medina knew about these 
crimes and would have been able to prevent them through a radio order, especially 
given that he had been located only about 150 metres from the massacre. The 
judge ruled that, for CR, the “evidence beyond a reasonable doubt” had to show 
that the commander had only had actual knowledge of the crimes committed.157 
Accordingly, the evidence cast doubt upon Captain Medina’s knowledge or having 
been actually aware of the killings as, throughout the operation, he was at his 
headquarters away from the battle field.158 As a result, he was acquitted, but this 
was controversial, because it contradicted the nature of CR as a norm of customary 
                                                          
148 Douglas O Linder, ‘An Introduction to the My Lai Courts-Martial, at My Lai: An Account’ (1999) 
Famous Trials, University of Missouri-Kansas City.  
<http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/Myl_intro.html> accessed 19/09/15. 
149 Smidt (n 146) 190. 
150 Ibid 189.  
151 Ibid 189-190.   
152 Ibid 190.  
153 Ibid.   
154 Jeannine Davanzo, ‘An Absence of Accountability for the My Lai Massacre’ (1999) 3 Hofstra L. & 
Pol’y Symp 287, 288. 
155 Smidt (n 146) 191.  
156 Matthew Lippman, ‘War Crimes: the My Lai Massacre and The Vietnam War’ (1993) 1 San Diego 
Just. J. 295, 362. 
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law. The controversy escalated primarily because the US had been the first to apply 
this doctrine, in Yamashita.159  
 
But, most importantly, the (American) Judge Advocate did not consider the 
military values, in contrast with the (British) Judge Advocate General at Sergeant 
Blackman’s court-martial.160 Basically, the judge in Medina overlooked the fact 
that the “military is a unique society where the commander has tremendous 
authority over subordinates not normally extended to superiors in the civilian 
sector”.161 Therefore:- 
 
“Commanders have both a moral and legal role in preventing atrocities that 
could potentially be committed by subordinates against non-combatants, 
including wounded and sick, civilians and prisoners of war, as well as the 
destruction of civilian property lacking in military value”.162 
 
The My Lai trial was generally criticised for being unfair.163 Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of this study, the case of Medina factually illustrates the significance of 
considering (and overlooking) military values specifically in relation to CR.  
 
4. CR: balancing military values between ICL and IHL:- 
The concept of ‘responsible command’ under IHL was designed to 
internationally direct the military activates during armed conflict.164 Corn, 
therefore, accurately stated that “responsible command is an essential requirement 
… and … central to the doctrine of command responsibility”.165 It is noteworthy 
that rules under IHL “are … reminiscent of the values or ethics” of the military 
society.166 The nature of breaching the IHL, being serious by nature of its resultant, 
                                                          
159 Lippman (n 156) 360. 
160 Cf. (n 140) et seq. 
161 Smidt (n 146) 166.  
162 Ibid. This is in accordance with the conclusion in re Yamashita by the US Supreme Court.  
163 Wm. C. Peters, ‘Article 37 of the UCMJ and Command Responsibility for War Crimes – Unlawful 
Command Influence as (Rogue) Elephant in the Room’ (2013) 5 Elon L. Rev. 329, 344. 
164 Richard Goldstone, ‘Ownership of International Humanitarian Law’ in Morten Bergsmo and 
SONG Tianying (eds), Military Self-Interest in Accountability for Core International Crimes 
(Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2015) 37. 
165 Geoffrey S Corn, ‘Contemplating the True Nature of the Notion of “Responsibility” in 
Responsible Command’ (2014) 96 International Review of the Red Cross 901, 901-902. 
166 SONG Tianying, ‘The International Humanitarian Law Implementation Paradigm and the Idea 
of Military Self-Interest in Accountability’ in Morten Bergsmo and SONG Tianying (eds), Military 
Self-Interest in Accountability for Core International Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 
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is the reason for the ICL jurisdiction.167 The post-WWII trials recognised this issue 
about the gross nature of crimes committed during the armed conflict. These trials, 
therefore, interpreted the nature of responsibility under CR in accordance with the 
nature of those underlying crimes; thus, they interpreted the IHL’s rules through 
resorting to associated values. Knoops argued, therefore, that for CR these military 
values are “meaningless when cannot be criminally enforced in order to deter 
military commanders from not honouring these ethical principles”.168  
 
The values element thus plays a role of significance for interpreting the 
nature of CR by judges because the IHL’ rules are created to guide and not to find 
criminal accountability. In re Yamashita and the IMTs’ judgments, these values 
were relied on for articulating the nature of responsibility under CR.169 Some of the 
Judge-Advocates’ - during the Military Tribunals and Commissions after WWII – 
interpretations of CR were problematic, but this was as a result of the rudimentary 
nature of CR and ICL. For example, the Judge-Advocate in the British Military 
Court at Wuppertal July 1946 stated that the accused:-  
 
“[w]as holding a military position which required him to do things which 
he failed to do and which amount to a war crime”.170 
 
The Judge-Advocate clearly resorted to the three and most significant military 
values: leadership, duty and responsibility. CR as a mode of liability, however, was 
evolved through the IMTs’ judgments, which took place after this trial;171 thus the 
Judge-Advocate in the British Military Court considered CR per se as a war 
crime.172 Note that during that time – before the High Command and Hostage – 
the military values dominated the concept of CR.173 This case should not be 
confused therefore with the consistent implementation of CR as a mode of liability 
in the IMTs’ trials where CR was crystallised. 
 
                                                          
167 Surveying the national statutory inclusion of CR is irrelevant to that in ICL unless the underlying 
crime was international crime. Cf. Hitromi Sato, ‘Modes of International Criminal Justice and 
General Principles of Criminal Responsibility’ (2012) 4 Goettingen J. Int’l L. 765, 787-789. 
168 Alexander Knoops (n 112) 8.   
169 Supra (nn 103-106); see also the discussions in Chapter 2. 
170 Law Reports Vol. IV, 88-9. 
171 The Nuremberg Tribunals were between October 1946 and April 1949.  
172 Cf. Mettraux (2009) 37-8. 
173 See (chapter 2 n 1); see also (chapter 2 n 60) et seq. 
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It is therefore, the essence and purpose of creating international criminal 
courts and tribunals was recently overlooked when examining the nature of CR.174 
Although it has repeatedly been emphasised that CR is an ICL creation,175 the 
meaning of this creation seems to have been overlooked. The recent practice at 
international criminal courts and tribunals shows, however, that the three 
elements of CR were unbalanced during the interpretation of CR: (a) the values 
were overlooked; (b) the essence of violating IHL was undermined; and (c) the 
nature of this form of responsibility - being international - was also disregarded.  
 
The four different generations of CR in the ICTY illustrate the extent of 
inconsistency and uncertainty about the nature of liability.176 These inconsistent 
generations of CR overlooked the fact that prosecuting individuals for the 
underlying crime is the only purpose of which these international criminal courts 
and tribunals were established. Overlooking this purpose resulted eventually in 
illegitimately lowering CR as a form of responsibility compared to the other forms 
of liability under ICL in terms of:177 (a) sentencing and (b) consistency of 
interpretation and specificity of information about the nature of CR.  
 
This subsequently impacted on the essence of violating IHL. In that sense, 
the duty to punish under IHL was incorrectly considered a sufficient step to 
discharge the duty to take reasonable measures during armed conflict.178 It was 
therefore endorsed at Hadžihasanović AC that disciplinary measures are sufficient 
to discharge the duty to punish international crimes.179 Note that disciplinary 
measures are applicable in case of minor disorder during armed conflict 
particularly because this was interpreted - under IHL - to be for the purpose of 
maintaining discipline during military operations rather than a judicial means.180 
                                                          
174 Article 1 of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL Statutes.  
175 This fact is endorsed by also the IHL’s scholars. See for examples, Yasmin Naqvi, ‘Enforcement 
of Violations of IHL: the ICTY Statute – Crimes and Forms of Liability’ (2014) 33 U. Tas. L. Rev. 1, 
22. 
176 See (Chapter 3 n 216) et seq. 
177 Judges Pocar and Liu (n 61); see also Stakić ruling that examining CR is “a waste of judicial 
resource” when the accused can be found liable under direct forms of responsibility. Stakić TC, para 
466. It is, therefore, Schabas stated that in the ad hoc tribunals’ case-law CR “has proven to be a big 
disappointment”. William A Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (CUP 2006), 324. 
178 This is in accordance with Art. 87 (3), which stated that “where appropriate, to initiate 
disciplinary or penal action against violations”. See the API Commentary, para. 3562. Nonetheless, 
this is controversial to be sufficient in relation to international crimes under ICL. See (Chapter 5 n 
164). 
179 See (Chapter 5 nn 165 and 232). 
180 See the API Commentary, para 3560. Some IHL scholars, Renaut for example, claimed that the 
acceptance of disciplinary measures by the ad hoc tribunals has enhanced the effectiveness of ICL, 
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However, under ICL (and criminal responsibility theories) the duty to punish is 
only a judicial duty that can only be fulfilled through a judicial prosecution.181 
  
With regard to military values, they were discussed during the drafting of 
the API in relation to formulating the duties and responsibilities of superiors. 
These values were generally referred to as the military basic principle.182 They were 
also referred to as being essential parts of the “military laws and regulations”,183 
“conditions set forth in military handbooks” 184  or “the basis of all military 
discipline”.185 In fact, they were more frequently perceived to be an “integral part 
of military rules” and therefore are required elements for discharging 
commanders’ duties generally.186    
 
Although a Judge-Advocate would be expected to employ these values in 
court-martial judgments, the importance of these values could easily be overlooked 
in international criminal proceedings. This is primarily because of the ad hoc 
tribunals’ case-law – particularly the ICTY- influence recently on developing CR. 
However, as discussed above these case-law findings were inconsistent and 
therefore their developments of CR are controversial. The ad hoc tribunals’ 
practice employed military values first in Blaškić, but because of the unbalanced 
implementation of these values and the failure to articulate their relevance to the 
nature of CR, this finding was rejected and these values were abandoned in 
subsequent cases. It is therefore importance to first acknowledge these values as 
part of the nature of CR. Then it is - more significant - to simultaneously 
implement these three elements in balance.   
 
Judges in the international criminal courts and tribunals frequently refer to 
the IHL rules to examine military operations and therefore based their opinions 
pursuant to only these rules’ guideline. Róisín Burke, for instance, articulated this 
issue, and stated that“[IHL] and the laws of war already legally regulate soldiers’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                
but this is not true as discussed in this thesis. Cf. Céline Renaut, ‘The Impact of Military 
Disciplinary Sanctions on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90 
International Review of the Red Cross 319, 326. 
181 Cf. Naqvi (n 175) 25-6. Note that this was over-studied to suggest to forms of failure to punish: 
the failure per se an offence and (b) the failure to punish as a mode of liability. Cf. Amy Sepinwall, 
‘Failure to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law’ (2009) 30 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. 251, 298-9. 
182 CDDH/I/SR.44, para 18.  
183 CDDH/I/SR.45, para 9. 
184 CDDH/I/SR.48, para 11. 
185 CDDH/I/SR.52, para 14. 
186 CDDH/I/SR.51, paras 41 & 49.  
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behaviour during armed conflict…However, these laws may not fully reflect codes 
of conduct or ethics by which a solider is or may feel bound by”.187 This is 
consistent with the words of Judge Blackett abovementioned that military values 
are significant in cases of military operations.188 This is also consistent with the 
reasoning of the Semrau case, where the Canadian Judge-Advocate convicted the 
accused commander with an act of violation of the IHL; therefore, the Judge 
considered the military values of military commanders in determining the 
appropriate sentence.189  
 
Judges at various international criminal courts and tribunals limit their 
focus to the laws of armed conflict particularly for the nature of CR. Judge Steiner 
recently to clarify the duty to prevent observed that such a duty “usually reflects a 
degree of situational specificity”.190 Judge Steiner, however, overlooked the 
importance of military values in examining such a duty limiting the examination to 
only the IHL’s guideline (i.e. the API Commentary).191 This was also the practice in 
the ad hoc tribunals in the interpretation process of CR, which allowed judges to 
use their own opinio juris when interpreting CR (instead of that of the participants’ 
states during the drafting of the API).192 Few judgments only referred to the 
customary precedent or included the military values for justifying the nature of CR.  
 
Blaškić TC judgment, for example, found the accused responsible for 
international crimes because “as a commander, he failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures which would have allowed these crimes to be prevented or 
the perpetrators to be punished”.193 In doing so, the TC cited Art. 28 of the ICC to 
justify the nature of responsibility under CR,194 and to articulate the requirements’ 
rationale and the duties’ role in interpreting and implementing CR.195 It also 
referred to the customary precedents that endorse the military values even for 
non-military superiors to interpret the rationale of duties and requirements of CR. 
                                                          
187 See Róisín Burke, Troop Discipline, the Rules of Law and Mission Operational Effectiveness in 
Conflict-Affected States’ in Morten Bergsmo and SONG Tianying (eds), Military Self-Interest in 
Accountability for Core International Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2015) 386. 
188 Supra (n 139) et seq.  
189 R v. Semrau, [2010] CM 4010, paras 9 and 10.  
190 Separate Opinion of Judge Sylvia Steiner, Bemba TC III, 21 March 2016, paras 12-13. 
191 Ibid. 
192 The issue became more notable between requirements and duties rationale. See (Chapter 5 n 
110) et seq. See Halilović, paras 38 (in footnotes 87-88) and paras 41, 61, 68, 83 and 85. Although 
Halilović TC referred to the customary precedents it based its interpretation of the requirements on 
CR pursuant to the API Commentary only. See also (Chapter 4 nn 86, 102 and 129). 
193 Blaškić TC, Disposition, 269.  
194 Ibid para. 301 (in footnote 530).   
195 Ibid para. 312.   
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It endorsed, therefore, Roechling findings that the duty to know was a prerequisite 
under CR and failure to know is not a defence.196   
 
Although Popović findings corresponded to those of the Blaškić TC, it did 
not examine the customary precedents.197 Blaškić TC examined, however, the 
customary precedent and, by implication, the three elements of the nature of CR. It 
accordingly found that “it is inconsistent with military principles for the 
commander of an operational area not to have authority over all the troops” 
therefore such conduct “was contrary to the principle of unity of command” and 
the notion of responsibility.198 These factors were taken into consideration at its 
conclusion that: (1) the duty is a component of CR stating that “when a 
commander fails in his duty … he should receive a heavier sentence than the 
subordinates who committed the crime”; (2) this coupled with leadership as 
another component stating that “[c]ommand position must systematically increase 
the sentence”; and (3) “thereby incurred responsibility for crimes committed” by 
his subordinates.199  The TC therefore sentenced General Blaškić, inter alia of CR, 
for 45 years imprisonment before it was reversed in the AC - particularly the 
counts relevant to CR - that then was reduced to 9 years, which caused controversy 
among Judges.200   
 
The Blaškić AC controversial rejection of the TC findings could be ascribed 
to three reasons: (a) the TC did not explicitly articulate the rationale of these 
values and their relevance to CR (duty, leadership and responsibility); (b) 
overlooking the threefold nature of responsibility under CR of values, custom and 
criminal elements; and (c) the TC over-reliance (or without balance) on the 
military values that impacted on other elements. In the ad hoc tribunals’ case-law 
as well as the literature these values were rather perceived as only aggravating 
factors201 or imposed as objective of deterrence202. In Kayishema, for example, the 
                                                          
196 Ibid para. 318 (in footnote 552), see also The Nuremberg, Ministries, Vol. XIV, 1088. 
197 Popović referred to the ICTY case-law, however, reached a different conclusion. See Popović TC, 
paras 1033-1046; see also (Chapter 5 n 228) et seq.  
198 Blaškić para 451. Although some military values were argued occasionally by judges, these were 
not for the purpose of incorporating them as part of interpreting the nature or requirements of CR. 
Cf. Popović TC, Dissenting and Separate Opinions of Judge Kwon, paras 49-50.   
199 Ibid para 789.  
200 Blaškić AC, para 726 et seq. Judge Roca argued that the AC “has failed to provide ‘cogent 
reasons in the interest of justice’ for departing from this [the TC] well-established precedent”. 
Blaškić AC, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weinberg De Roca, para 7. 
201 Cf. Barbora Holá, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of the 
Sentencing Case Law’ (2012) 4 Amsterdam L.F. 3, 16-7. See Čelebići AC, para 732; also chapter 5 (n 
12). 
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TC ruled that “Kayishema was a leader in the genocide … and this abuse of power 
and betrayal of his high office constitutes the most significant aggravating 
circumstance”.203  
 
Nevertheless, the ad hoc tribunals tended predominantly to interpret CR in 
accordance to the API and its Commentary. Recently Popović interpreted, 
however, the API and its Commentary in accordance with the customary 
precedents’ findings regarding the extent of applying “reasonable measures” in 
armed conflict. In doing so, it cited the conclusion in Von Leeb, that “[u]nder basic 
principles of command authority and responsibility, an officer who merely stands 
by while his subordinates execute a criminal [act] … By doing nothing he cannot 
wash his hands of international responsibility”.204 These cases exemplify both the 
problem of and, solution for, the inconsistently interpreted and implemented CR 
under ICL, particularly in the ad hoc tribunals’ case-law.  
 
The ICC recently - in Bemba – referred to the Popović findings of the 
precise nature of CR.205 The Blaškić TC, when examining this precise nature, 
correctly referred to Art. 28 of the ICC as containing the precise nature of CR.206 
Now that the judgment in Bemba has accurately elaborated on and articulated the 
precise nature of CR, subsequent interpretation and implementation of CR should 
be consistent with this remarkable precedent in ICL. The interpretations of 
different States Parties to the Rome Statute of Art. 28 have to be in accordance 
with the interpretation in Bemba.207   
 
In short, the interpretation of CR should be carried out with its three 
components, rather than the mere expansion and the over-studying of the 
‘criminal theory’ of liability for omission as in domestic law systems.208 The actual 
problem that needs to be resolved is balancing the three components of the precise 
nature of this doctrine simultaneously when interpreting and implementing CR.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
202 Cf. Shahram Dana, ‘Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing 
Jurisprudence of the ICTY’ (2004) 4 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 321, 344.  
203 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, TCII Sentence, ICTR-95-1 T, 21 May 1999, para 15. 
204 Popović AC, (para 1932 at footnote 5479). 
205 Bemba 2016, para 698; see also Chapter 3 (n 111). 
206 See Blaškić TC, supra (n 194). 
207 Such as the interpretation of Article 28 of the ICC under the German Criminal Code (VStGB), as 
against that of International Law and that of the UK International Criminal Court ACT. Cf. supra 
(nn. 82-89); see also the discussions in chapter 3 regarding Bemba (Chapter 3 nn 104-109). 
208 Elies van Sliedregt, ‘International Criminal Law: Over-studied and Underachieving?’ (2016) 29 
LJIL 1, 11.  
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5. Conclusion:- 
This chapter has examined the liability for omission as a criminal theory in 
conjunction with the nature of responsibility under CR. It has shown that “failure 
to act” was discussed interchangeably as “non-action”. However, “non-action” 
indicates a degree of innocence rather than accountability; whereas “failure to act” 
implies a form of liability. This has had an impact on the direction of the debates 
within the literature as well as on judges’ opinions, and thus explains the reason 
for arguments in favour of the too lenient sentences for those convicted under CR.  
   
This chapter has shown that “commission by omission” is the theory from 
which the nature of CR is recognised as a form of individual liability. During the 
drafting of the API, this theory was taken to be “the failure to act”. It has argued 
that the key problem is that during the drafting it was a problem, especially for 
those delegations whose countries lacked this form of liability. It has found that it 
was resolved by referring to the post-WWII judgments, where CR was developed, 
being threefold. Halilović re-considered the nature of CR, as “liability for 
omission”; but it was interpreted as akin to omission being an offence per se. 
 
This occurred as a result of excluding the values element throughout the 
processes of interpreting CR by the ad hoc tribunals. The need for incorporating 
the values elements as part of the nature of CR therefore became more acute at the 
international criminal courts and tribunals. Such a need is urgent in cases of 
interpreting the nature of CR. This chapter has suggested implementing the values 
element, being a separate component of the threefold nature of CR rather than an 
inner (moral) element of criminal theories or aggravating factor in sentencing 
alone. For CR to be an operative form of liability in ICL, particularly the values 
element has to be integrated as an essential component of the nature and 
requirements of CR. This can be consistently implemented and fairly justified only 
through acknowledging the threefold nature of CR as created and developed under 
ICL.  
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 Conclusion  
 
This thesis was concerned with examining the consistency of interpreting 
and implementing the nature and requirements of CR in ICL. It has discussed the 
extent and impact of this inconsistency, before suggesting a reason for these 
incompatible interpretations and implementations, which have adversely affected 
CR as an effective mode of liability under ICL. 
This thesis was divided, therefore, into three parts. Part I identifies the 
elements that compose the nature of CR. It then examines the development of 
these elements, to determine the extent of their inclusion under the current 
codifications of CR. Part II discusses the process of interpreting CR in conjunction 
with these codifications. It then examines the impact of this interpretation on the 
requirements of CR and on the accused person’s rights. Part III concludes this 
research by examining the core reason, and a possible solution, for the inconsistent 
interpretation and implementation of CR in ICL, followed by the thesis’s 
concluding remarks.  
At the beginning of this study it was observed that the attribution of 
uniqueness to CR can be justified only by implementing the three elements 
constituting its nature: values, custom and criminality. Military values established 
the concept of CR that was thereafter implied under the laws and customs of war; 
and then CR was developed as a form of criminal responsibility under ICL. Military 
values are those attached primarily to commanders: duty, responsibility and 
leadership. Through examining the origins of CR, this study has found the military 
values predominant in these principles, from its ancient creation to the post-WWII 
trials. It has therefore argued that, as a result of the domination of the values 
element, CR was perceived as a form of “accomplice liability” under various 
national legal systems.  
These three elements were gradually developed throughout the history of 
CR. This study has argued that these elements were unprecedentedly implemented 
during the few post-WWII trials simultaneously, as an integral part of the nature 
of CR. The discussions find that each element contributed to shaping the nature of 
CR during the interpretation process by judges. It examines Yamashita as the core 
precedent for this doctrine’s development. Although Yamashita was problematic 
as a fair trial, this thesis has found that the real problem was the imbalance of its 
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implementation of the three elements. This was because the values elements 
dominated the judges’ interpretation, being more influential under their national 
law. Re Yamashita, however, acknowledged implicitly these three elements, in that 
the values element was argued to be the reason for ‘responsible command’ being a 
principle under customary law. This was, however, without examining the criminal 
element, although it was implicitly perceived to be based on liability for omission.   
This study has therefore argued that, when interpreting the nature of CR, 
each of these three elements should be acknowledged and balanced as part of CR’s 
nature. It examines relevant trials at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and 
argues that the interpretation process during these trials was legitimate and 
consistent with the legality principle. It has found that the success of these cases is 
that, unlike that in Yamashita, the interpretation successfully balanced the three 
elements of the nature of CR. These discussions showed that the nature of liability 
under CR was articulated and applied effectively during the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials, as a result of balancing these three elements.   
This study has, further, argued that these three elements are the reason for 
the successful interpretation and implementation of CR’s nature and 
requirements. These judgments therefore contain the customary nature and 
characteristics of CR. These three elements would, it can be assumed, have been 
considered during the codifications of CR, if they had been acknowledged. The first 
codification of CR was the Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Convention 
(API). The nature of liability under CR was not specified under the API’s 
provisions; therefore CR was ambiguous.    
This thesis has reviewed the preparatory work (travaux préparatoires) of 
the API. It found that, during the codification of CR, the nature of the liability was 
controversial, because the liability for failure to act (omission) was not endorsed in 
the domestic law systems of a number of participant states. It has shown, however, 
that the post-WWII trials were cited as precedent for the nature of CR during the 
drafting history of the API. Nonetheless, the final draft did not specify the nature 
of CR. This was for two reasons: (a) this nature was not recognised by the national 
systems of a number of states; and (b) a number of states, also, endorsed the post-
WWII trials as the precedents where the nature of CR should be found. This 
finding supported this thesis’ argument that the post-WWII trials should be 
recognised as the customary precedents of CR. 
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The API’s significance for this study derives from the fact that it represents 
the customary status of CR as an already existing norm prior to its being stipulated 
in the Rome Statute, which embodies the current state of CR. Ambiguous 
formulation by the API influenced the drafting of CR under various statutes, 
especially those of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. Eventually, during judgments at the 
ad hoc tribunals, judges were confronted with this vague formulation of CR, under 
both these Statutes and the API.  
It has argued that, based on the contemporary codifications of this doctrine, 
there are two potential readings:- 
(1) CR is a mode of liability under ICL, to find a commander responsible for 
failure to prevent the commission of crimes by subordinates. 
(2) CR is a mode of liability under ICL, to find a commander responsible for 
the commission of crimes by subordinates as a result of that commander’s failure to 
prevent their commission.  
Thus, to clarify the nature of CR, judges resorted to the post-WWII trials to 
deduce the rules of CR through interpretation. This study has argued that, for the 
implementation to be successful, the interpretation should be consistently carried 
out with its customary precedents, through resorting to the three elements of the 
nature of CR. It has also argued that, if such a method of interpretation had been 
followed by the ad hoc tribunals’ judges, the second reading would have been found 
to endorse customary CR. The three components/elements of the nature of CR 
function, therefore, as a determinant of the nature of liability between these two 
readings: either (a) for omission or (b) for the underlying crime(s) committed.   
Part I was therefore designed to examine and articulate those elements that 
constitute the nature of liability under CR. The subsequent implementation of CR in 
the ad hoc tribunals, however, resulted in CR being implemented in the following 
four forms:- 
I. the responsibility is for the underlying crime by subordinates, but the 
verdict is based on the failure to act;  
II. the responsibility is for the failure to act and the underlying crime is 
not relevant to the commander’s own culpability;  
III. the responsibility is for the underlying crime and the verdict is for this 
crime; and  
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IV. the responsibility is with respect to the underlying crime and the 
verdict is for the failure to act.    
These four forms – or “generations” – appeared mainly in the ICTY, but they 
impacted on the SCSL interpretation of the nature of CR; and subsequently on the 
judgments of these tribunals, including the ICTR. These generations, above all, are 
inconsistent with one another and some of them contradict the reason for 
establishing international criminal courts and tribunals under ICL. More precisely, 
the second and fourth of these generations have changed CR from being a form of 
liability to being a punishable offence per se. This is contrary to the creation of CR 
under these tribunals’ applicable law and statutes, being codified as a mode of 
criminal responsibility. The reason for creating the ad hoc tribunals – according to 
Art. 1 of their statutes – is to prosecute persons responsible for serious crimes 
committed in those territories affected.  
This study has also found that, as a result of the ICTY being more influential 
and therefore the model for the other ad hoc tribunals, judgments of the SCSL 
appeared contradictory, because it resorted extensively to the ICTY’s inconsistent 
interpretations. It has, consequently, found that the requirements of CR were 
controversial at these tribunals, including the ICTR. It has attributed these 
inconsistencies to imbalanced interpretation and implementation of the three 
elements of the customary nature of CR, which would have not been affected had 
these courts resorted to the customary precedents to deduce the applicable law.  
Part I has found the implementation of CR inconsistent, as the nature of 
liability was controversial. Part II has therefore examined the legitimacy and 
consistency of the process of interpretation followed by the ad hoc tribunals. In 
these parts, the ICTY was given pride of place as a result of being the core 
mechanism and the influential authority for developing the law of CR for other ad 
hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence.  
The authoritative interpretation of CR by the ad hoc tribunals is Čelebići, 
but it did not articulate precisely the nature of this doctrine. The judges in 
Halilović therefore found its nature to be unspecified. They interpreted CR as a 
liability for omission; but then suggested that CR is per se a crime of omission 
rather than a form of liability for omission. This thesis has found that this was 
primarily due to interpreting CR analogously to the liability for omission in some 
domestic law traditions, without considering the effect of CR being created under 
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international law; its three elements were therefore not recognised. Thus 
subsequent judgments were more controversial. In Orić for instance, although it 
suggested the underling crime to be a fourth requirement of CR, it excluded the 
underlying crime from the commander’s responsibility and found the accused to 
be responsible only for his dereliction of duty. 
In this the actual underlying crime went unpunished, as it was replaced by 
the CR (being per se a crime, for dereliction of duty). This changed the nature of 
CR from being a separate form of liability to being per se a crime, which is contrary 
to its purpose in ICL. This interpretation was thereafter changed, as Popović found 
the commander explicitly responsible for the crimes of his subordinates; 
accordingly the accused was prosecuted and punished for the underlying crime, 
which fulfilled the purpose of CR and the reason for creating these ad hoc 
tribunals, as well as being consistent with the customary precedents. Nevertheless, 
Karadžić - more recently - found the accused responsible with respect to a crime 
for which his subordinate was criminally responsible. This is also controversially 
inconsistent, as it not only held the commander responsible with respect to – and 
not for – the underlying crime, but also changed the nature of CR and created a 
new form of it.  
It has found, accordingly, that the first case-law “generation” prosecuted 
individuals under an unspecified nature of liability. This was followed by the 
second generation, which changed CR from being a form of liability to being an 
offence per se. The third generation was also controversial, as it did not examine 
the nature of CR at all, although it was correctly interpreted, as a form of 
responsibility for the underlying crime, implicitly acknowledging the three 
elements of its nature; whereas, lastly, in Karadžić, the liability was with respect to 
- but not for - the underlying crimes: that constituted a new form.  
This study has found that the process of interpretation by judges at the ad 
hoc tribunals was inaccurate; and that this was the main reason for overlooking the 
true nature of CR. The discussions found that the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretation 
process followed the teleological approach to interpretation. This study has argued 
that the teleological approach was not consistently implemented and that the 
tribunals’ findings could, consequently, be illegitimate.   
In assessing the legitimacy of an interpreted rule the determinant criteria 
are that: (a) any such rule should be consistently implemented and (b) 
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implemented through a consistently applied method of interpretation. These two 
requirements were affected by the interpretation process of CR. This thesis has 
found that, during this process of interpreting CR, the ad hoc tribunals – 
particularly the ICTY – suggested a number of misleading findings that 
exacerbated the problem of this ongoing inconsistency. In this sense, the ad hoc 
tribunals resorted to the API and its Commentary as the core authorities for 
clarifying the nature of CR.  
Due to the vagueness of CR under the API provision, however, Čelebići 
reviewed – briefly and inconsistently with the teleological approach - the 
preparatory work of the drafting of the API. It suggested some findings as factual 
conclusions from few delegations’ discussions about CR, it concluded that: (a) the 
participants’ delegations rejected some standard such as that of ‘should have 
known’; and (b) that the duty to punish was supported as an affirmative duty. 
However, by reviewing the preparatory work, this study has found that the ad hoc 
tribunals’ findings were inaccurate. 
The interpretation process of CR was, therefore, per se controversial, as 
were the resulting findings. Although the ad hoc tribunals referred to the post-
WWII trials as precedents, this was not to deduce the law; more precisely, these 
precedents were listed as examples to support the status of CR as an already 
existing principle under customary law. Accordingly, the ad hoc tribunals’ judges 
were continuously re-characterising the nature of CR, thereby jeopardising their 
interpretation’s legitimacy.  
Having shown that the ad hoc tribunals inconsistently implemented CR and 
that their method of interpretation was also inconsistent, this thesis has examined 
the potential impact on the requirements of CR. It has argued that these 
inconsistencies have impacted on these requirements’ rationale. It has observed 
that the ad hoc tribunals - initially – recognised the importance of the ‘military 
values’ element, by acknowledging that the requirements of CR are deduced from a 
commander’s duties. This should be through identifying the duties imposed on 
commanders by international law; and then articulating the sub-duties of which 
the requirements are being examined and against which they are being weighed. 
This study has argued that the rationale of these requirements was 
overlooked. The interpretation of these requirements, therefore, appeared 
contradictory throughout the ad hoc tribunals’ judgments. As a result of the 
257 
 
inadequate interpretation of CR, these requirements were divorced from their 
actual rationale. This study has found that some elements eventually replaced the 
essential requirements of CR. Particularly the “effective control” test 
predominantly replaced the requirements of subordination throughout the ad hoc 
tribunals, until recently. 
 It has argued that the suggestion of successor command was a result of 
overlooking not only the rationale and the boundaries of these duties, but also the 
role of duty with regard to the nature of CR. This thesis has found, also, that the 
inconsistency of interpreting the constructive knowledge requirement resulted 
from misinterpreting the nature and scope of the sub-duty to know. It has found 
that the sub-duty to know was a step under the essential duty to take necessary 
measures to prevent, rather than a separate duty. It has also found that the 
misleading clause which suggested that the duty to punish existed in all military 
codes, had an impact on the rationale of such a duty. It has accordingly argued that 
this duty, which is available exclusively to the judicial authority, was transferred to 
the commander illegitimately. This was found through examining the relevant 
‘travaux préparatoires’ of the API, as well as its Commentary.  
 Consequently, the implementation of these requirements was found to be 
inconsistent. This primarily resulted from overlooking the nature of CR as having 
been created under international law; more precisely, the three elements of this 
nature were ignored. It became evident that the problem of the nature of the 
doctrine being continually re-characterised has resulted from the failure to 
acknowledge these elements of the nature of CR. Accordingly, this study has found 
the inconsistency of interpreting and implementing CR to have impacted 
subsequently not only on the doctrine’s requirements but also on other principles 
required generally in criminal proceedings.   
This thesis has therefore examined the potential impact of these 
inconsistencies on the rights of an accused person. Hence, it has argued that the 
inconsistent interpretation and continuous re-characterisation of CR jeopardise 
the Human Right standard that is guaranteed to every accused person under: (a) 
the principle of legality; and (b) the right to a fair trial. It then jeopardises the 
accused’s rights during these proceedings. It has argued this in the light of the 
previously discussed, and then demonstrated, inconsistencies.  
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This thesis has examined the impact of such inconsistency on two principles 
only. First, on the principle of specificity, which is a separate requirement under 
the principle of legality. Secondly, on the right of an accused person to be fully 
informed about the nature of the accusation against him, which is a requirement 
under the right to a fair trial. The extent of implementing these two principles was 
discussed, in conjunction with the problem of inconsistently interpreting and 
implementing CR in the ad hoc tribunals.  
In the light of the preceding findings, this thesis has found that the nature of 
CR was not clear and that it therefore lacked the specificity required by the legality 
principle. It has observed that the information that is available to the accused 
lacked specificity; and that that subsequently precludes the accused from the 
proper entitlements under the legality principle. It has found that, particularly in 
instances of charges pursuant to CR, such information, whether available or not, 
would not satisfy the legality principles. Because of the problem of inconsistency, 
such an accused would not comprehend the accusation until the verdict stage and 
by then the rights of the accused would have been eroded.  
This study has found an associated issue connected to information available 
to the accused concerning the nature of CR. One of the requirements of fair trial is 
the right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the charge and the 
case against him. This thesis has found that such a right was put in a lower 
category, to be the right of the defence in preparing, rather than part of a fair trial. 
It has also found that the ad hoc tribunals argued that, for CR, the specificity of the 
information is lower than that for direct liability. This study has argued, 
accordingly, that the problem of inconsistency would have been considered a 
violation of the accused person’s rights had this problem of inconsistency been 
acknowledged by judges at the ad hoc tribunals and the accused not precluded 
from his rights.   
Part I found CR to have been implemented inconsistently; and Part II then 
found such inconsistency to have (a) resulted from the process of interpretation, 
and (b) impacted on CR’s requirements and affected consequently the accused’s 
rights. Part III examined the core reason for the exacerbation of the inconsistency 
of CR under ICL.  
In the light of the above findings, Chapter 7 discussed the reason for the 
inadequate application of this doctrine under ICL. From this study’s findings, it 
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seems that the essence of the inconsistency in interpretation and implementation 
is the result of interpreting CR on the basis of domestic criminal theories rather 
than on that of its nature and its creation under ICL. This issue impacted on not 
only judges’ interpretations of CR, but also attracted scholars’ attention more 
frequently.  
This thesis, accordingly, has examined, lastly, the essence of the problem for 
the future of CR, to resolve this problem of inconsistency. It has argued that this 
problem concerning the nature of culpability under CR was also a controversial 
issue between states’ delegates in the API drafting history (i.e. regarding “the 
failure to act”). This thesis has discussed, therefore, the theory of the liability for 
omission under relevant domestic criminal law systems that were relevant to CR in 
the ad hoc tribunals’ interpretations.   
It has observed that some national criminal systems recognise “the failure 
to act” under liability for omission. Such liability exists in two forms: (a) 
“commission by omission”, where the responsibility is for the underlying crime; 
and (b) where the omission is a crime per se. It has found, also, that, although 
commission by omission is liability for the underlying crime, the implementation 
of this concept is controversial in some traditions. This supports the argument of 
this thesis that the methodology per se – which was adopted by judges during their 
process of interpretation - was inaccurate. CR was inadequately interpreted in 
accordance with only the theory of liability for omission in domestic law systems, 
without distinguishing between commission by omission and omission as a crime 
in itself. It has found that, partly because of such lack of a distinction, CR was 
interpreted inconsistently by the ad hoc tribunals.     
It has concluded, more precisely, that although the doctrine of CR borrows 
aspects of its nature from the theory of liability for omission, this should not 
overrule other aspects of the nature of this doctrine. The values element plays a 
fundamental role, particularly in cases of violating the law of armed conflict, 
implicitly under ICL and explicitly by military justice systems. The ad hoc 
tribunals’ interpretation of CR, therefore, neither reflected the military values nor 
adequately applied the purpose of ICL: to prosecute those responsible for 
violations of the laws of armed conflict.  
This thesis, lastly, has observed that only a few judgments in ICL 
implemented CR in conjunction with norms dictated by these three elements. Two 
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issues are therefore of more importance in future practices: the balance of these 
elements and the priority of their use in the implementation. In that sense, two 
cases were discussed to justify this stance: Popović and Blaškić TC. Although these 
cases implicitly interpreted CR pursuant to these three elements, it was 
unsuccessfully implemented in Blaškić due to the imbalanced application of these 
elements.  
First, Blaškić TC stretched the nature of CR beyond its scope, as a result of 
unbalancing the elements of CR; thus its finding was rejected. Secondly, Popović 
interpreted rules of IHL regarding CR by accurately resorting to the military values 
rather than the API Commentary. In these cases – unlike the majority of the ad 
hoc tribunals’ cases - military values were given priority during the 
implementation of CR, but it was admissible in Popović due to successful 
balancing the three elements of CR (values, custom and criminality). It is 
therefore, the balance and priority of implementing the three elements that are the 
two solutions for the inconsistency of CR under ICL, as summarised in the 
conclusion below.  
As outlined above, in order to implement CR as an operative and consistent 
form of liability under ICL, its interpretation should be re-considered in 
conjunction with its threefold nature. This thesis has found that the values 
element, especially, was overlooked throughout the process of interpreting and 
implementing the nature of CR by the ad hoc tribunals. It has also found that, to 
resolve such a problem, these three elements need to be balanced during the 
interpretation and implementation processes. Hence, this study has emphasised 
the importance of acknowledging the three components as being part of the nature 
of CR, which can be consistently implemented and fairly justified only through 
balancing these three components under ICL. 
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